















































COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT 




















HINDU PHILOSOPHY 


POPULARLY EXPLAINED. 


THE ORTHODOX SYSTEMS. 





CX_ 




(ViA^N*- ' 


BY 

RAM CHANDRA BOSE, A.M., 

OP LUCKNOW, INDIA, 

Author of “ Brahmoismf etc. 


AUG 

2jfa 


FUNK & WAGNALLS. 

NEW YORK: 1884. LONDON: 

10 and 12 Dey Street. 44 Fleet Street, 

All Rights Reserved. 


-BUIS ' 0 

TVs 


Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1884, by 
PUNK & WAGNALLS, 

In the Office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington, D. C. 



PREFACE. 


Some of the papers embodied in this volume present: 
the substance of lectures delivered in various places in 
India in furtherance of the work in which the author 
has been engaged for years. Two of them—those on? the 
Sankhya Philosophy—appeared as articles in the Calcutta ; 
Review , and the paper on Yoga Philosophy in the 
Indian Evangelical Review • while the supplemental 
paper, written years ago, was published as an article in? the 
Methodist Quarterly , then edited by Dr. D. D. Whedon. 
The paper on 44 Hindu and Christian Philosophy Con¬ 
trasted ’ ’ was delivered as a lecture at Key East, under 
the auspices of the American Institute of Christian Phi¬ 
losophy. All the papers embodied are based on standard 
translations of original works, and present the leading 
principles of the schools in the words of their celebrated 
founders and champions. There are a few works of 
recognized merit on Hindu Philosophy in the English 
language, barring the translations utilized in this vol¬ 
ume ; but there is not one which makes such a copious- 
use of the original sources of information as the volume 
now presented to the public, or which is better adapted 
to give an insight into the contents of standard works on 
the six great systems of Hindu Philosophy, as well as to 
show'the similarity that subsists between its broad prin¬ 
ciples and those which modern philosophers are prone to 
represent as original, the peculiar outgrowth of tho 





IV 


PREFACE. 


advanced thought of the nineteenth century. The 
writer’s humility trusts that the book may be of use to 
those who, whether missionaries and clergymen or mere 
lovers of literature, wish to have a bird’s-eye view of 
Hindu Philosophy without taking the trouble of going 
to the sources. The volume, if it be encouraged by the 
public here, will be followed by another of the same size 
on the Heterodox Systems of Hindu Philosophy. 

Ram Chandra Bose. 


July 28, 1884. 



\ 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER I. 

PAGE 

The Sources of Hindu Philosophy. 7 

CHAPTER II. 

The Sources of Hindu Philosophy Continued. 36 

CHAPTER III. 

The Age of Hindu Philosophy. 69 

CHAPTER IV. 

The Sankhya Philosophy, or the Hindu Theory of 
Evolution. 96 

CHAPTER V. 

The Sankhya Philosophy, or the Hindu Theory of 
Evolution Continued. 129 

CHAPTER VI. 

The Yoga Philosophy, or Hindu Asceticism ... 157 









VI 


CONTENTS, 


CHAPTER VII. 

PAGE 

The Nayaya System, or the Hindu Logic... 194 

CHAPTER VIII. 

The Vaiseshika Philosophy, or the Hindu Atomic Theory. 226 

CHAPTER IX. 

The Purva Mimansa, or Hindu Ritualism. .... 259 

CHAPTER X. 

The Vedanta System, or Hindu Pantheism. 291 

CHAPTER XI. 

The Maya, or the Illusion Theory.. 827 

CHAPTER XII. 

The Hindu and Christian Philosophy Contrasted...... 361 

SUPPLEMENT. 

Hindu Eclecticism. 396 








HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


CHAPTER I. 

THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 

It is very interesting to trace a noble river, through 
hundreds of miles of fertile land dotted with beautiful 
cities, thriving towns, and romantic villages, to where 
its broad sea-like expanse dwindles into a small, brawl¬ 
ing mountain stream. It ought to be, if it is not, much 
more interesting to trace a broad, expansive stream of 
philosophic thought, which has moulded and fashioned 
the inner life of a great though fallen people, and left 
its mark also on their outer life, to where its omnipo¬ 
tent influence is but faintly foreshadowed. India, as a 
country, presents an accumulation of differentiating 
marks, or such as are calculated to distinguish it from 
the other countries of the world. It has a unique con¬ 
figuration, unique features of beauty and grandeur, 
and a unique history. But the most remarkable thing 
one notices within its precincts is its universally adopt¬ 
ed, all-embracing, all-comprehensive pantheism. 

Pantheism in other lands is the monopoly of a few 
gifted but misguided minds, and its influence is scarcely 
felt outside of very narrow and narrowing circles. In 
India, however, it is co-extensive with social or national 



8 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


life, being held both by the learned and the ignorant, 
the rich and the poor, the high and the low. The 
miracle Western scholars scarcely expect to see realized, 
or transferred from the domain of possibility into the 
domain of fact, is a great nation of pantheists ; and 
this miracle is presented in all its entireness in India ! 
Here pantheism of a thoroughly spiritual type is 
preached and advocated, not only in temples of piety 
and halls of learning, but in places of public resort, in 
streets and thoroughfares ; not only in the seclusion of 
cloisters and cells, but amid the din and bustle of hives 
of industry and marts of commerce. 

And it is very interesting to note that the phrase¬ 
ology in which it is couched, the imagery by which it 
is illustrated, and the arguments by which its positions 
are fortified, are all as old as itself is, or the many- 
sided, liydra-headed religion of which it professes to be 
the essential part. The turns of expression, which are 
to-day bandied backward and forward by the cham¬ 
pions of pantheism in India, were coined under the 
shade, so to speak, of a rich, sonorous, and remarkably 
flexible language, about two thousand five hundred 
years ago. The tropes and metaphors utilized to-day 
by our countrymen to set forth the essential features 
of their pantheistic belief were first pressed into such 
service about the time when the prophet Isaiah was de¬ 
nouncing with characteristic fervor the vices by which 
his beloved country, the vineyard of the Lord of Glory, 
was being ruined. And the varied lines of reasoning 
by which this dreamy system is now defended by them 
were first arrayed under its banner by their forefathers, 
long before the initiation of their present forms of wor¬ 
ship. India appears a scene of mental immobility, both 
when the backward condition of its arts is taken into 


THE SOURCES OF HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


9 


consideration, and when the significant fact is realized 
that its rich literature has remained unimproved and 
unexpanded for ages untold. 

Had the influence of our national pantheism been 
confined to our own country, and not felt anywhere 
else, still, universal and all-powerful as its sway has for 
ages been within its limits, an attempt to trace it to its 
original source would have appeared very desirable. 
But we have reason to believe that its influence has not 
been thus confined. The varied forms of pantheistic 
belief, which flourished in schools of philosophy, if not 
in thoroughfares and market-places, in Western coun¬ 
tries in ancient times, have confessedly a dash of 
Orientalism about them ; and if not traceable to its 
direct influence, a common origin of all these phases of 
thought and of those associated with it must be sought 
in some Eastern region which brought speculative phi¬ 
losophy to the birth in some prehistoric age. Its influ¬ 
ence, however, is most assuredly noticeable in the dis¬ 
quisitions, and even in the phraseology in which the 
idealistic and pantheistic speculations of modern times 
are embodied. Pantheism certainly appears in these 
days in a new garb, and in forms more apparently 
rational and really attractive than it did in days long 
since gone by, but the likeness of the ectypes of the 
day to the archetypes of ancient times is so obvious 
that their essential identity is one of those facts which 
cannot possibly be ignored. At all events, it may 
safely be assumed that Indian pantheism has, besides 
moulding and fashioning the varied phases of our 
national life, largely influenced the more advanced 
philosophic notions of the age. An attempt, therefore, 
to trace it through successive phases of development to 
its original sources is doubly important, even more so 


10 


HUsTDlJ PHILOSOPHY. 


than an attempt to trace the requirements of modern 
jurisprudence to the well-known code of Justinian. 

Fortunately an attempt of this description is not 
likely to end in failure. Certain documents of unim¬ 
peachable integrity have come down to us from a 
remote antiquity, and in them we may discover the 
germs not only of the universally adopted pantheism of 
our country, but of the varied systems of philosophic 
thought, which it has either swallowed up and assimi¬ 
lated to its own nature, or overcome and thrown into 
the shade. These are the Upanishads, or philosophical 
treatises attached to the Yedas. Each of the four 
Yedas, on which the Hindu concentrates his present 
homage and retrospective veneration and builds up his 
hopes of prospective bliss, consists of three parts—the 
Mantra, the Brahmana, and the Upanishad. The 
hymns, prayers, and doxologies, which form its initial 
and certainly the most fascinating part, make up its 
Mantra division ; and the ceremonial directories, which 
have to be consulted when the oblations and sacrifices 
associated with the hymnology, are actually brought to 
the altar, constitute its Brahmana portion. The TJpan- 
ishad or concluding portion embodies the philosophy by 
which the occult meaning of the hymnology and the 
ritual is inquired into, ascertained, and set forth. The 
word Upanishad, like many words of a doubtful origin, 
has been variously interpreted by Oriental scholars, 
and an array of fanciful etymologies has been presented 1 
in connection with it. But the meaning of the word is 
plain—viz., that which destroys the sense-bred igno¬ 
rance, which the hymnology and the ritual it explains 
are fitted to nourish and mature. 

Every Yeda has its Mantras or hymns of prayer and 
praise, its Brahmanas or ceremonial directories or ritual 


THE SOURCES OE HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


11 


guide-books, and its Upanishads or philosophical trea¬ 
tises of an explanatory and discursive character. The 
number of the hymns may be fixed, if not with the 
strictest accuracy, at least with a close approximation 
to truth. A few of the hymns may have been lost, buU\ 
the vast body has come down almost as it existed in 
primitive times. But the number of the supplementary 
treatises, by which their right use and occult meaning 
are indicated, cannot possibly be fixed, owing specially 
to Oriental proneness to exaggeration. Lists are pre¬ 
served, such as may encourage the belief that the num¬ 
ber of the Upanishads alone exceeded two hundred and 
thirty, but only a few of these are now extant ; and 
the complete disappearance of the rest cannot be satis¬ 
factorily explained except by representing their alleged 
numerical bulk and strength as apocryphal, Hor is it 
at all necessary to plunge ourselves into learned dis¬ 
quisitions for the purpose of arriving at an approximate 
conclusion with reference to the original number of 
these treatises, as the few commented on by Sankar 
Acharya, one of the acutest thinkers and most volumi¬ 
nous writers India every saw, are represented by all 
parties as the most important ; and these are, properly 
speaking, the sources of Hindu Philosophy. 

The eleven Upanishads commented upon by Sankar 
Acharya may be divided into two classes, the major 
and the minor ; the two larger Upanishads and the 
nine smaller ones. It is possible that two or three of 
the smaller of these treatises were extant before the 
appearance of the larger ones ; but the logical precision 
by which they are as a body characterized, together 
with their lucidness of arrangement and coherence of 
thought, speaking of course comparatively, leads us to 
assign to their composition a date posterior to that of 


12 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


the more bulky and certainly the more important docu¬ 
ments in an archaeological point of view. 

The two larger Upanishads are the Chhandogya and 
the Brihad Aranyaka, the former belonging to the 
Sama Veda, and the latter to the collection of the 
Yajur Veda, called Vajasaneyi or white ; and their 
composition is traced by general consent to a period 
prior to the appearance.of Buddha on the stage of his¬ 
tory. They have many legends in common, related 
almost in the same words ; and this fact, if not any¬ 
thing else or anything partaking of the nature of ex¬ 
ternal evidence, may justify the presumption that one of 
them was written before the other. But the question, 
Which is the earlier of these two documents? cannot 
be solved any more than the length of the interval be¬ 
tween the composition of the one and that of the other 
can be ascertained. The features of similarity in 
thought and expression noticeable, together with the 
want of system characteristic of both, tend to confirm 
the views of those learned scholars who represent them 
as contemporary documents based on sources of infor¬ 
mation now lost, or on traditions and legends current 
at the time when they were both composed by inde¬ 
pendent writers. 

As it is our intention to analyze in this paper the 
contents of these two hoary documents, let us present 
the evidences of a high antiquity we have noticed in 
the course of a careful perusal, with pencil in hand, in 
consecutive order. The translations we shall utilize are 
that of the “ Chhandogya, ” by Dr. Bajendra Ball 
Mittra, and that of “ Brihad Aranyaka,” by Dr. Boer. 

And first of all let it be observed that the imagery 
presented is, together with the forms of expression, 
emphatically archaic. The truths presented are cer- 


THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


13 


tainly of a recondite character, but the images pressed 
into service are of the simplest order. The fire pro¬ 
duced by the attrition of two pieces of wood, the spokes 
issuing from the nave of a wheel, the athlete running a 
race, cows suckling their calves, leaves attached to the 
branches and the stocks, a bow strung, an arrow let 
fly, a flaming fire, a rolling car, a bellowing ox, a drop 
of water on a lotus leaf—such are the images which flit 
across our minds as we turn page after page of these 
ancient books. A favorite storehouse of figures is the 
beehive and the honey squeezed from it, which is now 
the best of gods, then the best of sacred writings, and 
anon the best of ceremonial observances. It is cer¬ 
tainly not proper to lay great stress on this feature of 
these Upanishads, inasmuch as the polite literature of 
our country, its poetry and romance, does not seem to 
have gone very far beyond the archaic stage of develop¬ 
ment. But yet, as the speculations of its philosophic 
age were characterized by a remarkable stiffness of 
style, the frequency with which such simple images 
occur in these documents, together with the flexibility 
of their style, is an indubitable proof of great antiquity. 

And this may be said also of the want of artistic 
finish manifested by the legends related, and the clumsy 
way in which these are arranged, and the truths incul¬ 
cated are presented. Not to speak of the remarkable 
brevity and conciseness which characterized the pro¬ 
ductions of what might in India be called the age of 
philosophy, the minor Upanishads are ahead of the 
major in the terseness of their style, in the concatenated 
order in which their contents are presented, and in the 
absence from them of mythical stories, such as are of a 
puerile character. 

Akin to this sort of evidence is that based on the 


14 


HIXDU PHILOSOPHY. 


longevity of the persons referred to, and in that pre¬ 
supposed in the division of life into distinct periods 
presented in chap, iii., sec. 16, of the Chhandagaya 
Upanishad. Man is in this part represented as Yajna 
or sacrifice, and the different periods of his fife are thus 
indicated. The first twenty-four years of his life, 
during which he is under the special protection of the 
Yashus or the fire-gods, are the matin sacrifice. The 
period between the twenty-fourth and the forty-fourth 
year of his fife is the midday oblation ; and during these 
years his presiding deities are the Rudras or storm-gods. 
The afternoon sacrifice is the period intervening be¬ 
tween the forty-fourth and the eighty-fourth year of 
his life, when he is under the special guidance of the 
Aclityas or sun-gods. The closing period, which in the 
case of a devotee, Mahidasa, son of Itara, extended 
from the eighty-fourth to the one hundred and six¬ 
teenth, may be represented as the evening sacrifice, 
though it is not characterized as such, and the deities 
protecting it are not named. It is, however, distinctly 
stated that the person who knows the significance of 
the first three periods of life will live for one hundred 
and sixteen years. All this betokens general longevity, 
which is an incontestable proof of great antiquity, 
though, so far as we are aware, no stress has been laid 
upon it by Oriental scholars. 

The gods mentioned in these disquisitions are those 
of the Yedas, not those of any post-Yedic period. The 
productive and destructive energies of nature, which 
appear under various names to have monopolized the 
worship of our unsophisticated ancestors of simple 
Yedic times, are the divinities around which the 
legends, speculations, and reasonings of these venerable 
documents revolve. And their number is set forth 



THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


15 


therein with the same indefiniteness which in the Rig 
Yeda makes it impossible for us to fix it. In one of 
the many dialogues embodied, their number is given as 
no less than “ three and three thousand.” It, how¬ 
ever, shrinks in the same dialogue into “three and 
three hundred,’’ then into “thirty and three,” then 
into “ six,” then into “three,” and ultimately into 
“one.” But, as in the Rig Yeda, “ thirty-three” is 
the number for which special partiality is shown when 
the spirit of philosophical generalization is held in 
abeyance for a moment ; and they are the eight 
Yashus, or various forms of the Fire-god, the eleven 
Rudras or forms of the Storm-god, and the twelve 
Adityas or forms of the Sun-god, besides Indra and 
Prajapati, representing perhaps heaven and earth. 
The God Brahma appears in these treatises either as 
the quintessence of all essences, or as in the Rig Yeda, 
not certainly as the first person of the Hindu Triad. 
The all but perfect identity of the pantheon herein dis¬ 
closed with that of which glimpses are presented in the 
Yedas, particularly in the earliest of these venerable 
books, as also its dissimilarity to that set up in post- 
Yedic times, cannot but be regarded as an incontest¬ 
able proof of great antiquity. 

The ceremonies referred to in these disquisitions are 
emphatically Yedic ceremonies, not those which were 
initiated in post-Yedic times. The Aswamedha, or the 
sacrifice of the horse, the crowning sacrifice of the 
simple times pictured in the Yedas, is not only alluded 
to again and again, but graphically described, ex¬ 
plained, and philosophized upon, specially in the open¬ 
ing section of the Brihad Aranyaka, in which the 
supreme greatness of the animal sacrificed, and its iden¬ 
tity with Prajapati, the lord of creatures, are shown by 


16 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


means of analogies and metaphors, the former far¬ 
fetched and the latter incongruous. The Somayajna, 
or the sacrifice of the Soma or moon-plant, which is 
prominently brought forward in all the Yedas, and 
which is the stock theme of one of them, the Sama 
Yeda, is the subject of innumerable allusions and many 
disquisitions in these treatises. The Pasu-medha, or 
animal sacrifices of an inferior order, are also referred 
to, and the great sacrifice called Purush-medha, or the 
sacrifice of the Lord of creatures for the good of those 
who are now gods but were once men, is also alluded 
to. Indeed an attempt is obviously made in these 
books to merge the varieties of the sacrifices enumer¬ 
ated in the Yedas into the supreme sacrifice of the 
supreme Being for the supreme good of the universe, as 
well as to sublimate the Yeclic pantheon into one per¬ 
vasive spiritual substance. 

The literature alluded to is, like the pantheon dis¬ 
closed and the ritual embodied, Yedic. The first three 
Yedas, Rig, Yajur, and Sama, have numerous refer¬ 
ences made to them ; and the last, Atharva, is also 
alluded to, though rarely. But not a single book 
extant in post-Yedic times is referred to. Exception 
may be taken to this statement, based on the two well- 
known passages in the two Upanishads, in which 
“ Ithases and Purans” are mentioned along with the 
Yedas, and the branches of literature embodied in or 
closely associated with them. And certainly if these 
two generic names were made to include the books now 
comprehended by them, the objection would be both 
well-grounded and unanswerable. But these names 
had a meaning in primitive times very different indeed 
from what they bear now. The name “ Ithases, 5 
which now includes the epic poems, comprehended in 


THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


17 


the age of the Upanishads the legendary lore embodied 
in the Yedas ; while by the Purans were understood 
the varied cosmogonies and theogonies found in those 
venerable records, not the obscene literature and my¬ 
thology from which the senseless forms of worship now 
prevalent in our country derive their sanction and 
sanctity. 

And lastly, the crude, undeveloped and unsystema- 
tiz<ed form in which caste appears in these treatises is an 
irrefragable argument in favor of their high antiquity. 
The four original castes are mentioned distinctly and 
emphatically, not merely hinted at, as in the Rig 
Veda ; but they do not appear separated from one an¬ 
other by broad and well-defined lines of demarcation, 
or guarded each by a network of iron rules. On the 
contrary, the relative position of the orders, especially 
of the two higher ones, appears left in uncertainty 
rather than defined with precision. There are doubtless 
passages which clearly show that the Brahmins were 
rising, slowly but surely, up to the ascendency they 
have for ages and centuries enjoyed ; but passages are 
not wanting fitted to show that they were often beaten 
by their rivals, the Kshetryas, in their attempt to scale 
the summit of sacerdotal power and authority. The 
opening section of chap. ii. of the Brihad Aranyaka 
presents a dialogue between a proud, self-complacent 
and self-sufficient Brahmin, by name Gargya, and a 
really learned and therefore humble Kshetrya, Ajata- 
satru, the moral of which is the abandonment by the 
former of his ridiculous pretensions to knowledge and 
Ms enrolment as a pupil of the latter. Such a thing 
)uld have been an impossibility if the caste system 

1 been matured, as it subsequently was in the age of 
iVLanu. 


18 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


But there is a dialogue in the Chhandogya eminently 
fitted to show that in occult, divine knowledge the 
Kshetrya was most decidedly ahead of the Brahmin. 
A Brahmin lad goes to Jaivali, the king of Panchala, 
of course a Kshetrya, and has five test questions regard¬ 
ing the condition of the dead and ethereal regions put 
to him. Unable to answer them, he returns to his 
father and teacher chagrined, and solicits instruction on 
those points. The father confesses his ignorance and 
repairs to the court of the learned king for instruction. 
The king receives him hospitably, but feels afflicted 
when informed of his motive. However, after much 
hesitation, he expresses his wish to teach him in these 
significant words : “ Since you have thus inquired, and 
inasmuch as no Brahmin ever knew it before, hence of 
all people in the world the Kshetryas alone have the 
right of imparting instruction on this subject.” 

The high antiquity of these documents having been 
established, it remains for us to analyze their contents.. 
A word or two, however, on their style and the age 
they portray would be a fitting preface to such analy¬ 
sis. We have already had occasion to speak of the 
extravagances of diction by which these treatises are, 
along with the entire body of Sanscrit literature, char¬ 
acterized. Transitions of the harshest kind from one 
pronoun to another, from one figure of speech to an¬ 
other, from one train of thought to another, and from 
one line of reasoning to another, along with the ellipti¬ 
cal nature of the sentences in general, throw an air of 
obscurity over many of the passages on which the main 
argument hinges ; while metaphors and allegories both 
incongruous and far-fetched add to the mystification. 
But the most repellent features of the disquisitions 
embodied are tiresome repetitions, phonetic analogies, 


THE SOURCES OE HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


19 


grotesque flights of the imagination, and inaccurate 
reasonings. 

Examples of all these varieties of defects cannot be 
presented within the limits which we must prescribe to 
ourselves ; but the following two strings of figures, one 
culled from the Chhandogya and the other from the 
Brihad Aranyaka, are pre-eminently fitted to set forth 
the sort of extravagance we have to wade through 
while perusing these books. Of the great Universal 
soul it is said that “ The heaven is the head, the sun is 
the eye, the wind is the breath, the sky is the trunk, 
the moon is the fundament, and the earth is the feet. 
The altar is his breast, the sacrificial grass constitutes 
the hair of his body, the household fire forms his heart, 
the Annoharyapachana fire forms his mind, Ahavarya 
fire his face.” The exordium of the Brihad Aranyaka 
sets forth the greatness of the sacrificial horse in these 
words : “ The sun is the eye ; the wind, the breath ; 
the fire, under the name Yaiswanara, the open mouth ; 
the year, the body of the sacrificial horse ; the heaven 
is the back ; the atmosphere, the belly ; the earth, the 
footstool (hoof); the quarters, the sides; the seasons^ the 
members ; the months, the half months, the joints ; 
day and night, the feet ; the constellation, the bones ; 
the sky, the muscles ; the half-digested food, the sand ; 
the rivers, arteries and veins ; the liver and spleen, the 
mountains ; the herbs and trees, the various kinds of 
hair. The sun as long as he rises, the forepart of the 
body ; the sun as long as he descends, the hind part of 
the body. The lightning is like yawning ; the shaking 
of the members is like the rolling of the thunder.” 
Decency leads us to throw the veil over the concluding 
portion of this series of grotesque metaphors and similes. 

The utter contempt for matters of fact, associated in 


20 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


these treatises with the wildest flights of speculation, is 
not perhaps a defect confined to Oriental Philosophy, 
it being discoverable in the writings of philosophers 
who in reasoning never appear egregiously at variance 
with the approved rules of logic. But the facility with 
which day-dreams are presented herein as facts of phi¬ 
losophy, or science in general, is peculiarly Oriental. 
The arteries, for instance, “ of the heart” are said in 
the Chhandogya to “ exist in a brown ethereal fluid, 
yea, in a white, a blue, a yellow, a red ethereal fluid.” 
They are in the other Upanishad divided into two 
classes, the good and the bad, and the number of the 
good ones given is 72,000 ! But we shall have to refer 
to this tendency to present dreams as established facts 
when we speak of the eschatology of these books ; and 
so we need not allow ourselves to be detained here by 
this feature of extravagance. 

The age depicted in the IJpanishads has justly been 
called an age of inquiry, of incipient rather than 
matured speculation. The gods worshipped, originally 
forces of nature, were many, and clothed with attri¬ 
butes by no means godlike ; the forms of devotion util¬ 
ized were apparently puerile and meaningless ; and the 
ceremonies reduced to practice were both cumbersome 
and absurd. The mind naturally recoiled from the 
surroundings of a pantheon so unworthy, and the para¬ 
phernalia of a worship so sensuous and degrading, and 
the question was naturally raised, Have these forms of 
devotion and these oft-recurring ceremonies any mean¬ 
ing, or are they absurdities to be exploded or cast over¬ 
board ? The belief in the current creed and current 
forms of worship was too strong even in the most 
thoughtful minds to admit of a general leaning toward 
the latter of these alternatives ; and so the conviction 


THE SOURCES OF IIIFTDU PHILOSOPHY. 21 

gained ground that there was some occult meaning in 
the system of faith and devotion so apparently at vari¬ 
ance with both reason and common-sense. What is this 
occult meaning ? This was the question which philoso¬ 
phy proposed for discussion and solution. And no 
wonder that far-fetched analogies, fanciful etymologies, 
phonetic resemblances, incongruous reasonings, and 
extraordinary flights of the imagination were resorted 
to for the purpose of extracting a meaning out of what 
was really meaningless ! But the spirit of generaliza¬ 
tion was not pressed into service in vain, for in a very 
short time the gods and goddesses adored, the forms of 
worship resorted to, and the cumbrous ritual reduced 
to practice, were all unified into a primal substance 
spiritual on the whole, but spoken of at times as mate¬ 
rial or quasi-material. But an age of wavering faith 
cannot develop the spirit of unshackled speculation ; 
and so the disquisitions under notice are characterized 
by an unsteadiness, a vacillation, a flexibility, and an 
inconsistency fitted to render them enigmatical, incon¬ 
clusive, and even puerile and absurd. 

A word about the commentary of Sankar seems de¬ 
sirable here. That profound thinker, who flourished 
during the latter part of the seventh and the earlier 
part of the eighth century, falls evidently into the mis¬ 
take into which modern philosophers fall when engaged 
in deciphering the contents of hoary documents, such 
as those under notice. He carries to the comparatively 
simple times of the Upanishads the well-conducted and 
abstruse controversies of an era of thought and specu¬ 
lation ten times more progressive. And therefore he 
may justly be accused of importing meaning into the 
text, rather than bringing meaning out of it, or rather 
of torturing out of the passages, plain or obscure, a sense 


22 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


fitted to bolster up his own foregone conclusions. But 
his acute exegetic dissertations are of great use, if not 
in elucidating the contents of these treatises, at least in 
exploding a notion which is now gaining ground in and 
out of India, especially among people who have a 
theory to advocate. The notion is that the form of 
religion inculcated in the Upanishads is a pure and sub¬ 
lime theism. It may suit the convenience of the theo¬ 
rists of the day to see nothing but a rational system of 
theism in these venerable documents ; but it is impor¬ 
tant to note that the learned Pandits of Sankar Acha- 
rya’s time saw in them forms of religion very different 
indeed from such a system. Some, with the great 
Sankar at their head, found pantheism in them, while 
those with whom that redoubtable controversialist was 
engaged in ceaseless discussion, saw in them nothing 
but the nihilism to which they had been brought by 
the atheistic speculations of Buddha. The position of 
the theorists, who represent the teaching of the JJpan- 
ishads as thoroughly theistic, is similar to that of the 
transcendentalists who pretend to find pantheism in the 
teaching of our Lord, in spite of its obvious drift and 
the concurrent testimony of the Church from its foun¬ 
dation up to the present time. 

Having disposed of the questions which naturally 
arise about these two hoary and venerable documents, 
let us endeavor to set forth what is in them. Their 
contents are of a miscellaneous nature, and though the 
main line of thought by which they may be unified 
savors of pantheism of a thoroughly spiritual type, the 
varied isms which flourished in Indian schools, over and 
above that, in subsequent times may be supported or 
upheld by them. The mistake into which some Orient¬ 
alists have fallen is that of representing these books as 


THE SOURCES OF HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


23 


sources exclusively of that system of pantheism which 
was subsequently matured by the profound thinker and 
the versatile writer Vyas, and the great commentator 
Sankar himself. These books certainly present the 
germs of this system, which has swallowed up all its 
rivals and has maintained an undisputed sway over the 
Indian intellect for more than two millenniums. But 
it is to be observed that the rival orthodox systems 
with which it had to contend, and over which its vic¬ 
tory was complete and glorious, also derive their phrase¬ 
ology, their principal outlines of thought, and their 
salient features of reasoning, together with the divine 
sanction to which they lay claim, from these treatises. 
They may therefore be justly represented as the primal 
sources not of this or that system of Indian philosophy, 
but of Indian philosophy in general, or Indian philosophy 
in all its orthodox branches at least. This appears from 
the cosmogonies embodied in these books, from their ac¬ 
counts of the Origin of Sin, and from their descriptions 
of the Universal Soul, the individuated Soul or Self, 
Elementary Substances, and such metaphysical ideas as 
are conveyed by the terms Space, Immensity, etc. 

The cosmogonies embodied in these Upanishads are 
not merely fanciful, puerile, and absurd, but of a dubi¬ 
ous significance, that is of a nature fitted to support 
nihilism and materialism, as well as pantheism. Take, 
for instance, the two following passages from the 
Chhandogya : 

1. “ The sun is described as Brahma—its descrip¬ 
tion : Verily at first all this was non-existent ; that 
non-existence became existent, it developed—it became 
an egg ; it remained quiet for a period of one year ; it 
burst into two ; thence were formed two halves of gold 
and silver.” 


24 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


2. “ Thereof the argentine half is the earth, and the 
golden half the heaven. The inner thick membrane 
(of the egg) became mountains, and the thin one cloudy 
fog ; the blood-vessels became rivers, and, lastly, what 
was born therefrom is the sun, Aditya” (chap. iii. 
sec. 19). 

1. “Before, oh child, this was sat (being) one only 
without a second. Thereof verily others say : ‘ Before 
this was asat (non-being), one alone without a second ; 
from that non-being proceeds being. 2. He (the 
teacher) continued : But of a truth, oh child, how can 
this be ? How can being proceed from non-being ? 
Before, oh child, this was being, one without a second. 
3. It willed, I shall multiply and be born ! It created 
heat. That heat willed ! I shall multiply and be 
born ! It created water” (chap. x. sec. 2). 

The first of these passages traces creation to non¬ 
existence or nonentity, and the second leaves it uncer¬ 
tain whether being or non-being is to be held up as the 
Creator of the universe. The same spirit of vacillation 
is noticeable in the cosmogonies given in the other 
IJpanishad, the Brihad Aranyaka, as is seen in the 
following passages : 

“ There was not anything here before : this was in¬ 
deed enveloped by death, who is voracity ; for voracity 
is death. He created this mind desiring : may I have 
a soul. He went forth worshipping. From him when 
worshipping the waters were produced, etc.” (chap. i. 
Second Brahmana). 

‘ ‘ This was before soul, bearing the shape of a man. 
Looking around he beheld nothing but himself. He 
said first : 4 This am 1. 5 Hence the name of I was 
produced. Therefore even now a man, when called, 
says first, 4 It is I, ’ and tells afterward any other name 


THE SOURCES OF IIIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 25 

which belongs to him. And because he as $ie first of 
all of them consumed by fire all the sins, therefore he is 
called Purush. . . . lie did thus not feel delight. 
Therefore no body when alone feels delight. lie was 
desirous of a second. He was in the same state as hus¬ 
band and wife are when in mutual embrace. He 
divided this self twofold. Hence were husband and 
wife produced. Therefore was this only a half of him¬ 
self as a split pea is of the whole. Thus has Yajnanal- 
kya declared it. This void is thus completed by 
woman. He approached her. Hence men were born. 
She verily reflected, How can he approach me whom 
he has produced from himself ? Alas ! I will conceal 
myself. Thus she became a cow, the other a bull. He 
approached her. Hence kine were born. The one be¬ 
came a mare and the other a stallion, the one a female 
ass, the other a male ass. ... In this manner he 
created every living pair whatsoever down to the ants” 

(chap. i. Third Brahmana). _ 

The first of these passages traces creation to nonenti¬ 
ty called death, and according to Sankar it was eagerly 
seized by the nihilists of his day and held up, along 
with others of course, as a justification of their views. 
Sankar, the redoubtable champion of pantheism, enters 
of course into a series of very abstruse disquisitions to 
prove that the word death or voracity or non-existence 
in this and other passages of the sorb means a spiritual 
substance, originally unseen and unknown, but de¬ 
veloped or evolved in the course of time into the varied 
modes of existence we notice around and in us. But 
the nihilists of his day had their reasons, and these by 
no means weak, for adopting a different construction. 
The second passage seems at first sight fitted to bring 
us to a conclusion the very antipodes of that supported 


26 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


by the first. But the embodied “soul” to which it 
traces creation is confessedly a medial not the original 
source. The discrepancies in the accounts of creation 
presented in these books may be easily reconciled. 
The cosmogony of the Yedas begins with an uncon¬ 
scious substance spoken of as It, coming in the course 
of ages to consciousness, and led by a perception of its 
solitariness to wish to be “ many ;” and if such sub¬ 
stance were posited as the groundwork of the accounts 
of creation presented in these two books, their apparent 
contrariety or inconsistency would disappear. 

With reference to the origin of sin, both these Upan- 
ishads present one and the same account, almost in the 
same words. “ Twofold indeed is the offspring of 
Prajapati (the Lord of Creation, elsewhere called 
Purush or Brahma), the gods and the demons. There¬ 
fore the gods are thus few in number, the demons 
.many.” The appositeness of the word “ therefore” in 
this connection is seen in Sankar’s Commentary, in 
•which the numeric superiority of the demons is attrib_ 
uted, in of course a roundabout way, to the ascendency 
of perception and sensation over thought and reflection. 
The gods and the demons evolved from the essence of 
the Creator “ rivalled in these worlds,” or contended 
with each other for ascendency. The gods at first 
resorted to speech for help, but the demons defeated 
their object by vitiating speech, and making it a foun¬ 
tain of “ improper words.” Breath was then resorted 
to by the gods and contaminated by the demons, and 
made a source of “improper odors.” The eye, the 
ear, and the mind were in this manner contaminated 
and made sources of “improper colors,” “'improper 
sounds,” and “improper notions.” The last party 
resorted to for help was life, and the demons in their 


THE SOUKCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


27 


attempt to contaminate it were annihilated, “ as a clod 
of earth by falling upon a rock is destroyed.” The 
demons being annihilated, speech and other organs of 
the body were freed from the pollution brought on 
them by contact. This account sanctions the current 
notion of the Hindus that sin inheres in the body, and 
does not reach the life or soul. 

The perfect identity of the Universal with the indi¬ 
vidual or individuated soul is set forth in many pas¬ 
sages. A few selected at random are given below : 

“ This soul, which is neither this nor aught else, 
which is intangible, for it cannot be laid hold of ; not 
to be dissipated, for it cannot be dissipated ; without 
contact, for it cannot come into contact ; not limited, 
not subject to pain, nor to destruction—this fearless 
(soul) O Janaka, is obtained by thee” (“ Brihad Aran- 
yaka,” chap. iv. Second Brahmana). 

“ This great unborn soul is the same which abides as 
the intelligent (soul) in all living creatures, the same 
which abides as ether in the heart ; in him it sleeps ; 
it is the subduer of all, the ruler of all, the sovereign 
lord of all ; it does not become greater by good works, 
nor less by evil works. It is the Euler of ail, the sov¬ 
ereign Lord of all beings, the Preserver of all beings, 
the Bridge, the Upholder of the world, so that they 
fall not to ruin” (“ Brihad Aranyaka,” chap. iv. Fourth 
Brahmana). 

“ He who dwelling in the seed is within the seed, 
whom the seed does not know, whose body is the seed, 
who from within rules the seed, is thy soul, the Inner 
Euler, immortal. Unseen, he sees ; unheard, he 
hears ; unminded, he minds ; unknown, he knows. 
There is none that sees but he, there is none that 
knows but he. He is thy soul, the Inner Euler, im- 


28 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


mortal. Whatever is different from him is perishable” 
(“ Brihad Aranyaka,” chap. iii. Seventh Brahmana). 

“ Then asked him Ushasta, the son of Chakra : 
c Yajnanalkya,’ said he, ‘ do explain to me that Brahma 
who is a witness and present, that soul which is within 
every (being).” [ITe replied,] 4 It is thy soul which is 
within every (being).’ (“ Brihad Aranyaka,” chap, 
iii. Fourth Brahmana.) 

“ He became to every nature of every nature ; there¬ 
fore to manifest the nature of him, Indra appears of 
manifold nature by his Mayas (illusions) ; for his hun¬ 
dred and ten senses are attached (to the body as horses 
to a car) ; it (the soul) is the senses ; it is ten ; it is 
many thousands, nay infinite ; it is Brahma who has 
not a Before, nor an After, nor a Beside, nor a With¬ 
out. This is the soul, Brahma, the perceiver of all ” 
(“ Brihad Aranyaka,” chap. ii. Fifth Brahmana). 

“ These rivers, my child, proceed from the East tow¬ 
ard the West, thence from the ocean (they rise in the 
form of vapor, and dropping again they flow toward 
the South, and) merge into the ocean. Here, as they 
do not remember what they were. 2. Even so all 
these created beings, having proceeded from the truth, 
know not that they have issued therefrom. They 
therefore become of the form they had before, whether 
that be of a tiger, a lion, a wolf, a bear, a worm, an 
insect, a gnat, or a mosquito. 3. That particle which is 
the soul of all this is the Truth ; it is the Universal 
Soul. O Swetaketu, thou art that” (“ Chhandogya, ” 
chap. vi. sec. 10). 

Quotations might be multiplied almost endlessly ; but 
these are enough to show that according to the teach¬ 
ing of these Upanishads the Universal Soul is not 
merely identical with the individual soul called self, but 


THE SOURCES OF HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


29 


the life of all that really is ; and they may be brought 
forward in support of the views of those who see noth¬ 
ing but sublime idealism in them. But there are things 
said about the soul eminently fitted to militate against 
such a conclusion. For instance, the soul is said to 
have extension, as in the following passage : “ Yerily 
the soul extends from below, the soul extends from 
above, the soul extends from behind, the soul extends 
from before, the soul extends from the South, the soul 
extends from the North—of a truth the soul is all 
this. ” 

Again, the soul is identified with Immensity, which is 
said to extend as it does, and to be “ all this” as it is. 
It is, moreover, identified with space, speech, ether, 
aliment, some material substances and some metaphysi¬ 
cal ideas. Consequently there is scarcely a system of 
philosophy, pantheistic, materialistic, and even nihilis¬ 
tic, which cannot find an array of evidences in support 
of its principles among the heterogeneous and conflict¬ 
ing affirmations and disquisitions of these hoary docu¬ 
ments. 

It is desirable before bringing this paper to a close to 
state what these two ancient books say about human 
duty and its consequences, especially in the life to 
come, or to give some idea of the practical religion and 
eschatology embodied in them. Let it be observed that 
these two books were written at a time when philoso¬ 
phy was the science of the All, not one branch of 
human knowledge, as in these days. Philosophy em¬ 
braced religion, morality, psychology, medicine, phys¬ 
iology—in a word, mathematics, physics, metaphysics, 
and theology. Whatever the topic of inquiry might 
be, or of whatever character the question raised might 
be—mathematical, physical, psychological or metaphys- 


30 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


ical—recourse must be had to philosophy for light, set¬ 
tlement, or solution. Called into existence in such an 
age, these philosophical treatises could not lay aside the 
great problem of human duty, and its proximate and 
ultimate results. The dissertations on this subject em¬ 
bodied in them are too important to be passed over, in¬ 
asmuch as they have, along with the characteristic ideas 
on which they are based, moulded and fashioned the 
religious life of our country for ages untold. One short 
quotation on human duty will suffice. 

“ Threefold is the division of Duty. Sacrifice, Study, 
and Charity constitute the first ; Penance is the sec¬ 
ond, and Residence by a Brahmacharin exclusively in 
the house of a tutor is the third. All those who attend 
to these duties attain virtuous regions ; the believer in 
Brahma alone attains to immortality. 5 ’ 

The great commentator, Sankar, enters into an elab¬ 
orate disquisition, in his own dialectic or argumentative 
style, to set forth the meaning of these verses. Ac¬ 
cording to his comments there were, in those early 
times as there have been in ah subsequent ages, four 
orders of devotees, those of the householder, the ascetic, 
the Brahmacharin, or the student of the Yedas, and 
Brahmasanstha or Paramahansa, one wholly devoted to 
Brahma. The duty of the householder was to offer 
sacrifices, or perform ceremonies diurnal, occasional, 
optional, and expiatory, to study the Yedas, and to 
bestow “ alms according to his resources” on “ parties 
not seeking for the same.” The ascetic fits himself by 
years of penance (tapas) in sequestered places for the 
acquisition of saving knowledge, or the knowledge em¬ 
bodied in the philosophical treatises attached to the 
Yedas. When thus fitted by self-inflicted mortification 
and the conscientious discharge of the duties of the 


THE SOURCES OF HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


31 


hermit, he becomes a Brahmacharin, or looks for an 
accredited teacher of Yedantic philosophy, and enrolls 
himself as his pupil. Years of study and meditatio 



under his roof enable him to cast off the bondage of 
what Sankar calls “ disjunctive knowledge,” or knowl¬ 
edge which recognizes differences between “ agents, 
actions, and objects,” acquires “ identifying knowl¬ 
edge,” the knowledge the watchwords of which are : 

£ ‘ The truth is verily one without a second, ” “ All this is , 
the divine soul,” “ All this is the Brahma”—and thus 
attains immortality. The highest bliss, that of absorp¬ 
tion in the Deity, is reserved for those who have been 
liberated from ignorance by right knowledge, and who 
see their perfect identity with the Universal Soul. 

“ This is his true nature, which is free from desire, sin 
(both sin and virtue), and fear. As in the embrace of a 
beloved wife one is unconscious of aught, from without 
and within, so embraced by the all-knowing soul, this 
Purush is unconscious of all, without or within. This 
is his (true) nature, where all desires are satisfied, where 
the (only) desire is for the soul, where there is no desire, 
where there is no grief.” There is a verse, however, 
which is fitted to lead one to the conclusion that ab¬ 
sorption in the Deity is reserved, not only for those 
freed from desire, sin, and fear, but for all who die. 

It runs thus : “ When a man departs (this life) his 
speech merges into the mind ; the mind merges into 
life ; the fife into heat, and the heat into the supreme 
Deity.” This like so many other verses, speaks of 
speech, life, and mind as material substances or forces, 
in the same category with heat, and represents the 
supreme Deity as the ultimatum from which all things 
proceed, and into which all things melt. The vacilla¬ 
tion noticed in the statements regarding the universal 


32 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


and the individual soul is also noticeable in the disserta¬ 
tions on future life. 

But what will become of the members of the other 
three orders of the pious and the godly, or of mankind 
in general ? To this all-important question a reply is 
furnished in the following passage : 

1. “ Of them (men so created) those who know this 
(origin of Purush) and those who worship God with 
faith and penance in a desert, repair after death to (the 
region of) light ; thence to (that of) the day, thence to 
(that of) the light half of the moon, thence to (that of) 
the six months during which the sun has a northern 
declination. 

2. “ Thence to (that of) the year ; thence to (that 
of) the sun ; thence to (that of) the moon ; and thence 
to (that of) the lightning ; thence an inhuman being 
takes them to (the region of) Brahma. This is the way 
to the gods. 

3. “ Now those villagers who accomplish their relig¬ 
ious duties by the performance of sacrifices, by the 
dedication of tanks, wells, halting-places, etc., and by 
charity beyond the boundary of the altar, are borne, 
after death, to (the region of) darkness. From (the 
region of) darkness they proceed to (that of) the night ; 
from (that of) the night to (that of) the dark fortnight ; 
from the dark fortnight to (that of) the six months 
during which the sun has a southern declination ; from 
the six months of the winter solstice they attain not 
the year. 



4. “ (But) thence (they go) to (the region of) the 


Pitris (Fathers) ; from (the region of) the Pitris (they 
go) to the sky, and from the sky to the moon. That 
moon is the King Soma. They are the food of the 
gods. The gods do eat them. 


THE SOURCES OE HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


33 


5. “ After remaining there for such time as the 
effects of their actions last, they return to the road to 
be prescribed, i.e., thence to the sky, and from the sky 
to the wind ; after becoming wind they become smoke, 
and from the smoke the scattered cloud is formed. 

6. “ From the scattered cloud proceeds condensed or 
raining cloud, which rains. From that proceed rice, 
corn, annuals, trees, sesamum, lentils, and the like. 
Now verily it is difficult to descend therefrom. Those 
who eat rice and procreate, become manifold. 

7. “ Therefore he whose conduct is good quickly 
attains to some good existence, such as that of a 
Brahmana, a Kshetriya, Yaisya. Next, he who is vi¬ 
ciously disposed soon assumes the form of some inferior 
creature, such as that of a dog, a hog, or a Chandala. 

8. “ Now, those who have not come to either of 
these two ways become small creatures of repeated 
birth. They are born, and they die. This is the third 
place or receptacle. This is the reason why the place 
(where men go to after death) filleth not. This is the 
reason why (this career) should be detested ; therefore 
is the verse : 

9. “ The robber of gold, the drunkard who drinks 
spirits, the defiler of his master’s bed, and the murderer 
of a Brahmin are debased and filthy, and fifthly, so is 
he who associates with these four” (“ Chhandogya,” 
chap. v. sec. 10). 

We present these long extracts for various reasons. 
It is in the first place an index of the stuff we have to 
wade through with a view to glean the few sporadic 
jewels of philosophic thought scattered among the con¬ 
tents of these books. It is one of the earliest detailed 
statements of the doctrine of transmigration to be 
met with within the compass of Sanscrit literature ; 


34 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


and it sets forth the eschatology of the "Upanishads in 
general, and of these two in particular. The assurance 
with which dreams are herein presented as facts is 
peculiarly Oriental, and may put to shame even the 
coolness with which modern philosophers and scientists 
evolve creation with all its glories out of substances and 
forms posited by them ! The various regions of heav¬ 
enly bliss dreamt of are within reach of the person who 
knows himself, or the Universal Soul, which, though 
infinite, is found confined in a “ minute vacuity” within 
“ a lotus-like chamber 55 in his body, called Brahmapur 
or habitation of Brahma, insomuch that if he simply 
wishes to go into one of these, say the region of the 
Fathers, or the Mothers, or the Brothers, or the 
Friends, he is instantly translated thereto. The various 
heavens of which so much was made by the followers 
of Buddha, are indicated in the minor [Jpanishads with 
greater clearness than in these ; but the prominence 
they enjoy herein is enough to throw the imaginative 
Hindu into a perennial stream of feverish delight. 

Some form of the doctrine of the Trinity, more or 
less imaginative, more or less corrupt, has been at the 
bottom of the varied systems of religion which have 
successively won and lost ascendency in India, and even 
its philosophical vagaries have received their color and 
complexion from one species or another of triadism. 
These two treatises, partly legendary and partly philo¬ 
sophical, have their triadism, a triadism fitted to uphold 
the thorough-paced phenomenalism of the Yedantic 
school of subsequent times and the equally thorough¬ 
going .nihilism of some classes of the Buddhists. Their 
triad consists of Ham (name), Bupa (form), and Karma 
(action) ; and from it the Buddhists derived not only 
the phraseology in which their philosophic speculations 


THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


35 


are couched, but their god, the being or force by 
which, when one state of existence is wound up, an¬ 
other is forthwith called into existence, or by which 
when one soul is annihilated another is called into ex¬ 
istence to take the consequences of its deeds, good or 
bad. We see nothing, says the philosopher of what 
may be called the* Upanishad school, but name and 
form in the universe, setting aside human actions. Let 
an underlying material substance be posited, and we 
have the species of materialism which traces creation 
to self-evolving matter in the shape of atoms or a 
primordial form. Again, let an underlying spiritual 
substance, originally unconscious but coming up in time 
to consciousness, be assumed, and we have all the 
varied forms of pantheism to which homage has been 
paid both in and out of India. Once more, let an un¬ 
derlying nonentity be taken for granted, or let it be 
affirmed that there is no underlying substance beneath 
the name and form we cognize, and we have the nihil¬ 
ism with which pantheism had to wage a war of ex¬ 
termination in the age of Sankar Acharaya. But how 
is action, the third member of the triad of the LTpan- 
ishads, to be disposed of ? Simply by merging it in 
name and form, making it a material evolute in the 
first case, a phenomenon or mode of development in 
the second, and an absolute nonentity in the third. 
And in this manner the varied systems of philosophy or 
speculation which have flourished in. our country, one 
after another in regular succession and sometimes simul¬ 
taneously, may be traced to the statements and disquisi¬ 
tions embodied in the hoary documents we have taken 
the liberty to call the prime sources of Hindu Philoso- 


CHAPTEE II. 


THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 

In our inquiry and research relative to the sources of 
Hindu Philosophy we should neither ignore nor over¬ 
look the minor Upanishads, in which the crude ger¬ 
minal speculations, embodied in the Chhandogya and 
the Brihad Aranyaka, are carried forward to a pretty 
advanced stage of development. The more important 
of these philosophical treatises, those commented upon 
by the celebrated Sankar, are eight in number, barring 
the Swetaswatara Upanishad, which cannot be properly 
represented as a source of Hindu Philosophy, and of 
which, therefore, a detailed notice will be taken at the 
proper time and in the proper place. These eight 
minor Upanishads are : One belonging to the Eig 
Yeda, viz., Aitareya Upanishad ; one belonging to the 
Black Yajur Yeda, viz., Taittiriya Upanishad ; one be¬ 
longing to the White Yajur Yeda, viz., Yajasaneyi- 
Sanhita, or Isa Upanishad ; one belonging to the Sama 
Yeda, viz., Talavakara or Kena Upanishad ; and four 
belonging to the Atharva Yeda, viz., Prasna, Katha, 
Mundaka, Mandukya Upanishads. 

They seem to have been composed in different 
periods, ranging between the appearance of the major 
Upanishads and the regular organization of Indian 
schools of philosophy. The composition of the last 
four, in which pantheism appears in a form much more 
matured than that in which it is presented in the 


THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 37 


others, must be ascribed to a later period. As a body 
of literature, all these treatises show a marked advance 
on the modes of thought and reasoning, if not on the 
habits of life, indicated in the two major Upanishads. 
They are written in a less extravagant style, and they 
are decidedly less burdened, not merely with incongru¬ 
ous metaphors and far-fetched allegories, but with such 
irrelevant matter as makes it impossible to see clearly 
what the earlier documents are in many places driving 
at. And they are almost, if not entirely, free from the 
legendary references, or rather the legends in which 
their predecessors abound ; while scarcely any trace is 
seen of the obscenity which makes some portions of the 
major Upanishads untranslatable and unpresentable. 

There is, moreover, more method in their arrange¬ 
ment, more appositeness in their forms of expression, 
more acuteness in their lines of thought, more cogency 
in their modes of reasoning, and more boldness in the 
spirit of speculation they set forth. Nov are they defi¬ 
cient in the attractiveness attached to dry, philosophical 
disquisitions by elevation of sentiment and sublimity of 
diction, as well as by poetic fervor. Their chief fault, 
however, is the obscurity thrown over their contents by 
what may be called brevity carried to excess, the brev¬ 
ity shown in short, elliptical sentences, easy to commit 
to memory, but hard to understand ; necessary indeed 
in an age when oral tradition was the only medium 
through which knowledge could be preserved and com¬ 
municated, but not the less vexatious at a time when 
their meaning has to be ascertained with the help of 
commentaries ten times more ponderous and abstruse. f 

All these documents have been translated by Dr. 
Eoer, whose introductory remarks and explanatory 
notes are of the most valuable type. His translations 


38 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


are to be utilized in this paper, as his translation of the 
Brihad Aranyaka was in the last, along with Dr. 
Bajendra Ball Mitra’s translation of the Chhandogya 
Upanishad. With reference to the style and teaching 
of the Upanishads in general, the following weighty 
observations of Professor Cowell are quoted by Major 
Jacob in his recently published translation of the 
Vedanta Sar : “ The Upanishads are usually in the 
form of dialogue ; they are generally written in prose, 
with occasional snatches of verse, but sometimes they 
are in verse altogether. They have no system or 
method ; the authors are poets, who throw out their 
unconnected and often contradictory rhapsodies on the 
impulse of the moment, and have no thought of har¬ 
monizing to-day’s feelings with those of yesterday or 
to-morrow. . . . Through them all runs an unmistak¬ 
able spirit of pantheism, often in its most offensive 
form, as avowedly overriding all moral considerations ; 
and it is this which has produced the general impression 
that the religion of the Veda is monotheistic.” These 
strictures are more thoroughly applicable to the major 
than to the minor Upanishads. 

The very style of the minor Upanishads, their 
strength of expression and improved method of reason¬ 
ing, and the boldness and consistency, comparatively 
speaking, of the conclusions they are fitted to uphold, 
conspire to prove their posteriority. Additional proofs 
are scarcely needed. A few, however, noticed by us 
in the course of a careful perusal of these ancient docu¬ 
ments, may be presented in corroboration of the con¬ 
clusion to which we are brought by the speculations 
they embody, and their style and diction, with refer¬ 
ence to the time of their composition. 

And first let us observe that Brahminism, which ap- 


THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 39 


pears militant in the Chhandogya and Brihad Aranya- 
ka, appears triumphant in these Upanishads. AVe do 
not see herein, as in the major Upanishads, the Kshet- 
riya marching alongside of the Brahman through the 
highway of philosophical speculation, and even claim¬ 
ing pre-eminence in knowledge, especially of the 
esoteric meaning of the hymnology and ritual of the 
Yedas. The Brahmin is the all-in-all in these treatises, 
and the Kshetriya is scarcely mentioned. The Brah¬ 
min appears as a Doctor of Divinity in theological 
seminaries, an officiating Bishop at holy shrines, an 
honored Guest in convivial meetings, and a spiritual 
Guide to the most honored members of the inferior 
castes. Not only as a leader of devotees has he pecul¬ 
iar honors accorded to him ; but even as a devotee he 
claims special privileges. And woe be to the wretch 
who presumes to treat him as a guest without proper 
respect or with neglect. ‘ ‘ A Brahmin guest enters the 
house like Yaiswanara (fire). For him (the good) 
make this peace offering. Take the water, O son of 
Yivaswat (the sun). Hope, expectation, meeting (with 
the good), friendly words, sacrifices, pious gifts, sons 
and cattle—all these loses the man of little sense in 
whose house a Brahmin dwells without taking food ” 
(“ Katha Upanisliad,” chap. i. sec. 1). In one of the 
earliest of these Upanishads, the Taittiriya, the pre¬ 
eminence of the Brahmins is set forth in words almost 
equally significant. The Brahmin evidently succeeded, 
during the time intervening between the appearance of 
the major and that of the minor Upanishads, in push¬ 
ing back his rival, the Kshetriya, and raising himself 
to the height of glory from which he now calmly looks 
down on all outside the pale of his favored caste. 

The fact that less stress is laid or less value set in 


40 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


these treatises on the worldly advantages accruing from 
spiritual knowledge than in the major Upanishads, is a 
proof of their posteriority. The great teachers of the 
Yeaic age, called Eishis, did not by any means live as 
ascetics, though they have had for ages the reputation 
of having done so. They lived in affluence and ease, 
amid the endearments and pleasures of domestic life, 
and they were evidently never tired of praying for 
wealth, property, houses, wives, offspring, kine, sheep, 
vand instruments of husbandry. People were directed 
by special revelations to approach them with gifts and 
largesses ; and anathemas were hurled at the churlish 
wretch who refused to reward them with becoming 
munificence for their services. Traditions fitted to 
render professorships in theological seminaries or 
teacherships in private religious schools remunerative, 
as well as honorable, were prevalent when the major 
Upanishads were written, though the belief in ascetic 
retirement as a necessary preparation for the study of 
sacred philosophy, or the acquisition of the right knowl¬ 
edge of Brahma, was gaining ground slowly but surely. 

The minor Upanishads show this belief in a very 
advanced stage of development, if not altogether tri¬ 
umphant. They set a very great value on ascetic 
renunciation, mortification, and penance ; and a pro¬ 
portionately small value on the secular advantages re¬ 
sulting from the position of one skilled or profoundly 
read in theological or Brahma science. These, how¬ 
ever, are not altogether thrown into the shade, espe¬ 
cially in the earlier of these treatises. One skilled in 
divine science is said in the Taittiriya Upanishad to 
have offered up this prayer, so well calculated to 
recall the simpler times of the Eig Yeda : “ The pros¬ 
perity (sri) which simply brings me clothes, increases 


THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 4J 

my cows, and prepares for me always food and drink, 
this prosperity, rich wool-clad flocks and other cattle, 
bring to me.” But these and such-like secular advan¬ 
tages are much more rarely spoken of than in the other 
treatises ; and the insignificant place they take in these 
is a proof of an advance of spiritual ideas, or proper 
appreciation of spiritual things, indicative, if not deter¬ 
minative, of their posteriority. 

Akin to this is the proof given of the advanced stage 
of asceticism indicated in these treatises. Two of the 
technical terms, which were subsequently made the 
watchwords of various sects of ascetics, are met with 
herein, viz., Dama, or subjugation of the senses, and 
Yoga, or concentration of the mind. These are re¬ 
ferred to in several passages, and they are uniformly 
represented as essential to the acquisition of right 
knowledge. Their frequent occurrence in these docu¬ 
ments, coupled with their entire absence from the 
major Upanishads, coupled moreover with the more 
artificial and repulsive forms of asceticism they are an 
index to, might justly be advanced as an additional 
proof of their posteriority. 

The change indicated herein in the triad of the Yedas 
is also a proof in this direction not to be passed over. 
The triad of the Yedas consists of Agni (fire), repre¬ 
senting things divine on the earth ; Yayu (air), repre¬ 
senting those in the atmosphere, and Surya (sun), 
representing those in the heavens. The third member 
of this triumvirate or triad is dropped, and another sub¬ 
stituted for it in the triad presented in the Talavakara 
or Kena Upanishad. Instead of Agni, Yayu, and 
Surya, we have Agni, Yayu, and Indra. Precedence 
in this remodelled triad is given*to Indra, and the way 
in which he acquired it is indicated in a legend which 


42 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


does not place the divinities concerned in a very favor¬ 
able light. These gods were placed above all others by 
Brahma after a hard fight with the Asnras (demons) ; 
but being thus raised, they forgot their benefactor so 
far as to be induced to attribute their elevation to their 
own might. To humble them Brahma manifested him¬ 
self to them in an extraordinary manner. “ They did 
not know him (and asked each other) : Is this (being) 
worthy of adoration ?” They asked Agni, the first 
member of the triad, to make suitable inquiries and 
solve the perplexing question. He approaches the glo¬ 
rious apparition, and introduces himself as one who 
“ can burn whatsoever there is on earth.” He is told 
to burn a single blade of grass pointed out to him; he 
fails, and returns to his companions humbled and de¬ 
jected. Yayu then, at their request, approaches the 
manifested god and introduces himself as one who 
“ can sweep away whatsoever there is on earth.” He 
being told to sweep away a blade of grass, tries, fails, 
and returns humiliated. Indra then advances, continues 
wrapped up in contemplation, till a beautiful female, 
or, as Sankar explains it, Knowledge in the shape of a 
beautiful female, dispels his ignorance. His persever¬ 
ance is rewarded, and he becomes the head of the 
triad. The object of this legend evidently is to show 
the excellence of right knowledge, which not merely 
ennobles and elevates men, but fixes the relative posi¬ 
tion even of the gods. 

Again, the cosmogonies embodied in these Upanishads 
are an advance on those presented in the larger records, 
and an approach to that of the Yedantic school con¬ 
fessedly organized a long time after the era of incipient 
philosophical speculation depicted in these treatises. 
These cosmogonies, scattered among the contents of 


THE SOURCES OF HIHDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 43 


these hoary records, but presented in a manner at times 
mystical but generally methodical, have as a rule for 
their starting point the Absolute Spirit called Brahma, 
a being described as “ existence, knowledge, and infin¬ 
ity.” But though united in their origin, the source of 
all being, the fountain-head of evolution, they present 
in the development of what may be called their main 
plot elements of discrepancy and discord, which, how¬ 
ever, it is by no means difficult to reconcile. 

Creation, according to some of these accounts, seems 
to have proceeded immediately from the Absolute Spirit 
in a stated order. Take, for instance, the following 
passage from the last chapter of the Taittiriya : “ From 
that soul (Brahma previously described ‘ as existence, 
knowledge, and infinity ’) verily sprang forth the ether, 
from the ether the air, from the air the fire, from the 
fire the waters, from the waters the earth, from the 
earth the annual herbs, and from the annual herbs 
food, from food seed, and from seed man, and man is 
verily the essence of food.” Again : “ All creatures 
which dwell on earth spring verily forth from food. 
Again they live by food, again at last they return to 
the same, for food is the oldest of all beings.” 

In the fifth chapter of the Katha the ubiquity of the 
human soul, identified with the Supreme Ruler, is thus 
described : “ As Hansa (Aditya, sun) it dwells in the 
heavens; as Yasu (wind) it dwells in the atmosphere; as 
the invoker (of the gods) it .dwells within the earth; as 
Soma (moon plant) in the water jar ; it dwells in man, 
it dwells in truth, it dwells in the ether, it is born in 
the waters (as aquatic animals), it is born in the earth 
(as rice, etc.), it is born in the sacrifice, it is born on 
the mountains (as the rivers, etc.), it is truth, it is the 
great one (infinite).” 


44 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


These passages indisputably propound that theory of 
evolution, the starting-point of which is the Divine 

VEssence, but there are others which place an interme¬ 
diate link of gold between this self-evolving spiritual 
substance and the chain of creation. They speak of 
an inferior gold-colored Brahma springing out of the 
Supreme Brahma, the Manifested (Yyakata) out of the 
Unmanifested (Avyakta), the Known (Yijnata) out of 
the Unknown (Avijnata), and causing creation to 
evolve out of his substance in the order stated above. 

//This omnific principle or Demiurgus is called by a 
variety of names—Brahma, the creator ; Indra, the 
King of the gods ; Prajapati, the lord of creatures ; 
Iliranyagarhha, the soul of creation, or the universal 
soul in contradistinction to the Supreme, Unmanifested, 
Unknown Spirit. 

In the Aitareya, evidently the earliest of these trea¬ 
tises, a different order of creation is presented, and a 
regular theogony comes between its incipient and con¬ 
cluding processes, between the creation of the spheres 
—the sphere of waters “ above the heavens,” the 
sphere of the sunbeams, the “ atmosphere,” the sphere 
of death, the earth, and the sphere of waters ‘ ‘ which 
are beneath it,” and the creation of man in whom the 
gods entered through the various openings of his body, 
not excluding its innumerable and imperceptible pores. 
The fanciful and grotesque character of this cosmogony 
and its advancement of what may at first sight be 
called an ex-nihilo theory of creation, stamps it as the 
production of an intermediate era, an age intervening 
between the appearance of the major and that of most 
of the minor Upanishads. 

The cosmogonies presented in these books, indicat¬ 
ing, as they do, a gradual progress from the ludicrous 


THE SOURCES OF HIHDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 45 


fancies of the larger Upanishads toward what was sub¬ 
sequently elaborated in the Yedantic school, are an in¬ 
disputable proof of their posteriority. 

Apropos of our remarks on the evidential value of 
the cosmogonies embodied in these records, /‘we may 
observe that the idea of creation springing out of 
matter and force, made so much of by the so-called 
advanced science of the day, is one of the oldest we 
come across in the world. It was found as a dominat¬ 
ing principle in the oldest schools of Greek philosophy, 
and it was elaborated into a consistent system in India 
in the age immediately following that of the Upani¬ 
shads. Nay, it is found in some of the declarations of 
the Upanishads themselves, standing on a background 
of an all-diffusive and self-evolving divine substance, or 
absolute existence, manifested or embodied in an 
omnific principle or personality. The Prasna Upani- 
shad, which consists of answers to a series of philo¬ 
sophical questions propounded one after another by 
anxious inquirers, opens with a cosmogony which pre¬ 
sents the dualism of an active and a passive principle, 
both springing from Prajapati, the inferior divinity 
throuo-h whom derived existence in its multifarious 

o 

forms is to be traced to the Absolute and the Uncondi¬ 
tioned. “ Prajapati,” it says, “ was desirous of off¬ 
spring. He performed austerity. Having performed 
austerity, he produced a couple, matter and life or fire 
or energy (with the intention) ; they shall in manifold 
ways produce offspring for me.” 

Another important question has to be raised and set 
at rest with reference to these cosmogonies. Do they 
imply a real or an illusory change in the substance of 
Brahma ? Does that substance actually become the 
elements to which material creation is traced ? Or is 


46 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


it merely the substratum concealed beneath varieties of 
deceptive phenomena ? Now no one can study the 
Upanishads carefully without being induced to indorse 
the opinion expressed by authorities like Cowell, viz., 
that an actual change of substance, not merely an illu¬ 
sory transformation, is indicated in the cosmogonies of 
the Upanishads, though the illusion theory is in a few 
solitary passages alluded to. The writers were Parina- 
mavadins or Vikarvadins, or those who insisted upon 
an actual metamorphosis of substance—not Mayavadins, 
or those who maintained an illusory change to uphold 
the doctrine of non-dualism in all its integrity. This 
subject will have to be enlarged upon when we treat of 
the Yedanta system ; and it need not be allowed to 
detain us here. 

Let us adduce one more proof of the posteriority of 
these records, a proof insignificant indeed at first sight, 
but one better adapted in our humble opinion to pro¬ 
duce conviction than many ostensibly more important. 
The proof is indicated in the well-known words of 
Jacob : 66 Few and evil have the days of the years of 
my life been, and have not attained unto the days of 
the years of the life of my fathers.” The longevity 
indicated in the smaller Upanishads is by no means so 
marked as that shown in the larger, the length of life 
having come down from one hundred and forty in the 
latter to one hundred in the former. And less earnest¬ 
ness in religious matters stamps these records of a 
period when tricks, such as that set forth in the follow- 
ingsentence, were unhappily becoming common : (“ A 
sacrificer) who bestows (cows) which have drunk their 
water, eaten their grass, given their milk, and which 
are barren, goes verily to the worlds of unhappiness.” 
But the best proof decidedly of the posteriority of these 


THE S0UECES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 47 

treatises is to be found, as has already been said, in the 
terseness of their style, in the method and logical pre¬ 
cision by which they are, comparatively speaking, 
characterized, and in the progress of speculative acute¬ 
ness and analytic thought shown in the disquisitions 
they embody. Their object is to teach the science of 
Brahma, the absolute spirit ; and its superiority to 
every other species of knowledge is shown by a dis¬ 
closure of its inherent excellence, by the eulogy lav¬ 
ished on those devotees who make it the sole object of 
their search, and by the insight presented into its glo¬ 
rious consequences. 

It is said to be “ the foundation of all sciences,” “ the 
highest science,” the “ supreme path” to felicity,. 
“ the last object of man , 5 ’yand high-sounding adjec¬ 
tives, or adjectives of the most imposing kind, are pressed 
into service to set forth its excellence. It is, properly 
speaking, the only correct science, the knowledge de¬ 
rived through pe rcep tion and inference being sheer 
ignorance. All persons in this world under the guid¬ 
ance of the senses are spoken of in terms by no means 
complimentary. “ In the midst of ignorance, fookK 
fancying themselves wise and learned go round and 
round, oppressed by misery as blind people led by a 
blind. ” The few who liberate themselves from the cob¬ 
webs of this sense-produced ignorance and eagerly run 
after right knowledge, are praised in extravagant terms. 

The legend with which the Katha Upanishad opens 
is eminently fitted to show this. ISTachiketas, being 
devoted by his exasperated father to Death (Yama), 
conciliates the monster by fasts and vigils, and is 
offered “ three boons.” With true filial piety he first 
solicits a change in his father’s heart favorable to his 
hope of reconciliation to him, then requests some knowl- 



48 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


edge about “ the heavenly fire” or the fire by which 
heaven is gained, and lastly propounds a question in 
"'these words : “ Some say the soul exists after the 
death of man, others say it does not exist. This I 
should like to know, instructed by thee. Such is the 
third of the boons.” Death, unwilling to communicate 
the precious knowledge to him, asks him to choose 
other gifts, such as “ sons and grandsons who may live 
a hundred years,” “ herds of cattle,” “ elephants,” 
“ gold and horses,” “ wealth and far-extending life.” 
He, however, continues stubborn, although pleasures 
unattainable by man, such as may be brought to him 
by “ the fair ones of heaven with their cars and musical 
instruments,” are offered him. Death ultimately 
grants him the boon requested, with these words of 
encouragement : “ One thing is what is good, another 
what is pleasant. Both having different objects chain 
man. Blessed is he who between them takes the good 
(alone), but he who chooses what is pleasant loses the 
last object of man.” The results of this knowledge 
will have to be displayed after its object has been set 
forth ; and they need not detain us here. Suffice it to 
say that it is represented as that by virtue of which 
“ all is manifested,” “ man is delivered from the mouth 
of death,” and even the status of the gods is raised. 

The excellency, moreover, of this science, the knowl¬ 
edge of Brahma, is set forth in the very difficult man¬ 
ner in which it is acquired. The path to it is not a 
path strewn with roses, but a path of thorns, the path 
of duty, renunciation, privation, study, meditation, and 
austerity in its most appalling forms ; and it is justly 
called “ the sharp edge of a razor.” One cannot group 
and carefully study the many passages and texts in 
which this path is indicated, without noticing much 


THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 49 


confusion of thought, if not glaring contradiction ; but 
order can, we believe, be evolved out of the chaotic 
mass. There are passages in which performance of the 
duties of life, study of the Yedas under an accredited 
teacher, austerity and penance are represented as indis¬ 
pensable requisites for the attainment of supreme knowl¬ 
edge, and there are others in which these are spoken 
of in disparaging. terms, and the mystic notion of a 
beatific or tranquil vision is prominently brought for¬ 
ward. And these two classes of texts are apparently 
at variance, but in reality there is no contradiction. 

The utilization of the means is necessary to the a£^\ 
tainment of the end ; and such exercises as worship, \ 
study, and penance are the prescribed means, and as \ 
such they should be earnestly resorted to ; but when 
this preliminary process has been completed, it should 
be entirely lost sight of, and nothing thought or even 
dreamt of but sublime contemplation leading to beatific 
vision, or rather a calm recognition of the real under 
the phenomenal, the permanent under the imperma¬ 
nent, the changeless under the fitful and the changeable. 

The first thing the Brahma student must do is to 
perform the duties of life called inferior in contradis¬ 
tinction to those which bring him where the great 
object of his career is gained, and he becomes liberated 
from sense-bred ignorance. He must as a ££ house¬ 
holder” perform his duties “ toward the gods and the 
forefathers” and all classes of people, not forgetting 
even “ the beggars.” He must conscientiously do the 
threefold work of “ offering, reading of the Yedas, and 
liberality,” and then “ renounce the world ” and “ ap¬ 
proach, sacred wood in his hand, a teacher who knows 
the Yedas and who is solely devoted to Brahma. ” But 
the question arises, Who is the accredited teacher to 


50 


HmDU PHILOSOPHY. 


whose guidance he must implicitly and unreservedly 
commit himself ? To be able to answer this question 
an insight into the Hindu theory of apostolic succession 
is needed. The accredited teacher of the hour is the 
legitimate successor, through a bright line of inspired 
teachers, of him who first learned the science of Brahma 
from the Creator himself, the emergent Deity who 
stands as a connecting link between the unmanifested 
substance and the manifested forms in which it appears 
in creation. “ Brahma, the Creator of the universe, 
the preserver of the world, was first produced among 
the gods. He taught the science of Brahma, the foun¬ 
dation of all sciences, to Atharvan, his eldest son. 
Atharvan revealed of old the science of Brahma, which 
Brahma had explained to him, to Angis ; he explained 
it to Satyavaha of the family of Bharadnaja, who 
revealed the science traditionally obtained by the suc¬ 
cession of teachers to Angiras” ( mundaka ). In this 
manner “ the highest science”—in contradistinction to 
the “ baser” which comprehends the Big, the Yajur, 
the Sama, and the Atharvan Yedas, accentuation, rit¬ 
ual, grammar, glossary, prosody, and astronomy, the 
Yedas and the Yedangas—has come down, through oral 
tradition, to the teacher of the hour. 

The necessity of resort to him is shown in almost in¬ 
numerable passages, such as the following : 

“ A wonderful teacher is required. Of the soul is 
wonderful the speaker, ingenious the receiver, wonder¬ 
ful the knower, instructed by an ingenious teacher.” 

. “ Arise, awake, get to the teachers and attend.” 


But the Brahma student must separate himself from 
his teacher when thoroughly instructed, and have re¬ 
course to hermit solitude, restraint of the senses and 


THE SOURCES OE HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 51 


concentration of the mind before his object can be 
gained. He must remember that the occult knowledge 
he is in quest of cannot be acquired through the senses, 
or through instruction of any kind, or even through 
revelation. “ The soul’s nature is not placed in what is 
visible. Hone beholds it by the eye.’ ’ “ With regard 

to him (Brahma) the sun does not manifest, not the 
moon, not the stars.” “ The soul cannot be gained by 
the knowledge of the Yeda, not by understanding its 
meaning, not by manifold science.” “ By the soul, 
which is chosen, it (the soul) can be gained.” 

Direct vision of the universal soul by the individual 
soul, calm rather than beatific, is the summum lonum , to 
which he is to rise, in consequence, not so much of the 
preparatory exercises he has gone through, as of ascetic 
self-mortification and serene contemplation. “ It is not 
apprehended by the eye, not by speech, not by the other 
senses, not by devotion or rites ; but he, whose intellect 
is purified by the light of knowledge, beholds him, who 
is without parts, through mediation” (Mundaka). 

The important questions discussed in these venerable 
records have reference to the nature of the Universal 
Soul, called Brahma, and his relation to the individual 
soul, and to the external world. They may be categor¬ 
ically stated thus : (1) What is Brahma ? (2) How is 
Brahma related to the human soul, mine or yours ? 
(3) How is Brahma related to what in ordinary human 
parlance is called the material world ? We cannot 
better dive into the philosophy of these treatises than 
by grouping the replies embodied in them to these im¬ 
portant questions. 

1. What is Brahma ? What do these books say 
regarding his nature ? The answer is embodied in the 
following passages : 


52 


HIKDU PHILOSOPHY. 


“ He who is the ear of the ear, the mind of the mind, 
speech of speech, is verily the life of life, the eye of the 
eye. The wise, who have abandoned (those individual 
existences) when departing from this world become im¬ 
mortal. Him (the Supreme Brahma) does not approach 
the eye or speech or mind. We do not recognize 
(Brahma as anything perceptible, therefore) we do not 
know how to teach him (his nature to a disciple). It is 
even different from what is known (from the unmani¬ 
fested universe ; if you then say it must be the unmani¬ 
fested universe, no) it is also beyond what is known (to 
the senses, it is beyond the unmanifested universe). 
Thus we heard from the former teachers who explained 
it to us” (“ Talavakara,” sec. 1). 

“ Whoever has understood (the nature of Brahma), 
which is without sound, without touch, without form, 
which does not waste, which is without taste, which is 
eternal, without smell, without beginning, and without 
end, higher than the great one (intellect), which is 
firmly based, escapes from the mouth of death” 
(“ Katha,” sec. 3). 

“ Higher than the senses (and their objects) is the 
mind, more excellent than the mind the intellect ; 
above the intellect soars the great soul, more excellent 
than the great one is the unmanifested. But higher 
than the unmanifested is the soul which is all-pervad¬ 
ing and without cause. Knowing this one gets liber¬ 
ated and gains immortality” (“ Katha,” sec. 6). 

“ Whoever, O beloved one, knows the indestructible 
(soul), on which (the being) whose nature is knowledge, 
and together with all the gods, the vital airs, and the 
elements are formed, gets omniscient, penetrates all” 
(“ Prasna,” sec. 4). 

“He (Brahma) is verily luminous, without form, a 


THE SOUKCES OF HIHDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 53 


spirit, he is without and within ; without origin, with¬ 
out life, without mind, he is pure and greater than the 
great indestructible one. From this Brahma are pro¬ 
duced life, mind, and all the organs, ether, air, light, 
the water (and), the earth, the support of all ” (Second 
Mundaka). 

“ I am the spirit (mover) of the tree (viz., of the tree 
of the world which is to he cut down). (Thy) fame 
(rises) like the top of the mountain. I am purified in 
my root, as immortality is glorious in the nourisher 
(viz., the sun). I am brilliant wealth, I am intelligent, 
I am immortal, and without decay. (Or I am sprinkled 
with immortality)” (“ Taittariya,” chap. i. sec. 10). 

These passages present a confusion of nomenclature 
which must be cleared up before the prominent idea set 
forth can be grasped. Brahma is in many passages 
called the Unmanifested (Avyakta) ; but in one of 
these passages he is distinguished from and placed 
above the unmanifested, and in another the unmani¬ 
fested from which he is distinguished is called the un¬ 
manifested universe. To set forth the distinction, we 
must ascertain what is meant by the manifested uni¬ 
verse, and what by the unmanifested. By the mani¬ 
fested universe we are to understand the various objects 
of nature, the knowledge of which we derive through 
perception. The material, perceptible world, that of 
the existence of which we are assured by the varied 
impressions made upon the senses, or the sensations 
caused by it, is the manifested universe. The unmani¬ 
fested universe is the world of tenuous substances, the 
world in modern phraseology of causes and forces, of 
the existence of which we are assured by inference, not 
perception. Beyond the world of shifting phenomena^ 
beyond the world of imperceptible substanges 


54 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


occult forces, is Brahma, “ the foundation 1 1 of all we 
perceive, and of all we cannot perceive, but legitimately 
deduce from the coincidences, the successions, and the 
transmutations of the phenomena perceived. 

Again, Brahma is in one of these passages called 
“ the indestructible soul, 11 on which all forms of life, 
all forms of organized and unorganized material and 
mental existence are “ founded while in another he 
is represented as 4 c greater than the great indestructible 
one. 11 "Who is this being described as “ greater than 
the great indestructible one 11 ? Sankar’s reply is, 
“ Brahma in his unmanifested state. 11 The phrase, 
however, is ambiguous, being applicable both to the 
being described “ as greater than the great indestructi¬ 
ble one, 11 and the being described as “ the indestructible 
one. 11 The distinction set forth is perhaps that be¬ 
tween the Absolute, Unmanifested Spirit, and the 
emanent or emergent Deity called Brahma, Prajapati, 
Iiiranyagarbha or Virat ; or simply that between the 
human soul called “ great 11 and the Supreme Spirit 
called “ greater, 11 because of its freedom from the 
bondage under which it groans. 

It ought not to be forgotten that according to the 
later speculations of the Yedantic school, a portion of 
Brahma called the “The Fourth 11 always remains un¬ 
connected with the detached portion manifested in the 
phenomena of nature. 

The last of these quotations presents a figure of 
speech with which our countrymen are familiar. The 
world is often in their sacred literature compared to 
“ an eternal, holy fig-tree, whose root is upward and 
whose branches go downward, 11 and the very sap 
which is the life thereof is Brahma, who may justly be 
called the cmima mundi , the life of the world. This 


THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 55 


image shows in what respect the Hindu theory of evo¬ 
lution differs from what is propounded in these days. 
It is a downward progression from spirit to matter, not 
an upward progression from matter to spirit. 

It is further to be observed that these passages merely 
show the relative position of Brahma, or the position he 
occupies in the scale of being, and what he is not. 
They do not show what he is. 

Brahma is, according to the philosophy of these 
records, illimitable, and therefore undeterminable and 
undefinable. The quibbles and puzzles, the riddles and 
enigmas, to which the modern doctrine of the Absolute 
and the Infinite has given rise, are found in these 
hoary records and disposed of beautifully. To define 
the infinite is tantamount to reducing the infinite to the 
category of the finite, and therefore all definitions given 
of the Supreme Brahma must be accepted with reserva¬ 
tion. When, for instance, he is called a spirit, no line 
of demarcation between spirit and matter should be 
drawn, and no attempt made to limit him, either by 
assuming the existence of matter apart from him, or by 
positing various orders of spirits essentially different 
from him. He is, properly speaking, the all-absorbing 
existence, and no form of being can be conceived of as 
existing apart from him. Again, when he is said to be 
“ without form,” “ without fife,” or “ without mind,” 
we are not to posit existences, such as that of “ form” 
or “ life” (mundane) or “ mind ” apart from him, and 
thereby reduce him to the category of the finite. He 
is, properly speaking, form, life, and mind, and no 
entity exists apart from him. Again, when he is rep¬ 
resented as the creator or the foundation of the world, 
we are not to limit him by recognizing an essential, or 
any but mere nominal distinction between the creator 


56 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


and the objects of creation. He is, to adopt the well- 
known phrase of Spinoza, the natura naturans; and 
there is, properly speaking, no difference between him 
and the universe, which is natura natureta. He is 
therefore above the region of definitions and deter¬ 
minations ; and the only thing that can be predicated 
of him is existence, absolute and unconditioned. And 
this existence, moreover, ought not to be separated 
by a broad line of demarcation from non-existence, as 
the infinite must embrace all states, that of existence 
and that of non-existence. Such at least is the modem 
dictum ! 

Brahma is called Sacchitananda, which is, being in¬ 
terpreted, Existence, Knowledge, and Bliss. But when 
the meaning attached to either of the two terms, knowl¬ 
edge and bliss, in this connection is looked into, the 
triad resolves itself into a monad. To this technical 
phrase, made so much of in subsequent times, we shall 
return after we have shown the perfect identity of the 
universal with the individual soul and the material 
world. 

2. What is the human soul, and what its relation to 
the universal spirit ? The following quotations will 
furnish a reply to this question : 

“ The knowing (soul) is not born, nor does it die ; it 
was not produced from any one, nor was any produced 
from it ; unborn, eternal, without decay, ancient as it 
is, it is not slain, although the lody is slain ” (“ Katha,” 
sec. 2). 

“ The perfect one (Purush) who, building desire after 
desire, is awake in those that a/re asleep , is called even 
pure, is called Brahma, is called even eternal. . . . 
As the one fire, when entering the world, becomes to 
every nature of every nature, so the one soul leing of 


THE SOURCES OF HIHDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 57 


every nature to every nature is the internal soul of all 
being ” (“ Katha ” sec. 5). 

“ As from blazing fire in a thousand ways similar 
sparks proceed, so, O beloved, are produced living souls 
of various hinds from the indestructible Brahma , and 
they also return to him” (Second Mundaka, sec. 1). 

“ Within (the heart) which the arteries enter as the 
spokes the nave of the wheel, he (Brahma) moves, be¬ 
coming manifold ” (Second Mundaka, sec. 2). 

“For this all (represented by ‘Om ’) is Brahma, 
this soul is Brahma. This soul has four conditions— 
viz., waking, dreaming, profound sleep, and a state 
different from any of the former” (Mandukya). 

The italics are our own. It is impossible to find 
words more adequate than these to set forth the perfect 
identity of the universal with the individual ego. The 
cosmogonies alluded to dwell, not merely on this iden¬ 
tity, but on the method in which the Supreme Spirit 
entered the human body previously created, and ani¬ 
mated it. Its dwelling-place within the body is u the 
ether of the heart,” and it is incased within five 
sheaths. The outer sheath is called the essence of food 
(i annam ), which is also called Brahma, and is repre¬ 
sented as an object of worship. The sheath immedi¬ 
ately beneath this is called “vital air,” and is said 
to be the embodied soul of the nutritious sheath, or the 
outer garb. Beneath the vital sheath there is the 
mental sheath or “the mind,” which has the Yajur 
Yeda for its head, the Rig for its right arm, and the 
Sama for its left. Beneath that lies that of knowledge, 
and beneath that is that of bliss, which covers the spirit 
dwelling in its “ cavity” in the heart, the spirit which 
is at one and the same time greater than space and 
smaller than a grain of mustard seed. The body in 


58 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


which it dwells is called the Brahmapura, or the town 
of Brama, and it is said to have eleven gates, the seven 
openings in the face, the navel, the two openings below, 
and the opening on the middle of the head. This last 
opening needs an explanation, it being, according to 
some of the Upanishads, the entrance through which 
the ingress and egress of the soul are effected. The 
explanation needed is offered in these two extracts, the 
first from the Taittiriya, and the second from the 
Aitariya. 

“ In the ether, abiding within the heart, is placed 
the Purush (soul), whose nature is knowledge—who is 
immortal, radiant like gold. The artery, Sushumna by 
name (the coronal artery), which springs forth from the 
upper part of the heart, and proceeds between the two 
arteries of the palate, and (within the piece of flesh) 
which like a breast is hanging down, then, after having 
made its way through the head and skull (terminates) 
where the root of the hair is distributed—this (artery) 
is the birthplace (road) of Brahma. ’’ 

“ Making an opening, where the hairs (of the head) 
divide, he penetrated by that door. This is called the 
door of division. This is the door of rejoicing (because 
it is the road to the Supreme Brahma). 5 ’ 

There is also a passage in one of the Upanishads 
which distinctly affirms that when a man dies the 
Brahma, dwelling in the ether of his heart, goes out of 
his body through the coronal artery, or the artery 
which is said to terminate where the hairs of his head 
divide. The ether of the heart, whatever it may be, 
is generally represented as the dwelling-place of the 
Supreme Spirit, though at times Brahma is identified 
with it. The following text from the third Prasna is 
fitted in the first place to corroborate this assertion, and 


THE SOURCES OE HIHDU PHILOSOPHY COXTIHUED. 59 


in the second to show the ease with which physiological 
facts are manufactured and retailed : “ For the ether 
(of the heart) is verily that soul (Brahma). There arise 
the one hundred and one principal arteries ; each of 
them is a hundred times divided ; 72,000 are the 
branches of every branch artery ; within them moves s 
the circulating air.” According to this calculation, the 
number of arteries in the human body is 727,210,201 ; 
and when these and the five vital airs, the circulating 
air, the equalizing air in the navel, which results in the 
digestion of food and its assimilation, the air of respira¬ 
tion, the ascending air, which rises up through the 
coronal artery, and the descending air, are all coolly 
manufactured, we need not be surprised at the physio¬ 
logical “ consciousness,” which in its anxiety to find a 
dwelling-place for the soul (which combines the oppo¬ 
site extremes of immensity and exiguity), posits a little 
ether in the heart ! 

It may, however, be said that all these physiological 
speculations on the constitution of the body, the 
entrance of Brahma into its inmost recess through an 
arterial pathway, and the varied sheaths or cases in 
which he lies enveloped, presuppose a distinction be¬ 
tween the body and the indwelling spirit, and savor of 
dualism. But the distinction indicated is, according to 
the uniform teaching of these records, apparent rather 
than real, or if real, derived rather than original—a 
distinction, strictly speaking, modal. This will appear 
when we look into 

3. The relation of the Supreme Spirit to the material 
world. It has already been shown that the cosmogo¬ 
nies embodied in these records develop the theory of 
evolution, which brings creation in all its diversified 
forms, matter organized and unorganized, and mind 


GO 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


with its thoughts, feelings, and volitions, out of an all- 
diffusive divine substance. Additional proof is scarcely 
needed. We shall content ourselves with one or two 
quotations under this head : “As the spider casts-out 
and draws in (its web), as on the earth the annual herbs 
are produced, as from the living man the hairs of the 
body spring forth, so is produced the universe from the 
indestructible (Brahma).” “ From him also were pro¬ 
duced in many ways the gods, the Sadhyas (a kind of 
gods), men, quadrupeds, birds, and vital airs that go 
forward and descend, rice and barley, devotion, faith, 
truth, the duties of a Brahma student, and observ¬ 
ance. ” Here is the theory of the consubstantiality of 
the material world with the Creator set forth with the 
greatest perspicuity and force. 

Contradictory statements cannot but abound in trea¬ 
tises which confessedly present a few grains of philo¬ 
sophical thought amid a heap of irrelevant matter, and 
which, though comparatively speaking well written, 
bristle with extravagances of thought and expression, 
as well as with tiresome repetitions. But the line of 
thought which underlies the wild and grotesque specu¬ 
lations in which they abound is thoroughly pantheistic, 
opposed to dualism, opposed to the universally recog¬ 
nized distinction between the Creator and creation, and 
consequently between the soul and the body, mind and 
matter. 

The solution, then, of the problems discussed in these 
treatises is that there is one divine being, Brahma, 
manifested in various forms or modes, both spiritual 
and material. This being is represented as Sat (Exist¬ 
ence), Chit (Intelligence or Knowledge), and Ananda 
(Happiness). The following quotations will establish 
this : 


THE SOURCES OE HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 61 


“ Whoever knows Brahma, who is existence, knowl¬ 
edge, and infinity, . . . enjoys all desires at one and 
the same time, together with the omniscient Brahma” 

(“ Taittiriya,’ J chap. ii.). 

“ The soul is to be perceived by (the notion of) exist¬ 
ence, it is to be perceived by its true notion (that is to 
say) by both of them ; the true nature of soul becomes 
manifest when (first) it has been perceived by the 
notion of existence” (“ Katha,” chap. vi.). 

“ For he is the beholder, the toucher, the hearer, the . 
smeller, the taster, the minder, the intelligent, the 
agent, the being whose nature is knowledge, the spirit 
(Purush). He is founded on the supreme indestructible 
soul (Fourth Prasna). 

“ They think the fourth him whose knowledge are 
not internal objects, nor external, nor both, who has 
not uniform knowledge, who is not intelligent and not 
unintelligent, who is invisible, imperceptible, unseiz- 
able, incapable of proof, beyond thought, not to be 
defined, whose only proof is the belief in the soul, in 
whom all the spheres have ceased, who is tranquil, bliss¬ 
ful, and without duality” (Mandukya). 

The third of these extracts speaks evidently of the 
individual soul, but its identity with the universal soul 
being established, the predicate knowledge reveals, not 
only its own nature, but that of the Supreme Spirit on 
which it is found. These and such like declarations we 
cannot collate without being led to grasp the character¬ 
istic idea embodied in the compound word Sacchita- 
nanda, formally applied to the Supreme Brahma, and 
made capital of in post-Vedic times. What is this 
idea ? When God is represented as Existence, Knowl¬ 
edge, and Bliss, have we not an idea as accurate, as 
well as lofty, as that presented in the Bible ; God the 


62 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


Father representing Existence, God the Son represent¬ 
ing Knowledge, and God the Holy Spirit representing 
Bliss? Onr answer would be “Yes,” if the terms 
knowledge and bliss were taken in the acceptation or 
sense attached to them when they are applied to God. 
But we have reason to conclude that they are not em¬ 
ployed to mean what they ordinarily signify, either in 
the TJpanishads or in the philosophical discussions car¬ 
ried on in ages subsequent to that of the Upanishads. 
The last of the above extracts, which represents Brahma 
as at one and the same time intelligent and unintelli¬ 
gent, shows that the word knowledge at least is used in 
this connection in a sense different from what, in com¬ 
mon parlance, or even in schools of philosophy (barring 
of course those of Qur own country), it bears. 

Properly speaking, God, according to the teaching 
of these books and the system of pantheism subse¬ 
quently borrowed from them, is existence and nothing 
more, the pure Being of some schools of Greek philoso¬ 
phy, the unmanifested essence beneath manifested acci¬ 
dents, the only noumenon beneath shifting phenomena. 
Like many Greek philosophers, the authors of the 
TJpanishads strove to find something permanent be¬ 
neath the ceaseless mutations of natural phenomena. 
All nature appeared to them in a flux, earth melting 
into water, water into heat, heat into air, air into ether, 
and ether becoming earth by a process of solidification 
embracing the other elements in a reverse order. iSTor 
did they see anything but ceaseless change in the vary¬ 
ing moods of the mind, the shifting states of conscious¬ 
ness, thoughts, emotions, and volitions. The question 
naturally presented itself to their minds, Is there noth¬ 
ing permanent beneath this ceaseless flow of change, 
etxernal and internal ? And they solved this vexed 


THE SOUKCES OE HIXDU PHILOSOPHY COHTIHUED. G3 


question by positing a substance, absolute and un¬ 
changeable, behind the transmutations of the material 
and the changes of the mental world. 

This existence, however, could not be an object of 
knowledge without implying distinctions fitted to mar 
its absoluteness ; nor could it be a subject of knowledge 
without giving birth to a similar contradiction. The 
knowledge, therefore, ascribed to this existence, is a 
knowledge without distinction of subject and object, 
and therefore essentially different from what we call 
knowledge. The same may be said of the predicate 
bliss as applied to this existence, it being happiness 
without such consciousness or feeling as may cripple the 
absoluteness of the absolute ! Besides, these three ex¬ 
pressions are not used as predicates at ail ; they form 
the trinitarian essence of the Supreme Brahma, not his 
attributes. 

All, therefore, that is predicable of the God of the 
Ilpanishads is infinite, unconditioned, absoluta exist¬ 
ence, which again should not be separated by a sharp 
line of distinction from non-existence. This will ex¬ 
plain the paradoxes in which the Upanishads abound ; 
such, for instance, as are set forth when God is said to 
be “ with knowledge and void of knowledge,” to “ re¬ 
joice and not rejoice.” Modern pantheism has made us 
familiar with such paradoxes as Ego-nonego, Subject- 
object, One-all, All-one ; but it will find itself distanced 
by those in which the Hindu mind loves to indulge 
when thinking and speaking of God, whom it loves to 
represent as “ with form and without form,” “ defined 
and undefinable,” “ a foundation and without a foun¬ 
dation,” as “ true and not true,” as one who “ moves” 
and “ does not move,” “ who is far and also near,” 
66 within this all,” and “out of this all.” Some of 


64 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


these contradictions are set forth in the following free 
metrical version of a well-known passage by Monier 
Williams : 

“ The slayer thinks he slays the slain 

Believes himself destroyed ; the thoughts of both 
Are false, the soul survives, nor kills, nor dies ; 

’Tis subtler than the smallest, greater than 
The greatest, infinitely small, yet vast ; 

Asleep, yet restless, moving everywhere 
Among the bodies—ever bodiless— 

Think not to grasp it by the reasoning mind, 

The wicked ne’er can know it ; soul alone 

Knows soul, to none but soul is soul revealed.” 

The eschatology of the minor Upanishads is of a 
piece with that of the major, and an additional disquisi¬ 
tion is not needed to set it forth. Suffice it to say that 
the two doctrines of the impeccability of the soul and 
its final absorption into the Deity are much more cate¬ 
gorically stated in these treatises. Sin inheres in the 
body, and may pollute the internal organs, and specially 
the mind ; but it cannot possibly taint the pure spirit 
that abides in the ether of the heart, guarded by the 
fivefold sheath of bliss, knowledge, mind, vital air, and 
nutrition. And because incapable of being polluted by 
sin, the soul is impassible. u As the one sun, the eye 
of the whole world, is not sullied by the defects of the 
eye or of external things, so the soul, as the inner soul 
of all beings, is not sullied by the unhappiness of the 
world, because it is also without it. 5 ’ 

The question, however may be asked, If the soul is as 
tranquil and blissful in the body as out of it, where lies 
the necessity of its liberation ? Why should a sensible 
man spend years in sequestered places amid mortifica¬ 
tions and penances to insure the emancipation of that 
spirit which is so calm and imperturbable, if not happy 


THE SOURCES OF HIXDU PHILOSOPHY COXTIXUED. 65 


in the ordinary sense of the term, in bondage as out of 
it ? This question is not discussed properly in the 
Upanishads ; but its solution was attempted in subse¬ 
quent times, when the theory of illusion was elaborated, 
and both bondage and liberation were represented as 
fictitious. 

The individuated souls are represented in almost in¬ 
numerable passages as taking the consequences of their 
actions in this life, or in the series of lives, which com¬ 
pose the long chain of transmigration, and they even 
drag the Supreme Spirit into the happiness and misery 
in which they are involved. 44 (The supreme and in¬ 
ferior souls) drinking the due reward of their works in 
this world, entered both the cave, the highest place of 
the supreme soul.” The soul must consume the fruits, 
good or bad, of its works, know itself, and then be lib¬ 
erated from sense-bred ignorance. 44 Whoever knows 
the origin, the entrance, the locality, and the fivefold 
power of life (soul) enjoys immortality ; whoever knows 
this enjoys immortality.” 

The doctrine of absorption is set forth in the follow¬ 
ing passages : 

4 4 As the flowing, sea-going rivers, when they have 
reached the sea, are annihilated, as their names and 
forms perish, and only the name of sea remains, so the 
sixteen parts of the witness (soul) which are going to 
the soul (as the rivers to the sea) when they have 
reached the soul, are annihilated, their names and forms 
perish, and only the name of soul remains ; it is then 
without parts, it is immortal ” ( 44 Prasna,” sec. 4). 

44 As the flowing rivers come to their end in the sea, 
losing name and form, so, liberated from name and 
form, proceeds the wise to the divine soul, which is 
greater than the great. Whoever knows this Supreme 


66 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


Brahma, becomes even Brahma. In his family there 
will be none ignorant of Brahma ; he overcomes grief, 
he overcomes sin, he becomes immortal, liberated from 
the bonds of the cave (heart)” ( u Mandaka,” sec. 3). 

The sixteen parts of the witness, soul, are the five 
organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, the 
eleventh organ, the mind, and the five gross elements 
of which the body is composed, or perhaps the five vital 
airs. Some of the categories of the Sankya school are 
referred to in many parts of these books, and they may 
at first sight lead us to the conclusion that some of 
them at least were composed after its organization or 
development. But it is just as reasonable to conclude 
that the characteristic ideas of that school had existed, 
and been, to some extent, matured before the appear¬ 
ance of the Sankhya philosophy as an organized system. 

Salvation is made dependent on knowledge of 
Brahma, and when this is attained in all its fulness a 
metamorphosis of the devotee takes place. He himself 
becomes Brahma, blissful, impassible, above the pollut¬ 
ing touch of sin, for even when in this blessed condition 
he does commit gross sins, such as adultery and murder, 
he is left unpolluted, and therefore perfectly pure. Let 
us conclude with an extract from one of Professor 
Gough’s scholarly papers on the IJpanishads, originally 
published in the Calcutta Review , and since republished 
in the form of a book, presented by Major Jacob in the 
book already alluded to : 

“ The theosophist liberated from metempsychosis, 
but still in the body, is untouched by merit or demerit, 
absolved from all works, good and evil, unsoiled by 
sinful works, uninjured by what he has done and what 
he has left undone. Good works, like evil works, and 
like the God that recompenses them, belong to the un- 


THE S0UECES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 67 

real, to the fictitious duality, the world of semblances. 
. . . Anandagiri : 4 The theosophist, as long as he 
lives, may do good and evil as he chooses, and incur no 
stain, such is the efficiency of gnosis ? ’ And so in the 
Taittiriya Upanisliad (ii. 9) we read : ‘ The thought 
afflicts not him ; what have I left undone ; what evil 
done ? 5 And in the Buhadaranyaka : 6 Here the thief 
is no more a thief, the Chandala no more a Chandala, 
the Paulkasa no more a Pauikasa, the sacred mendicant 
no more a sacred mendicant : they are not followed by 
good works, they are not followed by evil works. For 
at last the sage has passed beyond all the sorrows of his 
heart.’ Immoral inferences from this doctrine—the 
quietists of all ages have been taxed with immorality— 
are thus reargued by Nrisimhasaraswati : ‘ Some one 
may say, It will follow from this the theosophist may 
act as he chooses. That he can act as he pleases cannot 
be denied in the presence of texts of revelation, tradi¬ 
tionary texts, and arguments such as the following : 
4 Hot by matricide, not by parricide.’ ‘ He that does 
not identify not-self with self, whose. inner faculty is 
unsullied though he slay these people, neither slays 
them, nor is slain. He that knows the truth is sullied 
neither by good actions nor by evil actions. In answer 
to all this we reply : True ; but as these texts ard only 
eulogistic of the theosophist, it is not intended that he 
should thus act. ’ ” 

Does not this extract justify the assertion made by a 
great thinker that pantheism is pan-diabolism ? It will 
be shown, when Yedantism is treated of, that our 
recognition of all distinctions, moral or material, is ac¬ 
cording to the teaching of these records, and the great 
system evolved from it in subsequent times, illusory ; 
and the chief of those items of ignorance from the 


68 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


trammels of which we have to free ourselves by right 
knowledge. What we call good and what we call evil, 
virtue and vice, holiness and sin, both emanate from the 
diffusive Spirit from which we have sprung along with 
the objects of creation around us, and into which we 
shall be merged along with them when the season of 
divine hibernation once more makes its appearance, to 
be followed in due course by fresh acts of development 
and reabsorption. 


CHAPTER III. 


THE AGE OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 

In our analysis of the contents of the Upanishads, 
commented upon by Sankar, we purposely left out one 
as not entitled to a place among the Sources of Hindu 
Philosophy. This is the Swetaswatara Upanishad, a 
document which in bulk may justly be represented as 
an intermediate link between the major and the minor 
Upanishads, but which in chronological order leaves 
them all very far indeed behind it. The Swetaswatara 
is the most modem of the Upanishads, and its composi¬ 
tion must be traced to a period posterior to the organi¬ 
zation of the principal schools of Indian Philosophy, 
and therefore to the era when the incipient speculations 
embodied in these documents generally were systema¬ 
tized and matured into permanent and conflicting types 
of philosophic thought. 

Unmistakable traces of its late origin are discoverable 
among its miscellaneous contents. The mythology, for 
instance, of which glimpses are presented in its pages, 
is not that either of the Yedic or of the Heroic age of 
Indian History ; but that spun out into grotesque forms 
when the spirit of sectarianism gave birth to numerous 
factions within the precincts of Hindu society. The 
well-known triad, Brahma, Yishnu, and Maheshwar, 
shrinks into what may be called the monad, Siva, who 
again is identified with the Supreme Brahma, the 
Source of all Being. This deity, Siva, and the energies 


70 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


associated with him, each in the shape of a female 
divinity, are set forth as objects of worship rather than 
the gods and goddesses of the Yedic, or even of the 
Heroic age. Besides three of the six schools of Hindu 
Philosophy are referred toby name—viz., the Sankhya, 
the Yoga, and the Yedant — and references to the 
others, as well as citations from the minor Upanishads, 
are by no means few and far between. 

But the object of the document itself sets forth, more 
than the traces of its late origin already referred to, its 
posteriority, or its composition in an age subsequent to 
that, not only of the major, but of the minor Upani¬ 
shads. That object is similar to, if not identical with, 
that of the Bhagvada Gita—viz., to effect a reconcilia¬ 
tion between the varied lines of philosophic thought 
represented by the varied schools, especially between 
the rank materialism of the Sankhya and the equally 
rank pantheism of the Yedantic system. Its composi¬ 
tion, therefore, should be traced to the time when prac¬ 
tical difficulties arose from the ceaseless struggles of the 
schools ; and when an attempt to obviate them by 
• means of a compromise, a truce, if not a lasting peace, 
was peremptorily demanded. It must at the same time 
be admitted that internal evidence does not warrant 
the conclusion which sets forth the contemporaneity of 
the Upanishad under review with the Bhagvada Gita. 
The Krishna Cultus, which appears fully developed in 
the latter document, is not even referred to in the 
former ; while the differences noticeable in the modes 
of reconciliation proposed in the two documents presup¬ 
pose an interval of several generations between the 
composition of the one and that of the other. 

The Swetaswatara Upanishad, though not entitled to 
a place among the Sources of Hindu Philosophy, is a 


TIIE AGE OF IIIN'DU FniLOSOPHY. 


71 


very valuable document, presenting, as it docs, a cor¬ 
rect picture of what may emphatically be called the 
Age of Hindu Philosophy. It may be regarded as an 
index to the thoughts and struggles, the longings and 
yearnings of an era, which in intellectual activity and 
moral grandeur has scarcely been surpassed in the his¬ 
tory of non-Christian lands, certainly never in the his¬ 
tory of our own country. Let us give it prominence as 
indicating : 

1. The knotty problems which exercised the acute 
and penetrating intellects of the great Schoolmen of 
Ancient India ; 

2. The varieties of expedients to which recourse was 
had by these extraordinary thinkers for their solution ; 

3. The temporal benefits to which they looked for¬ 
ward, as the reward of their toil ; 

4. The conclusions at which they arrived ; 

5. The controversies to which these gave rise ; and 

G. The compromises by which these conclusions were, 

when obviously at war with each other, reconciled. 

In elucidating the contents of this Upanishad, we 
shall have to go over the whole ground of Hindu Phi¬ 
losophy, to repeat not a little of what we have already 
said, and to anticipate much of what we shall have to 
say, when we treat separately of each of the systems 
matured in the schools. But as an apology for such 
repetition and such anticipation we have to say that 
careful study of this venerable document is a very good 
preparation for an intelligent examination and apprecia¬ 
tion of the great fines of thought enshrined in Hindu 
Philosophy, and also to some extent that of ancient 
Greece. 

1. The problems which Hindu Philosophy strove to 
solve are indicated in the opening verses of this Hpani- 


72 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


shad : “ The inquirers after Brahma converse (among 
themselves). What cause is Brahma ? Whence are 
we produced ? By whom do we live, and where do we 
(ultimately) abide ? By whom governed ? Do we 
walk after a rule in happiness and unhappiness, O ye 
knowers of Brahma ? Is time Brahma (as cause), or the 
own nature of the things, or the necessary consequences 
of work, or accident, or the elements, or nature (yone), 
or the soul ? This must be considered : It is not the 
union of them, because the soul remains ; the soul (in¬ 
dividual soul) also is not powerful (to be the author of 
the creation (since there is (independent of it) a cause 
of happiness and unhappiness (viz., work).” 

These are the Hindu versions of the problems of ex¬ 
istence, and they indicate the path of inquiry fearlessly 
trodden by great thinkers in ancient India. Trans¬ 
lated into modern phraseology, they are : What is the 
ultimate ground of existence in general ? What is the 
ground of our own existence ? By what power are we 
sustained in life, and where do we permanently abide 
after death—in conscious existence, or in an endless 
chain of atomic or molecular movements and changes ? 
Why are we guided by desire and aversion, a natural 
longing for pleasure and an instinctive shrinking from 
pain ? What inflexible law leads to the apportionment 
of the measure of pleasure we secure and the measure 
of pain we groan under ? 

It is not necessary for us to repeat that these are the 
abstruse problems that have, from time immemorial, 
exercised, puzzled, and wasted some of the loftiest in¬ 
tellects the world has seen, and they are to-day as far 
from solution in the region of boasted philosophy as 
they were when the Upanishads, major and minor, 
were composed. In one and all the important centres 


THE AGE OE HIXDU PHILOSOPHY. 


73 


of ancient civilization, in India, in China, in Egypt, 
and in Greece, they were deeply meditated upon in 
solitudes ; earnestly discussed in schools frequently, 
and the agora and forum at times ; patiently elaborated 
into complicated though imposing theories ; and labori¬ 
ously propagated in the shape of practical lessons among 
people too busily engaged to recognize the vapory char¬ 
acter of the speculations to which they were inseparably 
linked. And in the most favored abodes of modern 
civilization these very problems are once more passing 
through a similar elaborative and transforming process 
in the mental laboratory of some of the greatest think¬ 
ers of the age. And it is a noteworthy fact that the 
results arrived at, or attained now, are not essentially 
different from those realized in the primitive age of 
which we wish to present a picture in this and the fol¬ 
lowing papers. The word failure might justly be 
inscribed on the lofty banner raised by ancient philoso¬ 
phy ; and the same humiliating issue is what modern 
philosophy can legitimately boast of ! 

It is worthy of special notice that the civilized world 
seems to have been roused, at one and the same time, 
from the slumber of ages, to take these important prob¬ 
lems into consideration. The age of Indian philosophy 
is not to be looked upon or represented as one of the 
ordinary periods of human history. It was indeed an 
extraordinary era, an era of giants both in the region 
of philosophic thought and in that of practical moral 
earnestness ; the age of Buddha, Zoroaster, Confucius, 
and Pythagoras ; the age which, as regards the great¬ 
ness of the men whose speculations and deeds rendered 
it conspicuous, and the imposing nature, if not practical 
efficacy, of the theoretical results attained, has scarcely 
had its parallel in the history of the world. It saw the 


'4 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


lofty spirit of philosophic investigation roused from 
dormancy and called into vigorous play, not in one or 
two solitary localities, but in the most conspicuous 
centres of civilization ; and, barring the disclosures of 
revelation, the world has not been able to improve upon 
the solutions of the problems of existence then pro¬ 
posed, except in outward form and drapery. In phi¬ 
losophy the interval between the sixth or seventh 
century before the Christian era and the vaunted nine¬ 
teenth century is almost nil! 

We cannot look upon what may in one sense be called 
the universally developed mental activity of the period 
in question without being led instinctively to ascertain 
its cause. And the cause happily is not one of those 
which, the more we are dazzled by their effects, retire 
the more thoroughly from the narrow horizon of our 
intellectual vision. It stands out in bold relief from the 
history of the development of the human mind. 

The problems of existence are among those which we 
are naturally and instinctively led to take into our seri¬ 
ous consideration ; and they have from the beginning 
engaged the attention and exercised the brains of the 
thoughtful members of the human family, if not of 
mankind at large. In what may be called the twilight 
period of human history, solutions were proposed, such 
as failed to satisfy the world after it had made some 
progress in knowledge and thought. The energies of 
nature, originally represented as its creative and sus¬ 
taining forces, gradually assumed gross and fetich 
forms ; and a host of gods and goddesses of limited 
potency and like passions with human beings, who 
wasted a great deal of their strength in lighting with 
one another, appeared on the stage and claimed human 
homage. Here the blazing sun-god, there the terrific 


THE AGE OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


75 


being concealed within the dark folds of the lowering 
clouds, and yonder the spirit of howling storms and 
sweeping whirlwinds appeared in tangible and what 
might be called stereotyped forms, clothed in the popu¬ 
lar imagination with authority and power, such as made 
it necessary for men to secure their favor by prayer and 
supplication, and avert their wrath by bloody sacrifices. 
But as knowledge advanced these causes appeared 
utterly inadequate to minds freed from the trammels of 
popular prejudice, and thereby trained to think and 
judge for themselves. 

Again, the multiplicity of the causes assigned could 
not but repel minds bent on discovering a unity beneath 
the complexity of natural phenomena, a something uni¬ 
versal, permanent, and immutable beneath their ever- 
shifting phases. An endless variety of finite or limited 
forces, or an endless variety of local gods and goddesses 
of circumscribed power cannot be held by thinking men 
as fitted to constitute an omnific agency of boundless 
potency, and so some unity of being or principle sup¬ 
posed to be behind them became an object of anxious 
inquiry as soon as current forms of thought appeared 
unsatisfactory. An attempt to make the numerous 
heroes of popular mythology coalesce into a single 
Being of unerring wisdom and limitless power, or to 
weld the jarring forces of nature into one primordial 
force, was necessitated by a reaction against palpable 
grossness of conception. 

But are there not solutions of these problems which 
may be called intuitive, or which are offered to our ac¬ 
ceptance on the strength, either of the primary beliefs 
of humanity, or of that primeval revelation which we 
see imbedded in the varied religions of the world ? 
The moment these solutions are accepted all difficulties 


76 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


vanish into thin air, and the necessity of hatching the¬ 
ory after theory in dark solitudes is obviated. Such 
solutions were certainly within the reach of the philoso¬ 
phers, who allowed themselves to be puzzled and bewil¬ 
dered by speculations of a recondite character. But 
they were too simple to commend themselves to their 
ambitious minds ; and they were in consequence cast 
overboard along with those embodied in popular song or 
mythology. The explanations furnished by popular 
literature were too gross, and those offered by intuition 
were too simple to suit their taste, and therefore they 
allowed themselves with all conceivable eagerness to be 
entangled in the mazes of plausible error. 

We have elsewhere shown that the rationalistic ten¬ 
dencies of the period under consideration might be 
traced to a reaction against ritualism. The age of phi¬ 
losophy in India was ushered in by the age of external- 
ism pictured in the Brahmanas ; and this was most un¬ 
doubtedly true of all the other centres of civilization, 
which felt the dominating influence of the spirit of 
philosophic inquiry so simultaneously roused in so many 
localities. The argument need not be reproduced here ; 
but a reference to the solutions of the problems of ex¬ 
istence, which were looked upon as heretical in India, 
will not be deemed uncalled for. 

The passage quoted above shows that an attempt was 
made to trace existence in its multifarious forms to 
Time, the Cronos of Greek mythology. Time has 
always been represented, by a bold figure of speech, as 
the beginner and the ender, the creator and destroyer 
of things. Forms of existence in a state of nonentity, 
or in an embryonic state are said to be in the womb of 
time ; when they make themselves manifest among the 
phenomena of life, they are its offspring ; and when 


THE AGE OF HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


77 


they finally disappear from the stage, their disappear¬ 
ance is traced to the sweeping action of its all-mowing 
scythe. But tropes and metaphors are, in course of 
time, or when the spirit of mythopoeic invention is 
evoked by what Grote calls retrospective veneration, 
clothed with flesh, and become living realities. The 
fast-moving old man, with the hour-glass in one hand 
and scythe in the other, became in time the Ancient of 
Days ; and the threefold work of creation, preserva¬ 
tion, and destruction of the world was attributed to 
him. Besides, how soothing is the thought that time 
will itself remedy the evils of time ! The soul is entan¬ 
gled by time in the meshes of mundane misery, but it 
need not despair ; time itself will destroy the net and 
bring the relief ! Is it a wonder that time was repre¬ 
sented as the Creator of all things, and the incarcerator 
and emancipator of the soul ? This theory, however, 
was regarded as heretical by the learned in India when 
they halted between materialism and pantheism, and 
when therefore they could not brook the idea of a 
mythological phantom rising up to claim the honor 
conferred on a self-evolving material form or a self- 
developing spiritual substance. 

Another of the heretical opinions condemned merci¬ 
lessly, revolved around what was called “ the own 
nature of things.” Every form of existence has its 
vitality, the ground of its being concealed in itself ; 
and it is absurd, as well as useless, to look for its creator 
and preserver apart from it. The ground of man’s ex¬ 
istence is man himself ; he is the author and sustainer 
of his being, the tormentor of his own pure spirit, and 
ultimately its glorious liberator. Man has no business 
to look beyond himself, in the depths of his misery, for 
help, his own recuperative power being enough to 


78 


HIN'DU PHILOSOPHY. 


work out liis deliverance in process of time. Manliness 
and independence cannot go further ! 

Then comes in the god of Buddhism, Karma, for his 
share of condemnation. Karma, work, occupies a 
prominent place in Hindu Philosophy. It is the great 
incarcerator and tormentor of the passive soul. Its 
causes are desire and aversion, which lead men to prac¬ 
tise virtue or vice, and thus become recipients of re¬ 
wards or punishments. It sends them up to heaven or 
down to hell to take the consequences of their own 
actions ; brings them back into mundane existence or 
existence in corporeal frames to be once more tor¬ 
mented by fresh desires and fresh actions ; hurls them 
back to regions of reward and punishment ; and so on 
through long, long series of births and deaths, till its 
own power being consumed and itself annihilated, they 
are liberated from its thraldom, and lost, either in the 
material essence of nature to pass through an endless 
series of such experiences after lengthened periods of 
hibernation, or in the divine spiritual substance to be 
compelled by the imperious law of development to reap¬ 
pear, after long periods of quiescence, on the stage of 
history with similarly gloomy prospects before them ! 
But though conspicuous for its malignant activity, in 
Hindu Philosophy, it is at first sight neither the start¬ 
ing-point nor the terminus of creation. The Buddhists, 
however, tried to make it such ; and so they drew upon 
themselves the awful sentence of schism and heresy. 

The Bible of the fool, the chapter of accidents, was 
not unknown to our ancestors of the age of Hindu Phi¬ 
losophy. Chance was represented as the creator and 
preserver of the world, and all talk of teleology, or the 
doctrine of final causes, was pronounced unmitigated 
nonsense. Do not some of our redoubtable champions 


TIIE AGE OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


79 


of science see their prototypes in ages which they are 
apt to mention with contempt as eras of ignorance and 
darkness ? Teleology, in the proper sense of the term, 
Hindu theologians of the most orthodox school were by 
no means averse to ; and chance appeared to them as 
absolutely nothing, and \the idea of bringing an. entity 
out of nonentity they could not possibly entertain for a 
moment[; and therefore this theory also received the 
brand of heresy. 

The elements were by another class of heretics repre¬ 
sented as the ultimate ground of existence. Who is not 
reminded by this of the tendency in modern philosophy 
to trace the universe to the evolution of what are 
called the ultimate powers of nature ? The ultimate 
powers, held up in these days as creative or self-evolv¬ 
ing potencies, are very different indeed from what were 
represented as such in the primitive age of Indian phi¬ 
losophy. Then the earth, water, fire, and air, with the 
addition of ether in some quarters, were looked upon as 
simple, uncompounded substances ; and to the action, 
individual as well as collective, of these elements exist¬ 
ence in its diversified forms of beauty and proportion 
was not very unnaturally traced. But to the philo¬ 
sophic mind of India, fond of subtle distinctions and 
averse to grossness of conception, these substances, 
though regarded as simple and uncompounded, ap¬ 
peared too gross to deserve the place assigned them as 
the productive causes of material and mental phe¬ 
nomena. And therefore those who represented them 
as the omnific powers of nature were regarded as a 
body of heretics fit to be burned alive ! 

Again Nature (Yoni) had also the honor, as it has 
always had, of being pointed out as the ultimate ground 
of existence. There is some doubt about the meaning 


80 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


of the word yoni in this connection, but if it be taken 
as meaning nature , a broad line of demarcation ought 
to be drawn between it and Prakriti of the Sankhya 
school, generally translated nature . Prakriti is a prin¬ 
ciple of extreme tenuity, more spiritual than material, 
a sort of primordial, self-evolving essence or form ; but 
Yoni represents either all the phenomena of nature put 
together, or the aggregate of all its forces and powers. 
The theory which traces creation to Prakriti has always 
been held as orthodox ; while that which makes Yoni 
the ultimate ground of existence has always been repro¬ 
bated as heterodox. In whatever sense the word nature 
is used in this connection, the speculation which evolves 
creation from it and thrusts the Creator, not merely 
into the background, but out of existence, cannot but 
appear fascinating to the materialists of the day ! 

And lastly, a species of egoism, not unknown in these 
days, was upheld in one of the numerous schools of 
heresy which flourished side by side with elaborate sys¬ 
tems of orthodox philosophy. The soul, the individual in 
contradistinction to the universal soul, was represented 
as the ultimate ground of existence ; but the spirit of 
Hindu orthodoxy recoiled in horror from such repre¬ 
sentation. The soul or the ego, both universal and in¬ 
dividual, is, according to its champions, perfectly quies¬ 
cent, and cannot therefore be an efficient cause. To 
. attribute to it the slightest degree of activity is to rob 
it of its happiness, which in their opinion is synonymous 
with the complete extinction of thought and desire, or 
of mental and spiritual activity. 

All these principles form, according to Hindu Philos¬ 
ophy, a chain of second causes ; and if the series were 
to terminate in a proper top or head principle, nothing 
could be said against them. Such a principle is indi- 


THE AGE OF HIXDU PHILOSOPHY. 


81 


cated in this verse : “ They, who followed abstract 
meditation (Dhyan) and concentration (Yoga) beheld 
(as the cause of the creation) the power (Sakti) of the 
divine soul concealed in its qualities, which alone super¬ 
intends all these causes, of which time was the first, 
and soul (the individual soul) the last.” This and the 
verses following set forth the attempt made in this 
treatise to reconcile materialism to pantheism. 

2. The verse quoted in the paragraph indicates also 
the way in which solution of the great problems of life 
was sought ; and to it let us in the second place advert. 
It is scarcely worth our while to observe that the expe¬ 
dients resorted to in those primitive times are very 
different indeed from those utilized in these days. A 
well-filled library, a cushioned chair, reading, study, 
and meditation, prolonged till what is called the mid¬ 
night oil is consumed—these, with perhaps a pipe con¬ 
cealed amid volumes of smoke, are the expedients 
resorted to in these days for such a purpose. But books 
were unknown, or, if not unknown, very rare in those 
days, and midnight oil was never consumed, except in 
religious and social festivities. The man of intellect, 
determined to set the problems of existence at rest, had 
to pass through a painful course of preparation. He 
had to prepare himself for his proper study by perform¬ 
ing the ordinary duties of life as well as going the 
round of religious observances with punctilious care. 
He had then to place himself under the guidance of an 
accredited teacher, and spend years in listening to the 
Yedas chanted by him ; he had, moreover, to propiti¬ 
ate the teacher as well as the gods, by varied acts of 
self-sacrifice, and by services of a menial nature. And 
when by such sacrifices and such services he had ob¬ 
tained what in modern phraseology would be called a 


82 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


pass-certificate, lie had to look for a proper place where, 
wrapped up in intense meditation, he might seek un¬ 
molested the right solution of the problems of life. 

The Swetaswatara Upanishad points out the sort of 
place he must select as his rendezvous in the tenth verse 
of the second chapter : “ At a level place, free from 
pebbles and gravel, pleasant to the mind by its sounds, 
water, and bowers, not painful to the eye, and repair¬ 
ing to a cave, protected from the wind, let a person 
apply (his mind to God).” lie must sit down, not 

■ “ . . . wander where the Muses haunt 
Clear spring, or shady grove or sunny hill.” 

The necessity of his retiring to a sequestered spot, 
“ pleasant to the mind by its sounds, water, and 
bowers, J ’ is obvious enough ; but why should the place 
selected be ‘ ‘ free from pebble and gravel 5 5 ? Be¬ 
cause “ bodily exercises” must be combined with those 
of the mind and the spirit ; and a level, smooth piece 
of ground was needed to render these practicable. 

What was he to do in such a solitary place ? Let the 
following verses, quoted from the same chapter, furnish 
the reply : 

“ Keeping the upper part (the chest, the neck, and 
the head) erect, and equal to (the other parts of) the 
body, subduing within the heart the senses together 
with the mind, let the sense by the raft of Brahma 
(Om) cross over all the fearful torrents (of the world).” 
“ Keeping down the senses, subduing his desires, and 
gently respiring by the nostrils, let the wise diligently 
attend to the mind as (the charioteer) to a car drawn 
by vicious horses.” 

In plain English, the man anxious to have the prob¬ 
lems of life solved must, in a solitary place, strive by 


THE AGE OF HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


83 


varieties of bodily as well as mental exercises, to obtain 
a thorough mastery over his passions and appetites, and 
to subdue the restlessness or the vagrant tendency of 
the mind. 

When he has succeeded in doing this preliminary 
work, he has to pass through various degrees of that 
concentration which is to culminate in the direct vision 
of God by his soul in dtself, as well as in the varied 
objects of Nature. The premonitory symptoms are 
thus set forth : u These appearances precede the con¬ 
centration by which the manifestation of Brahma is 
effected ; it (Brahma) assumes the form of frost, of 
smoke, of hot air, of wind, of fire, of fire-flies, of light¬ 
ning, of crystal, and of the moon.” The idea perhaps 
is that the inquirer first sees the Divinity somewhat 
veiled in the objects of Nature, and then in the fulness 
of His unclouded glory in his own spirit. 

This vision indicates the last degree of concentration. 
“ When absorbed in this concentration (the Yogi) sees 
by the true nature of his own self, which manifests like 
a light the true nature of Brahma, which is not born, 
eternal and free from all effects of Nature ; he gets 
released from all bonds. For he (the Yogi) is the god 
who is born before all the quarter, and intermediate 
quarters (Hiranyagarbha); he is indeed within the 
womb, he is born, he will be born ; in the shape of all 
he dwells in every creature.” Words cannot more 
clearly set forth the perfect identity of the individual 
with the universal soul, or the fact that the Yogi’s de¬ 
liverance means in reality the emancipation of the Deity 
from the trammels of Nature. 

The first degree of concentration is thus indicated : 
“ When (in the Yogi’s body) composed of earth, water, 
light, air, and ether, the fivefold qualities, which make 


84 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


concentration, are manifest, then there is no disease or 
age or pain for him, who has obtained the body burn¬ 
ing with the fire of concentration. When the body is 
light, and without disease, the mind without desire, the 
color is shining, sweet the voice, and pleasant the smell, 
when the excrements are few, they say the first degree 
of concentration is gained.” The intermediate degrees 
between this and the stage associated with the direct 
vision of Brahma are not indicated in this treatise ; but 
we obtain an insight into their exalted character when 
we note that the very first landmark indicates a body 
free from “ disease, age, or pain,” and a mind “ with¬ 
out desire.” 

But all this may justly be represented as a picture of 
the age of the Upanishads as well as of that of the sys¬ 
tems or schools of philosophy, of the age of inquiry as 
well as that of mature thought and bold speculation. 
Is there nothing to differentiate the one from the other 
as regards the varieties of expedients resorted to with a 
view to a proper solution of the knotty problems of ex¬ 
istence ? Our decided reply is, Xot much. The prob¬ 
lems were the same, and the means utilized to insure 
their solution were nearly the same. But there was a 
manifest difference between the two periods in the 
numbers of the persons by whom these problems were 
handled and these means utilized. In the preparatory 
period, or the age of inquiry, these were units scattered 
here and there, each pursuing his own line of investiga¬ 
tion in solitary grandeur, and the whole presenting the 
appearance of an assemblage of inchoative particles 
rather than a regularly organized body. But in the 
age of philosophy, properly so called, these units de¬ 
veloped into communities, and a series of sporadic and 
unconnected attempts at philosophic thought were sys- 


THE AGE OE IIIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


85 


tematizecl into well-organized schools. Another differ¬ 
ence arose from the spirit of controversial wrangling, 
which was called into vigorous activity, when school 
was opposed to school, and system fought with system 
for triumph and ascendency. In the simpler and purer 
times of the Upanishads, love of truth seems to have 
been the reigning principle ; but in those of the sys¬ 
tems this amiable passion was all but annihilated by an 
irrepressible love of controversy. And when the spirit 
of wrangling had done its work and created dissensions 
and discords of a fearful type, concessions and compro¬ 
mises were resorted to, and hybrids in the region of 
philosophy, such as those we notice in the Swetaswa- 
tara Upanishad and the Bhagavada Gita, were called 
into being. It should, moreover, be borne in mind that 
motives of an earthly character played a more conspic¬ 
uous part in the age of philosophy ; but these bring us 
to our next point. 

3. The advantages these devout inquirers looked for, 
and for which they betook themselves to a life of 
singular austerity and penance, were partly secular and 
partly spiritual. The secular advantages were the ex¬ 
traordinary powers attained by complete self-control 
and intense meditation. These are, in the words of 
Roer, whose translation we have utilized, “ assumption 
of the smallest possible shape, of the greatest possible 
shape, of the heaviest form, of the lightest form, the 
power of obtaining everything, irresistible will, ruling 
of all, and independency of all.” Furnished with such 
powers, the devotee could dazzle the world by miracu¬ 
lous feats. He could make himself at times visible and 
at times invisible ; could move in the water as fishes 
and fly in the air as birds ; could remain buried under 
the earth for days and months and years ; could com- 


86 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


mand a luscious fruit on the topmost branch of a giant 
tree to fall down on his outspread hands, or call into 
his clenched fist the diamond ring concealed beneath 
the stony floor of the darkest chamber of a castellated 
palace ; could make the strongest man weep as a child 
or fall prostrate upon the earth by the simple force of 
his indomitable will ; could bring the whole world 
under his irresistible sway in the twinkling of an eye, 
or hurl defiance at the powers that be with perfect im¬ 
punity. And who can measure the influence he might 
exert over a superstitious people by such dazzling dis¬ 
plays of superhuman power ? Xor were immensity, 
exiguity, gravity, levitation, irresistible will-power, 
dominating influence, and perfect independence the 
only powers by which he could dazzle the world into 
admiration and reverence. lie could by intense medi¬ 
tation make himself omniscient, and work all the won¬ 
ders connected with the powers known, in the phrase¬ 
ology of Mesmerism, as prevision, introvision, and 
retrovision. He could look back, as Buddha is re¬ 
ported to have done, to the varied stages of existence 
through which he had passed, before his migration into 
his present body, and report varieties of incidents con¬ 
nected with each. He could foretell future events with 
prophetic minuteness and particularity ; and read and 
make bare, so to speak, the inmost thoughts of his 
neighbors. How much awe and reverence might he 
not inspire by a display of such superhuman knowl¬ 
edge ! His toil did not go unrewarded even in this 
world. 

But it must be observed that these powers, though 
prized, should be looked upon as merely the subsidiary 
ad vantages, of his austere course of life. His main ob¬ 
ject was knowledge of Brahma and the liberation con- 


THE AGE OF HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


87 


sequent upon it. He looked upon himself as a slave to 
desire, which led him to acts, good and bad, and these 
to periods of rewards and punishment, and consequently 
through an almost endless chain of transmigrations. 
To deliver himself from the trammels of corporeal or 
conscious existence, not the acquisition of extraordinary 
powers, was the great object he had in view in forsak¬ 
ing the occupation and pleasures of the world, and mak¬ 
ing meditation the sole business of his life. lie looked 
for liberation, and he believed that he could not reach 
the summit of his wishes except through what may be 
called the ladder of right knowledge. For this knowl¬ 
edge, therefore, he was willing to make all sacrifices, 
undergo all privations, practise all austerities, and go 
through, in a word, a long course of self-renunciation 
and self-mortification. How he could reach the goal 
he looked forward to is indicated in the following 
extract from the third chapter of the Swetaswatara 
Upanishad : 

“ Those who know Brahma, who is greater than the 
universe, the great one, the infinite, who is concealed 
within all beings according to their bodies, the only 
pervader of the universe, the ruler become immortal.” 

“ I know that perfect, infinite spirit, who is like the 
sun after darkness. Thus knowing him, a person over¬ 
comes death, there is no other road for obtaining (libera¬ 
tion).” 

Extraordinary influence in this world and emancipa¬ 
tion from the fetters of existence were the motives 
which induced the devotee of these primitive times to 
exchange the comforts of domestic life for the priva¬ 
tions of that of an anchorite. It was not, therefore, to 
gratify an idle curiosity of the mind, but to satisfy an 
intense and irrepressible longing of the heart, that he 


88 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


betook himself to hermit solitude. Our modern phi¬ 
losophers lack his earnestness because they are led 
on by an intellectual rather than a moral impulse or 
force. 

The following extract from Dr. Geikie’s “ Life of 
Christ’ ’ shows that the possibility of attaining super¬ 
human knowledge and superhuman power by ascetic 
self-denial and concentrated meditation was recognized 
among the chosen people of God : “ The grand aim of 
this amazing system of self-denial and ascetic endurance 
is told by Josephus in a brief sentence. ‘ Consecrated 
from childhood by many purifications, and familiar be¬ 
yond thought with the Holy Books and the utterances 
of the prophets, they (the Essenes) claim to see into the 
future, and in truth there is scarcely an instance in 
which their prophecies have been found false.’ The 
belief that they could attain direct communion with 
God by intense legal purification and mystic contem¬ 
plation, and even pass, in the end, to such transcen¬ 
dental vision as would reveal to them the secrets of the 
future, was the supreme motive to endure a life of so 
much privation and self-denial. A similar course had 
been followed before their day as a means of prepara¬ 
tion for divine visions and communion with high 
powers. “ In those days,” says Daniel, “I was 
mourning three full weeks. I ate no pleasant bread, 
neither came flesh nor wine in my mouth, neither did I 
anoint myself at all till three whole weeks were ful¬ 
filled. And on the four and twentieth day of the 
month, as I was by the side of the great river, Avhich 
is Hiddekel, then I lifted up mine eyes, and looked, and 
behold a certain man clothed in linen, whose loins were 
girded with fine gold of Uphaz.” In the same way 
Esdras prepared himself for his visions : “ Go to the 


THE AGE OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


89 


flowery open, where there is no house,” said the angel 
to him, ‘ 4 and eat only the herbs of the field ; taste no 
flesh and drink no wine, but eat herbs only, and pray 
unto the Highest continually ; then will I come and 
talk with thee. 5 5 That the devotees in the promised 
land were not so wild in their expectations as their 
brethren in India is a proof of the decidedly better in¬ 
fluence exerted over them by their sacred scriptures. 

4. How let us advert to the conclusions at which the 
inquirers arrived. These may be classed under two 
heads, materialism and pantheism, the two poles around 
which all speculations on the problems of existence have 
revolved from the beginning of days. The Sankhya 
philosophy was evidently the earliest outcome ; and it 
traced creation through a succession of evolutes and 
evolvent principles to a quasi-material, if not material 
form, called Prakriti. The Upanishads had recognized 
a principle called Unmanifested (Avyakta) behind the 
perceptible universe, and the manifested (Yyakta) deity, 
its reputed, and in some respects its real, creator. This 
unmanifested principle was identified by the Sankhya 
school with its Prakriti, and a process of evolution was 
disclosed fitted to connect it, through the media of sub¬ 
stances of extreme tenuity, with the gross, material 
universe. But this solution was a little too atheistic to 
suit the irrepressible religious tendencies of the Hindu 
mind, and therefore a reaction in favor of pantheism 
was realized not long after its appearance and prev¬ 
alence. The apparent, if not real, dualism of the 
Sankhya philosophy did therefore in time shrink into 
the monism of the Yedantic school. The ultimate] 
ground of existence was declared to be, not a material' 
or quasi-material form, primordial and self-evolving, 
but a divine substance or the Divinity acting under an 


10 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


/automatic impulse. Such were the boasted results of 
philosophic thought in India, and such have been the 
boasted results of philosophic thought wheresoever and 
whensoever it has been vigorously applied to the prob¬ 
lems of existence both in ancient and modern times. 
And their unsatisfactory character is fitted to set forth, 
in an unmistakable manner, his inability to solve them 
by dint of thought and speculation. His business is to 
accept, with childlike simplicity, the solution placed 
within his reach by his subjective consciousness, as well 
as by objective revelation. And when he so far forgets 
himself as to shut his eye presumptuously to the dim 
light of the one source and the meridian lustre of the 
other, he cannot but get entangled in the mazes of gro¬ 
tesque fancies and ludicrous errors ! 

5. But these conclusions, antipodal as they are, could 
not but give rise to fierce controversies. The opposite 
schools of philosophy had themselves ranged under 
different standards, and fought with might and main 
for their respective shibboleths. The questions which 
were hotly debated in those days have lost much of 
their importance and exciting power ; the arguments 
which were plied with extraordinary skill and pro¬ 
fundity have lost much of their appositeness and 
cogency ; and even the technical phrases bandied back¬ 
ward and forward have lost much of their significance. 
But the spirit of controversy, evoked when the jarring 
systems fought for victory and ascendency, has not 
died out ; and racy anecdotes fitted to set forth its 
ardor and irrepressibility form a prominent and per¬ 
haps the most amusing element of table-talk in India. 
We are tempted to relate one of these to show what 
controversy means in India now, and what it must have 
meant when the champions of philosophy were arrayed 


THE AGE OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


91 


under hostile banners to fight to the death for their re¬ 
spective theories. 

Two learned Pundits, who were bosom friends, sallied 
out of a place of learning and walked on, engaged in 
pleasant chit-chat. Unfortunately, they allowed them¬ 
selves, in perhaps an unguarded moment, to be drawn 
into a philosophic controversy, and then the cheerful 
countenance, the bright smile, the musical voice, and 
the entertaining talk vanished into thin air. Their 
faces presented a gloomy aspect, their eyes flashed with 
animation, their voices became agitated and loud, and 
their attitude was that of men engaged in fierce con¬ 
test. They went on adding fuel to the flame till they 
reached the lofty mound of a spacious tank. Here 
they came from words to blows, and a scuffle ensued, 
the consequence of which was, they moved to the edge, 
lost their footing, and fell down into the waters below. 
Thus cooled, they returned to their respective homes by 
different roads, ashamed perhaps of the controversial 
ardor they had allowed to get the better of their reason 
and sober sense ! 

Nor were these controversies merely intellectual con¬ 
tests. They received the greater portion of their ardor, 
their vehemence, their rancor, and their virulence from 
religion. The schools were schools of religion as well 
as philosophy, for philosophy was in those primitive 
times polynia thy, the science of the All, the omnivorous 
science in which were included physiology, psychology, 
and theology. Again the schools were hopelessly at 
war with popular superstitions, and the champions of 
these, those who derived their position, wealth, and 
honor from them, could not but stand up against specu¬ 
lations so obviously subversive of them. So that there 
was what might be called a double contest in progress, 



92 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


the schools at war with one another, and popular super¬ 
stitions at war with them all. The materialistic schools 
hurled anathemas at the pantheistic, and the champions 
of the popular religion prayed down imprecations on 
both the classes of schools with perfect impartiality ! 

But this state of things could not last long. The 
very fierceness with which the spirit of wrangling oper¬ 
ated brought on a reaction, and the result was a decay 
of earnestness in combination with a supple, vacillating 
spirit of compromise. Ho wonder ! A compromise 
was demanded commensurate to the requirements of 
the hot controversy that was raging. A double com¬ 
promise was needed because a double controversy was 
raging. The schools must be reconciled with one an¬ 
other, and a reconciliation must be effected between 
them on one side, and the superstitions they despised 
on the other. This was by no means an easy task, but 
it was effected with an ingenuity which we cannot but 
commend. It is not at all difficult to show how, just 
as it was not at all difficult to show how the egg might 
be able to stand on the table, after the successful effort 
had been put forth. 

The Sankhya philosophy, the philosophy around 
which all materialistic views revolved, traced creation 
through a succession of principles, productive and non¬ 
productive, to Prakriti. Its cosmogony was admitted, 
and its founder, Kapila, was praised and honored as a 
favored child of heaven, nay, even as an incarnation. 
“ ITe who alone superintends every source of produc¬ 
tion, every form, and all the sources of production, who 
endowed his son, the Rishi Kapila, at the commence¬ 
ment of the creation with every kind of knowledge, 
and who looked at him when he was born. ”... The 
Yedantic system, the system around which all panthe- 


THE AGE OF HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


93 


istic notions revolved, presented a cosmogony which, in 
its broad features as well as in almost all its details, 
was a facsimile of that of the Sankhya schools. The 
starting point, however, of the Yedantic cosmogony 
was Maya, not Prakriti. But if Maya could be made 
identical with Prakriti, and an all-comprehensive, all- 
diffusive divine substance posited behind it, the inter¬ 
necine warfare between the two jarring schools of 
thought might cease. And this was precisely the ex¬ 
pedient resorted to. “ Know delusion (Maya) as nature 
(Prakriti), him who is united with her as the great 
ruler (Maheswar) ; this whole world in truth is per¬ 
vaded by (powers which are) his parts.” 

This verse of chap. iv. of the TJpanishad under review 
not only sets forth the way in which rank materialism 
was reconciled to rank pantheism, but shows the 
manner in which transcendental philosophy was recon¬ 
ciled to grovelling superstition. The diffusive sub¬ 
stance back of the demiurgic principle, Maya or Pra¬ 
kriti, was represented as no other than the third person 
of the Hindu Triad, Maheswar or Rudra. In the third 
chapter we have this prayer : “ May Rudra, the Lord 
of the universe, the all-wise (Maharshi) who produced 
the gods and gave them majesty, and who created at 
first Hiranyagarhha, strengthen us with auspicious in¬ 
tellect !” The prayer is repeated in chap. iv. : “ May 
Rudra, the Lord of the universe, the all-wise who pro¬ 
duced the gods and gave them majesty, (and) who be¬ 
held the birth of Hiranyagarhha, strengthen us with 
auspicious intellect !” In these and such passages the 
triad is looked upon as a monad, concentrated, as it 
were, in the third person ; and therefore the creator is 
sometimes called Brahma, and sometimes Rudra ; and 
Hiranyagarhha is no other than Maya or Prakriti. 


94 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


How ingeniously is peace restored. Rudra identified 
with the unmanifested divine substance is not merely 
the Creator, but the Preserver and Destroyer of the 
universe. In chap. iii. verse 2 we have these words : 
“ For it is one Rudra only—(the knowers of Brahma) 
acknowledge not a second—who rules these worlds with 
his ruling powers, who dwells within every man, and 
who, having created all the worlds, (and being their) 
protector, gets wrathful at the time of the end (destroys 
them). ” It must also be borne in mind that this august 
being cannot act except through an emanation called 
Sakti (energy), and to this power the varied names of 
Prakriti, Maya, and Hiranyagarhha are applied. 

The chronological order in which the six systems of 
Indian Philosophy were developed cannot possibly be 
set forth ; and the age in which they flourished can be 
indicated only by means of shrewd guesses, not by 
means of well-founded and therefore thoroughly reliable 
calculations. The starting and the terminal links of the 
chain may, however, be fixed with almost indisputable 
accuracy. The varied systems of philosophic thought, 
to which the homage of the country has been paid at 
different times, if not simultaneously, and by which the 
peculiar phases of our national life have been moulded, 
have a clearly discernible vein of Sankhya speculation 
running through it ; and therefore the Sankhya system 
may justly be represented as the first outcome of sys¬ 
tematized philosophy in India. And as these systems 
appear swallowed up, assimilated, and incorporated in 
Vedantism, it ought to be represented as the last link 
of the chain. The Sankhya system, therefore, ought to 
be treated of first in an attempt to trace the history of 
Indian Philosophy from the time when the work of its 
systematization was commenced to that when that 


THE AGE OF HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


95 


work was consummated. The Yoga Philosophy, which 
is its counterpart, must next claim attention. The two 
Logical or Analytical systems, the Eyaiyaika and 
Vaiseshika, should be disposed of before the two Yedic 
systems are sifted and analyzed. Such a treatment of 
this many-sided theme appears to be the best, fitted to 
do it justice, though arguments may be advanced, espe¬ 
cially by people disposed to carp at it as against any 
conceivable thing, from a plenum to a vacuum. 

These six systems—called orthodox—are thus speci¬ 
fied : 

1. Sankhya, founded by Kapila. 

2. Yoga, founded by Patanjali. 

3. Eyaiyaika, founded by Gautama or Gotama. 

4. Yaiseshika, founded by Kanada. 

5. The Purva Mimansa, founded by Jaimini. 

6. The Uttra Mimansa or Yedanta, founded by Bada- 
ray-una or Yyas. v 

They will be treated of in the following papers, one 
after another, in the order in which they appear in this 
enumeration. 


CHAPTER IV. 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY OF THE HINDU THEORY OF 
EVOLUTION. 

The Sankhya Philosophy and its counterpart, the 
Yoga, have lately been invested with a peculiar interest 
in the writings and peripatetic discourses of the cham¬ 
pions of Theosophy in India. The speculations formu¬ 
lated in the one, and developed in a series of practical 
rules of the most stringent type in the other, have been 
placed above the most improved science of the day ; 
and results are anticipated, compared with which those 
by which the comforts and conveniences of life are 
being multiplied are as trifles. It is proposed in this 
paper to show, by a careful analysis of the contents of 
one of the two original documents from which our 
knowledge of the Sankhya Philosophy is derived, how 
far the glowing eulogy bestowed upon it by Indian 
theosophists is well merited. 

The founder of the Sankhya, the first of the six 
schools of Indian Philosophy, was Kapila, one of the 
great thinkers whose speculations in the region of pure 
thought have not merely left an indelible mark in the 
literature of our country, but exercised a mighty influ¬ 
ence on our national life. Nothing certain or reliable 
is known about this great man ; and he must therefore 
be held up as a mythic rather than a historical charac¬ 
ter. The traditions current about him are such as are 
manufactured, in an age of superstition, by what Grote 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 


97 


calls the retrospective veneration of a few devoted fol¬ 
lowers, and accepted as invested with peculiar sacred¬ 
ness, if not as positively and indisputably unexception¬ 
able, by the unthinking masses. He is said by some 
champions of his school to have been one of the seven 
great sons of Brahma, who cut a figure in the theogo- 
nies of the Purans ; while by others he is held up as an 
incarnation of Yishnu himself. Others, again, led by 
the etymology of the word Kapila, which means a 
tawny brown color , as well as fire, look up to him as the 
great Yedic god, Agni himself, in a human form. He 
is, moreover, said to have been a descendant of the 
celebrated Indian lawgiver, Manu, to have lived in 
retirement as a recluse, to have successfully controlled 
his appetites and passions, and to have been invested on 
that account with various kinds of supernatural powers. 
But if he is identified, as he has been, with the irascible 
sage in the Kamayana, who destroyed the sixty thou¬ 
sand sons of King Sagara of Ayodhya (Oudh) in a fit of 
rage, consequent on their impudence in accusing him of 
the great crime of having stolen their father’s sacrificial 
horse, the complete self-control he is said to have 
attained becomes problematical ! 

Various other stories are told about him of a piece 
with these ; and the best thing the inquirer can do is to 
be content with the bare fact that Kapila was a Brah¬ 
min and the founder of the school of philosophy the 
speculations of which may be found as an underlying 
vein of thought in the most advanced of the systems 
elaborated in ancient India. Hor are we in possession 
of the writings of this great sage, the works ascribed 
to him—viz., the Sankhya-Pravachana, or Sankhya- 
Aphorisms and the Tattwa Samasa, or compendium of 
principles—being decidedly more modern. The former, 


98 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


translated by Dr. Ballantyne years ago, is not even 
mentioned by Sankara Acharya, the great Vedantist 
commentator, who lived in the latter part of the 
seventh and the earlier part of the eighth century ; 
and it is not even referred to in the Sarva-Darsana- 
Sangraha, a philosophical treatise evidently composed 
in the fourteenth century. The Sankhya-Pravachana, 
however, is a standard document of the Sankhya 
school ; and in our attempts to expound the principles 
of the philosophy associated with this school we cannot 
but give it a prominent place. We shall, therefore, 
present a synopsis of the contents of this work before 
proceeding to an examination, in another paper, of 
those of a treatise which is decidedly more ancient— 
viz., the Sankhya Karika, or exposition of the Sankhya 
Philosophy, recently translated by Mr. Davies, of the 
Royal Asiatic Society. Another treatise, also recently 
translated, we shall refer to, the treatise already 
named, the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha, or review of the 
different systems of Hindu Philosophy, a work of very 
great importance, which the student of our national 
philosophy will do well to master with a view to an 
intimate acquaintance with the lines of thought and 
reasoning embodied in it. 

The Sankhya-Pravachana consists of six books and 
five hundred and twenty-six Sutras or Aphorisms. 
The first four books present the principles of Kapila’s 
philosophy, without, it must be confessed, much regard 
to the advantage of a perspicuous or luminous arrange¬ 
ment, but with considerable acuteness and force. The 
fifth book grapples with and refutes some of the objec¬ 
tions to his system current, if not in his age, at least in 
subsequent times ; and the sixth, being a recapitulation 
of the principles enunciated in the first four, bears to 


THE SAXKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 


99 


the whole the same relation which the book of Deuter¬ 
onomy bears to the Pentateuch. Several commentaries 
fitted to elucidate the contents of this hoary document, 
and demanded peremptorily by its studied brevity and 
sententiousness, exist ; and a recourse to them is abso¬ 
lutely needed to clear up its obscure passages and make 
its many legendary and other references intelligible. 
But great caution must be exercised in their use to 
avoid the common fault of transferring the traditions 
and associations among which the commentators were 
brought up, to the age when the passages elucidated 
were penned. The best of these commentaries is 
Sankhya-Pravachana Bhashya, by Vijnana Bhikshu, 
who seems to have been an ardent admirer and a re¬ 
doubtable champion of the system, at a time when it 
was attacked by certain phases of pantheistic and nihil¬ 
istic thought, as well as by persons ^ho derived their 
inspiration from prevalent formo of theistic belief. 
The Sankhya Aphorisms, together with valuable por¬ 
tions of this commentary, were translated into English 
by Dr. Ballantyne, whose accuracy as an interpreter or 
expounder of Hindu Philosophy has been generally 
acknowledged by Sanscrit scholars. These translations 
are to be utilized in the following synopsis of the con¬ 
tents of this memorable work. 

The grand object of this philosophy is set forth in 
the very first of the five hundred and twenty-six Apho¬ 
risms of which the book consists : “ Well, the complete 
cessation of pain, (which is) of three kinds, is the com¬ 
plete end {summum.bonum) of man.” The three kinds 
of pain are particularized, not so much by the author 
of the book as by his commentators. Pain “ natural 
and intrinsic,” or pain arising from bodily and mental 
infirmities and weaknesses, is comprehended in the first 


100 


HIXDU PHILOSOPHY. 


class ; and that “ natural and extrinsic,” or pain aris¬ 
ing from such external causes as “ cold, heat, wind, 
rain, thunderbolts,” is included in the second class. 
The third class comprehends, according to the com¬ 
mentator Yachaspati Misra, pains proceeding from the 
influence of planetary bodies, or from the malice of im¬ 
pure spirits, such as Yackshases, Rakshases, etc. The 
subjection of the soul to this threefold pain, or to pain 
in its threefold aspect, is its bondage, and liberation 
from it should be, if it is not, the sole object of earthly 
and even heavenly existence. The object of Sankhya 
and every other system of Indian Philosophy is to show 
how this consummation is to be brought about, or how 
the final emancipation of the soul from the bondage of 
pain in its threefold aspect is to be effected. 

The diagnosis of a disease is the first step toward its 
cure ; and, therefore, an attempt is made to set forth 
the cause of this universal bondage before the sources 
of emancipation are pointed out. The disquisition on 
this cause is worthy of a detailed notice, inasmuch as it 
points to the varied antagonistic forces with which the 
system had to contend in its advanced, if not in its in¬ 
cipient stages of development. 

The great Napoleon developed a principle of universal 
applicability when, immediately after his coronation, he 
said : “A new dynasty must be baptized with blood.” 
A new school of philosophy, as well as a new empire or 
a new dynasty, has to pass through a season of almost 
ceaseless struggle for fife ; and it is not established till 
it has proved its right to five according to a law now 
said to be universally operative, the law of the survival 
of the fittest. And it cannot but be very interesting 
to notice the phalanx of antagonistic forces through 
which it has, in its inception and development, to force 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 


101 


its way to maturity, renown, and far-extending and 
triumphant influence, if not to universal ascendency. 
But this cannot be done in the case of the system of 
philosophy under review, inasmuch as we are not in 
possession of documents fitted to throw light on its 
early development. But we can indicate the varied 
hostile theories with which it had to contend when the 
Sankhya-Pravachana was composed. 

What, then, is the cause of the universally admitted 
bondage of the soul, or its subjection to the varied 
kinds of pain, the complete cessation of which is the 
object of philosophy or right knowledge ? Various 
parties come forward with varied answers, which are 
plausible enough at first sight, but which, when prop¬ 
erly weighed in the balance of reason, are found want¬ 
ing. The ordinary thinker, or one not far advanced in 
philosophy, comes forward and points to time and place 
as the cause, jointly and separately, of the bondage of 
the soul. But his theory is very easily exploded, as, 
both time and place being associated with all souls, 
those which are in bondage and those which are beati¬ 
fied, if they were the obnoxious cause, release or libera¬ 
tion would be an impossibility. But liberation is a 
fact, and souls released exist free from all pain, and 
beatified. -Time and place , therefore, cannot be the 
cause we are in quest of. The metaphysician steps for¬ 
ward and affirms that the bondage of the soul arises 
from its being conditioned and therefore necessarily 
defective. The reply to this is plain. The premises 
are incorrect, and therefore the conclusion is faulty. 
The soul is absolute and unconditioned ; a position 
established both by Scripture and common-sense. But 
this reply eli6its the rejoinder, “ If the soul is absolute 
and unconditioned, why talk of its bondage and subse- 


102 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


quent liberation ?” It is not at all difficult to dispose 
of this demurrer. Forms of expression, conventional, 
though not scientifically accurate, cannot be very well 
avoided. When the bondage of the soul and its libera¬ 
tion are talked of, the real meaning is not hidden, 
though some homage is paid to usage. The body, with 
its internal organ, the mind, is really in pain, the soul’s 
bondage is only reflectional, as the red color in a crystal 
vase containing a China rose. 

The metaphysician retires, giving place to the priest 
or the champion of current orthodoxy, who holds up 
works as the cause of the bondage of the soul. But 
works cannot weave a net for that to which they do 
not appertain. Works belong to the mind, and their 
influence, good or bad, does not and cannot extend to 
the soul, to which they do not in the slightest degree 
appertain. The Yedantin, or the pantheist of the 
Yedantic school, then comes forward, and with an air 
of triumph insists upon Avidya, or ignorance, as the 
cause of this bondage. But ignorance, look upon it as 
you will, or from whatever standpoint it may please 
you to do so, cannot cause bondage. Ignorance, ac¬ 
cording to the Yedantins, is unreal ; and that which is 
merely a phantom cannot be the cause of that which, 
like bondage, is a reality. If, however, it is affirmed that 
ignorance is real and not phantom-like, the very founda¬ 
tion of monism, or exclusive belief in or affirmation of 
one entity, is shaken. But suppose ignorance is repre¬ 
sented as both real and unreal, what then ? Such a 
reconciliation of opposites, such a naked paradox, is 
almost unthinkable, and cannot be accepted by any 
but “ children and madmen.” Such a thing, more¬ 
over, which at one and the same time is both real and 
unreal, is not included in the six all-embracing catego- 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 


103 


ries of the Yaiseshikas—viz., substance, quality, action, 
generality, particularity, and inhesion. How, then, 
can its existence be admitted ? 

The idealist then advances and affirms that, as noth¬ 
ing but thought exists, bondage is unreal and dreamy. 
But here, again, the premises are not correct. Our 
intuition of the external world proves its reality as de¬ 
cidedly as our intuitive knowledge of thought proves 
its reality. If intuition is to be set aside as fallacious 
or unreliable in the one case, it ought to be cast over¬ 
board in the other also. The believer in momentary 
existences, or he who believes that existence, instead of 
being a continuous, connected chain, consists of distinct 
and separate parts, each leaping into momentary exist¬ 
ence only to be replaced immediately by its successor, 
steps forward or walks into the arena with his theory, 
which, but for the fact that nothing is too absurd in 
the region of metaphysics or speculative science, might 
be looked upon as too odd to be entertained by sensible 
men even for a moment. He affirms that the bondage 
of the soul is occasioned by the influence of external 
objects of momentary duration. He, however, does 
not clearly see that external objects, being locally sepa¬ 
rate from the soul, cannot weave a net of bondage for 
it, and that things ephemeral, which make their ap¬ 
pearance one after another only to die, cannot have a 
permanent effect, as the bondage of the soul confessedly 
is. And the last gentleman whose opinions are 
weighed and found wanting is the nihilist, who main¬ 
tains that, as nothing exists but an eternal and unutter¬ 
able void, bondage is supposititious, a myth, or a non¬ 
entity. This gentleman has directed against him the 
very weapons by which his brother champion, the 
idealist, is chased out of the arena. 


104 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


Some of these opponents are regarded as brethren 
with mistaken notions, but the opprobrious epithet of 
heretic is applied to the rest, especially to those who 
uphold nihilism in one form or another. 

The varied theories of the bondage of the soul which 
Kapila’s system had to combat and overcome indicate 
the forms of thought and belief current in what might 
emphatically be called the Age of Indian Philosophy, 
and in times immediately subsequent to it. There was 
the tendency to reduce all forms of existence to space 
and time, or to merge the sensuous objects of nature 
into the supersensuous forms of thought. There were 
the theories of the absolute and the relative, the un¬ 
conditioned and the conditioned, propounded, matured, 
held as life, and fought for, as well as forms of thought 
arising from current superstition. There was, more¬ 
over, the transcendental type of monism which, origi¬ 
nating in pure Yedantic times, was being gradually 
fitted, by an inflexible and uncompromising logic, for 
that ascendency which it has enjoyed in our country for 
ages untold. There was idealism ready to affirm the 
existence of nothing but pure thought, side by side 
with nihilism proclaiming an interminable and absolute 
void under diversified forms of fictitious and deceptive 
existence. And finally there was the strange and par¬ 
adoxical theory of an endless chain of unconnected ex¬ 
istences, an infinite concatenation of finite links with¬ 
out anything like an interdependence or correlation of 
parts. Do not our modern philosophers find some of 
their most favorite whims anticipated in these forms of 
thought ? 

It is desirable to state here that Kapila’s system, 
though thrown into the shade by the ascendant star of 
Vedantism, has maintained its influence, in spite of 


THE SAHKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 


105 


these forms of thought, so far as to give rise to the 
saying, quoted by Monier Williams in his excellent 
treatise, “ Indian Wisdom”—viz., “ there is no knowl¬ 
edge like Sankhya, and no power like Yoga.” Let it 
not, moreover, be forgotten that the ascendency of the 
Yedanta has been secured and maintained by an assim¬ 
ilative process—that is, in consequence of its adoption 
and assimilation to itself of some of the characteristic 
ideas of the Sankhya philosophy. The Sankhya philos¬ 
ophy would exist in Yedantism in a noticeable form 
even if its existence as a separate system were utterly 
extinguished or thrown beyond the confines of possi¬ 
bility. 

The question must once more be raised, “ What is 
the cause of the universally admitted bondage of the 
soul ?” Two Aphorisms in Book I. are calculated to 
bring us to the conclusion arrived at by the commenta¬ 
tor Yijnana Bhikshu, who lived and flourished about 
three hundred years ago—viz., that “the immediate 
cause of the bondage of the soul is the conjunction of 
Prakriti and of the soul.” But the commentator is of 
course aware, as all students of Sankhya philosophy 
are, that the real cause lies beyond this conjunction, 
which, as Prakriti and soul are both pervasive and 
fitted to attract each oilier by inherent laws, is inevita¬ 
ble, and from which, therefore, there is no exemption 
even for beatified souls. The true cause of the bond¬ 
age of the soul is “ non-discrimination. ” The soul is 

o 

really different from Prakriti and its products—viz., 
intelligence, egoism, mind, etc. ; but it is led by non¬ 
discrimination to identify itself with them. Hence its 
bondage ! 

But the problem is not solved here. Another ques¬ 
tion arises. If the earth stands upon the elephant, 


10 G 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


what does the elephant stand upon ? If non-discrimi¬ 
nation is the cause of the bondage of the soul, what is 
the cause of non-discrimination ? Some persons may 
be prone to maintain that merit or demerit is the cause 
of non-discrimination. But merit or demerit, desert, 
good or bad, springs from non-discrimination ; and 
therefore we must posit one non-discrimination to 
explain another ; and there will in consequence be a 
regressus ad infinitum. But suppose we have recourse 
to the theory of spontaneity and affirm that non-dis¬ 
crimination comes naturally and spontaneously into 
being, will not such a hypothesis be enough ? No ; for 
in that case there can be no guarantee that liberated 
souls shall be freed from its molestation. Non-discrim¬ 
ination is really “ beginningless.” But that which is 
beginningless is really everlasting or endless, and there¬ 
fore the emancipation of the soul, consequent on the 
annihilation of non-discrimination, is an impossibility. 
It is not, however, beginningless, indivisible, and end¬ 
less in the sense in which the soul is ; but it is begin¬ 
ningless “ like an onflow (which may be stopped).” 
Nor is this to be wondered at, considering the fact that 
the beginningless, antecedent nonentity of a jar termi¬ 
nates as soon as it is made. Non-discrimination, though 
without beginning, is happily annihilable ; and the 
question how it may be annihilated is, properly speak¬ 
ing, the burden of the book under review. 

But before pointing out the means prescribed for 
bringing about this happy consummation, the annihila¬ 
tion of non-discrimination and the liberation of the soul 
under its bondage, let us ascertain what is said in these 
Aphorisms about the soul, and what about Prakriti, 
or, in other words, let us look into the psychology and 
physiology of this ancient document. 


THE SAHKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 


107 


Let us, in the first place, group a number of its 
declarations about the soul (Purush) : 

“ But not without the conjunction thereof {i.e. of 
Prakriti) is there the connection of that {i.e. of pain) 
with that (viz., the soul), which is now essentially a 
pure and free intelligence” (Book I. Aph. 19). 

“ Because this is impossible for what is inactive (or, 
in other words, without motion, as the soul is, because 
all-pervading and therefore incapable of changing its 
place)” (Book I. Aph. 49). 

“ Soul is something else than body, etc. Because 
that which is combined (and is therefore discerptible) 
is for the sake of some other (not discerptible)” (Book 
I. Aph. 139-140). 

“ And (the soul is not material) because of its super¬ 
intendence (over Prakriti). And (the soul is not mate¬ 
rial) because of its being an experience’ ’ (Book I. Aph. 
142-143). 

‘ ‘ From the several allotment of births, a multiplicity 
of souls (is to be inferred)’ 5 (Book I. Aph. 149). 

“ It (soul) is altogether free, (but seemingly) multi¬ 
form (or different in appearance from a free thing) 
through a delusive resemblance of being bound. It 
(soul) is a witness through its sense-organs (which quit 
it on liberation). The nature of sonl is constant free¬ 
dom. And finally (the nature of the'soul is) indiffer¬ 
ence (to pain and pleasure alike). Its (soul’s) fancy of 
being an agent is from the proximity of intelligence” 
(Book I. Aph. 160-164). 

“ It cannot be of its own nature, (that is to say) 
meditation cannot belong to soul essentially, because of 
the immobility of the soul ” (Book II. Aph. 44). 

A Bondage and liberation do not belong naturally to 


108 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


soul (and would not even appear to be) but for non- 
discrimination” (Book III. Aph. 71). 

“ Soul is, for there is no proof that it is not. This 
(soul) is different from the body, etc., because of 
heterogeneousness (or complete difference between the 
two)” (Book YI. Aph. 102). 

“ The plurality of soul is proved by the distribution 
(announced by the Yeda itself in such texts as whoso 
understand this, these are immortal, while others ex¬ 
perience sorrow' 5 (Book Y. Aph. 45). 

These texts are fitted to prove that, according to the 
Sankhya system, souls are multitudinous, immaterial, 
uncompounded, undiscerptible, all-pervading, immo¬ 
bile, and inactive. They are uncreate and essentially 
intelligence and freedom. They superintend or guide 
the evolutions of Prakriti, and experience pleasure and 
pain, but in a unique sense. 

As regards the origin of souls, the theory of creation¬ 
ism cannot but be discarded in a system which is essen¬ 
tially atheistic, and which at the same time cannot 
homologate so incongruous an idea as that of a pure 
spirit emanating from impure matter or from non¬ 
entity. Its great principle, ex nihilo nihil fit , is em¬ 
phatically stated in xlphorism 78 of the very first 
Book : “ A thing is not made out of nothing (that is 
to say, it is not-possible that out of nothing— i.e. out 
of a nonentity—a thing should be made, i.e. an entity 
should arise.” 

The theory of what in theological parlance or phrase¬ 
ology is called traducianism, or that of souls propagat¬ 
ing souls by the laws of generation, is also repulsive to 
a system which looks upon the absence of all desire and 
all activity, voluntary if not automatic, as essential to 


THE SAHKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 


109 


their perfect freedom from misery. And, therefore, 
the remaining theory of the pre-existence of souls, 
maintained by so many philosophers of so many differ¬ 
ent schools in ancient times and in the church by no 
less a man than Origen, is the only theory that can be 
propounded in consistence with the principles of the 
Sankhya school. Souls are, therefore, represented as 
increate ; but it is to be observed that the glory of 
being so does not belong to them exclusively. 

Again, they are said to be multitudinous, or rather 
innumerable, to avoid another difficulty. The object 
of creation or rather evolution being to effect the 
liberation of souls from the power or influence of non¬ 
discrimination, these must be numerous or innumerable 
to prevent the premature collapse or cessation of omnific 
work. The greater the number of souls, the longer is 
the process which first enslaves them one after another, 
and then effects their liberation singly, not en masse. 
The idea of the diffusiveness of souls is but a corollary 
deducible from their numerousness. It ought not to be 
forgotten that the Hindu philosopher, like his brother 
philosophers of other ancient schools, had at best but 
gross ideas of spiritual substances, and was therefore 
prone to confound them with material substances of a 
tenuous nature, such as ether, etc. Souls could not 
therefore be, according to him, multitudinous without 
being all-diffusive and all-pervasive. But is not each 
soul in itself, or apart from the congeries or mass of 
souls, diffusive and pervasive ? To some extent it is ; 
but perhaps not all-diffusive and all-pervasive ; though 
all that is said of souls and Prakriti may lead one to the 
conclusion that they overlap and interpenetrate one 
another, and are, moreover, overlapped and interpene¬ 
trated by Prakriti. The predications with reference 


110 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


either to the soul or Prakriti are by no means marked 
by perfect consistency and harmony. 

Activity, as has already been indicated, can on no 
account be attributed to souls, it being invariably asso¬ 
ciated with pain and misery through desire and aver¬ 
sion. Souls, therefore, are passionless and perfectly 
quiescent. But intelligence is certainly ascribed to 
souls—they are said to be intelligence itself. It may 
be said that intelligence and perfect quiescence cannot 
coexist, and that, souls being subjects of knowledge, 
they must pass through various states of consciousness, 
such as sensations, intellections, emotions, and voli¬ 
tions ; especially as omniscience, implying unchange¬ 
able thought and feeling, is not ascribed to them. But 
intelligence in this case, as in that of the Supreme 
Spirit of the Upanishads, is tantamount to non-intelli¬ 
gence, inasmuch as it makes or implies no distinction 
between self and not-self, subject and object. The 
Hindu philosopher is prone to look upon the pure spirit 
as a material entity of extreme tenuity, and he speaks 
of its intelligence as he speaks of the color of a colored 
substance, as a material attribute inherent rather than 
accidental. According to him, the intelligence of the 
soul is its golden color, its transparency, its luminous¬ 
ness. Its inherence in the soul can no more be the 
cause of intellectual, emotional, and volitional activity 
than the color of a colored substance, say the rosy hue 
of a rose, can be the cause of any display of activity on 
its part. Nor must it be forgotten that intelligence in 
the proper sense of the term is, according to this 
system, a product of Prakriti, the root-principle of 
nature, not an attribute or predicate of the soul. 

The soul’s essence is not merely intelligence, but free¬ 
dom. Then why talk of its bondage, a thing which, 


THE SAUKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 


Ill 


as contradictory to its nature, cannot exist in it without 
annihilating it. Here the Sankhya philosopher seems 
to falter for a moment, but gets rid of the difficulty 
with an ingenuity which may be commended. The 
soul’s bondage is reflectional, not real. Its proximate 
cause is contact with Prakriti, the root-principle of 
nature, called the anmulam mulam , the rootless root, 
or, in modern phraseology, the cause uncaused. This 
principle attracts the soul just as loadstone attracts 
iron ; or it is attracted by the soul which is represented 
as thoroughly immobile. 

In this description, however, our philosopher loses 
the balance of his logic and gets entangled between the 
horns of a dilemma. If he maintains that the soul is 
attracted by Prakriti into juxtaposition with itself, the 
doctrine of its immobility is neutralized ; while if the 
conjunction of the two is attributed to the attractive 
power of the soul, its complete passivity or quiescence 
is made problematical. The Sankhya philosopher gets 
out of the horns by ascribing to the soul some kind of 
automatic influence or attractive power. Yoluntary 
activity is most emphatically thrown out of the circle 
of the soul’s predicates ; but some irresistible influence 
or virtue emanates from it in the same manner in which 
some mysterious influence is exerted automatically by 
the loadstone over a piece of iron. But our philoso¬ 
pher does not see that there is absolutely no necessity 
of his positing an attractive force either in the soul or 
in Prakriti to account for their conjunction. Both the 
substances are, in his opinion, all-pervasive ; and there¬ 
fore their conjunction is inevitable. But here a fresh 
difficulty of an appalling nature makes its appearance. 
If Prakriti and souls are so universally diffusive that 
their union, or rather interpenetration, is inevitable, 


112 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


why are not souls simultaneously brought into bondage, 
and where are the beatified souls lodged ? 

Leaving this difficulty unremoved, as the Sankhya 
philosopher leaves it, let us advert to the lamentable 
fruits of the inevitable contact of souls with PrakritL 
From it proceed all the troubles of the mind ( manas ), 
which is a product of Prakriti, and therefore no portion 
of the soul ; and its sufferings are only reflected in the 
luminous and quiescent soul, and in this reflection con¬ 
sists its fictitious bondage. The soul is, therefore, in a 
very loose sense called an experiencer ; and all that 
can properly be predicated of it is that the ephemeral 
pleasures and pains brought upon the mind by its own 
malignant activity are reflected in its tranquil sub¬ 
stance^ In a sense still looser, as we shall see, the soul 
is called the ruler of Prakriti, and the witness and reg¬ 
ulator of its evolutions. 

But does not the Sankhya philosopher assume the 
reality of the bondage of the soul in his argument with 
the Vedanta and other philosophers of the phenomenal 
school ? But by the bondage of the soul he means in 
reality the bondage of the mind ; but as the mind is 
only a material evolute, its bondage cannot be real, at 
least in a spiritual sense. This is one of the glaring in¬ 
consistencies into which our philosopher is betrayed in 
spite of his logical acumen and philosophic penetration. 

The existence of a soul distinct or different from the 
innumerable souls posited by Sankhya philosophy, 
bearing relation to them as that which the creator 
bears to the creature, or the ruler to the subject, or the 
benefactor to the dependent, or even the superior to 
the inferior, is peremptorily denied. But is something 
like realism maintained in the Aphorisms ascribed to 
Kapila, such as may justify our looking upon multi- 


THE SAHKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 


113 


tudinous souls as modifications of one primal soul, their 
generic head ? Such an idea is not discoverable in 
them, though it might have been, and perhaps was, 
originated in his school in subsequent times. The idea 
appears in Yijnana Bhikshu’s commentary in a connec¬ 
tion, however, which makes it difficult to ascertain 
whether the primal soul spoken of is the generic soul, 
the pattern and exemplar of all, or whether it is noth¬ 
ing less than the pervasive, all-embracing Spirit of God 
Himself. 

In the Sankhya Aphorisms are posited two, and only 
two, entities, souls which are neither evolutes nor 
evolvent, and Prakriti, the evolvent root-principle of 
nature, and therefore not an evolute. Is there not a 
third entity spoken of as eternal in the sense of having 
existed throughout past eternity, but not everlasting in 
the sense of being inherently fitted to exist throughout 
future eternity ? Is not non-discrimination represented 
as having existed throughout past eternity, though ter¬ 
minable, or rather destined to pass into non-existence 
and continue therein for an almost incalculable cycle of 
ages ? Is non-discrimination real or non-real ? If 
real, the dualism assumed vanishes into thin air, or 
gives place to triadism. If unreal, how can it hold in 
bondage realities like living souls ? Are we to look 
upon it as the Yedantins look upon their Ignorance or 
Nescience, or Maya, as both real and unreal ? But 
such contraries cannot meet in an entity ; such union 
in one substance is unthinkable. The very argument 
which the Sankhya philosopher sets in battle array 
against the Yedantic notion of the soul being held in 
bondage by ignorance, may be marshalled in all its 
entirety against his favorite non-discrimination. But 
this he does not pause to consider. 


114 


niHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


Now let us see what the Aphorisms say of the second 
entity, Prakriti, the self-evolvent principle, to which 
creation, or existence, in all its proteus-like forms, is to 
be traced, as well as the temporary bondage and ulti¬ 
mate emancipation of souls. The word Prakriti, we 
may mention, by the way, has been, as a rule, trans¬ 
lated 44 nature,’’ but by no means with accuracy. It 
may be rendered, in deference to the scientific phrase¬ 
ology of the day, 44 the primordial form but the 
better word is 44 the self-evolving principle, ” the root of 
nature, called anrmdam mulam , the rootless root. 

The passages to be extracted in illustration of the 
nature of Prakriti are these : 

4 4 Prakriti is the state of equipoise of goodness 
(, sattwa ), passion ( rajas ), and darkness (tamas)” (Book 
I. Aph. 61). 

44 Since the root has no root, the root (of all) is root¬ 
less (that is to say, there is no other cause of Prakriti, 
because there would be a regressus ad infinitum , if we 
were to suppose another cause, which by parity of rea¬ 
soning would require another cause, and so on, without 
end). Even if there be a succession, there is a halt at 
some one point, and so it is merely a name (that we give 
to the point in question) when we speak of the root of 
things under the name of Prakriti. Alike in respect of 
Prakriti and of both (Soul and Prakriti, is the argument 
for the uncreated existence)” (Book I. Aph. 67-69). 

44 ITer (Prakriti’s) imperceptibility arises from her 
subtlety. (Prakriti) exists because her existence is 
gathered from beholding of productions (which have 
these qualities)” (Book I. Aph. 109-110). 

44 Though she be unintelligent, yet Prakriti acts—as 
is the case with milk (that is to say, as milk, without 
reference to man’s efforts, quite of itself changes into 


THE SAHKIIYA PHILOSOPHY. 


115 


the form of curd). Or, as is the case with acts (or on¬ 
goings), for we see them, of time, etc. (the spontaneous 
action of Prakriti is proved from what is seen). The 
action of time, for instance, takes place quite spontane¬ 
ously in the shape of one season’s now departing and 
another’s coming on—let the behavior of Prakriti also 
be thus—for the supposition conforms to observed facts. 
But still a senseless Prakriti would never energize, or 
would energize in a wrong way, less because of there 
being (in her case) no such communing as, “ This is my 
means of producing experience,” etc. To this he 
replies, From her own nature she acts, not from 
thought—just as a servant (that is to say, as in the case 
of an excellent servant, naturally, merely from habit, 
the appointed and necessary service of the master is 
engaged in, and not with a view to his own enjoyment, 
just so does Prakriti energize from habit alone). Or, 
from attraction by deserts which have been from eter¬ 
nity” (Book III. Aph. 59-63). 

Here we bring our string of quotations from the text 
—as well as from the commentary—to a close, and 
emphasize the points made. Prakriti is eternal, imper¬ 
ceptible, indiscrete, unintelligent, and ever active, 
except when in a state of equipoise. It resembles the 
soul in eternal duration, imperceptibility, and undis- 
cerptibility, but differs from it in activity or energy of 
self-evolution, not in its want of intelligence, as the 
intelligence of the soul, being destitute of the elements 
of self-consciousness and world-consciousness, is equiva¬ 
lent to non-intelligence. 

Here a couple of questions ought to be raised and 
disposed of. 

The first is, If Prakriti is imperceptible, how are we 
to be sure of its existence ? To be able to answer this 


116 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


question it is necessary to look into the laws of evidence 
which are recognized in the Sankhya school. The cham¬ 
pions of this school admit only three kinds of proof 
—viz., perception (Prataksha), inference (Anuman), 
and testimony (Sabda) ; and they discard comparison 
(' ujpamand ), which the Logical schools add to the list, as 
well as the two others admitted in the Yedic schools. 
The objects of the external world make their existence 
known to us through the medium of perception, or the 
impressions made upon the senses by them. But they 
are, each of them, discerptible, and consequently de¬ 
structible. Their discerptibility, or divisibility, proves 
that they are not eternal, and that, therefore, they 
cannot be the ground of their own existence. The law 
of inference leads the mind to look for the cause of 
their existence or manifestation apart from them ; and 
the ultimate ground at which we arrive, when we trace 
the different lines of causation to their converging point, 
is Prakriti. Its existence, therefore, is proved by infer¬ 
ence based on perception. 

Again, it is plain that these objects, evolved from 
Prakriti, do not exist for themselves. Or, in other 
words, Prakriti does not evolve for its own advantage. 
With its varieties of evolutes, it exists for something 
else, as “ axes for cutting,’’ or “ houses” for the ben¬ 
efit of those who dwell in them. For whom, or for 
what does Prakriti evolve, or do the evolutes of Prakriti 
exist ? For souls, certainly. The laws of inference, 
then, not merely establish the existence of Prakriti, 
but that of souls also. And as Prakriti, like the soul, 
is indiscerptible, it is uncreate and eternal. In this 
piece of reasoning the doctrine of final causes is recog¬ 
nized as in the preceding are the doctrines of efficient 
and material causes. 


THE SAHKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 


117 


Now comes the second question, How can Prakriti 
be called discerptible, seeing that it consists of the 
three qualities {gunas ), goodness, passion, and darkness, 
held in equipoise ? 

What are these gunas or qualities ? Are they ele¬ 
mentary substances of extreme tenuity, or are they 
mere predicates or attributes of substances ? If they 
are qualities or attributes, in the ordinary sense of the 
term, of substances, their inherence in Prakriti does 
not militate against its indiscerptibility. If, however, 
they are elementary substances, their union in Prakriti 
establishes its complex nature and its consequent dis- 
cerptibility. Their nature should, therefore, be thor¬ 
oughly looked into before the claim of indiscerptibility 
advanced in favor of Prakriti can be adjudicated upon. 

The word guna , generally translated “quality,” 
means a cord, and the three gunas of the Sankhya 
school are the three cords by which the soul, or rather 
Prakriti itself, is fettered. They are sattwa , rajas , 
and tamas. The word sattwa means purity and good¬ 
ness, and the sattwa guna is that which enlightens, 
soothes, purifies, causes virtue, and communicates 
pleasure and happiness. It prevails in ethereal regions, 
and causes the enlightenment, happiness, and joy char¬ 
acteristic of those seats of purity and goodness. In the 
world it predominates in fire, and that is the reason 
why flame tapers toward the sky, and sparks fly up¬ 
ward. When it abounds in man he becomes virtuous and 
happy ; and to its preponderance must be ascribed the 
acknowledged happiness of superior orders of beings, 
such as Prajapatis, Indras, Pitris, Gandharvas, Gods, 
and Demigods. The word rajas means passion, energy, 
and activity ; and the characteristics of the raj as-guna 
are variability, activity, vehemence, and restlessness. 


118 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


It is accompanied by vice and misery, and when it pre¬ 
vails in man he becomes a child of error and wretched¬ 
ness. It abounds in the atmosphere, and accounts for 
its fitful and erratic movements. And lastly, the word 
tamas means stolidity and darkness ; and the tamos- 
guna is that which produces sorrow, dulness, stupidity, 
and inaction. It predominates in earth and water, 
and accounts for their downward tendency ; and when 
it abounds in man it makes him sorrowful, stupid, lazy, 
and immobile. 

The three qualities abound respectively in upper, 
mundane, and nether creations. “ Aloft (above the 
world of mortals) it (the creation) abounds in, the 
quality of) purity. Beneath (that is to say, under the 
world of mortals) (the creation) abounds in darkness. 
In this midst, (that is, in the world of mortals, the 
creation) abounds in passion” (Book III. Aph. 48-50). 

But it is to be observed that they are, as a rule, if 
not invariably, found mixed in varied proportions, 
never almost dissevered or separated one from another. 
In the highest ethereal regions, as in superior orders of 
beings and the very best of men, purity abounds ; but 
it is not altogether dissociated from its troublesome 
companions, inasmuch as these exist, albeit in very 
small proportions, along with it. And in the lowest 
infernal regions, as in demons and evil spirits, as well 
as the worst of men, some degree of purity, however 
inconsiderable, is found in conjunction with the pre¬ 
ponderant passion and darkness. This fact explains or 
shows the distinction there is between these qualities, 
or rather material attributes, and the substances in 
which they are found mixed in varied proportions. 
They are almost inseparable in reality, though separa¬ 
ble in thought. They are a material trinity in unity, 


THE SAHKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 


119 


and unity in trinity. They are held in equipoise only 
in Prakriti in its quiescent state, and their union in it 
in equal proportions cannot militate against the theory 
of its eternity and indiscerptibility. They are, more¬ 
over, ubiquitous, existing in all the productions or 
modifications of Prakriti, in all the regions of space, in 
endlessly varied proportions. And they are, in their 
joint capacity as well as singly, an evil ; they being 
the cause of that bondage of the mind which is reflected 
in the soul, and from the reflection of which it has to 
be liberated. 

Prakriti, in its Trinitarian essence, is the great 
omnific principle, and it energizes spontaneously, as 
milk coagulates into curd when let alone. Though 
destitute of intelligence, and acting from a simple 
automatic impulse, it never errs, as “an excellent ser¬ 
vant” -anticipates and obeys the commands of his 
master “ from habit.” The order of creation is pre¬ 
sented in Aph. Cl of Book I. : “ From Prakriti (pro¬ 
ceeds) intelligence (Buddhi), from intelligence egoizer, 
or I-maker (Ahankara), from egoizer the five subtle 
elements (Tanmatras), and both sets (internal and ex¬ 
ternal) of organs (Indriya), and from the subtle elements 
the gross elements (Sthul bhuta).” Intelligence, the 
first product, or evolute, of self-evolving Prakriti, is 
called great (Mahat), because it is a principle of f - super¬ 
lative purity,” and occupies in creation the same place 
which the Prime Minister occupies in a well-organized 
government. It gives birth to egoizer, which is the 
cause of the distinction we make between self and not- 
self, a distinction fictitious rather than real, and one 
which proves to us a source of vexation and trouble. 
Then come the five tenuous elements, imperceptible to 
man, but perceptible to superior beings, or even to man 


120 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


when his natural powers are indefinitely enlarged by 
meditation—viz., sound, touch, color, taste or sapidity, 
and smell. These seven principles are evolutes of Pra- 
kriti, and evolvent ; and to their omnific activity, or 
prolific energy, creation in its multifarious aspects is to 
be traced. Then there are sixteen other principles, 
which are evolutes or productions, not evolvents or pro¬ 
ducers—viz., the five gross elements, earth, fire, water, 
air, ether ; the five organs of knowledge (Gyan-in- 
driyani), the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the 
skin ; the five organs of action (Karma indriyani), the 
hands, the feet, the larynx or the organ of speech, the 
orifice, and the generative organ; and the mind (Manas), 
called the eleventh organ, the real cause of the bondage 
under which it itself groans, and from the reflection of 
which the soul has to be freed. 

The existence of these twenty-four tattwas , or cate¬ 
gories, is proved by perception and inference, which 
last is a process of demonstration rising from what is 
perceptible to what is imperceptible. For instance, the 
gross elements, earth, fire, water, air, are perceptible 
to mortals ; and their existence is proved by the simple 
testimony of the senses. But they do not explain their 
own existence, and therefore we are led by the laws of 
reasoning to the tenuous principles, the subtle rudi¬ 
ments from which they proceed, and by which their 
existence is accounted for. But these subtle elements, 
imperceptible to men in general, though perceptible to 
superior beings, or even men endowed with powers of 
perception keener and more expanded than human 
beings ordinarily possess, are only modifications of the 
I-maker, which again is a modification of intelligence, 
the first-born of Prakriti increate. Again, the mind, 
the eleventh organ, is another modification of the 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 


121 


I-maker, and its existence is proved by that of the per¬ 
ceptible organs of knowledge and action. 

The existence of the twenty-fifth category, the soul, 
which is neither an evolute nor an evolvent, is proved 
by the creative energy of Prakriti, which energizes, 
not for its own advantage, but for that of an entity 
apart from itself. This is emphatically stated in such 
verses as these : u From Brahma down to a post for its 
(soul’s) sake is creation till there be discrimination 
(between soul and Prakriti), on which its liberation 
ensues.” “ Prakriti’s creation is for the sake of an¬ 
other, though it be spontaneous, for she is not the 
experiencer, just like a cart’s carrying saffron for the 
sake of its master.” 

But why not carry the arguments from inference a 
step farther, and recognize a Lord (Iswara) behind the 
varied manifestations of Prakriti, as the ultimate 
ground of existence ? There are insuperable obstacles 
in the way. A Lord cannot possibly be the creator of 
the universe. If he exists, he must either be free or 
bound. If free, he cannot have a desire to create prev¬ 
alent enough to determine his will, or lead to volition 
and action. It is an established maxim of Hindu Phi¬ 
losophy that a desire leading irresistibly to action, good 
or bad, is bondage. Such a desire on the part of God 
cannot but militate against His assumed freedom. If, 
however, He is bound, how could He possibly create ? 
The supposition, therefore, of a Lord behind the veil of 
shifting phenomena is both irrational and useless. 

How thoroughly the atheistic speculations of our 
vaunted age of progress were anticipated in times 
which may be called prehistoric, in India and other 
countries ! The scientists and philosophers of the day 
now and then betray a little weakness, to which their 


122 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


prototypes of ancient times were utter strangers. 
Given matter and the laws immanent in it, they have 
no difficulty whatever in explaining the wonders of 
creation, or solving the knotty problems of existence. 
But they manifest a little hesitation when they have to 
settle the question, ££ How came matter to be, and how 
and by whom were its laws impressed upon it ?” 
Their hesitation, however, is momentary, as they shake 
it off by assuming the eternity of matter, and the eter¬ 
nal inherence of its laws, as well as by upholding the 
principle, ex nihilo nihil fit. But our redoubtable phi¬ 
losophers of ancient times presented a braver front, and 
did not hesitate for a moment in affirming with oracu¬ 
lar assurance the eternity of matter ; and their dictum, 
as has already been said, runs thus : ££ A thing is not 
made out of nothing.” And even when they'admitted 
the existence of a God, their principle that an impure 
thing, such as matter in their opinion is, cannot possi¬ 
bly emanate from, or be created by, a pure Being, 
made it impossible for them to represent such a Being 
as its Creator. God or no God, matter, according to 
their teaching, is eternal, along with the laws inherent 
in it. 

But the way in which our philosophers dispose of the 
argument based on testimony, which is one of the three 
kinds of proof admitted in his school, is worthy of con¬ 
sideration. By testimony they understand, not only 
what is ordinarily included in that term, but a great 
deal more, even the teachings of revelation, and those 
of devotees and adepts, who by virtue of intense medi¬ 
tation have obtained, and may obtain, the power of 
recalling to their minds the varied events which oc¬ 
curred to them in several, if not all, of their past lives, 
and that of discovering and bringing to light occult 


THE SAHKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 


123 


truths, or truths hidden among the arcana of nature. 
But revelation distinctly affirms the existence of a 
Lord. How is this to be accounted for ? Is revelation 
to be discarded as a tissue of Old Wives’ Fables ? Our 
time-serving philosophers did not allow themselves to 
be ostensibly carried thus far by their scepticism. 
They got rid of the difficulty by resorting to orbits of 
shuffling criticism, not unknown to modern sceptics. 
(“ The Scriptural texts which make mention of ‘ the 
Lord ’ are) either glorifications of the liberated souls or 
homages to the recognized (deities of the Hindu Pan¬ 
theon).” And, besides, “ There is Scripture for this 
(world’s) being the production of Prakriti (not of a 
Lord).’ 5 

It may be mentioned here that, even when Hindu 
Philosophy allows the existence of a god, it makes him 
so quiescent and inactive that creation cannot possibly 
be attributed to him. We cannot ascribe creation to 
him without making him subject to passion, the second 
of the three qualities from which he must be free, and 
therefore representing him as actually held in bond¬ 
age. Hor can he be the governor of the universe with¬ 
out being u selfish” and “ liable to grief.” In Book 
Y. we have these Aphorisms : 

Aph. 3. “ (If a Lord were governor, then) having 
intended his own benefit, his government (would be 
selfish) as is the case (with ordinary governors) in the 
world.” 

“ (He must then be) just like a worldly lord (and) 
otherwise (than you desire that we should conceive of 
him) ; for if we agree that the Lord is also benefited, he 
also must be something mundane—just like a worldly 
[ orc l—because, since his desires are (on that supposition) 
not (previously) satisfied, he must be liable to grief.” 


124 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


And besides the supposition of a lord is useless. He 
cannot create, cannot govern, canuot judge, cannot re¬ 
ward or punish—the last prerogative, viz., that of be¬ 
stowing rewards and inflicting punishments being a pre¬ 
rogative of works, not of God. In Aph. 2 of this Book, 
we have these words : “ Hot from its (the world’s) 
being governed by the Lord, is there the effectuation 
of the fruit, for it is by works (that is, by merit and 
demerit) that this is accomplished—by works alone 
which are indispensable—and if we do make the addi¬ 
tional and- cumbrous supposition of a Lord, he cannot 
reward a man otherwise than according to his works.” 

If there is no . Lord, the question arises, Why believe 
in a revelation at all ? The proper answer to this ques¬ 
tion brings forward a theory which in absurdity has 
not its parallel even in the history of wild speculation. 
The Sankhya philosopher does not hold, like the Mim- 
ansakas and the Vedantins, the eternity of the Yedas. 
The forty-fifth Aphorism of the Fifth Book of the 
work under review runs thus : “ The Yeda is not from 
eternity, for there is Scripture for its being a produc¬ 
tion.” If not eternal, it must have been written either 
by God or by some gifted man. It could not possibly 
have been written, or vouchsafed through verbal com¬ 
munication, or in any other way, by God, for the 
Sankhya Philosophy does not recognize His existence. 
Nor could it have been written by a gifted man : such 
a man must be either liberated or in bondage. If lib¬ 
erated, he could not have a prevailing desire leading to 
its composition ; and if in bondage, he could not but 
have lacked “ the power” needed to bring about so 
glorious a result. 

The Yedas, therefore, could not have proceeded 
either from God or from man, nor are they eternal. 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 


125 


How then is the mystery involved in their existence to 
be unravelled ? Here is the explanation : “ The 

Vedas, just like an expiration, proceed of themselves 
from the self-existent, through the force of fate, unper¬ 
ceived by thought.” To explain this statement of the 
commentator, Vijnana Bhikshu, two questions have to 
be raised. Who is the self-existent from whom the 
Vedas are said to have emanated as an expiration ? 
The self-existent must either be Prakriti itself, or some 
evolute of Prakriti, there being nothing knowable or 
within the reach of proof behind it, and the soul being 
incapable of sending these venerated books out even as 
an efflation. The Sankhya philosophers speak of an 
emergent deity, whom they call Brahma when he cre¬ 
ates, Vishnu when he preserves, and Siva or Mahadeva 
when he destroys. This emergent deity is the first 
evolute of Prakriti, intelligence, called Mahat, the 
Great One ; not, however, personal intelligence, but 
something hke general intelligence, the intelligence of 
which personal intelligence, mine or thine, is only a 
form. This great one, the first-born of Prakriti in- 
create, is the unconscious author of the Vedas, because 
they emanate from him as an expiration. 

When do they emanate ? Here we have to unfold 
the doctrine of metempsychosis, which underlies all 
the philosophical speculations of ancient India ; which 
even those bokl spirits who, like Kapila and Buddha, 
cast aside all faith in God, personal, if not impersonal, 
did not dare abandon. Prakriti creates one world after 
another in endless succession, to meet the exigencies of 
human desert, or to afford scope for the consumption of 
the fruits of work. One world is evolved after another 
to reward or punish the accumulated work of those 
which precede, and to furnish cause, by its own accu- 


126 


HIKDU PHILOSOPHY. 


mulated work added to the tremendous load it inherits, 
for the existence of those which succeed. Every reno¬ 
vated world, with its shifting panorama of moral 
actions and moral deserts, is thus connected with an 
endless chain of antecedent, and an equally endless 
chain of consequent stages of existence. Each of these 
gradually unfolded stages of existence or works van¬ 
ishes, when its appointed service is over, only to see 
another springing up, and continuing its great work of 
rewarding virtue and punishing vice. At each of these 
renovations of the world, the Yedas issue out of the 
emergent deity, called intelligence in the original 
Sutras, and the self-existent, or Brahma, in subsequent 
times, as an efffation. 

In conclusion, let us ascertain what the work under 
review says of liberation, the great object and scope of 
all the speculations embodied in its pages. Prakriti 
creates or energizes, to liberate the soul from the bond¬ 
age of non-discrimination, or misapprehension, or mis¬ 
conception. How is this effected ? Hot by worship, 
for worship takes for granted what is not admitted, the 
existence of a creative and controlling being behind the 
veil of natural phenomena ; not by sacrifices, because 
these, as they inflict pain upon the victims, cannot but 
occasion pain to those by whom they are offered, by 
the law of retribution ; not by rites and ceremonies of 
a bloodless character, because whatever efficacy they 
may have is of a transient, not a permanent, nature. 
These all are certainly praised in various parts of 
Scripture. The sacrifice of the horse is said to give 
the offerer power to conquer all worlds, expiate sin, 
overcome death, and attain immortality. The juice of 
the soma, the moon plant (Asclepias acida ), is said to 
have conferred victory, triumph, “ effulgence,’ 5 and 


THE SAHKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 


127 


“ deathless being” on Indra liimself, and the subordi¬ 
nate gods and goddesses of the Indian Parnassus. But 
it is to be borne in mind that the benefits conferred 
by bloody and bloodless rites are evanescent, and that 
even the gods perish at every dissolution of the world, 
or at the consummation of every single stage of exist¬ 
ence. “ Many thousands of Indras and other gods 
have passed away in successive periods, overcome by 
time ; for time is hard to overcome.” Freedom from 
the galling yoke of transmigration, from an almost in¬ 
terminable chain of births and deaths, religious observ¬ 
ances cannot possibly secure. 

Such freedom is the result of right knowledge or dis¬ 
crimination, which is obtained by meditation. “ From 
knowledge (acquired during mundane existence) comes 
salvation (soul’s chief end)” (Book III. Aph. 23). 
Knowledge alone, dissociated from, not in conjunction 
with, works, is the fountain of liberation, as the verse 
following the one quoted assures us, “ Since this (viz., 
knowledge) is the precise cause of liberation, there is 
neither association (of anything else with it, e.g. good 
works) nor alternativeness {e.g. of good works in its 
stead). ” This knowledge is attained by meditation, on 
the nature and efficacy of which the following verses 
give information : 

“ Meditation is the cause of the removal of desire 
(that affection of the mind by objects which is a hin- 
derer of knowledge). It (meditation, from the effect¬ 
uation of which, and not from merely communing upon 
it) knowledge arises, is perfected by the repelling of the 
modifications (of the mind which ought to be obstructed 
from all thoughts of anything). This meditation is 
perfected by restraint, postures, and one’s duties. Re¬ 
straint (of the breath) is by means of expulsion and 


128 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


retention. Steady and (promoting) ease is a (suitable) 
posture, (such as the- crossing of the arms). One’s 
duty is the performance of the actions prescribed for 
one’s religious order” (Book III. Aph. 30-35). 

The subject of meditation and its varied appliances 
belongs, properly speaking, to Yoga philosophy, the 
counterpart, not only of the Sankhya system, but in 
some respects of every system of philosophy pro¬ 
pounded in India, not excluding almost all of those 
systems which, like Buddhism and its offshoots, are 
branded heterodox. Meditation, not in its incipient 
stages, but when perfected by years of close attention, 
and rigid conformity to its almost endless varieties of 
stringent rules, begets right knowledge, which dispels 
non-discrimination, and brings on emancipation. The 
essence of the knowledge begotten by meditation is the 
distinction between the soul and non-soul, the passive, 
quiescent, immobile spirit and the ever-active, plastic, 
formative Prakriti. When this distinction is clearly 
apprehended by the mind, the soul is set free from the 
bondage of its desires and aversions, its good and bad 
deeds, and their woeful consequences in an almost end¬ 
less chain of transmigrations. 

The soul is, of course, in a very loose sense said to be 
set free, its bondage and liberation being nominal, not 
real — reflections and shadows, not realities. The 
bondage and liberation spoken of throughout this book 
are in reality the bondage and liberation of Prakriti, 
which, first of all, weaves a net for its own entangle¬ 
ment by a process of evolution, and ultimately effects 
its own emancipation by a process of meditation. And 
to this mischievous activity it is impelled by passion 
{rajas), the-second of the three qualities which form its 
Trinitarian essence. 


CHAPTER Y. 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY, OK THE HINDU THEORY OF 
EVOLUTION CONTINUED. 

An exposition of the principles of the Sankhya sys¬ 
tem must be incomplete without some reference to a 
treatise decidedly earlier than the one already exam¬ 
ined—we mean the Sankhya-Karica, or exposition of 
the Sankhya, by Iswara Krishna. That this document 
is more ancient than the Sankhya Pravachana, or the 
Sankhya Sutras, falsely ascribed to Kapila, is proved 
both by internal and external evidence. The specula¬ 
tions embodied in the Sankhya Pravachana about the 
emergent Deity, who appears as Creator under the 
name of Brahma, as Preserver under that of Vishnu, 
and as Destroyer under that of Mahadeva, are suffi¬ 
cient to trace its composition to the age when an 
attempt was made to reconcile philosophy with current 
superstitions ; and they would be enough, even if 
other proofs were wanting, to establish its posteriority. 
The book, however, abounds with references to the 
varied systems of philosophy which are known to have 
flourished in times posterior to the age of Kapila, who 
in one important sense may be called the father of 
Hindu Philosophy. Such references, both direct and 
oblique, are scarcely met with in the Sankhya-Karica, 
which, moreover, does not indicate any advance on the 
part of Philosophy toward a reconciliation between the 
transcendental speculations of the schools and the grov¬ 
elling beliefs of the masses. 


130 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


The Sankhya-Karica consists of seventy-two sloJcas, 
or distichs, each, as a rule, bearing upon a distinct 
topic. As specimens of conciseness of style, condensa¬ 
tion of thought, and closeness of reasoning, these dis¬ 
tichs are worthy of all praise ; though they are free, 
comparatively speaking, from the tinge of eontrover- 
sialism by which the later work is distinguished. The 
book has been very recently translated by Mr. John 
Davies, whose elucidatory notes and extracts from 
standard commentaries are helps without which it is 
impossible for the ordinary reader to master its con¬ 
tents. Of his translation we shall avail ourselves in our 
attempt to present a synopsis of its contents. 

Regarding the author of the Sankhya-Karica, very 
little is known beyond what is indicated in the last 
three of its distichs. These we deem it desirable to 
transcribe : 

“ This supreme purifying doctrine, the Sage (Kapila) 
compassionately imparted to Asuri ; Asuri taught it to 
Panchasikha, by whom it was extensively made known. 

“ Handed down by disciples in succession, it has been 
compendiously written in Arya metre by the noble- 
minded Iswara Krishna, having fully learned the dem¬ 
onstrated truth. 

“ The subjects treated in seventy distichs are those 
of the complete science, containing sixty topics, ex¬ 
cluding illustrative tales, and omitting also controver¬ 
sial questions. 

“ Thus is completed the book of the Sankhya (Phi¬ 
losophy) uttered by the venerable, the great-minded, 
and divine Kapila. 

‘ May prosperity attend it! ’ ” 

In accordance with the plan referred to, if not dis- 


THE SAHKHYA PHILOSOPHY COHTIHUED. 


131 


tinctly laid down in the last paper, we shall present a 
synopsis of the contents of this book, allude cursorily 
to an expository argument in the dissertation on this 
Philosophy in the Sarva Darsana Sangraha, and con¬ 
clude with a few general observations on the doctrines 
and principles of the system under review. 

And first, in accordance with our arrangement, we 
shall inquire into what the book says about the soul 
and Prakriti, the two entities admitted as existent in 
the Sankhya school. But before we do so a prelimi¬ 
nary observation is desirable. 

The speculations embodied in Sankhya-Karica begin 
exactly where those of Sankhya Pravachana begin, 
that is, with the admission of the three kinds of pain 
begetting a longing for liberation, such as cannot possi¬ 
bly be satisfied by “ the visible means,” such as earthly 
pleasures, medicine, etc., or by “ the revealed means,” 
such as prayers, sacrifices, and other religious observ¬ 
ances. The first two distichs set forth in a condensed 
form the object and scope of Sankhya Philosophy, as 
well as the universally admitted fact on which it is 
based : 

“ From the injurious effects of the threefold kinds of 
pain (arises) a desire to know the means of removing it 
(pain). If from the visible (means of removing it) this 
desire should seem to be superfluous, it is not so, for 
these are neither absolutely complete nor abiding. 

“ The revealed (means) are like the visible (i.e. ineffi¬ 
cient), for they are connected with impurity, destruc¬ 
tion, and excess. A contrary method is better, and 
this consists in a discriminative knowledge of the mani¬ 
fested (forms of matter), the unmanifested (Prakriti or 
primeval matter), and the knowing (soul).” 

Mr. Davies shows how religious observances are, 


132 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


according to Kapila, accompanied with “ impurity, 
destruction, excess, or inequality.” The Yedic system 
which is an embodiment of what the text calls “ re¬ 
vealed means,” is imperfect and inefficient, because it 
is inseparably linked to bloody sacrifices, which cannot 
but result in impurity ; because the reward it promises 
is temporary happiness, not the liberation implied in 
the soul’s emancipation from all material influences ; 
and, lastly, because it gives some persons, for instance, 
the rich, who can offer bloody sacrifices more easily 
than the poor, an undue advantage over others. 

Kow let us group some of the passages in which the 
antithesis between the soul and Prakriti is set forth : 

3. “ Prakriti, the root (of material forms) is not pro¬ 
duced. The great one (Mahat, Buddhi or Intellect) 
and the rest (which spring from it) are seven (sub¬ 
stances) producing and produced. Sixteen are produc¬ 
tions (only). Soul is neither producing nor produced.” 

11. “ The manifested (Vyakta) has the three modes 
(guna ). It is indiscriminating, objective, generic, irra¬ 
tional, and productive. So also is Pradhan (Prakriti). 
Soul in these respects ; as in those (previously men¬ 
tioned), is the reverse.” 

15. “ From the finite nature of specific objects ; 
from the homogeneous nature (of genera and species) ; 
from the active energy of evolution (the constant pro¬ 
gressive development of finite forms) ; from the sepa¬ 
rateness of cause and effect; and from the undivided¬ 
ness (or the real unity) of the whole universe.” 

16. “ (It is proved that) there is a primary cause, 
the unmanifested (Avyakta) which acts (or develops 
itself) by three modes ; by blending and modification, 
like water, from the difference of the receptacle or seat 
of the modes as they are variously distributed. ” 


THE SAHKHYA PHILOSOPHY COHTIHUED. 133 

IT. “ Because an assemblage (of things) is for the 
sake of another ; because the opposite of the three 
modes and the rest (their modifications) must exist ; 
because there must be a superintending power ; because 
there must be a nature that enjoys, and because of (the 
existence of) active exertion for the sake of abstraction 
or isolation (from material contact) ; therefore soul 
exists.’’ 

18. “ From the separate allotment of birth, death, 
and the organs ; from the diversity of occupations at 
the same time ; and also from the different conditions 
(or modifications) of the three modes ; it is proved that 
there is a plurality of souls.” 

19. “ And from that contrariety (of soul) it is con¬ 
cluded that the witnessing soul is isolated, neutral, per¬ 
ceptive, and inactive by nature.” 

20. “ It is thus, from this union, that the unintelli¬ 
gent body (the linga) appears to be intelligent, and 
from the activity of the modes, the stranger (the soul) 
appears to be an agent. ’ ’ 

These distichs set forth the contrast between Prakriti 
and soul as well as the varied kinds of proof by which 
their existence is demonstrated. Prakriti is the root of 
the perceptible and inferrable universe, that is, the uni¬ 
verse of which the grosser objects are perceived, and 
the subtler inferred from those perceived. Prakriti is 
the unmanifested (Avyakta) developing itself, in con¬ 
sequence of an immanent law of cyclic evolution, into 
the manifested (Yyakta) ; and it unfolds itself in forms 
which may be classed in genera and in species. Prak¬ 
riti is objective, irrational, unfitted to discriminate 
one thing from another, and productive or evolvent. 
The soul is the very antipodes in all these respects of 
Prakriti. It is in its essence isolated from the universe 


134 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


of material objects, the entity which always continues 
unmanifested, is subjective, rational, fitted to discern 
the differences subsisting between things which differ, 
non-productive, and inactive. Its rationality and dis¬ 
criminativeness are, however, problematical, as we 
shall show by and by. Suffice it to say here that the 
two entities are so decidedly opposed to one another 
that, in order to produce either of them, we have only 
to divest the other of its peculiar attributes and clothe 
it with those which are their contrasts or opposites. 

In one important respect the antithesis between Prak- 
riti and soul is marked. Prakriti has the three gunas , 
or qualities, or modes, while the soul is entirely free 
from their presence or influence. Let us see what the 
Karica says about these constitutive elements of Prak¬ 
riti : 

12. “ The modes have a joyous, grievous, and stupe¬ 
fying nature. They serve for manifestation, activity, 
and restraint : they naturally subdue and support each 
other, produce each other, consort together, and take 
each other s condition. 

13. “ ‘ Goodness ’ (Sattwa) is considered as light (or 
subtle) and enlightening (or manifesting) ; ‘ passion ’ 
or ‘ foulness ’ (Rajas) as exerting and mobile ; ‘ dark¬ 
ness 5 (Tamas) as heavy or enveloping (or obstructive). 
This action for the gaining of an end is like that of a 
lamp.” 

14. “ In the higher world the quality (or mode) 
called 4 goodness ’ prevails ; below, the creation 
abounds in ‘ darkness ; ’ in the midst foulness or pas¬ 
sion abounds. Brahma and the rest (of the gods) and 
a stock form the limits. ” 

The gunas , it is to be observed, cannot, properly 
speaking, be called moral dispositions, such as good- 


THE SAHKHYA PHILOSOPHY COHTIHUED. 


135 


ness, activity, and indolence are. They may be repre¬ 
sented as producers of our moral dispositions, the mate¬ 
rial essence of which both our intellectual and moral 
affections are modifications or evolutes. Matter, ac¬ 
cording to this system, may be defined as a double- 
faced entity ; and it is presented in the universe in a 
variety of forms more or less gross, more or less subtle 
and tenuous. To its grosser forms we give the name 
of material objects ; while its subtler invisible forms 
we characterize as intellectual affections and moral dis¬ 
positions. But the sharp line of demarcation that we 
draw between matter and mind has no foundation in 
truth, though held up as obviously just by the factitious 
rules of our dictionaries and grammars ! 

Another point of difference, or rather contrariety, 
between Prakriti and Purush, or soul, hinges on the 
unity of the one and multeity of the other. Prakriti 
is one indivisible substance, appearing in endless varie¬ 
ties of forms under the influence of the quality called 
“ passion,” which leads it irresistibly to pass through a 
fixed process of evolution. Souls are, however, innu¬ 
merable. How is this to be proved ? Before it is 
possible to answer this question satisfactorily it is neces¬ 
sary to inquire, How is the existence of Prakriti itself, 
or that of Purush, or soul, to be proved ? 

Here we must notice that only three sources of 
knowledge, or kinds of proof, are admitted in this 
treatise, as in the Sankhya Pravachana. In distich 4 
we have these stated : “ Perception, inference, and fit 
testimony are the threefold (kinds of) accepted proof, 
because in them every mode of proof is fully contained. 
The complete determination, or perfect knowledge, 
of what is to be determined is by proof.” And in 
distich 6, the province, so to speak, of each of these 


136 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


lines of evidence is indicated : “ The knowledge of 
formal or generic existence is by perception ; of things 
beyond the senses by inference ; that which cannot be 
determined by this (method) and cannot be perceived 
must be determined by fitting means.” 

The argument brought forward to prove the exist¬ 
ence and multeity of souls is the same presented as that 
in the Sankhya Pravachana with some new features 
added. 

We are assured of the existence of the objects of 
nature by perception. But these objects are finite or 
conditioned, and they cannot but lead us to look for 
the ground of their existence apart from themselves. 
They are, moreover, classed in genera and species, and 
they consequently lead the mind toward an original or 
primary genus. The process of evolution noticeable in 
their production suggests an evolving principle ; while 
the chain of second causes they point to leads us to a 
recognition of a precedent first cause. And, lastly, the 
unity of the universe indicates the operation in its pro¬ 
duction of a principle, originally indiscerptible and in¬ 
discrete, though susceptible of modification, such as 
renders it now multiform, divisible, and divided. In¬ 
ference, therefore, rising from a series of effects to the 
primal cause, establishes the existence of Prakriti, 
“which develops itself by the three modes,” blended 
into varieties of forms, as “ simple water coming from 
the clouds is modified as sweet, sour, bitter, pungent 
in the nature of the juice of the cocoanut-palm, lei- 
Icaranja , and wood-apple.” 

But the vast assemblage of things into which Prakriti 
has developed cannot exist for nothing ; and it there¬ 
fore suggests the presence, somewhere, of one fitted to 
own and enjoy it, as a well-furnished house necessarily 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 


137 


carries with it the idea of a person dwelling in it. Be¬ 
sides, this assemblage of inanimate things needs the 
supervision and regulating power of an intelligent 
ruler ; while the rush toward emancipation made by 
Prakriti in some of its subtler forms leads the mind by 
a transition, natural and easy, to the recognition of a 
being enthralled, and therefore in need of deliverance. 
The existence of the soul is therefore established ! The 
argument, however, is a naked fallacy, inasmuch as the 
soul, being perfectly inert and quiescent, is, properly 
speaking, neither an enjoyer nor a ruler, while its 
enthralment is a fiction, rather than reality. 

Various facts are mentioned as tending to prove the 
multeity or plurality of souls. The varied accidents of 
birth and death form a series of indisputable facts fitted 
to set forth their multitudinousness. If souls were one, 
not many, the birth and death of one person would 
synchronize with the birth and death of all other per¬ 
sons ; or if there were only one soul, all human beings 
would come into the world and go out of it at one and 
the same time. But the fact is that they come in at 
different times and go out at different times ; and the 
endless diversity in their hours of ingress and egress is 
a proof that souls are multitudinous, not one. Again, 
if souls were one, the organs of perception and intellec¬ 
tion attached to them would not present the variety of 
aspects which is their most noticeable aspect. In one 
man, for instance, the sense of hearing or sight is ten 
times acuter than in another ; and in many the sense 
itself does not exist at all. Why these differences ? 
Owing certainly to the deserts of souls, to the merits or 
demerits accumulated by them severally in former 
states of existence. But if souls were one, and the 
deserts the same, the organs would present a uniform 


138 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


aspect, the sense of sight or hearing would be acute or 
dull in all human beings, and defects and imperfections 
would be equally, not unequally, distributed. And, 
lastly, all mankind would in that case be equally 
affected by the modes or qualities. The fact, however, 
is that there is an endless variety of ways in which 
human beings are affected by them. Some are pecul¬ 
iarly susceptible to the quality of goodness, and be¬ 
come good almost instinctively ; while others are 
enslaved, as it were, by the evil qualities almost from 
their birth. The reasoning here is fallacious, as it 
ascribes to the soul some responsibility, which in reality 
belongs to Prakriti ! 

One important question ought to be raised and dis¬ 
posed of before we proceed to a detailed treatment of 
the products or evolutes of Prakriti. If those disposi¬ 
tions which are characterized as moral are foreign to 
the soul, wherein do they inhere ? The Sankhya Phi¬ 
losopher is penetrating enough to see that such disposi¬ 
tions as goodness, passion, or indolence cannot inhere 
in or form portions of our gross bodies. Nor can they 
inhere in or form elements of the soul without leading 
it to some kind of action inconsistent with the hypoth¬ 
esis of its perfect quiescence. A habitation for these 
dispositions is therefore a desideratum in the system. 
The Sankhya philosopher meets the want by positing a 
subtle body between the perfectly quiescent soul and 
the gross, perceptible, and tangible body. This is 
called the linga-sarir , and it migrates with the soul 
from one gross body to another, and is dissolved only 
when its perfect emancipation is effected by intense 
meditation. The following distichs speak of this subtle 
body : 

39. “ Subtle (bodies), those which are born of father 


THE SA^KHYA PHILOSOPHY COHTIHUED. 


139 


and mother, with the gross forms of existence, are the 
threefold species (of bodies). Of these the subtle are 
permanent ; those which are born of father and mother 
perish. 

40. “ The subtle (body) Imga, formed primevally, 
unconfined, permanent, composed of intellect and the 
rest, down to the subtle elements, migrates, never 
enjoys, and is endowed with dispositions (Bhavas). 

41. “ As a painting does not stand without a support 
or receptacle, nor a shadow without a stake, etc., so 
the linga does not exist unsupported without specific 
elements. 

42. “ Formed for the sake of the soul, the linga , by 
the connection of means and their results and by union 
with the predominant Prakriti, plays its part like a 
dramatic actor.’’ 

All material objects are in these verses divided into 
three classes, subtle bodies, gross bodies, or those which 
are born of father and mother, and various forms of 
unorganized matter. The subtle body or linga-sarir is 
composed of the three primal evolutes of Prakriti, in¬ 
tellect or intelligence, egoism and Manas, or mind, and 
the rudimental elements (the Tanmatras) ; and it is, 
therefore, like these, imperceptible. It is more perma¬ 
nent than our gross bodies, is unconfined because it 
migrates from one gross body to another with the soul, 
and is endowed with moral dispositions, though incapa¬ 
ble of enjoyment, which is the prerogative of the soul, 
supposititious rather than real. It, however, enthralls 
the soul, which must cast aside this tenuous garment, 
as well as its series of grosser bodies, before its libera¬ 
tion or final separation from all material conditions is 
effected. 

It is time to advert to the productions or evolutes 



140 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


of Prakriti. These are set forth in the following 
distich s : 

22. ■“ From Prakriti issues the great principle 
(Mahat, Intellect), and from this the ego, or conscious¬ 
ness, from this (consciousness) the whole assemblage of 
the sixteen (principles or entities), and from five of the 
sixteen the five gross elements. 

23. “ Intellect is the distinguishing principle (Adhy- 
avasya). Virtue, knowledge, freedom from passion 
and power denote it when affected by (the mode) 
6 goodness ; 5 when affected by ‘ darkness ’ it is the 
reverse of these. 

24. “ Egoism is self-consciousness. From this pro¬ 
ceeds a double creation (sarga, emanation), the series 
of the eleven (principles) and the five (subtle) ele¬ 
ments. 

25. u From consciousness, modified (by c goodness ’), 
proceed the eleven good principles ; from this origin of 
being as darkness come the subtle elements. Both 
emanations are caused by the foul or active mode. 

26. “ The eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and 
the skin are termed the organs of intellect (Buddhi) ; 
the voice, the hands, the feet, (the organs of) excretion 
and generation are called the organs of action. 

27. “ The Manas (mind) in this respect has the 
nature of both (classes). It is formative (or determina¬ 
tive) and a sense-organ, from having cognate functions 
(with the organs). It is multifarious, from the specific 
modifications of the modes and the diversity of exter¬ 
nal things.” 

These evolutes with the root evolvent, Prakriti and the 
soul, which is neither an evolvent nor an evolute, form 
the tweny-five tathuas, or categories of the Sankhya 
Philosophy. For the sake of easy reference we give 


THE SAXKHYA PHILOSOPHY COHTIHUED. 


141 


them below in the order in which they are presented in 
Mr. Davies’ excellent book : 

1. Prakriti, or primordial, self-evolving matter. 

2. Ahankara, the egoizer or consciousness. 

3. Tanmatras, or subtle elements, five in number, 
sound tangibleness or touch, odor or smell, visibility or 
form, and sapidity or taste. 

5. The five gross elements, (Mahabhuta) viz., ether 
from the subtle element sound, air from touch, earth 
from odor, fire from sight or visibility, and water from 
taste or sapidity. 

6. The five senses, the eye, the ear, the nose, the 
tongue, and the skin (Gyan-Indryani, or organs of 
knowledge). 

7. The organs of action (Karma-Indryani), the voice, 
the hands, the feet, (the organs of) excretion and gen¬ 
eration. 

8. Manas, or mind, which receives and works into 
proper shapes the impressions made upon the senses, 
and which is regarded as one of the three internal 
organs, the other two being intelligence and conscious¬ 
ness. 

9. The soul (Atman or Purush), which is an entity 
distinct from Prakriti. 

Among the evolutes of Prakriti, the organs are 
divided into internal and external, and the elements 
into subtle and gross. 

The internal organs are the intellect or intelligence, 
consciousness or egoizer, and the mind or the thinking 
principle. They are the gate-keepers of the soul, while 
the external organs, the five organs of knowledge and 
the five organs of action, are the gates. The external 
objects of nature send their impressions through five 
especially of these gates to the mind, which works 


142 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


them into appropriate forms or ideas, and communi¬ 
cates them to consciousness, by which they are individ¬ 
ualized and conveyed to the intellect, which forms gen¬ 
eral concepts, such as are reflected in the soul, which is 
erroneously said to be the cognative principle. This is 
Mr. Davies’ view of the functions of these internal 
organs, but the commentators whom he consults pre¬ 
sent a very different and a much more confused notion 
of their varied operations. Yachaspati speaks of the 
mind thus : “ It gives form in a collective manner to 
that which is perceived by an organ of sense, and says, 
c this is a thing, ’ ‘ this is compounded and that is not so ’; 
and it discriminates or defines a thing by its specific 
and unspecific nature.” And Gaudapada says : “ As 
a person going along a road sees an object at a dis¬ 
tance and is in doubt whether it be a post or a man ; 
he then observes some characteristic mark upon it, or a 
bird perched there, and, doubt being thus dissipated by 
the reflection of the mind, the understanding (Buddhi, 
or intellect) discriminates that it is a post ; and then 
egoism interposes for the sake of certainty, as ‘ verily, 
or (I am certain) it is a post. ’ In this way the func¬ 
tions of intellect, egoism, and mind, and the eye are 
(successively) fulfilled.” 

The functions of the internal organs are not categori¬ 
cally stated in the Sankhya-Karica and the Sankhya 
Pravachana ; and modern commentators mislead when 
they speak of them in the phraseology current in mod¬ 
ern schools of philosophy. Let us turn from what is 
at least speculation to what is distinctly stated about 
them. Intellect under the influence of “ goodness” is 
distinguished by virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and 
supernatural power ; but it is disfigured under the in¬ 
fluence of “ darkness” by vice, ignorance, passionate- 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 


143 


ness, and weakness. The emancipation of the soul is 
ultimately effected by it, when it clearly sees the dis¬ 
tinction between soul and non-soul, the ego and the 
non-ego. Virtue and vice, therefore, as well as knowl¬ 
edge and ignorance, are material conditions, not moral 
dispositions and intellectual states in the proper sense 
of these terms. 

Intelligence, however, retires from the scene as soon 
as its great offspring egoism, or self-consciousness, 
makes its appearance. The work of creation is effected 
by this principle. Under the control of “goodness,” 
it evolves out of its own substance the eleven organs, 
which are all good, viz., the five organs of knowledge, 
the five organs of action, and the eleventh organ, or 
the mind, which, though one of the last of creations, 
takes rank with the first, and its own producer, con¬ 
sciousness. Under the control of “ darkness” it creates 
the subtle elements, and through them the gross ele¬ 
ments, which in varieties of combinations are found in 
the objects of nature. Consciousness evolves out of its 
own substance the entire creation ; and if consciousness 
were not a material product, an evolute of the assumed 
primordial material form, the Sankhya system might 
appropriately be characterized as a beautiful scheme of 
idealistic philosophy. 

The Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha presents in its disquisi¬ 
tion on Sankhya Philosophy the categories of the 
system in these words : “Now the Sastra of this 
school may be concisely said to maintain four several 
kinds of existences, viz., that which is evolvent only, 
that which is evolute only, that which^is both evolute 
and evolvent, and that which is neither.” 

Eegarding the bondage and liberation of souls we 
have these utterances : 


144 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


44. 4 ‘ By virtue an ascent to a higher region is ob¬ 
tained, by vice a descent into a lower region. Deliv¬ 
erance is gained by knowledge, and bondage by the 
contrary. 

45. “ By the absence (or destruction) of passion 
there is dissolution of Prakriti (or the power of Pra- 
kriti is destroyed). Transmigration is from disorderly 
passion. By power we gain destruction of obstacles, 
and the reverse by the contrary.” 

The cause of the bondage of the soul is ignorance, 
not vice ; and its liberation is effected by knowledge, 
not virtue. This is one of those principles of Hindu 
philosophy which are common to all the systems, many 
of those called heterodox not excepted. According to 
these, virtue is a source of bondage as well as vice. 
Yirtue, as has already been said, proceeds from desire 
for happiness and aversion to pain, which are in them¬ 
selves wrong principles of action. Yirtue results only 
in the prolongation of the chain of transmigration, its 
upshot being the translation of the soul into one of 
those ethereal regions which rise in an ascending scale, 
one above another, from this world, for the purpose of 
temporary enjoyment of the fruits of its good works, 
and its return in a bodily shape to this world, when 
these are in the course of slow-circling ages consumed. 
Permanent liberation of the soul, or its relegation to its 
original state of non-contact with matter, virtue cannot 
effect. That is the fruit of knowledge, knowledge of 
the categories of the Sankhya system—or rather of the 
difference between soul and non-soul ! 

Gaudapada, ojae of the great commentators, without 
whose help it is impossible to undertsand the book 
under review, thus speaks of knowledge in general : 
“ Knowledge is of two kinds, external and internal. 


THE SANKHYA. PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 


145 


The former includes knowledge of the Vedas, and the 
six branches of knowledge connected with them—reci¬ 
tation, ritual, grammar, interpretation of words, pros¬ 
ody and astronomy ; also of the Purans, and of knowl¬ 
edge, theology, and law. Internal knowledge is the 
knowledge of Prakriti and soul, or the discrimination 
that “ this is Prakriti,” the equipoised condition of the 
modes, and “ this is soul,” devoid of the modes, per¬ 
manent and intelligent. By external knowledge 
worldly distinction or admiration is obtained ; by in¬ 
ternal knowledge, liberation, that is from the bondage 
of matter. ’ ’ And in another place the same comment¬ 
ator says : “ He who knows the twenty-five principles, 
whatever order of life he may enter, and whether he 
wore braided hair, or top-knot only, or be shaven, he 
is free ; of this there is no doubt.’ ’ 

But, after all, the bondage and liberation of the soul 
are mere fictions. It is Prakriti that is in reality 
bound and liberated, the soul being essentially free and 
incapable of bondage ; nor is transmigration, the 
perennial source of misery from which deliverance is to 
be earnestly desired, a cause of trouble to the pure 
spirit. Distich 62 of the Book runs thus : “ Where¬ 
fore not any soul is bound, or is liberated, or migrates. 
It is Prakriti, which has many receptacles (or bodily 
forms of being) which is bound, or is liberated, or 
migrates. Again, in verse 3 we have the words : 
“ Prakriti by herself binds herself by seven forms, she 
causes deliverance for the benefit of soul by one form.” 
Prakriti is said to be “ generous” and “ modest.” 
She is generous, because all the trouble that she uncon¬ 
sciously takes in evolving creation out of its substance 
is for the benefit of the soul, not its own. But as she 
is after all the incarcerator and liberator of the soul, 


146 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


her belauded generosity is problematical. She is more¬ 
over called modest, because she retires as soon as she 
has exhibited herself to the soul. “ As a dancer, hav¬ 
ing exhibited herself on the stage, ceases to dance, so 
does Prakriti cease (to produce) when she has made 
herself manifest to soul” (59). “ Nothing is more 

modest than Prakriti ; that is my judgment. Saying, 
‘ I have been seen ; ’ she does not expose herself again 
to the view of the soul ” (61). But the fact remains 
indisputable, that she creates or evolves only to be seen ; 
and a girl who takes a world of trouble only to be 
seen, cannot appropriately be called modest, even 
though she has the good sense to retire as soon as she 
is seen. 

If bondage and liberation really belong to Prakriti, 
why ascribe them at all to the soul ? Let the com¬ 
mentator Yachaspati answer this question : “ These 
circumstances are ascribed to and affect the soul, as the 
superior, in the same manner that victory and defeat 
are attributed to and relate to a king, though actually 
occurring in his generals ; for they are his servants, and 
the gain or loss is his, not theirs.” This is, however, 
a string of words without meaning. The soul is in 
reality nor king, nor master, nor gainer, nor loser ; nor 
does it, properly speaking, see. Prakriti in all its 
modifications is only reflected in the tranquil, immobile 
and luminous soul, which, as it is destitute of volition 
and vitality, cannot possibly recognize what is fitted to 
make it miserable or happy. 

To show in what respect the Sankhya system is 
different from the forms of thought subsequently de¬ 
veloped, let us refer for a moment to a discussion em¬ 
bodied in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha. The author, 
after having stated the categories of the system and 


THE SAHKHYA PHILOSOPHY COHTIHUED. 


147 


grouped them under the heads evolvent only, evolutes 
and evolvent, evolutes only, and non-evolvent and non- 
evolute, thus raises the discussion alluded to : 

4 4 Here a fourfold discussion arises as to the nature of 
cause and effect. The Saugatas (Buddhists) maintain 
that the existent is produced from non-existent ; the 
Haiyayika, etc., that the (as yet) non-existent is pro¬ 
duced from the existent ; the Yedantins that all effects 
are an illusory emanation from the existent, and not 
themselves really existent ; while the Sankhyas hold 
that the existent is produced from the existent. J ’ 

It is not our intention to follow the author through 
the varied steps of his argument ; our object being 
simply to show that, while Buddhism, the source of 
the heterodox systems, maintains a species of rank 
nihilism, the orthodox systems were based on the as¬ 
sumption of a primordial substance, either material or 
spiritual, and they were all evolved from the teaching 
of the Upanishads. Hr. Mullens, in his well-known 
treatise on Hindu Philosophy, has fallen into the mis¬ 
take of holding up these venerable documents as the 
sources of Hindu Pantheism, not that of Hindu Philos¬ 
ophy in all its phases of development from nihilism. 
And men more profoundly versed in Hindu philosophy 
than the late doctor have shown a strong tendency to a 
similar, or rather identical, mistake. But one cannot 
study the Upanishads in connection with the systems of 
philosophy which have flourished in India in different 
periods of its history, without being led to connect the 
former with the latter, the Upanishads with the sys¬ 
tems, as cause and effect. 

It is not denied that the prevalent line of philosophic 
thought in the Upanishads is pantheistic. Their great 
motto, one without a second, is the battle-cry of Indian 


148 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


and European, indigenous and foreign, pantheistic 
forms of speculation. The cosmogonies presented in 
them, the description given of man’s nature and of the 
world itself, and the theory of salvation developed, 
manifest a stronger leaning, so to speak, toward pan¬ 
theism than toward any other form of speculative 
thought. But there are lines of reasoning and forms of 
expression in these records eminently fitted to uphold 
forms of thought other than those which are properly 
called pantheistic. The four well-known expressions, 
Sat and Asat, Yyakta and Avyakta, which play so 
conspicuous a part in the cosmogonies of the Upan- 
ishads, are certainly susceptible of nihilistic and mate¬ 
rialistic, as well as pantheistic interpretation, and they 
have in consequence been bandied backward and for¬ 
ward by almost all the jarring schools of Indian phi¬ 
losophy. 

In one verse especially, quoted in a former paper, 
creation is distinctly said to have flowed out of Asat, 
non-being and non-existent ; and in several passages 
the Avyakta, unmanifested, is represented as the 
ground of the Yyakta or manifested aspects of nature, 
and these passages may obviously be construed so as to 
uphold any form of thought ranging between absolute 
nihilism and absolute pantheism. The Buddhists, or 
some classes of Buddhists, have evolved from them 
their idea of an eternal void of non-being, developing 
into innumberablo forms of existence, more illusory 
than real. The Sankhya school has derived from them 
its notion of Prakriti, unmanifested in its undeveloped 
form, but manifesting itself in various imperceptible 
and perceptible shapes, in consequence of the mischiev¬ 
ous activity of one of its three essential elements. And 
the Yeclantic thinker has elaborated these very utter- 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 


149 


ances into his theory of illusory existence, concealing 
the real under the phenomenal, the one pure being 
under various types of non-being. The Upanishads, 
therefore, have given rise to the various lines of specu¬ 
lation by which the intellect of the country, by no 
means deficient in acuteness and depth, has been exer¬ 
cised and moulded for centuries and ages untold. 

The main principles of the Sankhya Philosophy have 
been set forth in this and the preceding paper, in the 
words mainly of the books which may be represented 
as its standard and authoritative documents. A simple, 
unvarnished statement of these is enough to show that 
the glowing eulogy of which it has been made the 
favored subject in some’ quarters is entirely misplaced 
and fulsome. The system is a heap of nonsense, 
dreamy in its character, self-contradictory in its state¬ 
ments, and immoral in its principles and tendencies. 
This will appear in the sequel. Meanwhile we raise 
the question, How is the system to be characterized ? 
With what system of philosophic thought is it to be 
compared ? 

It has been called, apparently with propriety, a sys¬ 
tem of dualism, because it postulates the existence of 
two entities, the passive soul and the active Prakriti. 
But the description it gives of the soul tends to make it 
an entity of no consequence whatever, in fact, a non¬ 
entity. The soul is without volition, without intelli¬ 
gence in the proper sense of the term, without sensi¬ 
bility—a lump of passivity and quiescence. It is im¬ 
possible to divine what use is subserved by its existence, 
or why its existence is posited. It thinks not, feels 
not, sees not, handles not. It plays no part whatever 
in the varied work of creation, preservation and de¬ 
struction ; and it is only falsely called a spectator and 


150 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


enjoyer of experience. It may therefore be appropri¬ 
ately thrown out of calculation entirely. 

The system, then, is rank materialism, and differs 
from the materialism of the day in its arrangement 
rather than in its principle. Modern materialism can¬ 
not ignore the established facts and conclusions of 
science, and consequently the theory of evolution it 
brings forward goes up in an ascending scale from the 
elements, the ultimate powers of nature, to their varied 
combinations, from inorganic to organized matter, from 
the lower to the higher types of life, from molecular 
motion to thought, feeling, and volition. But the 
founder of the Sankhya school was a stranger to that 
insight into the mysteries of creation which a schoolboy 
in these days may justly boast of ; and he, in conse¬ 
quence, propounded a theory of evolution which comes 
down in a descending scale, or rather moves fitfully or 
irregularly. But the two classes of systems agree in 
representing intelligence, consciousness, and mind with 
all its affections, apprehension, sensibility, volition, etc. 
as modifications of matter. The difference is that, in 
accordance with one of these two sets of systems, 
thought is evolved from gross matter ; while in accord¬ 
ance with the other gross matter is evolved from 
thought. Or, to express the same idea in a different 
form, gross matter is sublimated into thought according 
to the one set, while thought degenerates into gross 
matter according to the other. 

The two classes of systems also agree in another 
respect. They make hair-splitting distinctions between 
matter in its essence and matter in its grossness, be¬ 
tween matter subtle and matter gross. The Sankhya 
system discriminates between, as has already been 
shown, a subtle body and a gross body, a body which 


THE SAHKHYA PHILOSOPHY COHTIHUED. 


151 


migrates with the soul from one tenement of clay to 
another, and does not dissolve till its final emancipation 
from corporeal thraldom, and a body which is decom¬ 
posed soon after death, Uor does the discrimination 
stop here. A distinction is made between the senses 
and the powers inherent in them, between the sense, 
for instance, of sight and the unseen power of sight in¬ 
herent in the organ ; the sense of hearing and the 
power of hearing inherent in the organ ; and so on. 
Again, a distinction is made between subtle and gross 
elements, between the elements perceptible to us and 
those the existence of which is proved by inference, 
and which are perceptible to beings endowed with 
powers of sensation and intellection more enlarged 
than ours. Materialism of the modern school is obliged 
to make such subtle distinctions, as without them it is 
impossible to place the functions of the mind in the 
same category with the functions of the body. 

A tendency has been growing up, especially since the 
publication of the well-known treatise, the “ Unseen 
Universe,” to laugh at the idea of a vacuum, and fill 
the interminable regions of space, which were looked 
upon as a boundless void in former times, with a mate¬ 
rial, or quasi-material, luminiferous fluid of extreme 
tenuity ; as well as to posit a sort of invisible material 
organization or casement for the soul beneath the 
body, which is obviously decomposed after death. 
Many even of those persons who believe in the instinc¬ 
tively recognized dualism in man are prone to believe 
in the existence of a tenuous, subtle body between the 
immaterial soul and the gross material body, a sort of 
intermediate, permanent substance which death cannot 
affect, and of which the soul never gets rid. These 
advanced thinkers will rejoice, or be mortified, to find 


152 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


that their new-fangled theory was anticipated in India 
about five centuries before the birth of Christ. The 
existence of an all-pervading substance, material or 
quasi-material, consisting of three qualities, held in 
equipoise, was assumed by Kapila long before such 
words as “ nebulous matter” or “ star-dust” were 
coined. And the idea of a linga-sarir , or tenuous body 
in contradistinction to, though intimately connected 
with, the sthul-sarir , or gross body, is developed both 
in the treatise under review in this discourse and that 
taken notice of in the former. 

This idea is somewhat differently stated and further 
expanded in the Sankhya Sutras. The second Aphor¬ 
ism of Book III. runs thus : “ Therefrom {i.e. from 
the twenty-three principles there is the organization of) 
the body (or pair of bodies, the gross and the subtle).” 
The gross body ( sthul-sarir ) consists of the gross ele¬ 
ments, or rather the grossest of the gross elements, the 
earth ; and it is propagated by generation. It is in¬ 
capable of experiencing pleasure or pain, and it is per¬ 
ishable, and does actually perish. For purposes of 
fruition it is of no use to the soul, or rather Prakriti, as 
it cannot effect its liberation by consuming the fruits of 
its merit or demerit. For such purposes another body 
of subtler elements, of greater permanence, and of 
capacities more expanded, must be posited. This is 
the subtle body created at the commencement of the 
creation or annus magnus , or at every renovation of 
creation, not propagated by generation, consisting of 
seventeen principles, the eleven organs, the five rudi¬ 
ments, and the organ of consciousness, the egoizer. It 
migrates from body to body, and disappears only when 
the fruits of merit or demerit on the part of its associ¬ 
ate, the soul, or rather the mind, are consumed, and 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 


153 


beatification is realized. This body is sentient, but it 
is incapable of pleasure or pain, except in association 
with the gross body, which is its counterpart, and the 
existence of which is essential to the performance of its 
functions. This body, moreover, has a case or sheath, 
and that is called anusthani-sarir , a sort of intermedi¬ 
ate link between the impalpable, subtle, and the palpa¬ 
ble, gross body. Are not our modern philosophers 
beaten hollow by their prototypes of ancient times ? 

The Sankhya philosopher cannot properly be said to 
indicate the process of evolution. lie states the mate¬ 
rial categories, the formative principles, but does not 
show how they combine or re-combine, integrate, dis¬ 
integrate, and redintegrate ; or by what process they 
develop into the innumerable forms of beauty and 
proportion we see around us. But if he were asked to 
indicate this process, he would very likely adopt the 
language of Herbert Spencer, and affirm that the prog¬ 
ress of creation was from homogeneity to heterogene¬ 
ity, by a series of differentiations gradually effected. 
Hor would he in the slightest degree object to apply 
this law to social and moral development, as well as to 
that which is material. The truth is, his school, as 
that of Herbert Spencer, recognizes no real difference 
between material and moral conditions ; and therefore 
the attempts made by some Orientalists to identify his 
system with the idealism of Bishop Berkeley is futile 
indeed. He certainly does represent consciousness as 
the originator of material creation ; and if by con¬ 
sciousness he understood what is now meant by it, as a 
rule, he might be held up as an idealist of the first 
water. But consciousness according to him is a mate¬ 
rial organ or principle, not intellectual power, and in 
the work of evolution it performs, if work it can be 


154 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


called at all, its own substance, not anything extrane¬ 
ous, is utilized. 

The comparison instituted between the Sankhya sys¬ 
tem and that propounded by Pythagoras of Samos, 
about the time when it was itself elaborated in India, 
is juster. If the existing fragments of the work of 
Philolaus, who was a contemporary of Socrates, be 
regarded as correct exponents of the Pythagorean phi¬ 
losophy, the two systems may be represented, with 
some degree of justice, as similar, in many, if not all, 
respects. The system, which traces the wonders of 
creation through monadic and geometrical magnitudes 
to the principles of numbers, limiting and illimitation, 
may be placed in juxtaposition with one which per¬ 
forms the same feat under the auspices of a trinitarian, 
material essence called Prakriti, or Maha (Great) Prak- 
riti. But, barring the speculative wildness character¬ 
istic of both the systems, there are two points of simi¬ 
larity or contact to which prominence ought to be 
given. The Pythagorean, like the Sankhya system, is 
based on the doctrine of metempsychosis, and it repre¬ 
sents the soul as enchained to the body, in which, as it 
is material, it recognizes an inherent and irremovable 
depravity. Add to this the fact that the outcome of 
these two systems is one and the same process, the sys¬ 
tematic mortification of the body by ascetic penance 
with a view to complete emancipation of the soul from 
its bondage. 

The Indian system, however, is “ racy of the soil,” 
and almost all the principal vocables, which figure in 
the two systems, are used in it in a sense different from 
that which is attached to them by its rival. When the 
Indian system speaks of the bondage and liberation of 
the soul, it simply means the bondage and liberation of 


THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED. 


155 


Prakriti and its products down to the gross body, and 
the grossest of elements ; and it represents the extinc¬ 
tion of conscious life, consequent on the extinction of 
desire as the summum bonum , to be attained by a 
species of mortification and penance before which the 
most self-torturing Greek philosopher would have stood 
aghast. 

But the emancipation of Prakriti cannot be perma¬ 
nent, as it is fated to energize after long periods of 
quiescence. Creation emanates from it, and is ulti¬ 
mately absorbed in it, to be once more forced out and 
forced in. And, as Prakriti is never to get rid of its 
creative fits, it is fated to entangle and disentangle 
itself throughout eternity. Nor can the emancipa¬ 
tion of the soul be called permanent, inasmuch as, 
in accordance with the principles of this philoso¬ 
phy, it is neither bound nor liberated. The in¬ 
numerable contradictions which the system betrays 
in expression, if not in enunciation of principle, and 
which the reader must have noticed in this brief 
sketch, proceed mainly, if not entirely, from the fact 
that such a thing as the soul, without life, energy, or 
activity, mental, emotional or volitional, and without 
material properties, is uselessly placed in juxtaposition 
with an active and plastic material principle, which, 
through the vicious activity of one of its elements, 
evolves and gets entangled, and which laboriously pro¬ 
cures its own emancipation by a series of self-inflicted 
tortures of the most appalling nature ! 

The Sankhya system is called Nirishwar, or godless, 
in contradistinction to the Yoga Philosophy, which is 
called Seishwar, or with God. But yet it is an offshoot 
of a system of superstition and the fountain of an¬ 
other. It is an intermediate link between the nature- 


156 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


worship of Yedic times and the polytheistic worship of 
those of the Purans. The elemental gods of the Big 
Yeda were, by a process of generalization not certainly 
unnatural, unified by the spirit of philosophic inquiry 
into a living, diffusive, and creative essence ; and this, 
in process of time, became the active, formative princi¬ 
ple of the Sankhya school, its Prakriti, or Pradhan. 
But such a principle, too subtle to be grasped by the 
common mind, could not possibly make the system 
popular among the masses, or could not transfer it from 
academic groves to the thoroughfare and the market. 
It had therefore to be materialized or embalmed in a 
tangible, cognizable material form ; and the trans¬ 
formation was effected without much difficulty. The 
trinitarian material essence was merged into the triad 
of Hindu Mythology, Prakriti identified with Brahma 
under the influence of the quality, goodness, into 
Yishnu under that of passion, and into Mahadeva 
under that of darkness. But other transformations 
followed. The passionless, inactive, and dead soul, 
uselessly posited by Sankhya Philosophy, ultimately 
became the fountain-head, so to speak, of an almost 
unbounded pantheon of male gods, who are all more or 
less dronish ; while the active Prakriti became, under 
the name of Sakti or Brahmi, the mother of the almost 
innumerable female deities with whom these male gods 
are consorted. And thus, in process of time, the recon¬ 
dite speculations of Kapila were incorporated with the 
popular religion of the Hindus, and a system of rank 
Atheism culminated in a system of rank polytheism. 


CHAPTER VI. 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY, OR HINDU ASCETICISM. 

The Yoga Philosophy is the counterpart of the 
Sankhya system, and it begins where the other ends. 
The conclusion to which the Sankhya system brings us 
is that the emancipation of the soul is effected by right 
knowledge, or knowledge of the essential distinction 
between the ego and the non-ego, the soul and the non¬ 
soul. But a formal enunciation of this principle would 
be not merely useless, but positively tantalizing, if the 
means of attaining such knowledge were not indicated. 
The question therefore is one of paramount importance, 
How is right knowledge or knowledge of the essential 
distinction between soul and non-soul to be obtained ? 
The Sankhya Philosophy raises the question, but refers 
to the Yoga Philosophy for its solution ; and therefore 
the first form of philosophic thought is incomplete 
without the second. 

But the Yoga Philosophy may properly be repre¬ 
sented as the counterpart, not only of the Sankhya 
system, but of almost every other system of Indian 
philosophy, theistic, atheistic, and pantheistic. Almost 
every system of Indian philosophy makes salvation 
dependent on right knowledge, and represents right 
kn owledge as attainable only by such ascetic exercises 
as are prescribed in the Yoga Shastra. The exercises 
may not be exactly the same in all the systems, but the 
variations are so slight that we are justified in holding 




158 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


out this philosophy as the counterpart, not only of the 
scheme with which it is consorted, but of every other 
form of philosophic thought which flourished in ancient 
India, or which has flourished in India, both ancient 
and modern, leaving out of course those which are 
thoroughly Epicurean in their practical development. 
The Yoga system does not deserve the name of phi¬ 
losophy, it being an art rather than a science. The 
science of the soul and the mind, as well as of the 
powers known and unknown of nature, is embodied 
in the standard Works of the Sankhya School, but the 
varieties of bodily and mental exercises by which that 
science is utilized or practically developed are enumer¬ 
ated and described in the great treatise on Yoga Phi¬ 
losophy to be taken notice of ; but it ought not to be 
forgotten that the Yoga Philosophy properly so called 
is the art by which the teaching, not only of the San¬ 
khya school, but of every other prominent school of 
Hindu Philosophy, is reduced to practice. It is the 
art of asceticism, without which salvation is not attain¬ 
able according to the approved maxims, not of one or 
two, but of all the prominent schools of Indian thought, 
from Buddhistic nihilism up to Yedantic pantheism. 
Its importance therefore cannot be overrated, though 
its claim to be recognized as a scheme of philosophic 
thought may justly be questioned. 

In its character of universality, in the importance it 
enjoys in every prominent system of Hindu Philoso¬ 
phy, it has a parallel only in the essential or distinctive 
portion of the Nyaya philosophy, viz., logic. The 
logic of the Hyaiyaika philosophy runs like a thread of 
gold through one and all the dissertations on Hindu 
thought extant in the Sanskrit language. Its forms of 
expression and modes of reasoning are so thoroughly 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 


159 


intertwined with the original Shastras and the com¬ 
mentaries by which they are elucidated, that it is im¬ 
possible for a student of Hindu Philosophy to make any 
progress whatever in his favorite task without intimate 
acquaintance with them. How, as Indian logic is in 
some respects an indispensable feature of the theoretic 
developments of Hindu Philosophy, the stringent rules 
of the asceticism represented by the Yoga School form 
an essential and inseparable feature of its practical de¬ 
velopments. 

The reputed founder of the Yoga school was Patan- 
jali, regarding whom almost nothing is known, barring 
the fact that he was a man of a versatile genius, and 
distinguished both as a philologist and as a philosopher. 
The book ascribed to him, the Yoga Shastra, consists 
of four chapters and 191 aphorisms, the contents of 
which are thus analyzed in the Sarva-Darsana-San- 
graha : 

“ This school follows the so-called Yoga Sastra pro¬ 
mulgated by Patanjali, and consisting of four chapters 
which also bears the name of the ‘ Sankhya Prava- 
chana,’ or detailed explanation of the Sankhya. In the 
first chapter thereof the venerable Patanjali, having in 
the opening aphorism—‘ How is the exposition of con¬ 
centration (Yoga) 5 —announced his commencement of 
the Shastra, proceeds in the second aphorism to give a 
definition of his subject : ‘ Concentration is the hinder¬ 
ing of the modifications of the thinking principle ; 5 
and then he expounds at length the nature of Medita¬ 
tion (Samadhi). 

“ In the second chapter, in the series of aphorisms 
commencing, ‘ The practical part of concentration is 
modification, muttering, and resignation to the Su¬ 
preme,’ he expounds the practical part of Yoga proper 


160 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


to him whose mind is not yet thoroughly abstracted, 
viz., the five external subservients or means, ‘ forbear¬ 
ance ’ and the rest. 

“ In the third chapter, in the series commencing, 
‘ Attention is the fastening of the mind on some spot, ’ 
he expounds three internal subservients, attention, con¬ 
templation, and meditation, collectively called by the 
name of 6 subjugation 5 (Sanyana), and also the various 
superhuman powers which are their subordinate fruit. 

“ In the fourth chapter, in the series commencing, 
1 Perfections spring from birth, plants, spells, mortifica¬ 
tion, and meditation,’ he expounds the highest end, 
Emancipation, together with a detailed account of the 
five so-called perfections (Siddhis). ” 

Two of the four chapters of the Yoga Shastra were 
translated into English by Dr. J. R. Ballantyne, some 
years ago ; while the first of these two has recently 
been translated in the learned Professor Ivunte's well- 
known serial, “ Saddarsana Chintanika,” to which 
special reference will have to be made in a separate 
paper. But the whole book has been translated, also 
recently, by our illustrious countryman, Babu Rajendra 
Lala Mitra, LL.D., C.I.E., who has done so much to 
popularize the knowledge enshrined in the sacred lit¬ 
erature of the country. His translation, of which the 
last instalment has just been issued, is prefaced by a 
scholarly dissertation on Hindu Philosophy in general, 
and Yoga Philosophy in particular, and is, moreover, 
accompanied with a complete translation of the cele¬ 
brated commentary of Bhoj Rajah, and his own valua¬ 
ble notes. Of this work of his we shall avail ourselves 
freely in our treatment of the subject as we did of his 
translation of the Chandogya Upanishad in a former 
paper. 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 


1G1 


The fact that an enlightened king, like Bhoj, who is 
said to have flourished in the latter part of the tenth 
and the earlier part of the eleventh century, considered 
it liis duty to comment upon the Aphorisms of Patanjali, 
is a proof of the importance attached to them, or 
rather to the asceticism embodied in them in all ages 
and by all classes of the people of India. His remarks 
on commentaries in general and his own in particular 
are worthy of notice : 

“ All commentaries are the perverters of the mean¬ 
ing of their authors ; they avoid those parts that are 
most difficult to understand by saying that the meaning 
there is obvious ; they dilate upon those parts with 
useless compound words where the meaning is plain ; 
they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappro¬ 
priate dissertations without number. Avoiding volu¬ 
minousness, keeping clear of all mystifying and obvi¬ 
ously worthless network of words, and abstracting the 
inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage 
Patanjali, for the edification of intelligent persons” 

(p. 2). 

The general accuracy of this exordium is unchal¬ 
lenged, though the claim of perfect freedom from the 
defects pointed out advanced in favor of Bhoj Rajah’s 
own commentary may be disallowed. It may also be 
affirmed in justification of these defects that the com¬ 
mentaries cannot but partake of the confusedness, ob¬ 
scurity, and mystification stamped on the originals. 

The portion of the Yoga Shastra which may justly 
be called philosophical, may be disposed of in a few 
words. Dr. Rajendra Lala Mitra enters into a super¬ 
fluous argument in his scholarly introduction, to prove 
that the Yoga system was elaborated subsequently to 
the organization of the Sankhya school. The fact that 


162 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


the former completes the latter is enough to sustain 
this conclusion. Were an additional reason needed, 
the fact that the Yoga Shastra accepts the twenty-five 
categories of the Sankhya system without attempting a 
formal description or even enumeration, might be in¬ 
sisted upon. The Yoga Shastra, however, adds an¬ 
other category—viz., God, whose existence is declared 
unproven and undemonstrable in the Sankhya system. 
Here are the verses in which God is spoken of : “ Or 
by devotion to God. God is a particular soul, which 
is untouched by afflictions, works, deserts, and desires. 
In Him the seed of the omniscient attains infinity. He 
is the instructor of even all early ones ; for he is not 
defined by time. His indicator is the Pranava” (Book 
I. 23-27). 

These verses point to an entity in addition to the two 
entities, the existence of which is postulated in the 
Sankhya system ; and they may in one sense be said to 
convert the “ dualism” of Kapila into a sort of “ trial- 
ism.” It is to be observed that God as described in 
these extracts is obviously different from the soul or 
souls posited by him. He is not merely intelligence, 
as the soul is, but unlimited intelligence ; omniscient, 
not parviscient. He is the instructor of all the great 
teachers of ancient times, even of Kapila and his great 
teacher Maheshwara or Sayambhu, and He is said to 
be untouched by the afflictions—viz., ignorance, egoism, 
desire, aversion, and tenacity of life, by works, good 
and bad, and by deserts and desires, or the antecedents 
and consequents of works. The soul, on the contrary, 
is represented as limited in its being, circumscribed in 
its knowledge, and held in bondage by ignorance, the 
first of the afflictions and the source of the other four. 
God therefore is a new entity, and His introduction 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 


163 


into the sacred circle divests the system of its dualistic, 
and invests it with a trialistic, character. 

Such doubtless appears to be the truth at first sight ; 
but a closer examination brings us to the conclusion 
that the addition does not, in the slightest degree, 
interfere with the essentially monistic character of the 
Sankhya system. The entity brought in to satisfy a 
popular clamor or to humor current superstition, is as 
thoroughly a nonentity as the soul is. There is in 
reality no difference whatever between God and the 
soul, the Paramatma and the Jivatma, as brought out 
in this scheme of philosophic thought. God, like the 
soul, is perfectly quiescent and inactive. He does not 
create, does not preserve, does not destroy—these im¬ 
portant functions being all discharged by Prakriti, the 
active principle which exists independently of Him and 
over the evolutions of which He has only a nominal 
rather than a real control. It may be said that the 
soul is bound, while God is untouched by the afflic¬ 
tions. But it has been shown that the soul is bound 
nominally, not really. Prakriti, through the mischiev¬ 
ous activity of one of its evolutes, viz., the mind, is 
bound, passes through varieties of self-inflicted tortures, 
and is finally liberated ; and its bondage, self-inflicted 
tortures, and liberation are only reflected in the soul 
in consequence of the proximity of the one to the other. 
But it may be said that God is free even from this re- 
flectional bondage. How can He be ? Is He not all- 
pervasive, all-diffusive, as Prakriti is ? If so, how can 
contact, such as that to which the troubles of the soul 
are attributable, be avoided ? 

There is, after all, no difference whatever between 
the soul, as posited and described by Kapila, and the 
God whose existence is postulated by Patanjali. The 


104 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


soul is a useless entity, a nonentity rather than an 
entity, devoid of moral qualities as well as of natural 
properties, devoid therefore of all of those phenomena 
by which alone existence can manifest itself. The 
being called God, posited by the Yoga school, is pre¬ 
cisely of this description. 

It is instructive to note how the theistic conclusion 
was arrived at by the champions 'of the Yoga Philoso¬ 
phy. It was by an exoteric rather than by an esoteric 
process that they were brought to a recognition or 
assumption of an entity in addition to the two posited 
by Kapila and his followers. 

In this respect the Yoga philosophers occupied a 
platform the very antipodes of that occupied by Fichte 
and the Fichteans. These, like the Sankhya philoso¬ 
phers, concentrated their attention first upon the soul, 
called by them the individual ego. But, unlike the 
Sankhya philosopher, they proceeded a step farther. 
From the individual ego they were brought by a pro¬ 
cess of subjective reasoning to a recognition of the 
Universal Ego, that of which the Ego within is a mode 
or manifestation. But the Yoga philosopher was not 
evidently brought to such recognition by a process of 
esoteric reasoning. In his case the supposition of a 
God was simply a contrivance or stratagem resorted to 
for the purpose of meeting a popular demand rather 
than a necessity of the reasoning mind. 

A system of rank atheism could not be popular even 
in countries like Greece, where the sensuous was 
allowed admittedly to prevail over the intellectual fife. 
Far less could it prevail in a country where the reverse 
of this process was noticeable—that is, where the intel¬ 
lectual was allowed to swallow up the sensuous and 
aesthetic natures of man. 


THE YOGA. PHILOSOPHY. 


165 


Besides, it was not possible to make the Yoga Sliastra 
popular among the masses, or even among sensible 
men, without the entity added by it. Could sensible 
Hindus be persuaded to go through an extraordinar} r 
process of mortification and penance without a divine 
command behind, and a divine ideal before them ? 
They must be assured that a command of the Almighty, 
rather than a mere dictum of philosophy, was upon 
them ; and they must be assured that the grand pros¬ 
pect before them was no other than extinction of being, 
along with all its misery, in God, before they could be 
induced to exchange the comforts of domestic life for 
the privations and tortures of the life of an anchorite. 
The hypothesis of a God was therefore essential to the 
success of the system, not only among the masses, but 
among thinking men of all classes, and such a hypoth¬ 
esis was in process of time resorted to. 

It may, however, be said that the extraordinary 
powers, represented as attainable by intense meditation, 
might be enough to make the system popular, even 
apart from the supposition of a God attached to but 
not incorporated with it. That the hope of the ulti¬ 
mate acquisition of such powers was a potent induce¬ 
ment to many of those who actually did resort to 
hermit solitude and self-inflicted mortification, cannot 
be denied ; but this hope could be sustained amid trials 
of a disheartening character, only by the hypothesis to 
which recourse was had in the Yoga school. 

But the God assumed was after all a mere nonentity, 
a magnificent nothing. How, it may be asked, could 
such an assumption promote the object of the framers 
of the scheme ? How ! The framers of the scheme 
could legitimately calculate upon popular inability to 
reason, to analyze, and to comprehend. A phantom 


166 


IIIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


was enough to conciliate the masses ; while the think¬ 
ing classes might gradually be persuaded to prefer a 
perfectly quiescent God to one moved by a desire to 
create and ready to create, for the purpose of supplying 
a felt want. Why, the history of the world points to 
more miracles wrought by chimeras, phantoms, and 
shams, than by facts and realities of a stubborn charac¬ 
ter ; and Patanjali could not be ignorant of human 
life ! 

This opinion, formed long before the publication of 
the fourth part of Dr. Mitra’s translation and his Intro¬ 
duction, is confirmed by the following extract from the 
latter : 

“ Still the coincidence of a number of names of a 
given period is one which in Indian history cannot be 
easily set aside as purely accidental. Confining, how¬ 
ever, one’s attention to the text-books only, no one 
who has read them carefully can fail to perceive that 
Patanjali has contented himself by taking a theistic 
appendage of no direct utility to a positively atheistic 
model, without in any way blending the two ideas into 
one homogeneity or consistency. Hence it is that the 
Hindus call it Sesvara Sankhya, or Sankhya cum deo , 
as opposed to the former, which is Hireswara Sankhya, 
or Sankhya sine deo ” (p. xxii.). 

It is time to set forth the great object of the Yoga 
Philosophy; and with a view to do this it is necessary 
to inquire into the meaning of the word yoga. The 
word is derived from the root yuj , which means “ join¬ 
ing and it has therefore been explained by Yajna- 
valkya as the “ conjunction of the individual with the 
supreme soul.” To this meaning two exceptions have 
been taken by Madhavacharjya, and the author of the 
Sarva-darsana- sangraha. The first is the impossibility 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 


107 


of the conjunction suggested according to the approved 
rules of Indian logic, which maintain that two eternal 
and infinite substances cannot possibly be conjoined. 
The second is the present identity of the individual 
and universal soul according to the pantheistic princi¬ 
ples of the Yedantic school. 

These objections are brought forward to gratify a 
propensity to pugnaciousness rather than to remove 
obstacles to the attainment of truth. For neither the 
dictum of Indian logic on which the first is based, nor 
the principle of pantheistic philosophy which upholds 
the second, is recognized in the Yoga Shastra. The 
word yoga is used to mean both the end proposed by 
Yoga Philosophy and the means used according to its 
teaching to compass it. The end proposed is the union 
of the individual with the universal spirit ; and the 
means indicated are varieties of exercises, culminating 
in sjamadhi or concentration. But Yajnavalkya cannot 
but admit that though this is the present meaning of 
yoga, the word had a very different meaning in Patan- 
jali’s time ; for he himself says in his commentary on 
the Yoga Shastra : 

“ Yoga means samadhi , concentration, in the sense 
of the union of the subject and object—thought with 
thought itself.’’ 

The first two aphorisms of Patanjali’s great work 
thus set forth the objects of Yoga Philosophy : 

“ Now the exposition of Yoga is to be made. Yoga 
is the suppression of the functions of the thinking prin¬ 
ciple.” 

The word translated “ the thinking principle” is 
chitta, which certainly means the mind, the principle 
in us which receives impressions from the external 
world through the senses, and passes in consequence 


168 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


through an almost endless series of transformations 
and changes. 

The Sanskrit word for these mutations or modifica¬ 
tions is vritti, translated “ functions” in the text. 
These words, along with the word yoga, play an im¬ 
portant part in this philosophy, and they must there¬ 
fore be thoroughly understood. The following verses 
show what is meant by “ functions” or mitti: 

“ The functions are fivefold, and they are either 
painful or not painful. The functions of the thinking 
principle are right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep, 
and memory. Right notions are perception, inference, 
and testimony. Misconception is incorrect notion, or a 
notion which abides in a form which is not that of its 
object. Fancy is a notion founded on knowledge con¬ 
veyed by words, but of which there is no object corre¬ 
sponding in reality. Sleep is that function of the 
thinking principle which has far its object the concep¬ 
tion of nothing. Memory is the not letting go of an 
object that has been recognized ” (chap. i. 5-11). 

These five functions of the mind or of the thinking 
principle are the sources of its unutterable changeable¬ 
ness and restlessness. Right notions of the objects 
around us, obtained through the sources of correct 
knowledge, admitted in the Sankhya school, viz., per¬ 
ception, inference, and testimony ; wrong notions aris¬ 
ing from errors, such as we commit when we mistake a 
rope for a serpent, or from doubt realized when we 
cannot decide whether the object we see is a man or a 
cow ; phantasms of things which have no existence 
apart from a heated brain ; dreams of all kinds, from 
those distinguished by some degree of reasonableness or 
propriety down to those marred by the greatest wild¬ 
ness and incoherence ; and the innumerable clusters of 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 


109 


ideas and associations recalled or revived by memory— 
all these form the ever-shifting elements of onr mental 
existence, and they produce inus a restlessness similar 
to that by which they themselves are characterized. 

Here it ought to be noted that one of the universally 
admitted maxims of Hindu Philosophy is that the mind 
assumes the form of what it perceives ; and therefore 
it necessarily becames, really not figuratively, a tree, a 
tank, an animal, a sweet mango, a musical pipe, an 
odoriferous flower, or a hard stone ; not only so, it is 
changed into the grotesque forms and shapes conjured 
up by fancy either when we are awake or when we are 
asleep, or into the ideas, equally subjective, exhumed 
by memory from the vaults of its own mausoleum. 
Who can form an adequate idea of its volatility, its 
fickleness, its restlessness ? Who can number the varie¬ 
ties of mutations and transformations through which it 
passes in the course of the day, not to say a year, a 
decade, or the course of a long life ? To destroy this 
fickleness, this changeableness, this restlessness, to lead 
the mind to wade, so to speak, through these innumer¬ 
able transformations to its original state of serene 
repose—such is the object proposed by the Yoga Phi¬ 
losophy. The idea of union with God is a later graft. 

How can this be effected ? How are the modifica¬ 
tions of the mind to be suppressed, and how is it to be 
brought back to its primitive state of quiescence and 
repose ? To this question the proper reply is given in 
the twelfth aphorism of the first chapter : “The sup¬ 
pression of these functions is effected by Exercise and 
Dispassion.” These two expressions or vocables make 
up what is called Yoga, which consists of several mem¬ 
bers or parts. But before we refer to them it is desir¬ 
able to point out the obstructions which hinder our 


170 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


progress through ascetic exercises to the goal of It oga 
Philosophy. These are enumerated in Aphorism 30 
(Book I.) : “ Disease, languor, doubt, carelessness, 
idleness, worldly-mindedness, mistaken notions, unat¬ 
tainment of any stage of abstraction, and instability 
therein ; these, causing distractions, are the obstacles” 
(p. 38). 

Bodily ailments incapacitating the mind for close 
thinking, intellectual lassitude and indolence, doubt as 
to the feasibility and utility of meditation, careless or 
slipshod methods of procedure, earthly ambition, illu¬ 
sion, such as that which leads to a bit of mother-of-pearl 
being mistaken for silver, inability to attain to a partic¬ 
ular stage of contemplation, or to continue steady in it 
when attained—these are hindrances to Yoga ; and 
they are accompanied with, as the next aphorism 
assures us, “ pain, distress, trembling, inspiration, and 
expiration”—that is, pain in the threefold form referred 
to in the Sankliya Philosophy ; shaking of the body 
interfering with its proper posture, and irregular breath¬ 
ing. These can be avoided only by long-continued and 
persevering exercise. 

But not only are these interruptions or hindrances to 
meditation to be overcome, but efforts should be put 
forward to annihilate the great causes of our bondage. 
These are called “ afflictions, ” and they are described 
in the following aphorisms : “ Ignorance, egoism, de¬ 
sire, aversion, and ardent attachment to life are the 
five afflictions. Ignorance is the field of those which 
follow, whether they be dormant, weak, intercepted, 
or simple. Ignorance is the assumption of that which 
is non-eternal, impure, painful, and non-soul —to be 
eternal, pure, joyous, and soul. Egoism is the identi¬ 
fying of the power that sees with the power of* seeing. 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 


171 


Desire is dwelling on pleasure. Aversion is dwelling 
on pain. Tenacity of life is an attachment to the 
body, which relates to the residua of one’s former life, 
even on the part of the wise. These, the subtle ones, 
should be avoided by an adverse course” (chap. ii. 
3 - 9 ). 

Five causes of our bondage are stated ; and the first 
of these, viz., ignorance, is declared to be the source of 
the rest. Ignorance, therefore, is, according to this, as 
to every other system of Hindu Philosophy, the ulti¬ 
mate cause of that bondage from which deliverance is 
to be ardently desired. Ignorance of what ? JSTot of 
God and His attributes ; nor of the teaching in His rev¬ 
elation ; but of the essential and everlasting difference 
between soul and non-soul. The characteristics of the 
soul are in marked antithesis to the properties and 
qualities of matter and its evolutes. The soul is eter¬ 
nal, pure, and joyous ; while matter, in at least its 
present forms, is non-eternal, impure, and painful. 
But we are laboring under the hallucination that the 
soul is impure and miserable, while the fact is that im¬ 
purity and pain belong to matter, and cannot possibly 
appertain to soul. And the consequence of this igno¬ 
rance is that we wish to see the connection of the pure 
spirit with impure and painful matter, perpetuated 
rather than dissolved. 

But how does ignorance bring us to a conclusion so 
wretched ? The different stages of its operation are in¬ 
dicated. Ignorance begets egoism, by which the seer 
is identified with the seeing faculty, the enjoyer is con¬ 
founded with the instrument of enjoyment, or the soul 
is declared to be nothing more or less than one of its 
own material organs. The soul is the enjoyer, and the 
enjoyment is communicated to it through the internal 


172 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


organ, intelligence or mind, which is an evolute of 
Prakriti, and therefore a material form, though of the 
subtlest kind and imperceptible. But this form, though 
merely an instrument of enjoyment, is inflated with an 
idea of its own importance, and says, “ I enjoy.” Its 
ignorance of its own nature and position among the 
admitted categories of the system is the cause of its 
egoism. But, properly speaking, as it has been so often 
said, the charge of ignorance or egoism cannot be le¬ 
gitimately brought against it. It is in reality the 
enjoyer, and its enjoyment is simply reflected in the 
tranquil spirit, as the serene evening sky with its rosy 
light is reflected upon the surface of a calm sheet of 
water. The mistake does not rest therefore with the 
internal organ, but with the philosopher, who, after 
having extinguished all individuality on the part of the 
human spirit, allows himself to be led by his instincts 
to attribute some sort of responsibility to it. 

From egoism proceed a longing for pleasure and a 
recoil from pain ; and these instincts give birth to 
tenacity of life, or an aversion to that dissolution of the 
connection of the soul with material organs, on which 
true emancipation hinges. ITow ? Men instinctively 
desire happiness, and perform good works to secure it. 
But good works are fructescent, and they necessarily 
lead to their translation to regions of happiness, whence, 
as soon as the fruits of their good works are consumed, 
they have to come back in renewed bodies. Or, if they 
are bent on present enjoyment and secure it by bad 
works, they are sent into regions of punishment, 
whence, the fruits of their evil deeds being consumed, 
they also come back in fresh bodies. The chain of 
transmigration is, therefore, necessarily lengthened by 
works, which, whether good or bad, proceed from our 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 


173 


instinctive and fatuous desire for happiness and our 
equally instinctive and foolish aversion to pain. An 
additional reason is given for our shrinking from death 
in the expression, “ The residua of one’s former life.” 
What are the residua of a former life ? There are 
varieties of such, hut those referred to here are our own 
recollections of the pains experienced in consequence of 
death in former lives ; and these cannot but lead us to 
shrink from even a temporary dissolution of the ma¬ 
terial conditions by which the soul is enchained. 

These products of ignorance are found in various 
states in various individuals. In some they are “ dor¬ 
mant,” or in a state of hibernation, from which they 
are sure to come out with renewed vigor to torment us 
and drive us to works, fruits, births, deaths, repeated 
in all but endless chains. In some they are “ inter¬ 
cepted,” or their development is checked by the undue 
preponderance of one of them, such as the prevalence 
of egoism decided enough to check the manifestation of 
desire, aversion, and tenacity of life. In some they 
have been weakened by the preliminary operations of 
Yoga; while in some they have their full play, and are 
therefore called “ simple.” 

But in one case all the afflictions may justly be 
represented as the “ residua” of former lives. To 
understand this let attention be called to the following 
aphorisms : 

“ The residua of works have affliction for their root, 
and are felt either in this manifested birth or in the 
unmanifested one. The root existing, the deserts are 
kind, age and experience. They have joy or suffering 
for their fruit according as their cause is virtue or vice. 
To the discriminating all are verily painful, because of 
the adversity of the actions of the three qualities, and 


174 


IIIiTDU PHILOSOPHY. 


of tlie pains of sequence, anxiety, and residua” (chap, 
ii. 12-15); 

The afflictions—ignorance, etc.—are to be held ac¬ 
countable not merely for the works performed by us in 
this life, but for those we have performed in all the 
transmigrations through which we have passed. The 
remains, so to speak, of these works, we carry with us, 
and their consequences we take in “ kind,” or in rank, 
either in society or in the scale of being ; in “ age’ ’ or 
in longevity or its reverse ; and lastly, in “ experi¬ 
ence,” or in the delectation of pleasure, or the endur¬ 
ance of pain. Nor are their consequences or fruits, ex¬ 
cept in rare cases, consumed in this life, they being dis¬ 
played in that which is to come, and which, therefore, 
is yet unmanifested. If they have been effectuated by 
virtue, their present and future consequence must be 
joy ; while if they have been caused by vice, their 
present and future consequence is and will be sorrow. 
The discriminating, however, look upon all the con¬ 
sequences, joyful or sorrowful, as evils to be depre¬ 
cated for four different reasons. In the first place, the 
three cosmic qualities to which virtue, vice, and activity 
benevolent or malevolent, are to be ascribed, are, when 
their equipoise in Prakriti is once interrupted, in an¬ 
tagonism to one another ; and their frequent contests 
cannot but lead to disorder and misery. Pleasure, in 
the second place, is invariably followed by pain, “ by 
the law of sequence.” It is, moreover, accompanied 
with a great deal of anxiety, arising mainly from our 
consciousness of its evanescent character. And, lastly, 
all our actions and feelings leave behind them impres¬ 
sions, which revive the sensations of pleasure and pain 
within us, leaving aside the consequences, which it is 
absolutely impossible for us to evade or avert. 


THE TOGA PHILOSOPHY. 


175 


Now, we come to the means or accessories of Yoga. 
These are—first, Yama, restraint ; second, Niyama, 
obligation ; third, Asana, posture ; fourth, Prana 
yama, regulation or restraint of the breath ; fifth, 
Pratyahara, abstraction ; sixth, Dharana, devotion ; 
seventh, Dhyana, contemplation ; eighth, Samadhi, 
meditation. 

The following are the aphorisms in which these are 
set forth with their characteristics : 

“ On the decay of impurity, through the practice of 
the accessories of the Yoga, there is illumination of the 
understanding till discriminative knowledge results. 
Restraint, obligation, posture, regulation of the breath, 
abstraction, devotion, contemplation, and meditation 
are the eight accessories. Restraint includes abstinence 
from slaughter, falsehood, theft, incontinence, and 
avarice. The obligations are purification, contentment, 
penance, study, and devotion to the Lord : Posture is 
that which is firm and pleasant. On its being accom¬ 
plished, the regulation of breath, which is interruption- 
in the flow of inspiration and expiration. Abstraction 
is the assumption by the senses of the original nature 
of the thinking principle, from want of application to 
their respective objects” (chap. ii. 18-54, 114). 

“ Steadfastness or devotion is the confinement of 
the thinking principle to one place. Contemplation is 
unison there of the understanding. When that con¬ 
templation, existing as if without its own identity, 
enlightens solely one object, it is meditation” (chap, 
iii. 1-3). 

These eight means of Yoga are called its members as 
well as its accessories. The first five the outer, and 
the last three the inner members ; and they indicate 
the varied stages, incipient as well as advanced, of that 


170 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


laborious and painful exercise which terminates in the 
extinction of the thinking principle. It being neces¬ 
sary to draw particular attention to them, they are set 
forth one after another, in the order in which they ap¬ 
pear in the above extracts, with elucidating comments : 

1. Eestraint is the first step in all schemes of ref¬ 
ormation, meaning, as it does, abstinence from gross 
sins and sinful dispositions. The word “ slaughter” 
as used in the aphorism bearing upon it has a twofold 
meaning. It means religious sacrifice as well as mur¬ 
der. The Yoga Philosophy is as thoroughly opposed 
to the doctrine of sacrifice as Buddhism ; and it brings 
forward veracity as a substitute for the bloody rites 
enjoined in the Yedas, while it promises “ jewels from 
all sides” to him “ who is confirmed in abstinence from 
theft,” and represents attainment of vigor as insepa¬ 
rably associated with “ continence. ” It prohibits 
avarice not only in the sense in which the word is ordi¬ 
narily used, but in a sense unknown perhaps to all but 
students of Hindu Philosophy. The avaricious longing 
for fresh bodies and fresh births, of which we are sup¬ 
posed to be conscious, is condemned, as well as cupidity 
in the ordinary sense of the term. The first step of 
Yoga is renunciation of sin in act, word, and even 
thought. So far it is worthy of commendation. 

2. The second step is the cultivation of right disposi¬ 
tions within us by a strict conformity to the command¬ 
ments and ordinances of religion. A careful study of 
the Yedas, certain prescribed austerities and devotion 
to the Lord are fitted to purify the soul from all its base 
desires, and breed contentment in it. There would be 
no objection to this statement, if by “ devotion to the 
Lord ” were meant something more than muttering 
mechanically the two words Pranava and Om, which 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 177 

are represented as His symbols. It is affirmed that the 
frequent repetition of these symbols, or of some select 
verses from the Yedas, such as the Gayatri, leads to 
God-vision. Through muttering results vision , as ex¬ 
plained by Bhoj Rajah, of the desiderated deity. But 
God-vision according to this philosophy i s tantamount 
to nothing-vision—the God posited being a nonentity ! 

3. Here begin those bodily exercises which do not 
profit. The varieties of postures recommended and 
detailed for the attainment of firmness of mind and 
cheerfulness of disposition are too numerous to be taken 
notice of here. Yasistha, Yajnavalkya, and other 
sages of the Yedic and Post-Yedic age fixed their 
number at 84, stating that these had been prescribed 
and described by Siva, the Father of Indian Yogis. 
Gorakshanatha, a Yogi of a later date, disgusted with 
their paucity, swelled their number to 84,000,000. Of 
this number, however, ten are considered as the more 
important, and three or four of these last we shall in¬ 
dicate in the words of the learned translator. 

(a) 6 ‘ Padmasana. The right foot should be placed 
on the left thigh, and the left foot on the right 
thigh ; the hands should be crossed, and the two great 
toes should be firmly held thereby ; the chin should be 
bent down on the chest ; and in this posture the eyes 
should be directed to the tip of the nose. It is called 
Padmasana (lotus-posture), and is highly beneficial in 
overcoming all diseases.’ ’ 

( р ) “ Put the right ankle on the leftside of the chest, 
and similarly the left ankle on the right side, and the 
posture will be Gomukha, or of the shape of a cow’s 
mouth.” 

(с) “ Having assumed the fowl posture, should the 
two hands be placed on the sides of the neck, it would 


178 


Hindu Philosophy. 


make the posture like that of the tortoise upset ; it is 
called tortoise-upset posture.” 

The fowl posture is thus described : “Having estab¬ 
lished the lotus posture, if the hand be passed between 
the thigh and the knees and placed on the earth so as 
to lift the body aloft, it w T ill produce the fowl seat. ” 

(cl ) “ Hold the great toes with the hands, and draw 
them to the ears as in drawing a bowstring, and this is 
called the bow posture” (p. 104). 

The translator concludes his description of the prin¬ 
cipal varieties of postures recommended with these 
words : 

“ Treating of a system of philosophy, Patanjali has 
not thought proper to enter into details regarding age, 
sex, caste, food, dwelling, etc., as bearing upon Yoga ; 
but other works supply information about them to a 
considerable extent. A few notes derived therefrom 
may not be unfitly added here. The first question that 
would arise would be, Who are fit to perform the 
Yoga ? On this subject the “ Hatha dipika” fixes no 
limit. It says, “ By the practice of Yoga, every one 
may attain perfection, whether he be youthful, or old, 
or very old, or diseased or decrepid.” The next point 
is the selection of a proper place. ‘ 4 A small monastery, 
a dwelling not larger than a cube of six feet, situated 
in an out-of-the-way place, where there is no danger, 
within a circuit of a bow, of hail, fire, and water, in a 
country abounding in food, and free from danger of 
wars and the like, where religion prevails in a thriving 
kingdom,” is the most appropriate. The cell, or 
mathika , should have a small door and no window ; it 
should be free from holes, cavities, inequalities, high 
steps, and low descents. It should be smeared with 
cow-dung, devoid of dirt, not infested by vermin, with 


THE YOGA. PHILOSOPHY. 


179 


a terrace in front, a good well, and the whole sur¬ 
rounded by a wall. Dwelling in such a place, avoid¬ 
ing all anxieties, the Yogi should follow the path 
pointed out by his teachers in the exercise of the Yoga. 
He should avoid all excess of food, violent exertions, 
and vain disputations. Ilis food should consist of 
wheat, sali rice, barley, shasti rice (or that which 
matures in six days), the syama and the nivara grains, 
milk, clarified butter, coarse or candied sugar, butter, 
honey, ginger, palval, fruits, five kinds of greens, mung 
pulse, and water, 5 ’ and all soothing sweet things in a 
moderate quantity, avoiding flesh-meat, and too much 
salt, acids, and all stale, putrid, decomposed, or acrid 
substances. The quantity of food taken should be such as 
to leave one fourth of his appetite unappeased ” (p. 110). 

When the adept is able to assume any posture he 
wishes to appear in, he is unaffected “ by the pairs,” 
i.e. by the extremes of cold and heat, light and dark¬ 
ness, storm and lull, etc. Neither is he tormented by 
hunger and thirst. In a word, he becomes impassible ; 
and his steadiness of posture no contingency can shake 
for a moment. 

4. Regulation of breath is an important member of 
Yoga, and the process consists of expiration, inspiration, 
and retention of breath, according to fixed rules. To 
give an insight into these, let us present an extract from 
the translator’s notes (p. 43) on the subject : u The 
time devoted to inspiration is the shortest, and to reten¬ 
tion the longest. A Yaishnava in his ordinary daily 
prayer repeats the Yija-mantra (containing specific 
mystic syllables) once while expiring, seven times while 
inspiring, and twenty times while retaining. A Shakta 
repeats the mantra 16 times while inspiring, 64 times 
while retaining, and 32 times while expiring. These 


180 


HIUDU PHILOSOPHY. 


periods are frequently modified. The details vary 
according to each particular form of meditation and 
the capacity of the performer. As a rule it may be 
said that the longer the retention, the more proficient 
is the Yogi. The usual mode of performing the Prana- 
yama is, after assuming the posture prescribed, to place 
the ring finger of the right hand on the left nostril, 
pressing it so as to close it, and to expire with the 
right, then to press the right nostril with the thumb, 
and to inspire through the left nostril, and then to close 
the two nostrils with the ring finger and the thumb, 
and to stop all breathing. The order is reversed in the 
next operation, and in the third act the first form is 
required. This constitutes the Pranayama, and it 
may be repeated after short intervals, according to 
choice, for hours. The Hatha-dipika philosophizes on 
this by saying, “ By the motion of the breath, the 
thinking principle moves. When that motion is 
stopped, it becomes motionless, and the Yogi becomes 
firm as the trunk of a tree ; therefore the breath should 
be stopped. As long as the breath remains in the 
body, so long it is called living. Death is the exit of 
the breath, therefore it should be stopped.” 

5. Abstraction of the senses is effected by their with¬ 
drawal from the objects toward which they are 
attracted almost irresistibly, and by their concentration 
on the thinking principle. The senses cannot be ex¬ 
tinguished so long as the body of which they are in¬ 
separable organs continues ; but their natural ten¬ 
dency may not merely be counteracted, but completely 
neutralized. Their natural tendency is to go outward 
toward the varieties of tempting objects in which the 
world abounds ; and when they have their full play 
left unrestrained, they prove sources of ceaseless change 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 


181 


to the mind, and through it to the other internal 
organs and the soul. Their natural action must there¬ 
fore be, not only restrained and circumscribed, but 
completely paralyzed, or rather annihilated, and an 
action to which they are naturally averse substituted in 
its place. In other words, their outward and objective 
action must give place to action purely inward and sub¬ 
jective. The mind must draw them in as a tortoise 
draws its limbs within its shell ; and when thus fixed 
upon the soul itself they cease to be sources of rest¬ 
lessness and trouble. 

This consummation is the first great step attained in 
meditation ; and the complete subjugation or abstrac¬ 
tion of the soul ushers us into the inner temple of Yoga. 
The three remaining members are said to be u more 
intimate” than those already described, and they are 
therefore separated from the others and made to con¬ 
stitute a class by themselves. One result of this classi¬ 
fication is, that the number jwe plays an important 
part in Yoga Philosophy, as the perfect number seven 
does in Hebrew literature. We have, for instance, jwe 
functions or modifications—right-notion, misconception, 
purity, sleep, and memory ; jwe afflictions—ignorance, 
egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of life ; jwe for¬ 
bearances — slaughter, theft, falsehood, incontinence, 
and avarice \jwe obligations—purification, contentment, 
penance, study, and devotion to the Lord ; jwe subsid¬ 
iary means—restraint, obligation, posture, regulation 
of the breath, and abstraction of the senses. To these 
may be added th.Q jwe recognized sources of perfections 
(siddkis), viz., birth, works, incantations, austerity, and 
samadhi. 

6. The sixth step in this exercise is the confinement 
of the thinking principle to one place. In the earlier 


182 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


stages of meditation, 'the mind is not fitted for con¬ 
centration on its great theme of contemplation, viz., 
the soul. It must therefore be fixed on an external 
object, either through the eye or without the help of 
any of the senses. That external object may be the tip 
of the nose or the navel-wheel or a plexus of nerves in 
the belly, or the crown of the head or the sky or ether. 
"When the thinking principle has acquired by such exer¬ 
cise the power of concentration, it may easily be trans¬ 
ferred from an external to an internal object, from the 
objective non-self to the subjective self. 

7. Dfiyan , or contemplation, is the concentration of 
the thinking principle, not on an external object like 
the tip of the nose, or the crown of the head, but on its 
proper object of thought. Dhyan is not the finishing 
stroke of the Yoga, because it is not accompanied with 
the obliteration of all distinction between the thinking 
principle, the object of thought, and thought itself. 
The state of perfect unconsciousness, which is the goal 
before the Yogi, is only a step ahead. 

8. Samad/ii , or concentration, is the final stage in 
which the thinking principle loses its separate identity 
and becomes merged in the object of thought and 
thought itself ; or rather in which the thinking principle 
is extinguished along with thought, and the object of 
thought remains in its original state of solitude. This 
state is called kaivalya , translated “ abstraction” by 
Mr. Davies, and “ isolation” by Dr. Mitra. It is indi¬ 
cated in the following extracts from Book IY.: 

“ For the knower of the difference between soul and 
non-soul, there is a cessation of the idea of self in the 
thinking principle. Then the thinking principle is 
turned toward discriminative knowledge, and bowed 
down by the weight of commencing isolation. ” 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 


183 


u On the completion of the series there is produced 
the meditation called the ‘ Cloud of Virtue,’ even in 
the case of the non-aspirant, from the appearance of 
constant discrimination. Thence follows the cessation 
of afflictions and works. Then the knowable becomes 
small from the infiniteness of the knowledge free from 
all coverings and impurities. Thereupon takes place 
the termination of the succession of the modifications of 
the qualities which have accomplished their ends.” 

“ Isolation is the regression of the qualities devoid of 
the purpose of the* soul, or it is the abidance of the 
thinking power in its own nature. ’ ’ 

The process is plain. The devotee first recognizes 
the fact that his self is different from the thinking 
principle, and thus attains this discriminative knowledge. 
Then a shower of virtues or rewards falls upon him un¬ 
solicited, in spite of his aspirations being completely 
withdrawn from them. Then the afflictions and works 
disappear, and the objects of knowledge appear insignifi¬ 
cant before its vastness and infinitude. Then the 
cosmic gunas or qualities with all their modifications 
abandon the soul forever, or retire leaving the soul in 
its original state of quiescense and repose. Here is 
emancipation, the soul’s liberation from the trammels 
of Prakriti till a fresh renovation of the world, if not 
forever. ► 

It is to be noted here that Patanjali does not teach 
the doctrine of the soul’s absorption into the deity. On 
this important point let us hear what the learned trans¬ 
lator says : 

c( Professor Weber in his 1 History of Indian Litera¬ 
ture ’ (pp. 238-39) has entirely misrepresented the case. 
He says : ‘ One very peculiar side of the Yoga doctrine, 
and one which was more and more exclusively devel- 


184 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


oped as time went on, is the Yoga practice—that is, the 
outward means, such as penances, mortifications, and 
the like, whereby the absorption into the supreme God¬ 
head is sought to be attained. 5 To those who have 
attentively read the preceding pages, it will be obvious 
that the idea of absorption into the Godhead forms no 
part of the Yoga theory. Indeed it is difficult to con¬ 
ceive how so well read a scholar as the learned profes¬ 
sor could have formed this opinion unless we believe 
that he has not read the Yoga, and has borrowed his 
theory from the Bhagavat Gita and Puranic and Tan- 
tric modifications of Yoga. Patanjali, like Kapila, 
rests satisfied with this isolation of the soul. He does 
not pry into the how and the where the soul resides 
after the separation 55 (p. 209). 

Patanjali’s God being a phantom conjured up to 
satisfy a popular clamor rather than to meet a necessity 
of his philosophy, he is simply laid aside, as all phan¬ 
toms deserve to be in the work of liberation as in that 
of creation and entanglement of Prakriti in its own 
meshes, and it must not be forgotten that the so-called 
emancipation of the soul is in reality liberation of Pra¬ 
kriti in the shape of the thinking principle from 
troubles of its own creation. 

But this highest consummation, this summum bonum , 
is preceded by certain earthly advantages to the Yoga ; 
and to these some reference must be made. They are 
indicated in the following aphorisms : 

“ The knowledge of the past and the future is ac¬ 
quired by sanyama over the threefold modification. 
A confused comprehension of word, meaning, and 
knowledge arises from indiscriminate understanding. 
By Sanyama with due discrimination is acquired an 
understanding of the cry of all creatures. A knowl- 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 


185 


edge of former existence by making the residua ap¬ 
parent. With reference to cognition, a knowledge of 
another’s thinking principle’’ (Book III. 16-19). 

“ From Sanyama with reference to the shape of the 
body, the power of vision being diminished and the 
correlation of light and sight being severed, there is 
disappearance. Works are deliberate and non-de- 
liberate, and by Sanyama about them a knowledge of 
final end, or by portents. In powers, the powers of 
the elephant and the like. From contemplation of the 
light of the extremely luminous disposition, a knowl¬ 
edge is acquired of the subtile, the intercepted, and 
the remote. From Sanyama in the sun, a knowledge 
of regions” (III. 21-26). “ In the coronal light, vision 
of perfected ones’ ’ (III. 32). 

These extracts are enough to show that all sorts of 
extraordinary powers are derivable from the applica¬ 
tion of the last three members of Yoga, called San¬ 
yama in their joint capacity, to varieties of objects 
perceptible and imperceptible— (a) knowledge of the 
past and the future, of all sciences, of another’s mental 
states, of one’s own adventures in past times, and the 
coming rewards or punishments predestined on account 
of them and of present works ; (J) ability to compre¬ 
hend all -inarticulate and indistinct sounds, even the 
cries of inferior animals, which, be it observed, have 
souls as well as men, and speak intelligibly ; ( c ) en¬ 
larged powers of vision such as to enable a man to see 
heavenly intelligences, things subtile, such as ether, 
and concealed beneath the earth, such as the contents 
of mines, and such things as the elixir of life, found on 
the other side of the mountain of Meru ; (< d) physical 
powers, such as those of the lion, the behemoth—nay, 
much more expanded, even the powers that may enable 


18G 


HI^DU PHILOSOPHY. 


us literally to remove mountains and dry up seas ; (e) 
the power of intercepting the light between one’s own 
body and the eyesight of all classes of spectators, and 
thereby rendering one’s self either partially or wholly 
invisible ; (/*) power, in a word, to assume all shapes, 
walk on the water, fly in the air, remain buried under 
the earth for months and years, and then come up as 
the dead are expected to do on the day of judgment, 
or remain buried in the earth as a pillar of stone till a 
mound is thrown up around the body of the entranced 
devotee by ants, and nests are built by birds in his 
tangled and clotted hairs. The varied powers attain¬ 
able are classed under eight heads. And these are in¬ 
dicated by Bhoj Rajah in the following order : 

1. “ Attenuation ( anima ), the attainment of the form 
of atoms—molecularity. 

2. “ Levity (IcCghima), attainment of lightness, like 
that of floss or cotton. 

3. “ Ponderosity ( garima ), attainment of great 
weight. 

4. “ Illimitability (mahima), attainment of great¬ 
ness, or the power of touching the moon or the like 
with the tip of one’s finger. 

5. “ Irresistible will ( gyrakamya ), non-fructification 
of one’s desires. 

6. “ Supremacy (isila), highest authority over the 
body and internal organs. 

7. “ Subjection (vasita), prevailing everywhere, that 
is, the elements, being subservient to him, do not dis¬ 
obey his behests. 

8. “ Fulfilment of desires (Icammasayitroa ), accom¬ 
plishing one’s desires everywhere—that is, in whatever 
object a desire is found, the Yogi becomes accomplished 
in that, or brings it to fruition by attaining it ” (p. 158). 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 


187 


These perfections are not the products exclusively of 
samadhi • other causes are mentioned in the first apho¬ 
rism of the fourth or last chapter of the book under re¬ 
view as co-operating with it in their production. The 
aphorism runs thus : C( The perfections are produced 
by birth, herbs, incantations, austerity, or samadhi? ’ 
Actions performed in former lives must have their 
fruits, and if they are unfavorable to the acquisition of 
supernatural powers, they interfere with their attain¬ 
ment in spite of the admitted efficacy of concentration. 
And therefore merit acquired in past lives must co¬ 
operate with Yoga in the generation of these marvel¬ 
lous powers of the body and mind. ISor must such 
things as herbs, amulets, and incantations be despised, 
they being fitted as well to offer facilities for the ac¬ 
quisition of these powers as to remove obstacles or 
hindrances to the realization of the conditions on 
which their attainment is based. And as to austerity, 
nothing can be more meritorious than that to which 
the great sages of the Yedic age, like Yiswamitra, 
owed that greatness and glory which subsequent writ¬ 
ers have unanimously represented as even more than 
divine. 

It is, however, to be observed that these powers are 
after all the subordinate fruits of samadhi or concen¬ 
tration. They are accompaniments of the lower, not 
of the higher kind of meditation. Meditation is said 
to be with seed ( savija ) or seedless (nirvija) ; that is, 
with distinct recognition of subject and object alive, 
and such recognition dead. Meditation with seed is 
the stage where the mind gets rid of all modifications 
produced by external objects, but retains a distinct 
recognition of self or its self-consciousness. The ex¬ 
traordinary powers enumerated are the gorgeous ap- 


188 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


pendage of this stage ; and there is therefore some 
degree of selfishness connected with it. But when the 
mind passes to the higher stage and loses its recognition 
of self or becomes unconscious, these powers are cast 
aside as old garments, and complete absorption into 
the object of thought is realized, and the soul is saved 
from material conditions. 

But a great trial awaits the devotee before the final 
emancipation of his soul is realized. This is indicated 
in aphorism hi of Book III. : “ Avoidance should be 
made of association with, and encouragement of, celes¬ 
tial temptations, from apprehension of evil recurring.” 
The holy gods become jealous of the man who, by pen¬ 
ance and meditation, acquires extraordinary powers 
and brings himself to the borders of complete emanci¬ 
pation. No wonder ! Mortals have at times, if not 
very frequently, made themselves terrors and scourges 
to the gods themselves by means of extraordinary 
powers attained by austerity and meditation, and their 
deliverance is deprecated in heaven. And, therefore, 
the gods most naturally throw obstacles in the way of 
the devotee about to be beatified, by inducing their 
king, Indra, to send down courtesans from his court, 
and they make use of their charms and blandishments 
to induce him to swerve from the path of meditation. 
And when they fail, ghosts and hobgoblins, growling 
tigers and hissing snakes are let loose with the same 
object. But when the devotee succeeds in frustrating 
all “ celestial ” attempts to cajole or frighten him out 
of his chosen path, he is beatified, and his face becomes 
radiant with celestial glory, and the sweet smile of con¬ 
scious deliverance plays upon his lips ; such at least 
was the case with the great Buddha under the Bo-tree 
at Gy a, though the temptations thrown in his way 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 


189 


proceeded from the malice of Mara, not from the 
jealousy of the gods ! 

Such is Yoga Philosophy, if philosophy a series of 
practical rules, having for their object the complete ex¬ 
tinction of mental activity, can properly be called. 
Contradictory statements are sure to be met in our ex¬ 
position of its maxims, as the system itself veers about, 
now assuming the existence of God, and then convert¬ 
ing Him into a mere phantom or a useless appendage ; 
now making the soul the object of thought, and then 
making thought feed upon itself ; now representing 
salvation as the extinction of happiness as well as pain ; 
and then representing the “ saved ” man as happy 
beyond description ! The system, however, can be 
thoroughly understood only when we divest ourselves 
of all our metaphysical ideas, and look, according to the 
known principles of the Sankhya Philosophy, upon the 
so-called internal organs, intelligence, self-conscious¬ 
ness, and mind as material evolutes essentially uncon¬ 
nected with the soul ; and the complete extinction of 
all these subtle productions of matter as necessary to 
its salvation from both the happiness and the misery 
reflected in it on account of their existence and proxim¬ 
ity to it. The process by which such extinction is 
brought about is, not the skeleton merely, but the body 
and soul of this philosophy. 

The Yoga Philosophy has been compared to mesmer¬ 
ism and spiritualism by philosophic thinkers, as well as 
by the charlatans who, under the banner of so-called 
Theosophy, are trying to revive its lost prestige in 
India. But it has very little in common with mesmer¬ 
ism, as it does not uphold that belief in animal magnet¬ 
ism which its founder, Franz Mesmer, propagated ; 
and that faith in magnetic somnambulism by which one 


190 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


of his followers infused new life into it, when his theory 
was condemned by a conclave of professional men. 
Varieties of bodily exercises, rather than magnetization 
of chosen “ subjects” by passes of hand, were the ap¬ 
proved weapons of the Yoga philosopher, and self-con¬ 
trol rather than control over others his main aim. 
Some of the powers said to have been acquired by him, 
such as introvision, prevision, and retrovision, resemble 
those which are said to be realized under what is tech¬ 
nically called clairvoyance ; but while these played only 
a secondary part in Yoga Philosophy, they are the 
very soul of mesmerism. 

And as to Spiritism, there is one aphorism in Pa- 
tanjali’s work, the verse in which the power of seeing 
subtle evolutes of matter and spirits is represented as 
attainable, that alone has the remotest reference to it. 
The idea of seances and communication with the dis¬ 
embodied spirits of the great men of the world, dead 
and gone, may be represented as an innovation upon 
the system, not, however, as one of its original ele¬ 
ments. Nor did an investigation into the occult powers 
of nature originally constitute any portion of the Yogi’s 
business ; his aim being, not tlite acquisition of general 
knowledge, but that of the knowledge of the essential 
distinction between soul and non-soul. 

It may, however, be admitted that truths, some¬ 
what like those of Mesmerism and Spiritism, were su- 
peradded to the system before it was many years old ; 
and the Yogi appears, in consequence, as a juggler and 
necromancer in Sanscrit poetry and drama. The sys¬ 
tem deteriorated early ; and its success in a lower 
sense and failure in a higher are exhibited in India to¬ 
day. The power of self-torture the Yogi evinces now, 
as he did in days gone by, is miraculous indeed. 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 


191 


Monier Williams in bis “ Indian Wisdom” thus groups 
the forms of self-torture resorted to : 

“ We read of some who acquire the power of re¬ 
maining under water for a space of time quite incredi¬ 
ble ; of others who bury themselves up to the neck in 
the ground or even below it, leaving only a little hole 
through which to breathe ; of others who keep their 
fists clenched for years till the nails grow through the 
back of their hands ; of others who hold one or both 
arms aloft till they become immovably fixed in that posi¬ 
tion and withered to the bone ; of others who roll their 
bodies for thousands of miles to some place of pilgrim¬ 
age ; of others who sleep on beds of iron spikes . . . 
others have been known to chain themselves for life to 
trees ; others, again, to pass their lives, heavily 
chained, in iron cages. Lastly, the extent to which 
some Indian ascetics will carry fasting, far exceeds any¬ 
thing ever heard of in Europe, as may be understood 
by a reference to the rules of the lunar penance {chan- 
dr ay (ma) given by Manu. This penance is a kind of 
fast, which consists in diminishing the consumption of 
food every day by one mouthful for the waning half of 
the lunar month, beginning with fifteen mouthfuls at 
the full moon, until the quantity is reduced to nothing 
at the new moon, and then increasing it in like manner 
during the fortnight of the moon’s increase” (pp. 
105-106). 

But the Yogis, as a body, are for various reasons de¬ 
spised, rather than honored, except perhaps among the 
most ignorant and superstitious. They, in the first 
place, associate varied acts of self-indulgence of a cul¬ 
pable nature with the varieties of tortures they inflict 
upon themselves. They make use of intoxicating 
drugs, so as to be always in a state of partial insensi- 


192 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


bility ; and they never scruple to allow themselves to 
be implicated in nefarious and libidinous intrigues. 
They are, in the matter of self-control, the very anti¬ 
podes of what they are expected to be, being as a rule 
avaricious, irascible, quarrelsome, and turbulent. And 
lastly, they never hesitate to resort to varieties of low 
tricks for the purpose of imposing on the credulity of 
those by whom, but for them, they would be held in 
contempt. Their attitude proves to a demonstration 
that bodily tortures are not necessarily accompanied 
with spiritual renovation, even when inflicted by the 
devotee upon his own self, with the most pious of 
motives. It also shows that those missionaries who 
advise native preachers to live as they do, do not place 
before them very exalted models of character or types 
of self-sacrifice ! 

But why do they not give up those bodily tortures 
which are trying to flesh and blood ? Because they 
believe that they are, in spite of their freaks of temper 
and aberrations of conduct, acquiring extra merit by 
their chosen course of mortification and penance. The 
idea that sin and virtue can on no account be united is 
foreign to Hindu theology ; and external observances 
of the most exacting stamp are eagerly resorted to in 
our country by persons who never dream of giving up 
their favorite sins as fitted, not merely to make an 
atonement for these, but to secure a store of superero¬ 
gatory merit in spite of them ! Can moral turpitude 
go further ? 

We cannot conclude without an opportune reference 
to the farce played by the Hew Dispensationists under 
color of the Yoga system. They call themselves dev¬ 
otees of Yoga, entertain the public with a new species 
of dance, and practise some species of sacred jugglery 


THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY. 


193 


within the walls of a splendid house, and amid comforts 
spurned by the ancient Yogi as antagonistic to the 
main object of his life. But they are utter strangers to 
the sacrifices, privations, mortifications, and penances 
as enjoined in the Yoga Sastra ; while as busy bodies, 
engaged in getting up sensational demonstrations for 
the purpose of maintaining their sinking prestige, they 
never dream of betaking themselves to that intense 
meditation without which their loudly tallied of “ God- 
vision’ ’ is unattainable, even according to books which 
might be represented as a series of improvements upon 
that Sastra. All this, and something more, may be 
said of the self-constituted Theosophist, who, while talk¬ 
ing aloud of Yoga as the best of sciences, never scruple 
to live after the fashion of the world, and thereby set 
forth the contrast between what they say and what 
they do ! 


CHAPTER VII. 


THE HAYAT A SYSTEM, OR THE HINDU LOGIC. 

The two systems of philosophy, the Sankhya and 
Yoga, are synthetic, the process adopted by them being 
that of an evolution from a primordial, diffusive sub¬ 
stance, through material forms of a tenuous, impercep¬ 
tible character, into that complicated framework of 
nature, the varied portions of which make suitable im¬ 
pressions on the senses. But the two systems we have 
to deal with in this and the succeeding paper—viz., the 
Hyaiyaika and Vaiseshika—are analytic, as their 
adopted method indicates a descent from complexity to 
unity, not an ascent from the uniform to the multi¬ 
form, the one to the many. They begin with classifica¬ 
tion ; place the objects of nature, both imperceptible 
and perceptible, under fixed categories ; state the prin¬ 
ciples by which the cognition of the latter by the mind 
is regulated, and the existence of the former is demon¬ 
strated ; show how the soul is enslaved and distressed 
by them ; proceed to the very source of its bitter 
bondage, and the ultimate cause of creation ; and, 
finally, point out the way in which its emancipation is 
insured and effected. They therefore embrace a 
variety of subjects, and can only be called Logical in 
the most ancient and comprehensive sense of the term. 
The philosophy of these schools is what was understood 
in ancient times by the now rarely used term, Po- 
lymathy, including, as it does, Logic, Physiology, Psy- 


THE HAYAYA SYSTEM. 


195 


chology, and Theology. It includes what is embraced 
in the tripartite classification of the Hegelian system, 
in which the Science of Logic, the Philosophy of Na¬ 
ture, and the Philosophy of the Spirit are all em¬ 
bodied. 

We shall in this paper confine ourselves to a portion 
of the all-comprehensive philosophy of the Nyaiyaika 
and Yaiseshika schools, the portion embodying its 
Logic and Physiology, and reserve our exposition of its 
Psychology and Theology for a separate paper. Our 
desire is to present the salient features of this huge and 
all-comprehensive system in the modes of reasoning, 
the forms of expression, and, as far as possible, in the 
very words in which these are set forth in its standard 
works. 

A word about the founders of these two schools of 
Philosophy, and the original and standard documents in 
which their principles are unfolded, ought to precede 
our analysis of the system in question. The founder of 
the Nyaiyaika school was Gotama or Gautama, and the 
founder of the Yaiseshika school was Kanada. These 
two persons are mythical heroes, like Kapila and 
Patanjali, the founders respectively of the Sankhya and 
Yoga systems. Scarcely anything reliable is known 
regarding them besides the undisputed fact that they 
founded respectively the schools of thought with which 
their names are inseparably associated. 

Gautama is said in a sacred legend to have been born 
in Northern India in the beginning of the Treta Yuga, 
or the second of the four great eras into which the his¬ 
tory of the world is divided by Hindu chronologists, 
and to have married Ahalya, the daughter of Brahma 
himself. But though thus highly connected, his family 
life was by no means happy, inasmuch as his wife, 


196 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


albeit a goddess herself, was seduced by Indra, the 
king of heaven, and ultimately changed into a rock for 
her infidelity to the solemn vows of matrimony. Her 
divine seducer and lover was also punished, but in a 
manner over which decency compels us to draw the 
veil. Scarcely any reliable report, good or scandalous, 
has come down to us about Kanada ; but he appears 
to have been the more austere devotee and the greater 
thinker. On the whole, the two philosophers agreed 
with each other, though their differences on minor 
points have been noticed in the exegetic disquisitions by 
which their writings have been elucidated by eminent 
commentators. 

The original works of these schools are the Sutras or 
Aphorisms ascribed to Gautama, called the Nyaya 
Sutras, and those traced to Kanada, called the Vaise- 
shika Sutras. These, like all the Aphorisms of all the 
schools of the ancient philosophy of our country, are 
elliptical, enigmatical, and obscure ; and they would, 
but for the triple set of commentaries by which they 
have been made to some extent clear, be positively un¬ 
intelligible. 

Gautama’s work, the Kyaya Sutras, consists of five 
books, each of which is divided into two Lessons. The 
miscellaneous nature of its contents is set forth in the 
following conspectus presented in the “ Sarva-Darsana- 
Sangraha 

“ The principle that final bliss, i.e. the absolute aboli¬ 
tion of pain, arises from the knowledge of the truth 
(though in a certain sense universally accepted), is 
established in a special sense as a particular tenet of 
the Kyaya school, as is declared by the author of the 
Aphorisms in the words, ‘ Proof, that which is to be 
proved, etc.—from knowledge of the truth as to these 


THE ls T AYAYA SYSTEM. 


197 


tilings, there is the attainment of final bliss . 5 This is 
the first aphorism of the Nyaya Sastra. Now the 
Nyaya Sastra consists of five books, and each book 
contains two £ daily portions.’ In the first daily por¬ 
tion of the first book the venerable Gautama discusses 
the definitions of nine categories, beginning with 
‘ proof,’ and in the second of those of the remaining 
seven beginning with £ discussion. ’ In the first daily 
portion of the second book he examines £ doubt , 9 dis¬ 
cusses the four kinds of £ proof , 5 and refutes the sug¬ 
gested objections to their being instruments of right 
knowledge ; and in the second he says that £ presump¬ 
tion,’ etc. are really included in the four kinds of proof 
already given (and therefore need not be added by the 
Mimansakas as separate ones). In the first daily por¬ 
tion of the third book he examines the soul, the body, 
the senses, and their objects ; in the second, £ intelli¬ 
gence ’ (Buddhi) and £ mind ’ (Manas). In the first 
daily portion of the fourth book he examines £ volition ’ 
(Pravritti), the £ faults,’ £ transmigration,’ £ fruits ’ (of 
actions), £ pain, ’ and £ final liberation ; ’ in the second 
he investigates the truth as to the causes of the 
‘ faults, ’ and also £ wholes ’ and £ parts. ’ In the first 
daily portion of the fifth book he discusses the various 
kinds of £ futility ’ (Jati), and in the second the various 
kinds of £ occasions for rebuke ’ (Nigrahastama or £ un¬ 
fitness to be argued with ’).” 

Four of the five books were edited and translated by 
Dr. Ballantyne, with portions of one of the standard 
modern commentaries. These, with a Compendium of 
Indian Logic, called ££ Tarka Sangraha,” edited and 
translated by the same scholar with his own comments, 
and the larger book, called ££ Bhasa Parichheda,” with 
its commentary, ££ Sidlianta Muktavali,” both partially 


198 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


edited and translated by him, and fully by Dr. Roer, 
are the standard works on the system of logic to be un¬ 
folded in these pages. Our remarks on the Yaiseshika 
Sutras, edited and translated in a masterly manner by 
Professor Gough, are reserved for our next paper, 
though our determination to lay this great work under 
contribution in this is freely expressed. The system of 
Indian Logic belongs in its main features to both these 
schools, and therefore a discrimination between them is 
hardly desirable in an attempt to set forth its princi¬ 
ples. 

It cannot be asserted too often that the peculiar 
phraseology of Indian Logic and its approved modes of 
reasoning run like threads of gold through all the dis¬ 
sertations on Hindu Philosophy extant, insomuch that 
the latter cannot be understood unless the former are 
thoroughly mastered. A careful study of foreign logic 
is by no means a proper preparation for a study of 
indigenous philosophy. A person may be a perfect 
master of Aristotelian logic and the varied systems to 
which it has given birth in Europe ; but such mastery, 
though acquired after years of toil, will not in the 
slightest degree help him through the tangled webs of 
logomachy and sophistry, as also of correct reasoning, 
which stand out in bold relief from the pages of stand¬ 
ard works on Hindu Philosophy. To be able to bring 
this enterprise to a successful issue, he must master the 
high-sounding terminology and the cumbrous modes of 
reasoning by which the Indian Logical System is differ¬ 
entiated from all other rival schemes. Of this fact he 
will be convinced the moment he takes up a book like 
the “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha,” opens it at random, 
and begins the arduous task of understanding what is 
set before him on the page on which his attention is con- 


THE HAYAYA SYSTEM. 


199 


centrated. Treatises like Sankar’s commentaries on 
the Upanishads or the Brahma Sutras, or the innumer¬ 
able other commentaries piled up in the way of the 
student of Hindu Philosophy, cannot possibly be under¬ 
stood, not to say mastered, without an intimate ac¬ 
quaintance with the peculiarities of the Logic, from 
which they derive their most prominent, as well as 
repellant, features. 

Indian Logic is, to adopt a word current in mediaeval 
schools, a t/rwium , or a complex system of grammar, 
logic, and rhetoric. The following quotations from the 
“ Tarka Sangraha” will show that even the most ordi¬ 
nary principles of grammar are not forgotten in a 
standard treatise on logic : 

“ The cause of a sentence’s being significant (is the 
presence of) mutual correspondence, compatibility, and 
juxtaposition (of words). 

“ Mutual correspondence means the reverse of a dis¬ 
position to indicate any other than the intended connec¬ 
tion of one word with another. Compatibility consists 
in (a word’s) not rendering futile the sense (of the sen¬ 
tence). Juxtaposition consists in the enunciation of the 
words without a (long) pause between each. 

“ A collection of words devoid of mutual corre¬ 
spondence, etc., is no valid sentence—for example, 
‘ Cow, horse, man, elephant ’ gives go information, 
the words having no reference to one another. 

“ The expression, Hie should irrigate with fire,’ is 
no valid sentence, for there is no compatibility (between 
fire and irrigation). 

“ The words, ‘ Bring—the—cow,’ not pronounced 
close together, but with an interval of some three hours 
between each, constitute no valid sentence from the 
absence of (the requisite) closeness of juxtaposition.” 


200 


IIIN'DU PHILOSOPHY. 


These extracts are not presented as instances of de¬ 
fectiveness in the system, it being a well-known fact 
that a little grammar must always be associated with 
logic, especially in its classification of propositions and 
its statement of the terms of which each distinct propo¬ 
sition, positive or negative, universal or particular, con¬ 
sists. The very second essay of Aristotle’s “ Organon” 
is an essay on philology rather than logic, treating as it 
does of what he represents as the component parts cf 
discourses, such as propositions and sentences. It must 
be confessed that in its classification of propositions or 
presentation of the peculiarities of sentences, Indian 
Logic is poorer than the system of Aristotle. 

In rhetoric it is perhaps richer. Rhetoric cannot be 
dissociated from logic, inasmuch as the efficacy of a 
logically conducted argument is often enhanced by 
happy turns of expression, attractive illustrations, and 
eloquent appeals to feeling. Indian Logic has not 
erred in enlisting on its side a few of the well-known 
rules of grammar, and a few of the imposing embel¬ 
lishments of rhetoric, as will be made manifest by 
and by. 

Indian Logic, like every other system of logic, treats 
of the objects of knowledge and the laws of thought, 
and its approved mode or method of discussion is indi¬ 
cated by three words : (1) Enunciation (Uddesa), (2) 
Definition (Lakshana), and (3) Investigation (Pariksha). 
Enunciation is the formal statement of the subject to be 
discussed ; Definition is a statement of the differentiae 
by which it is discriminated from all other subjects, 
whether cognate or otherwise ; and Investigation is an 
examination into and an analysis of these differentiat¬ 
ing properties. 

The subjects discussed in the Ryaya Sastra are six- 


THE XAYAYA SYSTEM. 


201 


teen in number, and they are categorically stated in the 
first aphorism of the book. They are : 

1. Pramana, or Proof or Instrument of Right Notion 
or Knowledge. * 

2. Prameya, or Objects of Right Notion or Knowl¬ 
edge. 

3. Sansaya ; or Doubt about the Point to be Dis¬ 
cussed. 

4. Prayajana, or Motive for Discussing it. 

5. Drishtanta, or Familiar Example. 

6. Siddhanta, or a Determinate Case or Tenet. 

7. Avayava, or the Syllogism. 

8. Tarka, or Refutation. 

9. Nirnaya, or Ascertainment. 

10. Vada, or Controversy. 

11. Jalpa, or Wrangling. 

12. Vitanda, or Cavilling. 

13. Hetwabhasa, or Fallacies. 

14. Chhala, or Frauds or Quibbling Artifices. 

15. Jati, or Futile Replies. 

16. Nirgahastana, or Conclusion by pointing out the 
objector’s “ unfitness to be argued with.” 

1. The first subject treated of is “ Proof,” in accord¬ 
ance with the maxim given in the “ Sarva-Darsana-San- 
graha,”in these words : “ To know the thing to be 
measured, you must first know the measure.” The 
Nyaiyaikas admit four kinds of proof or instruments 
of right knowledge, the three admitted in the Sankhya 
school and one more. These are : (a) Perception, ( l >) 
Inference, (c) Testimony, (d) Comparison. 

a. The importance of Perception as an instrument of 
knowledge need not be enlarged upon at a time when a 
tendency is manifested by a class of philosophers to a 
recognition of the evidence furnished by it as the only 


202 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


conclusive evidence available to us. It is, however, 
desirable to show the process involved in every distinct 
act of perception, according to the principles of this 
school. Cognition is the result, not of an external 
object only, not even of the conjunction of an external 
object with a sense-organ, but of “ contiguity*of soul, 
organ, and object.’’ “That,” says Kanada, “is an 
invalid argument (which affirms that sensible cognition 
is an attribute either of the body or of the senses).” 
The cognitive faculty is then transferred from the 
material body and from the senses, both external and 
internal, to the soul ; and in this a marked deviation 
from the principles of the Sankhya school is realized. 

It is distinctly affirmed that “ consciousness” does 
not inhere in the body or in the external senses, or in 
the inner sensory or mind ; and that the process of 
elaboration by which the raw materials of sensation are 
worked up into appropriate ideas is not their work. 
The soul, then, according to the theory of perception 
propounded in this school, is not an unconscious recipi¬ 
ent of reflected impressions, but a conscious, percipient 
principle, and an active framer of ideas. This is a 
great improvement on the Sankhya philosophy, which, 
by positing an unconscious, inactive, perfectly quiescent 
soul, has laid itself open to the charge of propagating 
rank materialism. But it will be shown by and by 
that the analytical schools are not thoroughly consistent 
either in their representations of Grod, the universal, or 
in their descriptions of the individual soul. 

The peculiarity of the theory of perception propounded 
in schools of Hindu Philosophy in general is set forth 
when it is stated that the object of perception is identi¬ 
cal with the subject of right notion. The percipient 
faculty literally becomes the object perceived. For in- 


THE HAYAYA SYSTEM. 


203 


stance, when a jar is perceived, the percipient mind or 
soul assumes the form of the jar; and therefore the idea, 
which is formed in the mind or into which the mind 
is changed—viz., the subject of right notion—is not 
different from the external object perceived. Accord¬ 
ing to the Yedantic school, when an object is perceived 
an effluence comes out of the percipient soul and as¬ 
sumes the form of that object, and all difference be¬ 
tween the subjective idea and the objective reality is 
annihilated. 

b. Inference is represented, by no less a logician than 
John Stuart Mill, as “ not only valid,” but “ the foun¬ 
dation” of both induction and deduction, or syllogism. 
Our great Indian logicians make as much of it as he 
does, though they do not seem disposed to sympathize 
with him in his avowed contempt for the syllogistic or 
deductive process of reasoning. Inference, according to 
them, is of three kinds, as perception is of six, the in¬ 
struments of the latter being the five external and one 
internal organ. “ In the Nyaya Aphorisms,” says a 
modern commentator, “ it is taught that inference is of 
three kinds—from the antecedent, from the subsequent, 
and that which is drawn generally. That which is 
from antecedence (or progressive inference) has for its 
mark a cause, or an invariable sequence. That which 
is from subsequence (or regressive inference) has an 
effect for its mark, or the incompatibility of other 
causes. That which is general has for its mark some¬ 
thing distinct from cause and effect, or is from concom¬ 
itance and incompatibility.” The same commentator 
elsewhere says : “ Inference is threefold, as produced 
by illation from only positive conditions ; from only 
negative conditions, and from both positive and nega¬ 
tive conditions. For example : This is a proposition, 


204 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


inasmuch as it is knowable, etc., is an illation only 
from positive conditions ; earth differs from other sub¬ 
stances inasmuch as it is possessed of odors, etc., is an 
illation from only negative conditions ; the mountain is 
fiery inasmuch as it smokes, etc., is an illation from 
both positive and negative conditions. 5 5 

In plainer terms, we have here set forth inference 
a priori, or inference from cause to effect ; inference 
a posteriori , or inference from effect to cause ; and in¬ 
ference by analogy, as our inference that mango-trees 
are generally blossoming from the sight of one blossom¬ 
ing mango-tree. These three classes are subdivided into 
various smaller ones, of which no notice need be taken 
in a brief synopsis like what is attempted in this paper. 

The ingenuity of Indian logicians is displayed in 
what is said about inferential cognition in the first 
aphorism of the Second Daily Lesson of the Ninth 
Book of the Vaisesliika Sutras : “ Inferential cognition 
is that one thing is the effect or cause of, conjunct 
with, repugnant to, or coinherent in, another. 5 ’ This 
is thus explained by another commentator : “ Inference 
results from a mark, which is an effect, as the inference 
of fire, etc. from smoke, light, etc.; also from a mark 
which is in a cause, as where a deaf man infers a sound 
from a particular conjunction of a drum with the drum¬ 
stick. . . . This single connection, then, characterized 
as the relation of cause and effect, has been stated in 
two ways. Inference from a conjunct object is such as 
inference of the organ of touch from observation of an 
animal body. Inference from a repugnant object is 
such as inference of an ichneumon concealed by bushes, 
etc., from observation of an excited snake. Inference 
from a coinherent object is such as the inference of fire 
connected with water from the heat of the water. 55 


THE HAYAYA SYSTEM. 


205 


c. Testimony, as an instrument of knowledge, is 
twofold, divine, and human. The “ Tarka Sangraha” 
thus sets forth the difference : “ Speech is of two kinds, 
Sacred (vaidiJca) and Temporal or Profane ( laukika ). 
The former, being uttered by God, is all authoritative ; 
but the latter, only if uttered by one who deserves con¬ 
fidence, is authoritative, otherwise it is not so.” Here 
not only is revelation admitted, but its perpetuation 
through the instrumentality of a succession of prophets 
and seers. 

The existence of objects not generally perceptible, 
such as the soul, space, time, etc., is proved both by 
inference and revelation. We say “ not generally per¬ 
ceptible,” because it is possible, according to Hindu 
Philosophy, to have our faculties of perception so far 
expanded as to make it competent to us to perceive 
those realities which are generally represented as im¬ 
perceptible. The eleventh aphorism of the First Daily 
Lesson of the Ninth Book of the Vaiseshika Sutras 
runs thus : “ Perception of the soul (results) from a 
particular conjunction between the soul and the internal 
organ in the soul.” On these words we have these 
comments : “ Ascetics are of two kinds, those who 
have meditated on the internal organ and are called 
united, and those who have not meditated on the inter¬ 
nal organ and are called disunited. Of these the 
united, having reverently fixed on the object to be pre¬ 
sented to it, are engaged in meditation ; and in them 
cognition of the soul, whether of their own or of that 
of others, is produced. Perception of the soul is that 
cognition wherein the soul is the percept or object of 
presentation.” 

d. Comparison as a source of right notion is thus set 
forth in the “ Tarka Sangraha”: “ Comparison 


206 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


( upamana) is the cause of an inference from similarity 
(upamiti). Such an inference consists in the knowl¬ 
edge of the relation between a name and the thing so 
named. The recollection of the purport of a statement 
of resemblance is a step involved in the process. For 
example, a person not knowing what is meant by the 
word gcwaya (Bos gavwus) having heard from some in¬ 
habitant of the forest that a gavaya is like a cow, goes 
to the forest. Remembering the purport of what he 
has been told, he sees a body like that of a cow. Then 
this inference from similarity arises (in his mind) that 
this is what is meant by the word gavaya .” There is, 
after all, not much difference between comparison, as 
enunciated in this' extract, and the third kind of infer¬ 
ence already alluded to, inference from analogy ; and 
hence the Sankyha philosophers are right in limiting the 
number of the instruments of right knowledge to three. 

Here it is desirable to observe that, in one respect, 
the analytical schools concur thoroughly with the syn¬ 
thetical. Both the classes of schools are arrayed 
against the doctrine of innate ideas, and thus far they 
may be patronized by the champions of materialism in 
these days. There are no such things, according to 
them, as a priori truths, those represented as such 
being generalizations of experience. With reference to 
axioms and intuitions, the primary beliefs of humanity, 
scientific or moral, their champions might, with an air 
of triumph, reiterate the words of Mill : “ They are 
only a class, the most universal class, of inductions 
from experience, the easiest and simplest generalizations 
of the facts furnished by the senses and the conscious¬ 
ness.” They would only add to these facts a new class 
of facts, regarding things unseen and eternal furnished 
by revelation ; while their view of the contents of 


THE KAYAYA SYSTEM. 


207 


human consciousness would appear ridiculously defec¬ 
tive to a champion, not only of idealism, but of empi¬ 
ricism also, in these days. 

It remains to be added, under this head, that Gau¬ 
tama in his Second Book proves that the additional 
means of right knowledge assumed by the Mimansakas 
—viz., Rumor, Conjecture, Probability, and Non-exist¬ 
ence—are superfluous. Rumor is included in testimony 
or “ verbal evidence, ” while the rest may very well be 
merged in inference. He also states and refutes some 
of the objections raised against the instruments of 
knowledge he himself points out, as that there may be 
a conjunction of an organ of sense with an object with¬ 
out leading to perception as in sleep, and inference may 
be wrong, owing to the disjunction of a sign from the 
tiling signified. But the objection against such testi¬ 
mony as is embodied in the Yeda indicates the preva¬ 
lence of scepticism. “ That (the Yeda) is no instrument 
of right knowledge, because of its faults of untruth, 
self-destructiveness, and tautology. 5 ’ Its promises had 
out been fulfilled in the case of well-known devotees ; 
its inconsistencies and contradictions had been pointed 
out as inconsistent with its assumed authoritativeness, 
and its prolixity had passed into a proverb ! A feeble 
attempt is made to rebut these objections. The non- 
fulfilment of promise complained of results from un¬ 
known faults perpetrated in a past life, or from some 
defect in the fulfilment of conditions on the part of a 
devotee. The charge of inconsistency is repelled by an 
assertion of the obvious truth that different classes of 
instructions are demanded by the exigencies of different 
times. And the tautology pointed out results from the 
necessity of “ re-inculcation,” especially in matters of 
religion. 


208 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


2. Prameya, or Objects of Right Knowledge, are pre¬ 
sented in Aphorism IX. of the First Book of Gautama’s 
Sutras : “ Soul, body, sense, sense-object, understand¬ 
ing or intelligence, mind, activity, fault, transmigra¬ 
tion, retribution, pain and emancipation—such are the 
objects concerning which it is desirable that we should 
have right notions. ’ ’ 

Let us pass over for the present the objects of knowl¬ 
edge reserved for the next paper—viz., soul, intelligence, 
etc.—and confine our attention to what is said about 
the body, its organs of sense, and the objects of sense 
around it. 

a. The body is, according to Gautama, “ the site of 
muscular action, of the organs (of sense), and of the 
sentiments (of pleasure or pain experienced by the 
soul).” Kanada has the following utterances in the 
Second Daily Lesson of the Fourth Book : “ The body 
is not composed of the five elements, for the conjunc¬ 
tion of things perceptible and imperceptible is imper¬ 
ceptible.” “The body is not composed of three ele¬ 
ments, because there is not manifested another quality.” 
“ Of these, body is twofold, uterine and non-uterine. ” 

The body is represented by some philosophers as 
consisting of five elements—viz., odor, moisture, heat, 
breath, and ether ; by others as consisting of four of 
these. But the body cannot be such a compound, in¬ 
asmuch as it is visible, while the component elements 
are not. Again, the opinion that it consists of three of 
these elements—viz., odor, moisture, and heat—is not 
admissible, as a union of heterogeneous substances is 
impossible. Bodies are of various kinds besides the 
earthy—viz., aqueous, igneous, and aerial—seen in the 
spheres respectively of Yaruna, the sun, and the air. 
These are not visible to ordinary mortals, but they can 


THE NAYAYA SYSTEM. 


209 


be seen by those ascetics who have had their visual 
organ almost indefinitely expanded by dint of austerity 
and meditation. 

All classes of bodies are either uterine or non- 
uterine, the former class including the varieties known 
as the viviparous and the oviparous ; and the latter 
bodies ungenerated, such as those of some classes of 
gods and goddesses ; bodies generated in filth, such as 
worms, maggots, and other vermin ; and vegetative 
bodies, such as those of trees and plants. The body, 
of whatever kind it may be, not even barring trees and 
plants, which, according to Hindu notions, suffer pain 
and are but human beings—nay, gods and goddesses in 
embryo—is the seat of activity and the site of sensation 
and of the soul’s enjoyment or suffering. 

b. “ The organs of sense,” says Gautama— u viz., 
smell, taste, sight, touch, and hearing—are what appre¬ 
hend the qualities of the elements and of things formed 
of these” (Book I. Sec. 3, Aph. 12). To these must be 
added the internal organ, mind, which communicates 
with the external world through them, as its servitors. 

Aphorism Id of this section thus sets forth the ob¬ 
jects of the senses : “ Their objects are the qualities 
of the elements and of things formed of these—mean¬ 
ing the qualities odor, savor, color, tangibility, and 
sound.” These are divided into seven categories by 
Han ad a ; and these categories are substance, attribute, 
action, generality, particularity, and inhesion. Ac¬ 
cording to the established method of Hindu logicians, 
these ought to be particularized under this head, but 
we shall confine ourselves here to the first of the seven, 
viz., substance. 

Under the generic name “ substance” are specified 
earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, soul, and 


210 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


the internal organ. Setting aside for the time being 
the metaphysical ideas and entities called substances by 
a misnomer, it is desirable to set forth what is said 
about the five so-called elements. 

“ Earth,” says Kanada, “ is possessed of color, taste, 
smell, and touch” (Book II. Lesson First, Aph. 1). 
Odor, however, is its distinguishing property. It is 
eternal in its original form of atoms, but transient in 
its present aggregate or complex shape. It has, of 
course, the attributes common to most substances— 
number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunc¬ 
tion, priority, posteriority, gravity, placidity, velocity, 
elasticity. 

Aphorism 2 of the same section thus speaks of water : 
“ "Water is possessed of color, taste, and touch, and is 
fluid and viscid. ” Its distinguishing property is taste 
according to some, coolness or clamminess according to 
others. It is also eternal as atoms and transient as 
aggregates. Bodies made only of water or aqueous 
bodies are seen in the realm of Yaruna. Odor when 
perceived in water proceeds from some earthy particles 
dissolved in it, and is therefore adscititious. 

Aphorism 3 of the same runs thus : “ Light has color 
and touch. Its peculiar characteristic is color, and 
its work is to illumine other substances.” These are, 
however, seen, not on account of luminous- rays falling 
upon and emitted by them, but on account of the visual 
ray which issues out of the eye and makes them trans¬ 
parent. Light is also eternal as atoms and non-eternal 
as aggregates. Light and heat are inseparably associ¬ 
ated ; and the united substance is said to be of four 
kinds—terrestrial light, or that of which the fuel is 
earthy ; celestial, or that of which the fuel is w T atery, 
as lightning, meteoric lights, etc.; alvine or stomachic, 


THE NAYAYA SYSTEM. 


211 


of which the fuel is both earthy and watery, and which 
digests both food and drink ; and mineral, or that 
which is found in mines, as gold, which is simply light 
solidified. Luminous bodies are to be found in the 
realm of the sun. 

Aphorism 4 represents air as “ possessed of touch.” 
It also is eternal as atoms and non-eternal as aggre¬ 
gates. Aerial aggregates are of four kinds—organized 
aerial bodies and evil spirits inhabiting the atmosphere ; 
the organ of touch, which is air spread over the cuticle, 
or an aerial integument ; mind, or unorganized air ; 
and breath and other vital airs. 

In aphorism 5 we have these words : “ These (quali¬ 
ties) do not exist in ether.’’ Ether is, unlike other 
elements, infinite and eternal, and is the substance of 
which the auditory organ is composed. It is posited, 
as Dr. Ballantyne says in his comments on “ Tarka 
Sangraha, ’ ’ to account for sound, which is perceptible 
on account of a peculiar virtue in the ether of the ear, 
and which, where this peculiar virtue does not exist, as 
in the ether of the ear of a deaf man, cannot possibly 
be perceived. 

3. The first section of the Second Book of Gautama’s 
Aphorisms embodies a disquisition on the subject of 
Doubt, and four aphorisms (17-20) of the Second Daily 
Lesson of the Second Book of the Yaiseshika Sutras 
treat of the same. subject. According to Gautama, 
doubt arises “ from the consideration of characters com¬ 
mon (to more than one) or several (such as cannot really 
belong to one and the same thing),” and “ from the con¬ 
centration of (mutually exclusive) characters under the 
aspect of an attributive. ’ ’ Doubt also arises from ‘ 4 con¬ 
flict of opinion” and <e from unsteadiness (in the recog¬ 
nition of criteria as present or absent). ’ ’ The five sources 


212 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


of doubt set forth in these obscure words may be thus put 
in plain English. Doubt arises in the first place from 
the possession by two distinct objects of a common at¬ 
tribute, such as tallness, which may lead us to doubt 
whether a particular tall object indistinctly seen is a 
man or a post. In the second place, the two objects 
seen may resemble in one respect and differ in another, 
and a doubt may be generated in the mind by both the 
similarity and the difference. That doubt, in the third 
place, arises from a conflict of opinion is plain enough. 
Again, doubt arises, in the words of the commentator, 
from u unsteadiness in the recognition (of some mark 
which, if we could make sure of it, would determine 
the object to be so and so) or unsteadiness in the non¬ 
recognition (of some mark which, were we sure of its 
absence, would determine the object to be not so and 

According to Kanada^loubt arises u from perception 
of a general, non-perception of a particular, and remem¬ 
brance of particularity also from “ knowledge and 
want of knowledge. ” These five sources of doubt—viz., 
perception of a general or common property, non-per¬ 
ception of a special or specific property, memory of an 
attribute seen at a past time but not in the present mo¬ 
ment, knowledge of the varieties of opinion held on a 
particular subject, and partial ignorance—are almost 
identical with those pointed out by Gautama. Our 
philosophers did not fail to see that absolute knowledge 
or absolute ignorance precludes doubt, it being a state 
of hesitancy generated by two propositions, neither of 
which has a preponderance of evidence in its favor. 
The well-known affirmation of Herbert Spencer, 
“ Force is unknowable,” involves, therefore, a flagrant 
contradiction in terms, an item of certain knowledge, 


THE HAYAYA SYSTEM. 


213 


its unknowableness, being authoritatively stated regard¬ 
ing a thing not known. In other words, the attitude 
of absolute knowledge and absolute ignorance is as¬ 
sumed where that of dubiousness alone would be justifi¬ 
able ! 

4. The motive for discussing a particular subject 
ought to be definitively stated in every properly con¬ 
ducted argument, as without its timely disclosure the 
importance of the controversy may be underrated. 
Motive is defined by Gautama to be “ that thing 
which, when placed before us, causes us to act.” 

5. A familar example is then brought forward, and 
regarding it we have these words in Aphorism 25, Sec. 
iv., Book I. : “ In regard to (some fact respecting) 
what thing both the ordinary man and the acute in¬ 
vestigator entertain a sameness of opinion, that (thing) 
is called a £ familiar case 5 (of the fact in question). ’ ’ 
In plain English an ordinary example, which may 
appear admissible to both the parties engaged in dis¬ 
cussion, ought to be adopted for use in the course of 
the controversy in preference to other illustrations. 
The example generally selected in the case of fire and 
smoke is “ the culinary hearth.” 

6. “A tenet,” says Gautama, “is that, the stead¬ 
fastness of the acceptance of which rests on a treatise 
(of might and authority). ” Tenets are divided into 
four classes—“ Dogma of all the Schools,” “ Dogma 
peculiar to some one or more Schools,” “ A Hypotheti¬ 
cal Dogma,” or one implied in a particular declaration. 
What is meant under this head is simply a statement of 
a single or of a series of truths, constituting what is 
called common ground. 

7. Then comes the syllogism, which is more complex 
than that of Aristotle, being, as Monier Williams says, 


214 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


a compound of the enthymeme and the syllogism. 
Says Gautama : “ The members (of a syllogism) are 
(1) the Proposition, (2) the Reason, (3) the Example, 
(4) the Application, and (5) the Conclusion. ’ ’ The fol¬ 
lowing examples are generally brought forward to illus¬ 
trate the five-membered syllogism of Hindu Logic : 

1. The hill is fiery. Pralijna, or Proposition. 

2. For it smokes, .... Hetu , or Reason. 

3. Whatever smokes is fiery, as a culi¬ 

nary hearth, . . . . Udaharan, or Example. 

4. This hill is smoking, . . . Upanaya, or Application. 

5. Therefore it is fiery, . . . Nigamana , or Conclusion. 


Example Second. 

1. Sound is non-eternal, . . . Proposition. 

2. Because it is produced, . . . Keason. 

3. Whatever is produced is non-eternal, 

as pots,.Example. 

4. Sound is produced, .... Application. 

5. Therefore it is non-eternal, . . Conclusion. 

Here a peculiarity of Indian Logic ought to be set 
forth. There are three terms which must be thor¬ 
oughly understood before. arguments couched in the 
cumbrous phraseology and method of Indian Logic can 
be comprehended or intelligently followed. The first 
of these terms is Vyapati , which means invariable con¬ 
comitance or pervasion. The second is Vyapaka or the 
pervader, or invariably pervading attribute, and the 
third is Vyapya , or invariably pervaded. An ordinary 
example, capitalized so often in Hindu Logic, will illus¬ 
trate the significance of these technical terms : “ Wher¬ 
ever there is smoke there is fire.” Here the invariable 
connection between smoke and fire is Yyapati, or inva¬ 
riable concomitance or pervasion ; smoke is Yyapya, or 
invariably pervaded, and fire the pervader, or Yyapaka. 


THE NAYAYA SYSTEM. 


215 


Translated into Aristotelian phraseology, Yyapati is 
the connection between the two terms in the major 
premiss ; Yyapaka is the major term ; and Yyapya, or 
smoke, is the middle term. 

It ought here to be mentioned that no regular classi¬ 
fication of syllogisms, such as that of Aristotle, who 
divides them into apodictic, dialectic, and sophistic, is 
attempted in standard works on Indian Logic ; but the 
syllogism is made neither too much of, as in the Aris¬ 
totelian system, nor too little of, as in that of Mill. 

8. Refutation or Confutation, is thus set forth in the 
opening aphorism of Sec. 7, Book I. of Gautama’s Sutras: 
“ Confutation, (which is intended) for the ascertaining 
of the truth in regard to anything, the truth in regard 
to which is not thoroughly discerned, is reasoning from 
the presence of the reason (which would not be present 
if that which is to be established were not present).” 
That is, when a disputant admits the premisses, but 
refuses to accept the conclusion legitimately deduced, 
therefrom, a new method of refutation, reductio ad 
absiirdum, must be resorted to. 

9. “ Ascertainment,” we are told in the following 
aphorism, “ is the determination of a matter by dealing 
with both sides of the question after having been in 
doubt.” It is the settlement of the question by setting 
forth the legitimacy of the conclusion deduced and the 
absurdity of the opposite one. The argument ought to 
conclude here, but the Hindu love of wrangling renders 
some additional steps necessary, and therefore we have 

10. A fresh controversy or discussion, regarding 
which we have these words in the opening aphorism of 
Sec. 8 : “ Discussion is the undertaking (by two 
parties respectively) of the one side and of the other in 
regard to what (conclusion) has been arrived at by 


21G 


HIKDU PHILOSOPHY. 


means of the five-membered (process of demonstration 
already explained ; this discussion) consisting in the 
defending (of the proposition) by proofs (on the part of 
the one disputant), and the assailing it by objections (on 
the part of the other), the discussion being conducted 
on both sides without discordance in respect of the 
tenets (or principles on which the conclusion is to de¬ 
pend).’ ’ This simply implies another fight pro and con 
over the conclusion arrived at by such a tedious process. 

11. Wrangling, therefore, is not out of place: 
“ Wrangling, consisting in the defence or attack (of a 
proposition) by means of £ frauds, ’ ‘ futilities, 5 and 
£ what calls for nothing save an indignant rebuke,’ is 
what takes place after the procedure aforesaid (that is 
to say, after a fair course of argumentation)—supposing 
this to have failed to bring the disputants to an agree¬ 
ment.” Frauds are of three kinds—fraud “ in respect 
of a term,” “ in respect of a genus,” and “ in respect 
of a trope.” The first species of fraud is knowingly 
attaching to a term employed a sense different from 
what it is intended to convey ; the second is knowingly 
deducing a fallacy from the similarity subsisting be¬ 
tween two objects mentioned ; and the third is con¬ 
scious misconstruction of figurative language. Futili¬ 
ties result from attempts made to confound invariable 
concomitance with a bare outward resemblance, and 
that which calls for an indignant reproof is “ stupid¬ 
ity,” assumed or real. 

12. Then comes cavilling. “ This (viz., wrangling), 
when devoid of (any attempt made for) the establishing 
of the opposite side of the question, is cavilling.” 

13. Fallacies are divided into five classes : (1) ££ Er¬ 
ratic,” (2) ££ contradictory,” (3) ££ equally available on 
both sides,” (4) ££ in the same case with what is to 


THE HAYAYA SYSTEM. 


217 


be proved, 5 ’ and (5) the ‘‘ mistimed. 5 5 The ‘ ‘ Tarka San- 
graha,” under the head of fallacies, has these words : 
“ The five that merely present the appearance of a 
reason are : (1) that which goes astray, (2) that which 
would prove the contradictory, (3) that than which 
there is a stronger argument on the other side, (4) the 
inconclusive, and (5) the futile. In the Yaiseshika 
Sutras we have one example given illustrative of all 
the fallacies : “ Because this has horns, therefore it is 
a horse.” On this we have these comments : “ Where 
a hare or the like is the subject, and the being a horse 
is that which is to be proved, and the notion of having 
horns the argument, in such a case there exist all the 
five fallacies.” 

It is very difficult indeed to make this manifest, but 
not impossible. The hare has horns, therefore it is a 
horse. But it has no horns, and therefore the conclu¬ 
sion is derived from a major premiss which is erroneous, 
—viz., whatever has horns is a horse—and a minor pre¬ 
miss equally erroneous. Again, granting that the 
hare has horns, the conclusion deduced is the converse 
of what is deducible. Supposing, again, the horse has 
horns, the premises may prove that the subject is a 
horse or not a horse. Again, the premises and the 
conclusion are in the same predicament, the one need¬ 
ing proof as well as the other. And lastly, the whole 
argument is mistimed, as our senses prove that both 
the hare and the horse have no horns. 

But examples more apposite than this ought to be 
adduced. The example of the first given in “ Tarka 
Sangraha” is this : “ The mountain is fiery because 
the existence of the mountain is capable of proof.” 
Here the major premiss—whatever may be proved ex¬ 
istent is fiery—is an error. Of the second the example 


218 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


given is : “ Sound is eternal because it is created.” 
Here the premises support the very opposite conclu¬ 
sion. Of the third : “ Sound is eternal because it is 
audible. 5 ’ Its audibility may be brought forward with 
equal cogency to prove its non-eternity. Of the 
fourth : “ The sky-lotus is fragrant because the nature 
of a lotus resides in it. 5 5 Here the nature of a lotus is 
assumed to be invariably associated with fragrance. 
And lastly, the fallacy called mistimed or futile is thus 
illustrated : “ For example : suppose one argues that 
fire does not contain heat because it is factitious, the 
argument is mistimed, if we have already ascertained, 
by the superior evidence of the senses, that fire (grant¬ 
ing it to be factitious) does contain heat.” 

Nothing sets forth the crudeness of Hindu Logic more 
than its disquisitions on the subject of Fallacy, the few 
instances given being almost all reducible to the irregu¬ 
lar fallacy non causa pro causae. 

14, 15, and 16. Quibbling artifices, or frauds, or 
futile objections have already been taken notice of, and 
it is not necessary to refer to them here, excepting for 
the purpose of showing that their separate specification 
in the text is an example of tautology. The conclusion 
brings the discussion to a close by showing the oppo¬ 
nent’s stupidity, and his inability in consequence to 
carry on the argumentation any further, as well as by 
upholding the proposition originally stated. 

Dr. Ballantyne, always prone to whitewash Hindu 
learning, offers a very ingenious explanation of this 
cumbrous process of reasoning. He affirms that this 
style of reasoning combines all the advantages of a logi¬ 
cal process with those of what may be called a rhetorical 
flourish. The objector is first of all led through the 
varied steps of a well-conducted argument, beginning 


THE HAYAYA SYSTEM. 


219 


with the proofs admitted, and rising up to a direct dem¬ 
onstration in the form of a lucidly stated syllogism, and 
an indirect demonstration fitted to reduce any conclu¬ 
sion but the right one to an absurdity. He is then 
allowed, if found stubborn, to plunge afresh into con¬ 
troversy, get entangled in wrangling, resort to cavil¬ 
ling, make use of naked fallacies, stoop to frauds and 
futilities, and ultimately have himself “ voted a nui¬ 
sance” amid the plaudits of a large body of spectators. 

But whatever the advantage of the process may be in 
a public discussion, conducted in a large hall under the 
nose of innumerable spectators, it is, as a method of 
arriving at truth, both prolix and cumbrous. Never¬ 
theless the Pandits are so decidedly attached to it that 
they look upon a simpler mode of argumentation as one 
which it is beneath their dignity to have recourse to. 
And if these incarnations of pedantry are to be influ¬ 
enced at all in favor of a body of truth other than what 
they are apt to look upon as worthy of acceptance, the 
varied steps of this tedious and awkward process must 
be utilized, and, if possible, they voted nuisances in the 
presence of people thoroughly versed in their habits of 
thought and modes of reasoning. And it is because 
missionaries as a body cannot use this weapon with any 
degree of dexterity, and the few who can will not wield 
it, that their influence over the learned in Hindustan 
has hitherto been almost nil. 

We shall now refer to the subject of Cause and its 
varieties as set forth in Indian Logic. The definition 
given of cause in the “ Tarka Sangraha” is simple, 
and on the whole unexceptionable : “ That which in¬ 
variably precedes an effect, that cannot else be, is a 
cause.” An effect is defined as “ that of which there 
was antecedent non-existence.” The different kinds of 


220 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


causes are thus set forth : “ Cause is of three kinds, 
according to the distinction of intimate, non-intimate, 
and instrumental. That from which an intimately 
relative effect arises is an intimate cause, as threads are 
of cloth, and the cloth itself of its own color, etc. 
Where this intimate relation exists, that cause, which 
is associated in one and the same object with such 
effect or cause, is non-intimate. Thus the conjunction 
of threads is the non-intimate cause of the cloth, and 
the color of the threads that of the color of the cloth. 
The cause which is distinct from both of these is the 
instrumental cause, as the weaver’s brush, loom, etc., 
are of cloth. Among these three kinds of causes, that 
only which is not a universally concurrent cause or 
condition (of all effects, as God, time, place, etc. are) 
is called the instrumental cause. ” 

Dr. Ballantyne shows that we have here the four 
kinds of causes described in Aristotle’s logic—material, 
efficient, formal, and final. The intimate cause, which 
in the case of a piece of cloth is the threads of which it 
is composed, corresponds evidently to his material 
cause. The non-intimate cause, which is the conjunc¬ 
tion of the threads into a particular shape, is the formal 
cause. The piece of cloth itself is the final cause, if by 
this expression we understand what seems to have been 
understood by Aristotle himself—viz., the effect in its 
completeness, not the use to which it is subservient. 
The instrumental cause, properly so called, is by Aris¬ 
totle included in his definition of efficient cause ; and 
if we merge his efficient cause in the instrumental, we 
have all the varieties of causes he enumerates treated of 
in the “ Tarka Sangraha.” 

Professor Gough, in his elaborate translation of the 
Vaiseshika Sutras, makes use of expressions different 


THE XTAYAYA SYSTEM. 


221 


from these in his presentation of the view of causes 
entertained in Indian schools of philosophy. Instead 
of Ballantyne’s terms, “intimate,” “non-intimate,” 
and “ instrumental,” he makes use of the terms “ coin- 
herent, ” “ non-coinherent, ” and “efficient.” Let us 
present a few of the many examples scattered in the 
aphorisms and commentaries he translates to show that 
the Hindu notion of an efficient cause is very peculiar. 
Before doing so let us give the definition of an efficient 
cause presented in the “ Tarka Sangraha :” “An 
efficient cause not common to other causes is called a 
special cause.” 

In the First Daily Lesson of Book VIII. the subject 
of cognition is treated of, and its causes are thus set 
forth : “ The causes of knowledge were stated in the 
aphorism, that which is produced by contiguity of soul, 
sense-organ, and object is other than those. The soul, 
then, is the cause, is the coinherent or material cause of 
cognition ; conjunction of the soul and internal sense 
is the non-coinherent cause ; apposition of the object is 
the occasional or efficient cause.” Here it should be 
remembered that, according to an established maxim of 
Hindu Philosophy, the soul is literally changed into the 
object perceived, and that a line of distinction is 
scarcely drawn between instrumental and efficient 
causes. The soul is the matter of cognition, its con¬ 
junction with the internal sense gives it a definitive 
form, and the object placed before it is the instru¬ 
mental cause. 

Take another example. Aphorism IT of the First 
Daily Lesson of Book V. runs thus : “ The first ac¬ 
tion of the arrow is from impulse, the next is from 
self-reproduction caused by that action, and in like 
manner the next and the next.” On this we have 


222 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


these comments : “ The first action in an arrow when 
discharged is produced by a bowstring drawn by 
human volition. In this case the impulse is the non- 
coinherent cause ; the arrow is the coinherent cause, 
volition and gravity are the efficient causes. By this 
first action self-reproduction, termed velocity, is pro¬ 
duced in the same substance.” Here there is evidently 
a confusion of ideas according to modern notions, 
though efficiency is traced to its proper source, if voli¬ 
tion and gravity are not caused by some extraneous 
power and influence. But both these are in reality 
effects, and efficiency is traced to some mysterious 
power called Destiny. 

Aphorism 15 of this very section runs thus : “ The 
movement of the gem and the approach of the needle 
are caused by destiny.” The commentator thus eluci¬ 
dates the passage : “ By the term gem are intended 
vessels made of gold, etc., and filled with water. To 
such a vessel magicians apply incantations for the 
recovery of stolen property. The tradition of the an¬ 
cients is that the vessel is set on the ground, and some 
other person lays his hand upon it. The vessel accom¬ 
panied with the hand, in consequence of the efficiency 
of incantation, turns toward the spot where the stolen 
property has been deposited. The reason of the move¬ 
ment of such a vessel is not a particular volition, but 
the efficient cause of the merit of the former possessor 
or the demerit of the thief. The non-coinherent cause 
is the conjunction of such a vessel with soul possessing 
such destiny (or results of actions done in previous 
states of existence), and the coinherent cause is such a 
vessel. In like manner destiny is also the cause of the 
attraction toward a loadstone which takes place in 
needles or metallic rods when in proximity to the mag- 


THE HAYAYA SYSTEM. 


223 


net.” All efficiency, whether apparently inherent in 
volition or really immanent in the forces of nature, is 
traced to merit or demerit, or to Work, (Karma) the 
god not only of the Buddhists but of Hindu philosophers 
in general. 

Apropos of the subject of causes, it is desirable to 
mention that our Indian logicians display a good deal 
of acuteness and ingenuity in their classifications, as 
well as considerable breadth of view in their generaliza¬ 
tions. We have not only three kinds of causes enumer¬ 
ated, but several subordinate ones not only coinherent, 
but con-coinherent and con-con-coinherent causes, as 
will be seen in the following extracts from the “ Tarka 
Sangraha “ The relative proximity of the sense and 
its object, which is the cause of perception, is of six 
kinds : (1) conjunction, (2) intimate union with that 
which is in conjunction, (3) intimate union with what 
is intimately united with that which is in conjunction, 
(4) intimate union, (5) intimate union with that which 
is intimately united, (6) and the connection which arises 
from the relation between that which qualifies and the 
thing qualified. For example : when a jar is perceived 
by the eye, there is (between the sense and the object) 
the proximity of conjunction. In the perception of the 
color of the jar there is the proximity of intimate 
union with that which is in conjunction, because color 
is intimately united with the jar, which is in conjunc¬ 
tion with the sense of vision. In the perception of the 
fact that color generally is present, there is the prox¬ 
imity of intimate union with what is intimately united 
with that which is in conjunction, because the generic 
property of being colored is inherent in the particular 
color which is intimately united with the jar which is 
in conjunction with the sense of vision. In the percep- 


224 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


tion of sound by the organ of hearing, there is the 
proximity of intimate union, because the organ of hear¬ 
ing consists of the ether which resides in the cavity of 
the ear, and sound is a quality of ether ; and there is 
intimate union between quality and that of which it is 
a quality. In the perception of the nature of sound (in 
a given sound of which we are cognizant) the proximity 
is that of intimate union with what is intimately 
united, because the nature of sound is inherent in 
sound, which is intimately united with the organ of 
hearing. In the perception of non-existence the prox¬ 
imity is dependent on the relation between a distinctive 
quality and that which is so distinguished, because 
when the ground is (perceived to be) possessed of the 
non-existence of a jar, the non-existence of a jar dis¬ 
tinguishes the ground which is in conjunction with the 
organ of vision. ” 

The system of logic, into which we have striven to 
present an insight through the media of quotations and 
extracts from standard works, displays a good deal of 
acuteness ; but as a method of arriving at truth it has 
failed. It has fostered, not the science of dialectics 
properly so called, but what is justly called “ the 
pseudo-dialectical science of dispute,” or Eristic ; and 
its result has been scepticism rather than recognition, 
spread, and preponderance of truth. It may be com¬ 
pared to that lore of the Sophists of ancient Greece, 
which led to individualism, pantheism, and nihilism, to 
Stoic pride and Epicurean libertinism. It is, however, 
a favorite study with the learned Pandits of India, and 
the ascendency in their minds of its phraseology and 
modes of reasoning make them inaccessible to truth 
conveyed in a simpler manner. And the only way in 
which their minds can be influenced in favor of truth 


THE HAYAYA SYSTEM. 


225 


unknown and unpalatable to them is, as has already 
been said, a skilful use of the weapons borrowed from 
this armory. The preachers of the Gospel in this 
country have, as a rule, neglected them either on ac¬ 
count of their ignorance of or distaste for the style of 
reasoning in vogue ; but such neglect cannot be justi¬ 
fied ; and when such neglect is the inevitable sequence 
of an accumulation of non-missionary work, the pres¬ 
ence in our systems of this heterogeneous element 
cannot be condemned in terms too strong ! 


CHAPTER VIII. 


THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY, OR THE HINDU ATOMIC 
THEORY. 

We presented in our last paper several extracts from 
the Vaiseshika Sutras, the Sutras ascribed to Kanada, 
the reputed and doubtless real founder of the Vaiseshika 
school, and embodied in ten books, each of which is 
divided into two Daily Lessons, like each of the books 
of the Nyaya Sastra. But we have yet to present, ac¬ 
cording to our practice, a conspectus of the contents of 
the Vaiseshika Sastra in the words of the “ Sarva- 
Darsana-Sangraha 

‘‘ In the first book, consisting of two daily lessons, 
he (Kanada) describes all the categories which are 
capable of intimate relation. In the first ahinka (daily 
lesson) he defines those which possess ‘ genus 5 (jciti) ; 
in the second, ‘ genus 5 (or generality) itself, and ‘ par¬ 
ticularity.’ In the similarly divided second book he 
discusses ‘ substance, ’ giving in the first ahinka the 
characteristics of the five elements, and in the second 
he establishes the existence of space and time. In the 
third book he defines the soul and the internal sense— 
the former in the first ahinka , the latter in the second. 
In the fourth book he discusses the body and its ad¬ 
juncts—the latter in the first ahinka , and the former in 
the second. In the fifth book he investigates action ; 
in the first ahinka he considers action as connected 
with the body, in the second as belonging to the mind. 


THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 


227 


In the seventh book he discusses quality and intimate 
relation ; in the first ahinka he considers the qualities 
independent of thought, in the second those qualities 
which are related to it, and also intimate relation. In 
the eighth book he examines 4 indeterminate 5 and ‘ de¬ 
terminate 5 perception and means of proof.” 

The author of the “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha” falls 
into an unaccountable mistake as to the contents of the 
ninth and tenth books. Professor Cowel, who is the 
translator of the paper on Vaiseshika Philosophy in the 
book, thus speaks of their contents : “ The ninth book 
treats of that perception which arises from supersensi¬ 
ble contact, etc., and inference. The tenth treats of 
the mutual difference of the qualities of the soul, and 
the three causes.” It may be added that the con¬ 
tents of each of these books are of such a miscellaneous 
nature that it is difficult, if not impossible, to assign 
it its distinctive character ; and consequently the clas¬ 
sification given above may justly be called in ques¬ 
tion. 

The object of the work is one, though its contents 
are varied and multiform. That object is set forth in 
its first two aphorisms : “ JSTow, then, we will explain 
(what) merit (is). Merit is that from which (results) 
attainment of elevation and of the highest good.” 
The first result of merit acquired in a former state of 
existence, or in a series of former states of existence, is 
the acquisition of “ elevation” or knowledge of the 
truth, or the true distinction between soul and non¬ 
soul ; and the ultimate result is “ the highest good,” 
the summum bonum , which is cessation of pain. One 
of the celebrated commentators, in commenting upon 
these aphorisms, says : “ The attainment of paradise 
by merit is with visible means, while the attainment of 


228 


HIXDU PHILOSOPHY. 


liberation is by means of knowledge of the truth ; con¬ 
sequently there is a distinction.” 

The Yaiseshika Aphorisms, though a unity as regards 
their object, are a complexity as regards the variety of 
subjects treated of. The lore they present is of the 
most miscellaneous nature, consisting as it does of dis¬ 
sertations on logic, physics, psychology, metaphysical 
inquiries about the ultimate ground of existence, and 
practical directions as to the best mode of insuring 
liberation from the chains of transmigration. No one 
can study the book without concluding that the modern 
theory of the co-ordination of the sciences was not un¬ 
known in ancient times in our country, and that an 
approach at least was made to Comte’s vaunted “ hier¬ 
archical classification.” 

There is doubtless some beauty or attractiveness in 
the thought that all the knowledge which we may ac¬ 
quire by investigating into the facts and mysteries of 
nature, as well as by prying into the realities of the 
moral world, has a reflex bearing on the advancement 
of the soul, and its final emancipation. But the prac¬ 
tical influence emanating from such an idea is demoral¬ 
izing, inasmuch as it leads to a concentration of one’s 
gaze, while engaged in prosecuting a course of liberal 
study, upon one’s own self, rather than upon some 
object or being apart from self. But whether fitted to 
exalt or calculated to degrade, the conception is the 
root-principle of Hindu Philosophy ; and it is not a 
matter of wonder that a knowledge of the categories of 
the Yaiseshika system, the categories which set forth 
the distinction between the ego and the non-ego, should 
be represented as a stepping-stone to complete salva¬ 
tion. 

These categories, six in number, though, according to 


THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 


229 


some champions of the school, seven, have already been 
enumerated : (1) substance, (2) attribute, (3) action, 
(4) generality, (5) particularity, and (6) inhesion. With 
the exception of the first, the categories may be identi¬ 
fied with Aristotle’s predicables—viz., genus, species, 
difference, property, and accident. What the Yaise- 
shika Sutras say with reference to these categories 
ought now to be indicated in order. 

1. The word substance is used in a philosophical 
rather than in its ordinary acceptation, as a substrate 
of attributes or qualities, and therefore we have under 
this head not only earth, water, light, air, ether, but 
time, space, soul, and the internal organ, or the mind. 
Of these the physical entities have already been taken 
notice of, and the others will be treated of by and by. 

2. The attributes assumed originally were seventeen 
—viz., color, taste, smell, touch, numbers, extensions, 
individuality, conjunction and disjunction, priority and 
posteriority, intellections, pleasure and pain, desire and 
aversion, and volitions. To these seven were subse¬ 
quently added gravity, fluidity, viscidity, self-restitu¬ 
tion, merit, demerit, and sound. 

3. Actions are “ throwing upward, throwing down¬ 
ward, contracting, expanding, and going.” 

4 and 5. Generality and particularity are what con¬ 
stitute genus and species. Existence is represented 
as the summum genus , and it includes the first three of 
the categories—substance, attribute, and action—while 
the subaltern genera are substantiality ( dra/vyatya ), the 
genus of quality or qualitativeness (c/unatya ), and the 
genus of action (Icarmatya). 

Particularity may in one sense be said to indicate 
the difference between the summum and subaltern 
genera, as well as between genera and species. But 


230 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


the word particularity ( visesh ), from which the school 
derives its name Yaiseshika, indicates the peculiarity 
by which such substances as ether, time, space, the 
atomic minds, and the varied kinds of atoms, of which 
earth, water, air, and fire are composed, are discrimi¬ 
nated from others. It is, therefore, the ultimate 
difference” between simple and compound substances. 
It corresponds in some respects to the technical word 
differentia or differentiae. 

6. Inhesion or intimate relation is the relation in 
which the series of relations pointed out by the Yaise¬ 
shika doctrine of causality terminates when traced back¬ 
ward. Colebrooke thus explains this in his essay on the 
Nyaya and the Yaiseshika philosophy: “ For the relation 
of cause and effect, and for distinguishing different sorts 
of cause connection (sambodha) or relation, in general, 
must be considered. It is twofold : simple conjunction 
(scmyoga) and aggregation, or intimate or constant re¬ 
lation ( samanaya ) ; the latter being the connection of 
things, whereof one, so long as they coexist, continues 
united with the other—for example : parts and that 
which is composed of them, as yarn and cloth ; for so 
long as the yarn subsists the cloth remains. Here the 
connection of the yarn and cloth is intimate relation ; 
but that of the loom is simple conjunction. Intimate 
relation or inhesion is, in Aristotelian phraseology, the 
material cause, and inseparable from the effect as long 
as it continues what it is. 

To set forth the order of the categories, let us present 
an extract from the “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha ”: “If 
you ask, ‘ What is the reason for this definite order of 
categories ? ’ we answer as follows : Since £ substance 5 
is the chief, as being the substratum of all the catego¬ 
ries, we enounce this first ; next, ‘ quality,’ since it 


THE YAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 


231 


resides in its generic character in all substances (though 
different substances have different qualities) ; then 
‘ action,’ as it agrees with ‘ substance ’ and ‘ quality ’ 
in possessing ‘generality;’ then ‘ generality, ’ as resid¬ 
ing in these ; then ‘ particularity, ’ inasmuch as it pos¬ 
sesses ‘ intimate relation ; ’ and lastly, intimate relation 
itself ; such is the principle of arrangement.” 

To these categories originally assumed, one was sub¬ 
sequently added, viz., non-existence, which may be 
represented as a peculiar feature of Indian Logic. Non- 
existence is of four kinds— antecedent, subsequent, recip¬ 
rocal, and absolute. 

Antecedent non-existence is thus set forth in the first 
aphorism of the First Daily Lesson of Book IX : “ (An 
elfect) is antecedently non-existent, inasmuch as there 
is non-existence of assertion of actions and qualities. ’ ’ 
Lst this be read in conjunction with these comments: 
“Antecedently, that is, before the production of an 
effect, an effect or product, such as a water-pot or piece 
of cloth, is non-existent; that is, non-existent by self- 
determined negation during that time^ The reason 
assigned is the absence of predication of actions and 
qualities. If the effect, the water-pot, etc., were exist¬ 
ent during that time, it would be affirmed to possess 
actions and qualities, as in the case of a water-pot 
already produced, such affirmations are made as that 
the water-pot is at rest, or in motion, or seen to be 
colored. There is no such assertion antecedent to its 
production. It is, therefore, inferred that it is during 
that time non-existent.” 

Subsequent non-existence is simply destruction. 
Aphorism 2 runs thus : “ The existent (becomes) non¬ 
existent.” “It is proved,” says the commentator, 
“ by perception and inference that an existent product, 


232 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


such as a water-pot, after the operation of a hammer, 
etc., which destroys it, is now non-existent, in like 
manner as it is proved by perception and inference that 
an effect is, previous to the operation of its cause, non¬ 
existent.” 

Aphorism 4 sets forth reciprocal non-existenre in 
these words: “ The existent also is non-exisient. ” 
“ For,” says the commentator, u there are such cogni¬ 
tions as that a horse is not identical with a cow, a cow 
is non-existent as a horse, a piece of cloth is non-exist¬ 
ent as a water-pot, a cow is not a horse, a horse is not 
a cow. There appears then in such a cognition the faqt 
that a cow possesses reciprocal non-existence with a 
horse, a water-pot is reciprocally non-existent with a 
piece of cloth ; and this reciprocal non-existence is 
otherwise designated absence of identity.” 

Absolute non-existence is set forth in Aphorism 5 : 
“ Whatever else, moreover, than these is non-existent 
is (absolutely) non-existent.” Absolute non-existence 
is that of which the three other kinds of non-existence 
cannot be predicated—antecedent, emergent or subse¬ 
quent," and reciprocal—which never was existent, and 
never will be, and which does not exist now. An ex¬ 
ample often adduced in Hindu Logic, viz., “ hare’s 
horn,” may be brought forward in illustration of this 
species of non-existence. 

The logical schools may justly be characterized as 
atomic, as the cosmology they teach traces creation 
through successive stages of development to primordial 
atoms of various kinds and properties. It is time to 
set forth the atomic theory of these schools. Let the 
following aphorisms be considered and weighed : 

“ The common property of substance and quality is 
that they originate things of the same class’ ’ (Book II. 


THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 


233 


Lesson I. Aph. 9). The commentator has these words 
in explanation : “ Terrene atoms originate a terrene 
aggregate of two atoms ; blue color and the like in an 
atom produce blue color and the like in an aggregate of 
two atoms.” 

“ The eternal is existent and uncaused ” (Book IY. 
Lesson I. Aph. 1). 

“ The elfect thereof is the mark of its existence” 
(Book IY. Lesson I. Aph. 2). 

“ The supposition that atoms are non-eternal is 
nescience” (Book IY. Lesson I. Aph. 5). 

“ The qualities have been stated. Also the color, 
taste, smell, and touch of the earth, etc., inasmuch as 
substances are non-eternal. By this is declared their 
eternity in things eternal ” (Book YII. Lesson I. Aph. 
1-3). 

“ In the non-eternal (extension) is non-eternal. In 
the eternal it is eternal. Atomic extension is eternal ” 
(Book YII. Lesson I. Aph. 18-20). 

In these aphorisms the theory appears in a germinal 
form, and it seems to have been matured in subsequent 
times by the champions of these schools. Atoms are 
the ultimate particles of matter, indivisible and eternal. 
They are divided into four classes, according to the four 
elements recognized in ancient times—terrene, aqueous, 
aerial, and igneous. The terrene atoms have, as the 
earth which they compose, color, taste, smell, and 
touch. The aqueous atoms have, as water, color, taste, 
and touch ; the aerial, as air, color and touch, and the 
igneous color only. The atoms cohere or agglutinate, 
not in consequence of the power of God, not in conse¬ 
quence of an inherent efficacy, but owing to an ex¬ 
traneous plastic influence or force. 

What is that influence or force ? A modern com- 


234 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


mentator has these words on an aphorism already 
quoted : u It is to be inferred that destiny is the cause 
of the motion of pieces of grass attracted by amber, of 
the upward flaming of fire, of the horizontal motion of 
wind, and of the action of primordial atoms.” The 
same commentator says elsewhere : “ The universal 
pervasion of the soul is proved, inasmuch as conjunc¬ 
tion with soul influenced by destiny is the cause of ac¬ 
tion in the atoms at the time of creation. ” 

Atoms are made to act or set in motion by destiny 
or the accumulated work of past states of existence, 
together with the merit and demerit attached thereto. 
And when set in motion by this mysterious and irresist¬ 
ible force, the principle, like attracts like, is realized, 
and atoms of one and the same class cohere. Two of 
them form a compound atom, and three a tertiary 
atom, which is visible like a mote in a sunbeam. And 
in this way, by a process of integration, disintegration, 
and redintegration, the universe is evolved out of these 
ultimate particles. 

The atomic theory, propounded in ancient Greece by 
Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera, is in some re¬ 
spects essentially different from that of our Logical 
schools. The motive power in it is derived, through 
gravitation, from chance, not from the efficacy of accu¬ 
mulated merit and demerit, called destiny. The atoms 
posited by these philosophers are of different kinds, 
differing in size, form, and weight. The higher ones 
being heavier than the lower ones descend, causing the 
latter to ascend ; and thus horizontal motion is gen¬ 
erated. And this motion produces lateral motion by 
means of percussion, the particles in their constant 
ascent and descent striking and causing one another to 
move laterally. In this way arose their rotary motion, 


THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 


235 


which resulted in their conglomeration into the huge 
masses of matter called worlds. The earth, when small 
in bulk and weight, was in motion, but it came to a 
state of rest when increased in volume and gravity. 
From its moisture arose organized beings, while souls 
were formed of those nice, smooth, and round atoms 
which are the constituent elements of fire. Such atoms 
are diffused over the whole body, and exercise particu¬ 
lar functions in its particular organs, generating thought 
in the brain, anger in the heart, desire in the liver, and 
so on. We inhale soul-atoms and exhale them, and we 
live so long as this process of respiration lasts. 

This statement makes the main difference between the 
two systems manifest. While the one system makes 
atoms the source of existence in all its forms, physical 
and spiritual, the other looks upon the process which 
evolves pure spirits out of the ultimate particles of im¬ 
pure matter as thoroughly absurd. Hindu Philosophy, 
in all its orthodox branches at least, affirms the eternal 
existence and incorruptible purity of the soul, as well as 
the eternity and impurity of matter. The antithesis 
between matter and mind has nowhere such promi¬ 
nence given it as in our national schools ; and whatever 
scheme of thought is calculated to confound these two 
irreconcilable entities is thrown aside as un-FIindu, un¬ 
reasonable, and absurd. The atomic system of ancient 
Greece presents such confusion, and all attempt to 
assimilate it to what was elaborated in ancient India 
must be pronounced futile. Besides, work as a primal 
force has a methodical way of operating, and must not 
be confounded with chance, the inscrutable and unin¬ 
telligent force behind the varied movements and com¬ 
binations of varieties of atoms assumed in the Greek 
school referred to. 


23G 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


We pass on now to the metaphysical ideas, time and 
space, represented by Kant as subjective forms of 
thought rather than objective realities. They are 
called substances because either of them is a substratum 
of certain qualities or attributes. The qualities of the 
one are priority, posteriority, and simultaneity, and 
those of the other are proximity and remoteness, both 
included in the quality “extensions.” Here are the 
aphorisms that speak of time and space : 

“ The notions of posteriority in relation to posterior¬ 
ity, of simultaneity, of slowness and quickness, are 
marks of the existence of time. Its substantiality and 
eternity are explained by air. Its unity is explained 
by existence” (Book II. Daily Lesson II. Aph. 6-8). 

“ The mark appertaining to space is that whence the 
knowledge arises that one thing is remote and not 
remote from another. The substantiality and eternity 
(of space) are explained by air. Its unity (is explained) 
by existence. Its diversity is (caused to be conceived) 
by the difference of its effects. (Space is regarded as) 
east because of a past, future, or present conjunction of 
the sun. So likewise (space is regarded as) south, west, 
and north” (Book II. Daily Lesson II. Aph. 10-15). 

The meaning of tlieSe extracts is plain. Time is a 
substance, because it is the substrate of certain attributes 
or predicates. It is eternal as air, or the primary aerial 
atom, and it is one as the summum genus existence is 
one. Its marks have already been pointed out. 

Space also is, for similar reasons, a substance eternal 
and one ; but it appears diverse on account of its acci¬ 
dental conjunction with other objects. “ One man,” 
says a commentator, “ has the practical assurance that 
this is the east because the conjunction of the sun in 
the orient first took place yesterday. Another has the 


THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 


237 


notion of the east from observing that the conjunction 
of the sun in the orient will first take place to-morrow. 
Another has the notion of the east from observing that 
there is a present conjunction of the sun now taking 
place in that quarter.” “ In like manner the practical 
assurance of the south arises from past, future, or pres¬ 
ent conjunction of the sun with the mountains, etc., in 
the southern quarter. So also the notion of west and 
north may be analogously accounted.” 

From the metaphysical entities we pass on to what 
is called the internal organ or the inner sensory, mamas , 
the mind. Let us, according to our usual course, pre¬ 
sent in a group the aphorisms bearing on the subject, 
and deduce proper conclusions from them. These, 
however, may be prefaced by a quotation from the first 
book of Gautama’s Sutras : “ The characteristic of the 
mind is this, that there does not arise (in a single soul) 
more than one cognition at once.” The Vaiseshika 
Sutras bearing on the subject are these : 

“ Existence and non-existence of knowledge on con¬ 
tact of the soul with the objects of sense are the mark 
of the existence of an internal organ. Its substantiality 
and eternity are explained by air. Because of non- 
simultaneity of volitions and non-simultaneity of cog¬ 
nitions it is one (in each body)” (Book III. Lesson II. 
Aph. 1-3). 

“ The upward flaming of fire, the sideward blowing 
of wind, and the first action of atoms and of the inter¬ 
nal organ are caused by destiny. The action of the 
internal organ is explained by the action of the hand. 
Pleasure and pain result from contact of soul, sense, 
mind, and object. Absence of action in the internal 
sensory reposing in the soul ; non-existence of pain in 
the body—this is union. The egress and ingress (of 


238 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


internal sensories from and into bodies), conjunctions 
with things eaten and drunk, conjunctions with other 
effects—all these things are caused by destiny” (Book 
V. Lesson II. Aph. 13-17). 

u In consequence of the non-existence of that (univer¬ 
sal pervasion), the internal organ is absolutely small ” 
(Book YII. Lesson I. Aph. 23). 

To these extracts one from the paper on Yaiseshika 
Philosophy in the “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha” ought 
to be added with a view to a comprehensive presenta¬ 
tion of the idea of the mind as enounced in the Logical 
schools :• 

u The general terms atmatya and manastya are the 
respective definitions of soul (atmari) and mind (memos). 
The general idea of soul is that which is subordinate to 
substance, being also found existing, with intimate re¬ 
lation, in that which is without form ( amurtd ). The 
general idea of mind is that which is subordinate to 
substance, being also found existing with intimate rela¬ 
tion in an atom, but (unlike other atoms) not the inti¬ 
mate cause of any substance.” In these extracts a 
view of the mind is presented such as may justly be 
represented as somewhat ambiguous. At first sight 
the mind appears to be nothing more or less than a 
material organ of communication between the soul and 
the bodily senses. It is merely an organ of sensation 
and intellection to the soul. The external world 
makes, by its endless varieties of objects, suitable 
impressions upon the bodily senses ; and these impres¬ 
sions, called the raw materials of sensation, are one 
after another communicated to the soul for cognition 
by the mind. It is material, being small as an atom. 
Its atomic character is set forth by the fact that it can 
let in only one idea at a time. It has a form ( murtd), 


THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 


239 


and therefore differs from time, space, and ether, which 
are amurta , or without form. It is not infinite like 
ether, for had it been so it would have made simultane¬ 
ity or cotemporaneity of cognitions and volitions on the 
part of the soul a possibility. It is, like the soul, mul¬ 
titudinous, its plurality being proved by the fact that 
everybody in the world has a particular mind attached 
to it. It moves to and fro, gets into and comes out of 
bodies ; but all its movements are caused and regulated 
by the mysterious, unseen power called destiny. It is in 
reality the internal sensory, as Professor Gough calls it, 
a material organ of communication attached to the soul, 
and forming a sort of intermediate post-office between 
the governor within and the external senses, its servitors. 

This view of the mind appears at first sight to be a 
great advance on that of the Sankhva school. By the 
Sankhya philosopher the mind is called the internal 
sense, the eleventh organ’, a material evolute ; but it is 
not according to his views an unconscious, inactive in¬ 
strument of communication between the soul and the 
external world. On the contrary, it is the only active 
principle in man ; it receives the impressions made 
upon the senses, elaborates them into ideas, arranges 
and classifies them, deduces general conclusions from 
them, wills and acts, and desists from willing and act¬ 
ing according as it is moved by preponderant and non¬ 
prepond erant motives. In a word, it performs all those 
functions which are ascribed by general consent to the 
soul, or to the mind as the soul itself, not as one of its 
organs. The soul, again, is merely a passive, uncon¬ 
scious, luminous substance, in which the sensations and 
ideas elaborated by the mind are simply reflected. 

But here in the Logical schools the order seems 
reversed. The mind is the passive, unconscious sub- 


240 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


stance of atomic size and shape, and the soul is the 
active principle in man. The mind is caused to find its 
own level among its internal organs, while the soul 
has its ceaseless activity restored to it, along with its 
percipient, elaborative, volitionating power. Thus far 
an improvement seems to have been realized. 

But these schools waver, and there are aphorisms in 
their standard works which indicate a tendency to 
return to the Sankhya view, which, be it observed, is 
in perfect accord with the most approved principles of 
Hindu Philosophy in general. The aphorism, for in¬ 
stance, already quoted : “ Absence of action in the 
internal sensory reposing in the soul, non-existence of 
pain in the body—this is union.” The meaning of 
these words is elucidated in these comments : “ When 
the internal sensory abides in the soul alone . . . there 
results the non-commencement or non-production of the 
action of the internal sensory. The sensory then be¬ 
comes immovable. In this state there is non-existence 
of pain in the body—that is, pain is not produced in 
relation to the body. This is called the conjunction or 
union with soul of the internal organ excluded from all 
things external.” 

Here the internal organ is represented as active, and 
its action is a source of pain, and therefore a stum¬ 
bling-block or an obstacle all but insuperable in the 
way of emancipation. Its activity, moreover, is the 
result of its outward move toward the objects of exter¬ 
nal nature or the organs of sense. And the cessation 
of its activity can be realized only when this outward 
tendency is superseded by an inclination inward, or, in 
plainer terms, when it is withdrawn from the objects of 
sense, and made to repose, calm and imperturbable, in 
the soul. 


THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 


241 


The “sixfold union” by which this change in the 
mischievous outward tendency of the mind is brought 
about is set forth in these comments : “ Sitting, check¬ 
ing the vital airs, abstraction, suspension of the facul¬ 
ties, meditation, and contemplation—these are the six 
elements of union.” Here the course recommended for 
the suppression of the mischievous activity of the mind, 
and the insurance of its ultimate repose in the soul, is 
nearly the same detailed in Patanjali’s treatise on Yoga 
Philosophy. We notice, therefore, in the Hyaya and 
Yaiseshika Sutras a sort of oscillation between the 
views which ascribed perfect quiescence to the soul 
and mischievous activity to the mind, and those which 
reverse the order of the synthetic schools, and make the 
soul active and the mind passive. 

This vacillation, by no means unaccountable, will be 
still more manifest when the aphorisms on the soul are 
presented and thoroughly examined. Here are these 
aphorisms : 

“ The universal cognition of the objects of sense is an 
argument for (the existence of) another object than the 
objects of sense’ ’ (Book III. Lesson I. Aph. 2). 

The aphorism embodies an argument in favor of the 
existence of souls drawn out in the succeeding apho¬ 
risms. It is very plain and forcible to the Hindu mind. 
The objects of sense have no consciousness and percipi¬ 
ent faculty, and therefore cannot cognize themselves. 
Hor can the senses, which are also without conscious¬ 
ness and percipient faculty, cognize them. The mind 
being in the same predicament—a material organ— 
cannot be the author of cognition. But the objects of 
sense are cognized and made the bases of appropriate 
ideas, general concepts, or judgments both simple and 
complex ; and as the cognitive and elaborative faculty 


242 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


does not reside in them, nor in the instruments through 
which they are perceived, something must be assumed 
as its substratum or as in possession of it. That some¬ 
thing is the conscious soul. 

The marks of the existence of the soul are thus set 
forth : 

“ The ascending and descending vital airs, the open¬ 
ing and closing of the eyes, lips, motions of the internal 
organ, affections of the other organs, pleasure, pain, 
desire and aversion, and volition, are marks of the ex¬ 
istence of the soul ” (Book III. Lesson II. Aph. 4). 

This continues the argument presented in the apho¬ 
rism commented on above. Not only is the existence of. 
the soul proved by ‘ 4 the existence or non-existence of 
knowledge,” by science and nescience, but by the 
physical conditions of life, such as the horizontal and 
circular motions of the vital airs within, by the impres¬ 
sions made upon the organs of sense, by the activity of 
the internal sensory, by the qualities of pleasure and 
pain, desire and aversion, and lastly by volition. Are 
all movements within the body voluntary ? If so, they 
certainly indicate the presence of a volitionating princi¬ 
ple, or the soul. But some of the movements of which 
we are conscious, such as the action of the lungs, are in 
reality automatic rather than voluntary. How can 
these demonstrate the existence of the soul ? Here the 
well-known argument of the Sankhya school is utilized. 
Even action, which is called automatic, from which the 
principle of volition is absent, is not objectless. What 
can be the object of the varieties of physical movements 
within us ? Certainly the gratification of the soul. 
They, therefore, ought to be brought forward as fitted 
to prove the existence of the soul. All this may be 
predicated of the motions of the internal organs, which 


THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 


243 


also have for their object the gratification of the soul. 
And as to pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, they 
certainly indicate the existence of the soul, as they can¬ 
not possibly be properties of inanimate matter. And 
lastly, what can prove the existence of soul better than 
volition ? 

To this argument an exception may be taken. In 
the case of a simple judgment, such as, This is Yajna 
Datta, nothing is perceived beyond the conjunction of 
an organ of sense and an object ; why should it be 
regarded as an indication of the existence of some prin¬ 
ciple behind the perceptible contact'* Besides, even if 
we grant that desire and aversion, cognition and voli¬ 
tion are indicative of a substratum in which they in¬ 
here, why should we look upon that substratum as the 
soul, not as something else ? It may therefore be con¬ 
cluded that nothing short of revelation can prove the 
existence of an imperceptible entity like the soul. To 
this the proper reply is couched in Aphorism 9 of Les¬ 
son II. of Book III. : 

“ Existence of the soul being the conditio sine qua 
non of the use of the word 1 is not evidenced only by 
revelation.” 

Again, in Aphorism 18 we have these words : 

“ The knowledge of the ego, being individually estab¬ 
lished, like sound, as a conditio sine qua non , neither 
too narrowly nor too widely affirmed, by its predomi¬ 
nant and sensible attributes, does not depend upon rev¬ 
elation. 9 5 

These aphorisms indicate a fresh item of deviation 
from the Sankhya and Yoga schools. Egoism or con¬ 
sciousness is represented in these schools as an entity 
distinct from the soul, which appears more like an un¬ 
conscious lump of luminous matter than a spiritual 


244 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


principle. But in the Logical schools egoism is identi¬ 
fied with the soul. Its predominant and sensible at¬ 
tributes are pleasure, pain, etc., and these prove its ex¬ 
istence as decidedly as sound proves the existence of 
ether ; inasmuch as these attributes are not applicable 
to the body as the quality sound is not applicable to 
earth, water, air, or fire. It may, however, be said 
that we do speak of the body being pained or of the 
body moving or acting. But these expressions are 
tropical or figurative, and they should not be taken in 
a literal sense. The plurality of souls is maintained in 
these, as well as in the synthetic schools. The follow¬ 
ing quotations are enough to prove this : 

“ Activity and inactivity observed in one’s own soul 
are the mark of the existence of other souls” (Book 
III. Lesson I. Aph. 19). 

“Because of its circumstances, soul is manifold” 
(Book III. Lesson II. Aph. 20). 

It is not at all hard to explain the first of these 
aphorisms. Activity and inactivity are generated by 
desire and aversion, a natural longing for pleasure, and 
an instinctive recoil from pain. Of this fact our con¬ 
sciousness assures us, as well as the testimony of credi¬ 
ble or trustworthy witnesses. But of all the activity 
and inactivity noticed in the world, we are not the 
centre. The largest quantity by far must needs be 
traced to other individuals—our companions, fellow-citi¬ 
zens, and fellow-men. Activity and inactivity in their 
case indicate what they indicate in ours—viz., desire 
and aversion. But these are properties or affections of 
the soul, and consequently activity and inactivity in the 
case of our fellow-men indicate the existence in them 
of souls similar to ours. 

But the plurality of souls is proved by another fine of 


THE YAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 


245 


reasoning. Our circumstances vary. Some among us 
are rich, some poor ; some are respectable, some mean ; 
some are happy, and some miserable. This variety in 
our circumstances is an indisputable evidence of the 
plurality of souls. 

These lines of proof, though shabbily stated ill the 
Sutras, may be adopted by a modern psychologist. 
But there is one which may be described as “ racy of 
the soil.” The existence of souls in general maybe 
proved, as has already been affirmed, by direct percep¬ 
tion. Devotees have had their vision so far extended, 
by dint of austerity and meditation, that they have been 
able to see human souls—their own soul and the souls 
of others—just as we see the visible objects of nature 
around us. As a rule, souls are said to be impercepti¬ 
ble. The second aphorism of the First Lesson of Book 
VIII. sets forth its imperceptibihty along with that of 
the internal organ : “ Therein the soul and the internal 
organ are imperceptible.” As an imperceptible object, 
it is placed in the same category with ether, time, 
space, air, and atoms. But cognition of the soul is the 
result of a particular condition, which is set forth in 
Aphorism 11 of the Second Daily Lesson of Book 
VIII.: u Perception of the soul (results) from a particu¬ 
lar conjunction between the soul and the internal organ 
in the soul.” The meaning is clear. When the inter¬ 
nal organ, having withdrawn itself from the external 
objects of sense, as the tortoise draws its limbs within 
its shell, merges itself in the soul, that which is invis¬ 
ible becomes visible ; souls are seen, while the material 
creation vanishes out of sight, except in its atomic forms. 

Gautama, in Book I. Sec. 3, speaks of the soul in 
these words : “ Desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, 
pain, and knowledge are the sign of the soul.” 


246 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


Let us now present in one focus all that is predicated 
of the soul in these and other aphorisms of the stand¬ 
ard works of these two schools of Hindu Philosophy. 

The soul is an eternal, imperceptible, active principle, 
not a passive substance endowed with the cognitive 
faculty and volitionating power. It is, therefore, the 
source of cognition, knowledge, emotion, every species 
of noticeable activity, and every species of voluntary 
abstinence from activity. Its characteristic features 
are volition, desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, and knowl¬ 
edge, both in its incipient and matured states. It com¬ 
municates with the external world through the internal 
organ, the mind, and the external organs of sense, hear¬ 
ing, seeing, taste, smell, and touch. It has no innate 
or supersensuous ideas. Thus far, barring the repre¬ 
sentation of the mind as an internal organ, not as an¬ 
other name for the soul itself, the description may in 
all its entireness be adopted by those philosophers of 
the sensational school who do not look upon it, as John 
Stuart Mill does, as simply “ a permanent possibility 
of sensation, 5 ’ and therefore inferentially identical with 
or not different from matter itself. 

The view presented of the soul may at first sight 
seem correct and consistent. But while studying Hindu 
Philosophy we must never lose sight of the proverb, 
“ Everything that glitters is not gold.” According to 
its approved maxims, the properties or affections enunci¬ 
ated are adventitious, not essential. Desire and aver¬ 
sion are defects of which the soul must get rid before 
emancipation can possibly be realized. Again, desire 
and aversion are generated in the soul through the 
cognitive faculty by the objects of the external world. 
The cognitive faculty is, therefore, a mischievous princi¬ 
ple, and must also be annihilated. Once more, desire 


THE VAISESIIIKA PHILOSOPHY. 


247 


and aversion lead the soul to activity or inactivity 
through volition, which is, therefore, a mischievous 
power to be suppressed or eradicated. The soul simply 
goes back to its original condition of perfect quiescence 
when its emancipation from the bondage of ignorance 
is realized. A state of happy inactivity or blissful pas¬ 
sivity is its starting-point and goal, and whatever is 
calculated to bring it out of such state is an acci¬ 
dent to be deprecated, and ruthlessly eradicated when 
realized. 

This point will have to be enlarged on before the 
sequel. Meanwhile it is desirable to raise a question of 
paramount importance—viz., Do the Sutras speak of a 
Universal Soul of an unlimited power, and do they 
represent Him as the creator of the world, the source 
of all knowledge and bliss ? The aphorisms in which 
God is spoken of in the Vaiseshika Sutras are very few 
in number, and are by no means of an unambiguous 
nature. The first of these runs thus : 

“ Authoritativeness belongs to revelation because it 
is a declaration of that” (Book I. Lesson I. Aph. 3). 

On this verse a modern commentator has the follow¬ 
ing remarks : 

“ The word Tat (that) signifies God, though He has 
not been previously mentioned, it being inferred from 
His being universally known, just as in the aphorism of 
Gautama, ‘ That is unauthoritative, being vitiated by 
falsity, self-contradictoriness, and repetition.’ By the 
word ‘ that ’ the Veda is signified, though not pre¬ 
viously mentioned. Accordingly an authoritativeness 
belongs to revelation—the Yeda—because it was de¬ 
clared by Him—revealed by God.” 

Another aphorism bearing on the subject runs thus : 

u But word and work are the mark of those beings 


248 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


who are distinguished from ourselves” (Book I. Lesson 
II. Aph. 18). 

An ancient commentator thus explains these ambigu¬ 
ous words : 

44 The word 4 but ’ implies the exclusion of the marks 
of touch, etc. A word is a name, a work an effect, 
such as the earth, etc. Both of these are a mark of the 
existence of G-od and the great sages who are more ex¬ 
cellent than ourselves. ’ 5 

The modern commentator referred to thus comments 
upon these words : 

44 The word 4 but 5 expresses a division of the sec¬ 
tions, and implies that the section treating of the Deity 
is now commenced. A word is a name, such as air, a 
boar, barley, a reed, and the like ; a work is an effect, 
as the earth, a blade of grass, etc. These are both 
marks inferring the existence of God and the great 
sages, who are distinguished from ourselves, who are 
able to produce this and that effect, and are possessed 
of omniscience and omnipotence.” 

The reader must not suppose that 44 the section treat¬ 
ing of the Deity” is of average length and breadth ; it 
only consists of the aphorism quoted above and the fol¬ 
lowing : 

44 Because words and works are known by perception 
to be produced.” 

The ancient commentator thus explains these words : 

44 As when the bodies of Chaitra, Maitra, and others 
are objects of perception to a father and others, the 
names Chaitra, Maitra are given, so the giving of 
names to a water-pot, a piece of cloth, etc., is depen¬ 
dent on the will of God. Whatever word God wills to 
be the name of anything is applicable to it, in the same 
manner that every herb that is touched by the edge of 


TIIE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 


249 


an ichneumon’s teeth is an antidote to the venom of a 
snake. Therefore a name of this kind is a mark infer¬ 
ential of those beings which are distinguished from our¬ 
selves and others. 5 ’ 

These aphorisms and these comments make it evident 
that the argument resorted to or brought forward by 
the ancient logicians of India is that based on design in 
nature or the teleological argument. They sometimes 
did bring forward explicit statements, culled from rev¬ 
elation, in support of the fundamental doctrine of all 
religion, the existence of God ; but even when this was 
done, the point on which the greatest stress was laid 
was not so much the testimony itself as the marks of 
design in the testimony, as the following passage from 
the “ Kusumanjali,” a work on Logic recently trans¬ 
lated by Professor Cornell, will show : 

“An omniscient and indestructible Being is to be 
proved from the existence of effects, from the combina¬ 
tion of atoms, from the support of the earth in the sky, 
from traditional arts, from belief in revelation, from 
the Yeda, from its sentences, and from particular 
members.” 

In this extract, design in the construction of the sen¬ 
tences of the Yeda, and the clauses of which they are 
composed, is insisted on, as well as the bare testimony 
embodied in revelation. What a gap between the 
teleological argument, as it was unfolded in those days, 
when the best example of design available was a jar or 
a water-pot, and the same argument as it is presented 
in these days of steam-engines, locomotives, and tele¬ 
graphic wires ! A modern audience might laugh if an 
orator prone to enlarge upon the art of giving names, 
or constructing sentences, or weaving cloths, or making 
jars as an indisputable proof of the existence of God ; 


250 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


but it must not be forgotten that the absurdity of the 
theory of evolution, as propounded by those who do not 
believe in design, has often been set forth in our day 
by the hypothesis of an accidental agglomeration of 
letters into words, words into sentences, sentences into 
the beauty and pathos, the truth and depth of Shake¬ 
speare. Our ancient philosophers had evidently no idea 
either of the ontological or of the moral argument in 
favor of the existence of God. 

It may seem strange that a multitude of sages, 
“ more excellent than ourselves,” are associated with 
God in the aphorisms of Kanada quoted above, in the 
work and word which demonstrate His and their ex¬ 
istence. It is explicitly declared that the objects of 
nature and the names given to many of them are proofs 
of the existence, not only of God, but of other spiritual 
beings imperceptible to our gross percipient faculties. 
"Who are these ? Men raised to the position of the 
gods by austerity and meditation, or angelic beings who 
have always stood nearer to God than man ? Perhaps 
both these classes of glorious beings are referred to, 
though the word “ sages” used by the commentator is 
more applicable to human adepts than to ethereal intel¬ 
ligences. They are represented as co-sharers, both in 
His attributes and in ITis works, with God. They are 
expressly said to be “ possessed of omniscience and 
omnipotence.” 

But it is to be observed that this representation, 
paradoxical though at first sight it may appear, is in 
perfect keeping with the approved principles of Hindu 
Philosophy. One of these is that a person literally be¬ 
comes that which he makes the subject of long-contin¬ 
ued and intense meditation. He can transform himself 
into an atom by meditating intensely upon an atom, or 


THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 


251 


the diffusive ether by making that all-pervasive sub¬ 
stance the subject of concentrated, self-oblivious con¬ 
templation. By a similar process he can even change 
himself into God. “ I will be God by meditating 
upon God ”—such is the sublime aspiration of many a 
devotee in India. And if the God believed in were 
something more than a mere nonentity, such aspiration 
would be higher than the highest ever cherished by a 
human being. But neither God nor the human soul is 
anything better than a nonentity, according to Hindu 
Philosophy ; and therefore this aspiration, at first 
sight so high, resolves itself into a desire to pass from 
troublesome existence into troubleless non-existence ! 

In these verses God is certainly represented as the 
Creator of the universe. In the paper on the Nya}ra 
Philosophy in the “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha” there is 
an elaborate argument presented to prove that He is 
such. The objections against the notion of attributing 
creation to Him are by no means few or of a contemp¬ 
tible order, according to Hindu Philosophy. God, you 
say, is the Creator of the universe. Yery well; the 
question rises, What could lead Him to create ? His 
own advantage or that of His creatures ? Hot cer¬ 
tainly His advantage, because as the Absolute Being 
He needed nothing, and can need nothing to complete 
His perfection. Did He, then, create to make His 
creatures happy ? If so, He must have miserably 
failed, for His creatures are far from happy—are very 
miserable indeed. This objection may be easily rebut¬ 
ted. God’s determination to create proceeded from 
u compassion,” or a wish to make His creatures happy. 
But these have by their own works made themselves 
miserable. 

There is, however, an insuperable objection to the 


252 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


idea of God bringing Himself to a determination to 
create. God cannot create without being moved by a 
desire to do so. Hence creation on the part of God 
implies on His part a desire, and a preponderant desire, 
or a desire leading to a volition and an action. How a 
desire, according to Hindu Philosophy, is an evil and a 
source of bondage, however good it may be. How 
can that which is admittedly a source of misery be 
evinced by a Being described as eternally free from all 
pain as well as pleasure ? The Hindu philosopher 
shows no little vacillation here, and escapes the horns 
of a formidable dilemma by supposing a force behind 
the Deity as the ultimate source of creation. That 
force is in these Sutras called Destiny. 

We have already had occasion to dwell upon the 
many forms in which this mysterious primal force 
manifests itself. It is, properly speaking, the source 
of all material movements in creation. In commenting 
upon a verse already quoted, one of the commentators 
says : “It -is to be inferred that Destiny is the cause of 
the motion of pieces of glass attracted by amber, of 
the upward flaming of fire, of the horizontal motion of 
wind, and of the action of primordial atoms in crea¬ 
tion.” It is also the source of desire and aversion to 
which every species of activity, other than material, is 
traceable. Let the following aphorisms prove this : 

“ From pleasure arises desire. And also through 
that being ingrained. And also through destiny” 
(Book Y. Lesson II. Aph. 10-12). 

From pleasure arises desire, and that is traceable to 
Destiny. Destiny, therefore, generates and controls 
all material movements, and all our thoughts, feelings, 
and volitions. And Destiny originally caused the 
atoms to combine, integrate and disintegrate, and de- 


THE YAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 


253 


velop into the varied objects of creation. Destiny, 
then, is the ultimate ground of existence in its multi¬ 
farious forms. Or if God were represented as the cre¬ 
ative principle or power, the representation would not 
be correct unless He were held up as a sort of demi¬ 
urgic link between the creation and the Creator. God 
could not create without being moved by a desire to do 
so. But all desires proceed from Destiny, to which, 
therefore, His desire to create must be traced. Des¬ 
tiny, therefore, is the Creator, whether creation is 
traced to it through God or through atoms ! 

But why are two plans of creation set forth—the one 
tracing it through a God, and the other directly through 
innumerable atoms to Destiny ? Because perhaps the 
philosophers of these schools oscillated between their 
own and the popular notion of creation; or perhaps 
they tried to conciliate popular sentiment by an intro¬ 
duction into their scheme of some elements of belief, 
without which it was sure to fall flat on the public. 
And lastly, we may suppose that they identified Des¬ 
tiny with God. The second of these hypotheses ap¬ 
pears to us correct. The logicians posited a perfectly 
inactive and quiescent God more to humor popular 
prejudices than to serve any recognized purpose of their 
essentially atheistic scheme of philosophy. 

But what is Destiny, the Adrishta , Unseen Force 
behind the phenomena of nature and evolutions of 
Providence ? To settle this question we must examine 
what is said about desire and aversion, and merit and 
demerit.' 

Gautama describes the passions, or desire and aver¬ 
sion, as having “ this characteristic, that they actuate,” 
or cause actions. Kanada defines desire as a longing 
for jfleasure and aversion, as a recoil from pain. They 


254 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


both lead to activity, and therefore they are both mis¬ 
chievous. We have already quoted the aphorism : 
“ From pleasure arises desire.” The following com¬ 
ments on these words are worthy of consideration : 

“ Desire or wish arises from pleasure generated by 
attachment to garlands, sandal-wood, women, and 
other objects of sense, or in the pleasures of those suc¬ 
cessive kinds, or in the means of those pleasures. It is 
also to be considered that aversion arises from pain be¬ 
gotten by snakes, thorns, etc.; in these pains or in the 
means of these pains. Desire, aversion, and infatua¬ 
tion, in virtue of being incentives to activity, are 
called defects. Accordingly the aphorism of Gautama, 
Defects have for their characteristic incitement to 
activity. 5 ’ 

Here the thing to be noted is, that pleasure and pain 
are antecedent to desire and aversion, which again 
lead to action, and that to bondage. The definitions 
given of pleasure and pain are of the crudest type. 
What a gap between them and Sir William Hamilton’s 
definition of pleasure as unimpeded energy, and of pain 
as impeded energy ! How gross, again, are the ideas 
of pleasure and pain presented ! The exquisite enjoy¬ 
ments and the exquisite sufferings arising from the in¬ 
tellectual and moral nature of man are almost entirely 
thrown out of calculation ! 

Let us now advert to the subject of merit and de¬ 
merit. In Aph. 3 of the Second Lesson of Book Y. we 
have these words : “ The duty of the four periods of 
religious life (has been declared). Fidelities and infidel¬ 
ities are the causes of merit and demerit. ” This is a 
very important aphorism, inasmuch as it traces merit 
and demerit, not only to external acts, such as the 
duties performed by a Brahmin passing through the 


THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 


255 


four stages of studentship, householdership, hermitship, 
and mendicancy, but to states of the heart or internal 
dispositions. In the aphorism following, infidelity is 
said to be “ a deficiency of faith,” and fidelity “ non- 
deficiency. ’ 5 

In aphorisms 14 and 15 of the same book and section 
we have these words : “ Activity in merit and demerit 
has for its antecedents desire and aversion. By these 
are conjunction and disjunction. ” 

The ancient commentator explains the last few words 
thus : 

“ Existence in a future state is now declared to be 
the occasion of merit and demerit. By these—by merit 
and demerit—conjunction—that is, birth—is caused. 
By conjunction is here intended connection with non- 
previous pains of bodily organs. Disjunction is the dis¬ 
junction of body and the internal sensory, characterized 
as death. The meaning is, therefore, that this transi¬ 
tory world, a series of births and deaths, otherwise 
termed existence in a future state, is caused by merit 
and demerit.” 

We shall only quote another aphorism from Book 
IX. : “ The knowledge of inspired sages and perfect 
vision result from merit. 5 ’ 

The ideas presented in these extracts may be thus 
grouped : Our present life is the result of merit and 
demerit accumulated in past lives. We are adding 
constantly to this accumulated load by our conduct in 
this life, our dispositions and acts. We acquire tran¬ 
scendent knowledge and miraculous powers by such 
meditation as is a result of merit, and our final eman¬ 
cipation is also connected therewith. From these 
statements it is plain that what is called Destiny is 
identical with merit and demerit, or with work, the 


256 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


source of merit and demerit. Work, then, rather than 
God, is the creator of the universe, our creator and 
incarcerator ; and it also ultimately leads to our eman¬ 
cipation through the medium of that meditation by 
which it is itself annihilated ! Here, again, is the im¬ 
personal God of Buddhism ! 

And lastly we come to what Gautama calls the chief 
end of man, Emancipation. In Book Y. Lesson II. 
Aph. 18, we have this set forth : “ Where there is 
non-existence of this (that is, of Destiny), there is non¬ 
existence of conjunction, and non-existence of manifes¬ 
tation, emancipation.” 

Destiny or work is the cause of that all but endless 
chain of births and deaths under which we groan. 
But when its fruits are consumed and it itself is annihi¬ 
lated, in the case of a spirit raised through successive 
stages of exalted existence to the summit of concentra¬ 
tion, its conjunction with material conditions disap¬ 
pears, along with its manifestation in a bodily form, 
and its final liberation is realized. 

The means are indicated in this aphorism : ‘ £ Eman¬ 
cipation is declared as dependent on the actions of the 
soul ” (Book YI. Lesson II. Aph. 16). 

These words are thus explained : “ This it is which 
is separation of body and soul. When there* exist the 
actions of the soul, emancipation ensues. The actions 
of the soul are as follows : Hearing, meditation, the 
practice of devotion, abstraction, a sitting posture, re¬ 
straining the vital airs, acquisition of quietism, and self¬ 
subjugation, the presentation of one’s own and others’ 
souls, knowledge of merit and demerit previously ac¬ 
quired by fruition, and emancipation characterized as 
removal of pain, consequent on the cessation of birth, 
resulting from the cessation of activity, in consequence 


THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 


257 


of the non-production of further merit and demerit, by- 
overcoming the mist of defects characterized as desire 
and aversion. Of these, the primary act of soul is 
knowledge of the real nature of the six categories.” 

The concatenation ending in emancipation is else¬ 
where set forth in these comments : “ Therefore the 
practical application of this introductory section of two 
aphorisms is that persons desirous of emancipation are 
concerned in the non-existence of birth for the sake of 
non-existence of pain ; in the non-existence of activity 
for the sake of non-existence of birth; in the non-exist¬ 
ence of faults for the sake of non-existence of activity ; 
in the cessation of false knowledge for the sake of non¬ 
existence of faults; and in forming a mental presenta¬ 
tion of the soul for the sake of cessation of false knowl¬ 
edge. ” 

The links to be successively destroyed are false 
knowledge, faults, or desire and aversion, activity, 
pain, birth ; and the means of destruction is right 
knowledge of the soul and its difference from non-soul, 
which right knowledge is attained by work and the 
meditation which destroys work ! And when mundane 
existence is rolled up as a scroll, we have the perma¬ 
nent entities, God, Soul, Mind, Atoms, left—all im¬ 
mobile and inactive except when operated upon by 
Destiny. How came Destiny to exist before the be¬ 
ginning of the chain of conjunction and disjunction, 
births and deaths, to which it gave birth; or how, when 
destroyed by a process of self-destruction, it reappears, 
Phoenix-like, at every renovation of creative work— 
these mysteries are left unsolved. The only reply at¬ 
tempted is, The process is eternal ! 

Pandit Nehemiah Goreh praises the system in his 
well-known book on Hindu Philosophy for its recogni- 


258 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


tion of God as the Creator of the universe. It is im¬ 
possible to say how the truth has escaped his calm and 
philosophical intellect, that God, according to it, has 
nothing to do with our creation,, our incarceration, and 
our salvation. He is simply a superfluous entity, intro¬ 
duced for conventional or utilitarian purposes, and 
therefore perfectly dispensable, along with the soul, 
and perhaps the mind. Destiny and atoms, matter and 
force, are in reality the ground of existence. The ap¬ 
parent trialism of these schools dwindles, when prop¬ 
erly interpreted, into the materialistic monism of the 
Sankhya system ! 


CHAPTER IX. 


THE PURVA MIMANSA, OR HINDU RITUALISM. 

The schools directly and ostensibly associated with 
the Yeda next claim attention—viz., the Purva and 
the Uttara Mimansa. The words Purva and Uttar a 
mean “ prior” and “ posterior, ” “ antecedent’ ’ and 
“ subsequent and in connection with the word 
Mimansa the ideas they express are a prior and a pos¬ 
terior decision. There is a little ambiguity attached to 
the expressions at first sight, and it has plunged such 
great thinkers as Dr. Ritter into error. Is the idea of 
antecedence or subsequence in time conveyed by these 
words in this connection ? Or are the predicates ap¬ 
plicable to something lying beyond the confines of 
chronology ? Some writers of eminence have fallen 
into the mistake of attaching to them the ideas of 
priority and posteriority in time ; and Dr. Ritter occu¬ 
pies the foremost place among them. According to 
them, the Uttara Mimansa school, or what is oftener 
called the Yedantic school, was founded after the 
Purva Mimansa school had been organized ; and this 
circumstance sets forth the significance of the appella¬ 
tives in question. But this notion is not obviously ten¬ 
able, as in the Sutras ascribed to Jaimini, the acknowl¬ 
edged founder of the Purva Mimansa or the prior 
school, the name of Badarayana, the founder of the 
later school, is distinctly mentioned as an authority. 
In Book I. Sec. 1, Aph. 5, we have these words : 


260 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. ' 


“ But the natural connection of a word with its sense 
is (the instrument of) the knowledge thereof (i.e. of 
Duty), and the intimation (of Scripture, which is) 
unerring, though given in respect of something imper¬ 
ceptible. This (according to our opinion, as well as 
that) of Badarayana (the author of Vedanta Aphorisms) 
is the evidence (by means of which we recognize Duty), 
for it has no respect (to any other evidence, such as 
that of sense).” 

This express mention of the founder of the later 
school as an authority, co-ordinate, if not supraordi- 
nate, in one of the opening Sutras of the standard doc¬ 
ument of the prior school, militates against the princi¬ 
ple of interpretation, to which the mistake alluded to is 
attributable. The ideas of priority and posteriority in 
time must be set aside altogether. These epithets 
refer to the well-known divisions of the Veda, to the 
prior and posterior portions of that venerable work, 
rather than to two successive divisions of time. 

In the first of this series of papers, the three main 
divisions of the Rig and other Vedas were pointed out. 
A fresh reference to them is needed to explain these 
two important terms. The three principal divisions 
of each of the Vedas are : (1) Mantra, or Hymns ; 
(2) Brahmana, or Ritualistic Directory; and (3) TTpan- 
ishad, or Underlying Philosophy. The hymnology and 
the ritual form the prior portion, while the philosophy 
in which these two elements terminate constitutes the 
later portion. The Purva Mimansa philosophizes on 
the earlier portion of the Veda, or the portion embrac¬ 
ing the Mantra and the Brahmana; and the Uttara 
Mimansa treats of the later portion, or that embracing 
the Upanishad. The former school is, properly speak¬ 
ing, called the Mimansa, and the latter the Vedanta. 


THE PURVA MIMANSA. 


2G1 


The schools are also called the Exoteric and the 
Esoteric. 

It is to be observed that, though in one sense they 
may justly be said to have appeared contemporane¬ 
ously, the Yedantic school was not matured and per¬ 
fected till the rival form of thought had nearly, if not 
entirely, lost its prestige and dominating influence.* 
The Yedantic school may therefore be called the 
Uttara Mimansa, both in a chronological as well as in 
the sense of its philosophy being confined to the con¬ 
cluding portion of the Yeda. 

The founder of the Mimansa school was Jaimini, 
who is more than once named in the Sutras ascribed 
to him, but regarding whom little or nothing is 
known besides the fact of his having founded one of 
the six great schools of Hindu Philosophy, and ex¬ 
pounded its principles, after the orthodox fashion, in a 
series of aphorisms. The number of aphorisms ascribed 
to him is no less than 2652, and they are classified into 
915 Adhikarcms , or topical sections, and these again 
are grouped into sixty chapters, which form twelve 
books, each consisting of four chapters, besides the 
third, sixth, and tenth, each of which has twice as 
many, or eight chapters. 

This mass of aphorisms would be thoroughly unintel¬ 
ligible but for the glosses and scholias extant, or within 
reach of the plodding student. The ancient commen¬ 
tator, whose great commentary has been revised by 
subsequent scholiasts, was Sahara Swami Bhatta, and 
his great work is called after him, u Sahara-Bhashya.” 
The greatest of the subsequent annotators was Kuma- 
rilla Swami Bhatta, who is one of the great leaders of 
the memorable crusade, the issue of which was the 
almost complete banishment of Buddhism from the 


262 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


country of its birth. Of this great man Colebrooke 
speaks thus : 

“ Kumarilla Bhatta figures greatly in the tradition¬ 
ary religious history of India. He was predecessor of 
Sankar A chary a, and equally rigid in maintaining the 
orthodox faith against heretics who reject the authority 
of the Yedas. He is considered to have been the chief 
antagonist of the sect of Buddha, and to have insti¬ 
gated an exterminating persecution of that heresy. He 
does indeed take every occasion of controverting the 
authority and doctrine of Sakya or Buddha, as well 
as Arhat or Jina, together with obscurer heretics, 
Bodhyana and TJmsaka ; and he denies them any con¬ 
sideration, even when they do concur upon any point 
with the Yedas. The age of Kumarilla, anterior to 
Sankar, and corresponding with the period of the per¬ 
secution of the Bandhas, goes back to an antiquity of 
much more than a thousand years. ’’ 

Another annotator of note ought to be named, as, 
from references in the “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha,” he 
appears to have led one great division of the Miman- 
sakas, a division forming a sort of opposition to Kuma¬ 
rilla Bhatta. Ilis name is Pravakara, and he might 
have been a contemporary of his opponent, Kumarilla. 

We give, as usual, the synopsis of the contents of 
Jaimini’s great work, as presented in the paper entitled 
“ Jaimini Darsana” in the “ Sarva-Darsana-San¬ 
graha 

“ An objector may here ask, Are you not continually 
repeating that merit (Dharma) comes from the practice 
of duty (Dharma); but how is duty to be defined or 
proved ? Listen attentively to my answer. A reply 
to this question has been given in the older Mimansa 
by the holy sage Jaimini. How the Mimansa consists 


THE PURVA MIMAHSA. 


263 


of twelve books. In the first book is discussed the 
authoritativeness of those collections of words which 
are severally meant by the terms ‘ injunction ’ (vidhi), 

‘ explanatory passage ’ ( arthavada ), ‘ hymn ’ {mantra), 

‘ tradition ’ ( smriti ), and 6 name ’ (nam). In the second, 
certain subsidiary discussions (as e.g. on Apurva) relat¬ 
ing to the difference of various rites, refutation r>f 
(erroneously alleged) proofs, and difference of perform? 
ance (as in c constant ’ and ‘ voluntary ’ offerings). 
In the third sruti, ‘sign,’ or ‘sense of the passage’ 
(Jingo), ‘ context ’ (vakya), etc., and their respective 
weight when in apparent opposition to one another, 
the ceremonies called pratipatti-lcarmani ; things men¬ 
tioned incidentally, things accessory to several main 
objects, as prayajas, etc., and the duties of the sacri¬ 
fices In the fourth, the influence on other rites of the 
principal and subordinate rites, the fruit caused by the 
juhu being made of the butea-prondosa, and the 
dice-playing, etc., which form subordinate parts of the 
vajasuya sacrifice. In the fifth, the relative order of 
different passages of sruti, etc., the order of different 
parts of a sacrifice (as the seventeen animals at the 
vajapeya ), the multiplication and non-multiplication of 
rites, and the respective force of words of sruti, order 
of mention, etc., in determining the order of perform¬ 
ance. In the sixth, the persons qualified to offer 
sacrifices, their obligations, the substitute for enjoined 
materials, supplies for the lost and injured offerings, 
expiatory rites, the sattara offerings, things proper to 
be given, and the different sacrificial fires. In the sev¬ 
enth, transference of the ceremonies of one sacrifice to, 
another by direct command in the Yedantic texts, and 
then as inferred by ‘ name ’ or ,‘ sign. ’ In the eighth, 
transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or ob- 


264 


Hr 




PHILOSOPHY. 


scurely expressed ‘ sign,’ or by the predominant e sign,’ 
and cases where no transference takes place. In the 
ninth, the beginning of the discussion on the adaptation 
of hymns when quoted in a new connection (uha), the 
adaptation of samans and mantras , and collateral ques¬ 
tion^ connected therewith. In the tenth, the discus¬ 
sion of occasions where the non-performance of the 
primary rite involves the 4 preclusion ’ and non-per- 
* formance of dependent rites, and of occasions where the 
rites are precluded, because other rites produce their 
special result; discussions connected with the graha 
offerings, certain samcms , and various other things, and 
a discussion on different kinds of negation. In the 
eleventh, the incidental mention and subsequently the 
fuller discussion of tantra (where several acts are com¬ 
bined into one). In the twelfth, a discussion on 
prasanga (where the rite is performed for one chief 
purpose, but with an incidental further reference) ; 
tantra , cumulation of concurrent rites, and option. ” 
From the foregoing conspectus it is evident that very 
little of what is properly called philosophy is found in 
this mass of aphorisms. The problems of existence are 
not here even referred to. The soul, its nature, the 
relation in which it stands to the non-ego or to the infi¬ 
nite, the source of its bondage, and its emancipation— 
subjects discussed with no little logical acumen and 
philosophical insight in the other schools—are simply 
thrust into the background. And practical directions 
as to the sacred books to be invested with canonical 
authority, the rites and ceremonies to be performed 
with punctilious care, the varieties of sacrifices to be 
offered, the mystical syllables and words to be re¬ 
peated, the hymns to be chanted, and the incantations 
to be muttered, are made to occupy the prominent posi- 


THE PUIIVA MIMANSA. 


265 


tion which in the other philosophical works of the 
orthodox schools is assigned to dissertations on the 
abstruse problems of life. 

There is philosophy, however, in the method in 
which the disquisitions embodied in this work, on a 
variety of non-philosophical topics, are presented. The 
logical acumen shown is deserving of all praise, though 
the conviction forces itself on the mind that a great 
deal of close and accurate reasoning is wasted on what 
might justly be characterized as trash. As a repertory 
of truth or a magazine of philosophic thought, the 
book is exceedingly worthless ; but as a picture of an 
age of ritualistic fervor, brought on by a reaction 
against speculations of the wildest sort, it is not with¬ 
out value. And therefore we are inclined, on the 
whole, to sympathize in what Max Muller says of it in 
a private note published in the serial to be referred to : 
“ To me these Mimansaka discussions are extremely 
attractive, and for accuracy of reasoning they have no 
equal anywhere.” As a specimen of the way in which 
its discussions are conducted, we are tempted to tran¬ 
scribe the section in which its approved doctrine—that 
the connection between a word and its sense is eter¬ 
nal—is set forth, with the reasons pro and con. 

But before we yield to the temptation we must say 
something on the translations which are to be utilized 
in our exposition of the maxims of the Mimansa school. 
Of the great work of this school a very small fragment 
was translated by Dr. Ballantyne, with the accuracy 
characteristic of all the versions made by that distin¬ 
guished Orientalist. But a much larger portion has 
been translated by our learned countryman, Pundit 
Moreshwar Kunte, B.A. and M.D., in his serial named 
Saddarsana-Chintanilca , a magazine started in 1877, 


266 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


and edited up to date with an amount of ability and 
erudition worthy of all praise. The work has been of 
the greatest value to Oriental scholars as far as it has 
gone, and it is to be hoped that the learned author will 
live to finish it. He has translated more than a moiety 
of the Sutras associated with the Mimansa school, a 
considerable portion of the Yedanta Sutras, and a frag¬ 
ment of the Yoga Sutras ; and the work before him is 
more formidable by far in bulk, if not in importance, 
than what he has so patiently and persistently accom¬ 
plished. When the serial is completed it will present 
complete translations of the standard original works of 
the orthodox schools, with copious notes and comments, 
which, barring the one-sided theory they are evidently 
intended to bolster up, will be looked upon as very val¬ 
uable indeed. From the second number of this series 
we quote the arguments in favor of the doctrine alluded 
to, the arguments for and against : 

“ 5. Therefore the connection between a word and 
its sense is eternal. The knowledge of this eternal 
connection is a precept. Such a precept is never erro¬ 
neous. (But) when the sense is unknown, then there 
is an error. Therefore, according to Badasayana, a 
precept is authoritative, (as) other knowledge is not 
needed. 

“ 6. Some (state) that a word is an action. It ap¬ 
pears when pronounced. (This is a statement in oppo¬ 
sition.) 

“ 7. The sound of a word vanishes the moment it is 
pronounced, therefore it is transitory. (Second state¬ 
ment of an opponent.) 

“ 8. The verb to make is used in relation to a sound ; 
therefore it is transitory. (Third statement of an op¬ 
ponent.) 


THE PURVA HIM ANSA. 


267 


“ 9. Different animals simultaneously hear the same 
sound ; therefore it is transitory. (Fourth statement 
of an opponent.) 

“ 10. A word has an original form and a modified 
form ; therefore it is transitory. (Fifth statement of 
an opponent.) 

“ 11. By many making a sound, its increase (is seen). 
(Sixth statement of an opponent.)” 

Thus are the arguments against the theory of the 
eternity of the connection between a word and its sense 
methodically or categorically stated. The replies are 
attached as pendants to these : 

“ 12. On this subject there is a parity of reasoning, 
therefore a word is not eternal.” The reasoning of 
the opponent himself—viz., a word appears when pro¬ 
nounced^—is enough to prove its non-transitoriness, be¬ 
cause it presupposes the latent existence of a word pre¬ 
vious to its utterance. Mr. Kunte thus explains what 
is meant by “ parity of reasoning”: “ An example 
will illustrate this logical contrivance. ‘Well,’ says 
Jaimini to his opponent, ‘ you say a word appears when 
pronounced ; your statement implies that a word exists 
latent before its appearance. Well, its latent existence 
is not against me. Your statement shows that this is 
not against you. ’ This is a case of parity of reason¬ 
ing.” 

“ 13. When not an object (of sensuous) perception, 
even an existing substance is not cognized.” The 
transitoriness of a word is proved because its sound is 
not perceived after it is uttered. This argument, how¬ 
ever, will prove the non-existence of several things 
which are not perceived, but which nevertheless are 
proved to be existent, such as ether, etc. 

“ 14. That which exists is cognized (only) after (its) 


268 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


application.” Sound is said to be made or employed 
or applied when it is heard, but it exists before it is 
heard, and its non-perception, except when employed, 
is no argument against its eternity. 

“ 15. Because sound is simultaneous (and universal) 
like the sun.” As the sun is one and universal, sound 
is one and universal ; hence the fact noticed by the op¬ 
ponent—viz., that it is simultaneously heard by differ¬ 
ent animals. 

“ 16. The change of a letter is its non-modification.” 
Here the opponent’s statement, that a word has a modi¬ 
fied form, is emphatically denied. The original form is 
in reality not changed when, in consequence of certain 
slight changes of letter, it appears in so-called modified 
forms. 

“ 17. A word is augmented in proportion as sound is 
augmented.” Sound, according to Hindu Philosophy, 
is produced by vibrations in the air generating vibra¬ 
tions in the ether in the cavity of the ear. The quan¬ 
tity of ether in the ear stirred up varies in volume, 
but in all such apparent modifications it remains un¬ 
altered. 

The objections having been refuted, the reasons for 
maintaining the doctrine in question are categorically 
stated. They are: (1) the impossibility of our grasping 
the meaning conveyed by words, after they have been 
uttered, but for the eternity of sound ; (2) the simul¬ 
taneity of the recognition of sound by various parties 
in different places ; (3) the non-applicability of the 
predicate number to sound—the word “go,” for in¬ 
stance, ten times repeated being simply the word 
“go ;” (4) the indestructibility of sound or the absence 
of a cause fitted to destroy it ; (5) the fact that sound 
is not a modification of air, and therefore an effect ; and 


THE PURVA MIMANSA. 


269 


(6) lastly, express declarations in the Scripture affirm¬ 
ing the eternity of sound. 

This is the precise though somewhat cumbrous way 
in w r hich the argument in favor of the eternity of 
sound, or eternity of the connection between a word 
and its meaning, is presented. Let it be observed that 
this is by no means the method of conducting argu¬ 
ments approved of in this school in all its entireness. 
That method has five distinct parts : the first, the 
enunciation of the subject ; the second, the statement 
of a doubt arising from it ; the third, the formal ad¬ 
vancement of the objections that may be started, to¬ 
gether with their refutation in a consecutive order ; 
the fourth, the declaration of the demonstrated conclu¬ 
sion ; and the fifth, its connection and relevancy set 
forth. The paper in “ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha” on 
the Mimansa of Jaimini or the Jaimini Darsana, brings 
forward an example in illustration of this complicated 
style of carrying on debates. But as a rule it is simpli¬ 
fied, and the mode of argumentation utilized is that 
shown in the quotations already presented in support 
of the strange doctrine of the eternity of sound. 

Before proceeding further it is proper to remark that 
the Mimansa doctrine of the eternity of sound is essen¬ 
tially different from the doctrine of permanence of 
sound maintained by modern scientists. An impres¬ 
sion made upon the atmosphere by a sound may last 
forever. The ripples occasioned may go round and 
round throughout eternity, or as long at least as the 
atmosphere lasts; and after millions or billions of ages 
some gifted angel may, after carefully tracing the 
vibrations to their source, get at the original sound by 
which they are occasioned and perpetuated. A sound 
once made lives in the atmosphere in vibrations and 


270 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


convolutions forever, according to established laws of 
nature ; but such a statement is very different from the 
one which represents sound as without beginning and 
without end, and as having, moreover, a meaning 
which usage did not originate and which usage cannot 
change. And it is to us a matter of surprise that an 
intelligent man like Dr. Ballantyne should have been 
prone to confound the ancient Hindu and modern scien¬ 
tific theory, and go so far as to represent them as one 
and the same ! 

Let us now advert to the various kinds of proof ad¬ 
mitted in this school. They are six : (1) Perception, (2) 
Inference, (3) Comparison, (4) Testimony, (5) Presump¬ 
tion, and (6) Privation. Perception is thus defined in 
Book I. Aph. 4 of the treatise under consideration : 

“ Sensuous perception is the knowledge produced by 
the senses coming in contact with the soul. 5 5 

This is Mr. Kunte’s translation. That of Dr. 
Ballantyne is somewhat different, and it runs thus : 
“ When a man’s organs of sense are rightly applied to 
something extant, that birth of knowledge (which then 
takes place) is Perception. ” 

Perhaps both the versions are more or less accurate. 
According to the Nyaya and Yaiseshika Sutras, per¬ 
ception results from a twofold conjunction—conjunction 
of a sense-organ with an external object on one side, 
and the indwelling soul on the other. The ancient 
scholiast referred to thus defines four of the other 
sources of knowledge or means of proof : 

“ On sight of one member of a known association, 
the consequent apprehension of the other part which is 
not actually proximate is (cmumcm) Inference. The 
association must be such as had been before directly 
perceived, or had become known by analogy. 


THE PURYA MIMAtfSA. 


271 


u Comparison ( upamana ) is knowledge arising from 
resemblance more or less strong. It is apprehension of 
the likeness which a thing presently seen bears to one 
before observed ; and likeness or similitude is concomi- 
tancy of associates or attributes with one object, which 
were associated with one another. 

“ Presumption {arthapath) is deduction of a matter 
from that which could not else be. It is assumption of 
a thing not itself perceived, but necessarily implied by 
another, which is seen, heard, or proven. 

“ Knowledge of a thing which is not proximate (or 
subject to perception), derived through understood 
sound—that is, through words, the acceptation whereof 
is known—is ( sastras ) ordinance or revelation. It is 
(sabda) or verval communication.” 

All classes of the Mimansakas accept these five 
means of proof or sources of knowledge ; but those 
under the guidance of Kumarilla Bhatta add another 
kind of proof to this list—viz., Privation. This may 
be explained by a simple illustration. The presence of 
an effect indicates the presence of its cause, as the pres¬ 
ence of a jar indicates the presence of clay. The ab¬ 
sence of an effect similarly indicates the absence of its 
cause, and hence the conclusion —no jar , no day. This 
is Privation (Abhab). 

Colebrooke shows how these various kinds of proof 
are held by various schools of Indian Philosophy, in a 
passage which ought to be quoted : 

“ The Charvakas, as noticed in the first part of this 
essay, recognize but one—viz., Perception. The fol¬ 
lowers of Kanada and those of Sugata (Buddha) ac¬ 
knowledge two—Perception and Inference. The San- 
khyas recognize three, including Affirmation (or Revela¬ 
tion). The Kaiyayikas or followers of Gautama count 


27 2 


niKDU PHILOSOPHY. 


four—viz., the foregoing, together with Comparison. 
The Prabhakarars (or the Mimansakas under the guid¬ 
ance of Prabhakara) admit five (adding Presumption). 
And the rest of the Mimansakas enumerate six (adding 
Privation). It does not appear that a greater number 
has been alleged by any sect of Indian Philosophy.” 

The statement that Kanada’s followers, or philoso¬ 
phers of the Yaiseshika school, hold only two of these 
proofs is not quite correct, though their tendency to 
merge the others in the two accepted by the Baudhas 
may be admitted. 

The Mimansa Sutras may justly be said to embody 
an encyclopaedia of exegesis ; and almost all the prob¬ 
lems they attempt to solve are hermeneutical and 
philological rather than philosophical. Here are some 
of them stated by Mr. Kunte in his number for June, 
1877 : “ What is the principal sentence ? a subordinate 
sentence ? an indirect subordinate sentence ? or a rea¬ 
son or a causative statement ? Whether subversion of 
the S3^nthetical order of words is advisable or not ? 
What are the difficulties in the way of dividing a sen¬ 
tence ? The solution of these develops the system of 
exegetics.’ ’ 

To what books are the canons of interpretation de¬ 
veloped in this system applied ? To the Vedas, in the 
first place. The authoritativeness of these venerable 
documents was upheld in the teeth of the objections 
raised by a school of rationalists, if not several such 
schools, which had sprung up as a standing protest 
against the dogmatism maintained by the champions of 
orthodoxy. It is curious to note that the objections 
raised by rationalism against the authoritativeness of 
the Vedas, or their canonicity, are very nearly the 
same which are advanced to-day against every book 


THE PURVA MIMANSA. 


273 


professing to be a revelation directly or miraculously 
vouchsafed by God. The principles needed for our 
guidance in life were, it was affirmed with emphasis, 
implanted in the human mind, and an examination or 
analysis, subjective rather than objective, was enough 
to bring them to light. Such being the case, where 
was the necessity of an objective revelation granted in 
a supernatural way ? Again, the Vedas might be 
proved antagonistic to those moral principles regarding 
the accuracy or acceptability of which no sane man had 
ever or could ever doubt. The Vedas, moreover, were 
rendered useless by the air of mysteriousness thrown 
over many of their parts, and the mysteries coming 
out in bold relief from their pages. This last objection 
is stated in the following aphorism : “ (The Vedas are 
to no purpose) because it is impossible to know the sense 
(of some Vaidika texts).” 

It was also affirmed that the Vedas were full of con¬ 
tradictions as well as mystification, as appears from 
these aphorisms : “ (The Vedas are to no purpose) be¬ 
cause there are in them contradictory statements on the 
subject.” “ (At the time of learning under a precep¬ 
tor, as prescribed by sacred canons), the sense of the 
texts (in this connection) is never taught, and therefore 
(the Vedas are to no purpose).” 

These objections—objections based on intuition, in¬ 
consistence with the inner laws of our being, the pres¬ 
ence of mysteries, obscurity of language, and self-con¬ 
tradictoriness—are the stock-in-trade of our modern 
rationalists, as they appear to have been of their proto¬ 
types in bygone days. But some of the objections 
against the canonical authority of the Vedas, brought 
forward by the rationalists of ancient India, were pe¬ 
culiarly Indian. Here, for instance, is one : “ (The 


274 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


Yedas are to no purpose) because objects incapable of 
knowing are described (as performing sacrifices). Mr. 
Kunte thus explains this aphorism in his notes : 

“ An illustration will explain the Sutra : ‘ Oh veg¬ 
etable ! save him ! ’ This text occurs in the Taithriya 
Sanhita (1. 2. 1). ‘ Being learned, oh stones ! listen ! 5 ” 
This text occurs in the Taithriya Sanhita (1. 3. 13). 
The opponent asks, ITow can stones listen, and how can 
they be learned V J There were also objections raised of 
a purely grammatical type. These varieties of objec¬ 
tions were advanced with an earnestness fitted to show 
that Jaimini, in defending the great citadel of Hindu 
orthodoxy and propping up its moribund rites and cere¬ 
monies, had by no means an easy task to perform. 

But the canons of criticism developed in his Sutras 
are applied not only to the Y edas, but also to the vast 
body of literature which had gathered around these 
sacred records. The Yedas of course have the prece¬ 
dence, but other documents are regarded as authori¬ 
tative, though not equally so. This appears from the 
opening aphorisms of the third chapter of Book I. : 

u All duty originates in the Yedas ; therefore what 
is not to be found in the Yedas is not to be accepted. 
(First statement of an opponent.) 

“ No (though whatever is not to be found in the 
Yedas is not to be accepted, yet) from their author (of 
the Yedas and Smritis) being common, it is to be in¬ 
ferred that what is not in the Yedas is to be accepted. 
(Final statement.) 

“ For when that which is established by testimony 
(sabda or sruti) is opposed to that which is not so estab¬ 
lished (as asabda or smriti), the latter is not to be 
recognized. (And) when the two are not opposed, in¬ 
ference (smriti) is to be recognized.” 


THE PUKVA MIMANSA. 


275 


The word sruti means that which is heard, and rep¬ 
resents revelation. The Yedas alone form the sruti ; 
and as authoritative records they are placed above all 
other books or documents. The word smriti means 
that which is remembered, and is applied to the body 
of tradition that in the course of time gathered around 
these venerable records. This body of tradition is au¬ 
thoritative, but its authoritativeness is subject to one 
limitation. Its authoritativeness must be disallowed 
where there is within its compass a statement inconsis¬ 
tent with the spirit or even the letter of what was con¬ 
tradistinguished from it as the revelation heard from 
the lips of the Supreme Spirit. Barring such state¬ 
ments, and those in which “ a worldly motive is pat¬ 
ent,” the tradition is to be received as of co-ordinate 
authority with the Yedas. 

In one of the aphorisms quoted above, the authorita¬ 
tiveness of smriti or tradition is affirmed, because the 
author of the Yedas is also its author. But, properly 
speaking, the Yedas have no author, and they are 
therefore declared to be eternal. The eternity of the 
Yedas is one of the peculiar doctrines of this school, 
and is connected with its doctrine of the eternity of 
sound, as a corollary is connected with the proposition 
from which it is legitimately deduced. It is set forth 
in the verses immediately following those in which the 
theory of which it is a counterpart is propounded. We 
quote these from Dr. Ballantyne’s Fragment : 

“ And the Yedas some declare to be something 
recent, (because) there are the names of men (in them.) 

“ Because of our seeing uneternal persons (mentioned 
in the Yedas). 

“ But there has been declared (already) the priority 
of sound (to any point of time). 


276 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


“ The name, (derived from that of some mortal, was 
given to this or that section of the Yeda) because of 
his reading it. 

“ But the terms in the text (which seem to be names 
of men) are common to other objects, and do not desig¬ 
nate men.” 

These aphorisms affirm the eternity of the Yedas, 
and refute one or two of the arguments advanced 
against the doctrine by the champions or followers of 
the Logical schools. Certain names are found at the 
heads of certain sections of these records, such as 
Kathaka, Karma, etc. ; # and their appearance in such 
connection indicates human authorship, and conse¬ 
quently militates against this peculiar doctrine. Again, 
there are sentences in the Yedas in which mortals, or 
“ persons to whom belonged birth and death,” express 
some wish or breathe some prayer—such as “ Babara, 
the son of Pravahini, desired,” and “ Kusuruhinda, the 
son of Uddulaki, desired.” These sentences could not 
possibly have been penned before these persons were 
born. These objections are rebutted in a very ingeni¬ 
ous way. The. persons named at the heads of certain 
sections are the readers, not the authors, of these sec¬ 
tions, while the mortals named or represented as desir¬ 
ing are everlasting things, not human beings subject 
to the law of birth and death. Let us quote the pas¬ 
sage in which this piece of exegetical finesse appears : 
“ Although there is the name ‘ babara ’ or ‘ Prava¬ 
hini 5 (in the Yeda), yet in the text, the word Pravahini 
or the like is common —that is, is expressive also of 
some other thing (than it may appear at first sight to 
denote). For example, (in the word Pravahini), the 
prefix Pra implies ‘ excess,’ the word vah signifies 
‘ motion,’ the final i represents ‘ the agent,’ and thus 


THE PUEVA MIMAHSA. 


277 


the word signifies mind which moves very fast ^ and this 
is without beginning ; and (moreover) the word 
‘ Babara ’ is a word imitative of the sound of the mind, 
so that there is not even a smell of inconsistency.” 

Is not this precisely the way in which mythological 
heroes are being converted into natural forces and ob¬ 
jects by a class of critics in modern Europe ? Here an 
extract from an article which appeared in the Hindu 
Patriot years ago may be presented : “ The Mimansa 
is by far the most important in connection with the 
religion of the Hindus. Its object is. to reconcile the 
rituals of Hindu worship and the legends of the Purans 
with philosophy ; and the success with which the 
reconcilement has been effected by Jaimini is worthy 
of the highest praise. To quote an instance from the 
writings of the Mimansists : ‘ European writers have 
for a long time, and very justly, condemned the Hindu 
Sastras for having attributed to Brahma the odious 
charge of a disgusting incest. The Mimansists show 
that the whole of it is a mere myth. Brahma is but 
another name for Prajapati or the sun, and the dawn, 
which precedes sunrise, is poetically and very aptly de¬ 
scribed as a fair maiden born of the sun. Therefore, as 
the sun follows the dawn, it is in poetry described as 
chasing the maiden; and since the dawn merges imthe 
sun as soon as the latter has risen above the horizon, 
the allegory is complete. Other myths have been 
treated in the same way, and it is no ordinary praise to 
say that the Indian gymnosophists, some two thousand 
years ago, adopted a line of philosophical argumenta¬ 
tion which would not be unworthy of the greatest 
German scholars of the present day.’ ” 

We are certainly disposed to give our ancient philos¬ 
ophers credit for originating a specious method of ex- 


278 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


plaining away the obscenities associated with the Hindu 
faith, and the more so as it is our intention in this 
treatise to show that the most ingenious speculations 
and theories of the day were anticipated in the ancient 
world in India and in other advanced countries. But 
it ought always to be borne in mind that it is one thing 
to explain away the obnoxious features of a book or 
creed, and another to explain them. Hor must it be 
forgotten that, after all such features have been ex¬ 
plained away as are likely to bend under such handy 
modes of interpretation, an immense residuum of ob¬ 
scenity and filth remains, which no amount of exegetic 
skill and finesse can clear away. The gain therefore is 
very little indeed. Besides, what shall we say of the 
prurient imagination which delighted to clothe ordinary 
natural phenomena in various putrid shapes of vice, and 
thereby corrupt the minds and morals of a nation ? 

In the paper on the Mimansa in the u Sarva-Darsana- 
Sangraha,” an elaborate argument is presented in sup¬ 
port of the eternity of the Yedas ; and in it, as in 
almost all arguments in Hindu books, we notice a great 
deal of acuteness in combination with much puerility 
and sheer nonsense. One of the arguments brought 
forward by the Mimansakas in favor of the doctrine in 
question is thus expressed : “ But (asks the Mimansaka) 
how can the Yeda have been uttered by the incorporeal 
Parameswara, or God, who has no palate and no 
organ of speech, and who therefore cannot have pro¬ 
nounced the letters?” “ This objection (answers the 
Haiyayika) is not happy, because, though Parameswara 
is by nature incorporeal, he can yet assume a body in 
sport, in order to show kindness to his worshippers. 
Consequently the arguments in favor of the doctrine 
that the Yeda had no personal author are inconclusive. ” 


THE PURVA MIMAHSA. 


279 


The argument on which the eternity of the Yedas is 
made to hinge is a marvel of futility and inconclusive¬ 
ness. Let us here present an extract from the “ Sarva- 
Darsana-Sangraha” as illustrative of it, and the way in 
which it was met by the followers of the Nyaya 
system : “ Well, be it so (say the followers of the 
ISTyaya) ; but how can the Yedas be said to be unde¬ 
rived from any personal author, when there is no evi¬ 
dence to establish this ? Would you maintain that 
they have no personal author because, although there is 
an unbroken line of tradition, there is no remembrance 
of any author, just as is the case with the soul ? This 
argument is weak, because the alleged characteristics 
(unbroken tradition, etc.) are not proved ; for those 
who hold the human tradition of the Yedas maintain 
that the line of tradition was interrupted n,t the time of 
the dissolution of the universe. And again, what is 
meant by this assertion that the author is not remem¬ 
bered ? Is it (a) that no author is believed, or (b) that 
no author is remembered ? The first alternative cannot 
be accepted, since we hold that God is proved to have 
been the author. Nor can the second, because it can¬ 
not stand the test of the following dilemma—viz., is it 
meant (a) that no author of the Yeda is remembered 
by some person, or (b) by any person whatever ? The 
former supposition breaks down, as it would prove too 
much, since it would apply to such an isolated stanza 
as “ He who is religious and has overcome pride and 
anger,’ ’ etc. And the latter supposition is inadmissi¬ 
ble, since it would be impossible for any person who 
was not omniscient to know that no author of the 
Yeda was recollected by any person whatever. More¬ 
over, there is actual proof that the Yeda had a personal 
author, for we argue as follows : “ The sentences of 


280 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


the Yeda must have originated from a personal author, 
since they have the character of sentences like those of 
Kalidasa and other writers. And again, the sentences 
of the Yeda have been composed by a competent per¬ 
son, since, while they possess authority, they have at 
the same time the character of sentences like those of 
Manu and other sages.” 

There is one reasoning in these lines which will ap¬ 
pear dark to a reader not versed in the philosophical 
literature of India—the reasoning with pointed reference 
to the stanza quoted. The meaning is that the author 
of that stanza, though not generally known, might have 
been known to some person. The argument that it is 
necessary to be omniscient in order to prove a universal 
negative, such as no person ever remembered the 
author of any of the books of the Yeda, shows a meas¬ 
ure of penetration scarcely appreciated in the present 
age, when it has been made familiar by many a philo¬ 
sophical writer. 

Is the body of tradition called smriti also eternal like 
the Yedas ? The aphorism quoted above—that which 
ascribes the Yedas and the smritis to a u common” 
authorship—would seem at first sight to justify an 
affirmative reply. The smriti , however, is by univer¬ 
sal consent attributed to human authorship, to holy 
sages deeply read in the Yedas. It consists, properly 
speaking, of three parts : the first, in which Yedic 
truths and precepts are found epitomized and classified; 
the second, in which matter supplementary and elucida¬ 
tory is embodied ; and the third, in which statements 
occur either in direct contravention of some truth or 
precept revealed, or apparently fitted to set forth the 
selfishness or cupidity of the writers. The first part is 
of course to be accepted in all its entireness, in conse- 


THE PURVA MIMAHSA. 


281 


quence of its perfect harmony with revelation ; and the 
second part on the supposition that it would be corrob¬ 
orated if the entire revelation assumed eternally exist¬ 
ent were within reach ; but the third part is to be re¬ 
jected without ceremony. 

Then there are other books which may be accepted 
as authoritative only so far as they agree with Script¬ 
ure and reason—viz., the Kalpa-Sutra and the Grihya- 
Grantha, etc. They are, however, not to Be considered 
as parts of revelation, and they must be placed far below 
the Yedas and the smritis in authority and importance. 
But as they are the productions of men conversant in 
the Yedic literature, they may and should be consulted, 
and treated moreover with some degree of reverence. 

Established usages, customs, and institutions should 
not be despised in our attempts to ascertain our duty. 
These are of two kinds—universal and local. The lat¬ 
ter, or festivals merely local, “ such as the Holoka 
(Huh), or the spring festival in the East, the worship 
of local tutelary deities hereditarily by families in the 
South, the racing of oxen on the full moon of Jyeshtitha 
in the North, and the adoration of tribes of deities in 
the West,” are not to be regarded as of much con¬ 
sequence. 

The great object of the Mimansa Philosophy is the 
knowledge or ascertainment of duty, its watchword 
being “ Duty-inquisitiveness” in contradistinction to 
“ Brahma-inquisitiveness, ” the watchword of the 
Yedanta school. The very first aphorism of the book 
under review makes this manifest : “ Next, therefore, 
(O student that hast attained thus far), a desire to know 
Duty (Dharma) (is to be entertained by thee).” To 
ascertain this, to know our duty, we have to consult 
these sources of information, the Yedas, the smriti, the 


282 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


Kalpa-Sutras, etc., and the established customs and 
institutions of a universal stamp, not merely of local 
importance. These sources of knowledge ought to be 
consulted as pointing to duty rather than to a Being 
from whom duty derives its sanctity and authority or 
imperativeness. The Mimansakas as a rule thrust God 
into the background, and some of them even go so far 
as to deny His existence. Pandit Hehemiah Hilkanta 
Goreh, in his very able treatise, “ A Rational Refuta¬ 
tion of the Hindu Philosophical Systems,” thus sum-, 
marizes the principles of this school : 

“ It is not the design of the Mimansa, as it is of the 
other systems, to consider bondage, and emancipation, 
and soul, and what is not soul, but simply to treat of 
the precepts of the Yeda, and of its cultus ; and I do 
not purpose examining it as touching these heads. Its 
points, which are here specially deserving of mention, 
are as follows : First, it repudiates the idea of a God, 
and, in the second place, it contends that the Yeda was 
originated by no one, but has always existed. The in¬ 
junctions, inhibitions, and good and evil fruits of works 
rehearsed in it, are held indeed to be true. But the 
accounts of the divinities given in the Yeda are reputed 
to be false, and are written solely for the purpose of 
magnifying works. "With regard to this matter, the 
surprising notions about to be noted are proposed. It is 
recorded in the Yeda that Elysium is obtained by sacri¬ 
fice. And a sacrificial observance consists in offering 
in fire, clarified butter, flesh, etc., to Indra, Yaruna, 
Agni, and other divinities, with the recitation and 
reiteration of hymns of praise from the Yeda, and 
laudation of the exploits and virtues of the aforesaid 
divinities. How, the Mimansakas assert that Indra 
and those other divinities have no existence whatever, 


THE PURVA MIMAHSA. 


283 


and that the prowess ascribed to them is entirely ficti¬ 
tious. Nevertheless, there is such a wonderful potency 
in the falling of offerings into the fire, in their name, 
after the manner prescribed in the Yeda, in uttering 
the syllables of the songs that hymn them, as to insure 
attainment of celestial abodes.’’ 

The learned Pandit does not quote a single text from 
the Mimansa Sutras in support of his summary, and 
specially in support of his assertion that the Miman- 
sakas “ repudiate the idea of a God.” In a foot-note 
he gives his reason in these words : “ To name one 
Mimansaka, Parthasarathi Misra, in the first chapter 
of the Sastra Dipika, labors at length to overset the 
arguments adducible to prove the existence of Deity.” 
And with reference to his assertion that the gods men¬ 
tioned in the Yedas, Indra, Yaruna, etc., are regarded 
as myths rather than real persons, he quotes the fol¬ 
lowing verse from a manuscript called Bhatta-Dipika : 
“ Therefore it is not by any means to be acknowledged 
that a god is an embodied form, and so forth ; but he 
is to be regarded as a mere verbal expression of the 
Yeda. As for the thing signified by that expression, 
it is held to be, according to the expression, some sen¬ 
tient being or unsentient object—not endowed, how¬ 
ever, with a figure, etc., i.e. purely notional. But in 
devotion and so forth, mere meditation on him, in pict¬ 
uring to one’s self the unreal as real, is to be observed. 
Such is the gist of the doctrine of Jaimini here consid¬ 
ered. But, by the very repetition of this blasphemy, 
my tongue contracts defilement—from which the re¬ 
membrance of Hari is the only safeguard.” 

The atheistic feature of the Mimansa as it now exists 
in its fully developed form is certainly not inconsistent 
with its original principles, and it perhaps grew out of 


284 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


them when they were pushed to their legitimate conse¬ 
quences. It was not brought into bold relief, and 
perhaps not definitely apprehended at the time of 
Jaimini, whose Sutras simply throw God and the Yedic 
pantheon of gods and goddesses into the background. 
The worshipper, according to these, does not need 
either him or them to stir up devotion within him, or 
to pave his way to the speedy realization of his object. 
His attention is withdrawn from them, and concen¬ 
trated on the work he has to do, and he is assured that 
that work has an inherent potency, and will bear its 
fruits, good or bad, in its own time. Whether this 
innate tendency is dependent on an economy unalter¬ 
ably established by God, or whether it is entirely inde¬ 
pendent of the power, will, or the decrees of God—these 
questions the Mimansa Sutras do not meet in the 'face 
or attempt to solve. But their tone is in favor of the 
position that work derives its efficacy, its mysterious 
power, from itself, rather than from a Being or force 
apart from it, and that it would bear fruit even if God 
and the array of beings called gods and goddesses did 
not exist, or existed as mere ciphers rather than living, 
working agents. There is therefore no use of looking 
up to them or making them objects of contemplation, 
and asking them to hear our prayers and answer them. 
Let them live, if they live at all, behind the veil, and 
let us perform conscientiously the work which will bear 
its own fruits, whether they exist or not. 

This mysterious power is called Apurva. Colebrooke 
makes the following observations on it : “ The subject 
which most engages attention throughout the Mimansa, 
recurring at every turn, is the invisible or spiritual, 
operation of an act of merit. The action ceases, yet 
the consequence does not immediately ensue. A virtue 


THE PURVA MIMAHSA. 


285 


mean time subsists unseen, but efficacious to connect 
the consequence with its past and remote cause, and to 
bring about at a distant period, or in another world, 
the relative effect.” 

It is to be observed that this mysterious potency is 
acknowledged in almost all schools of Indian Philoso¬ 
phy, and it is the characteristic feature of Buddhism, to 
which the Mimansa is favorable in some respects and 
hostile in others. Like it, the Mimansa throws God 
and His worship into the background, and renders His 
existence superfluous by maintaining the efficacy of 
work, if not its creative power. And like it, the 
Mimansa seems to maintain the eternity of the world, 
or its successive evolutions and involutions in cycles, 
beginningless and endless. But while Buddhism de¬ 
clares a war of extermination against the doctrine of 
sacrifice, the Mimansa gives the greatest prominence to 
it—upholds, enjoins, and exalts it in varieties of ways, 
through varieties of express declarations, and by the 
varieties of laudations of which it is made the favored 
theme. Sacrifice, in short, is the duty enjoined in the 
Mimansa, and paradise is the end proposed. 

A sacrifice, according to the Mimansa, is a thing or 
animal voluntarily and cheerfully offered. Sacrifices 
are, therefore, of two kinds—bloodless and bloody. 
The sacrifices connected with the soma-plant (asclepias 
acida) and the exhilarating juice expressed out of it, 
being more or less like simple libations of wine, are 
examples of bloodless sacrifice, as also simple oblations 
called ishtisj and burnt-offerings called homa , consist¬ 
ing of ghi or clarified butter, and other things thrown 
into a fire raked up into a flame. The bloody sacrifices 
of the Vedic Age, such as the asma-medha , the horse- 
sacrifice ; the pasu-medha , or the sacrifice of smaller 


286 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


animals, goats, sheep, etc.; the nar-bali , or human 
sacrifices, had received a check from the spread of 
Buddhism, and were less common in the age of the 
Mi mansa. According to its teaching, while all these 
are helps, paradise is secured by the model sacrifice, 
called Jyotistoma , which is a permanent sacrifice, and 
the complicated ceremony connected with which must 
be performed by a Hindu at least once in his lifetime. 
With reference to this sacrifice, let us present two ex¬ 
tracts from Mr. Kunte’s serial (Eo. for October, 1877) : 
“ Jyotistoma is a big model sacrifice. Agnistoma, 
Atyagnistoma, Ukthya, Sodeshi, Atiratra, Aptiryama, 
and Yajapaya—these are the seven big sacrifices or 
sansthas. They are modifications of Jyotistoma, the 
model sacrifice. 5 ’ 

“ The Yaidikacharjya observes : ‘ It must not be 
stated that the seven sacrifices and the Jyotistoma are 
not all model sacrifices. Only the Jyotistoma sacrifice 
is the model sacrifice, and the seven sacrifices are its 
modifications.’ Baudhacharjya, you will ask, why 
such a distinction should be made ? Listen, then, to 
what I have to say. The Jyotistoma sacrifice is a per¬ 
manent and obligatory sacrifice, and is distinguished 
from occasional or optional sacrifices. Every Arya 
must in his lifetime perform the Jyotistoma sacrifice. 
The Jyotistoma sacrifice is not performed for accom¬ 
plishing any human desire. He that seeks to obtain 
heaven ought to perform the Jyotistoma sacrifice.” 

This great sacrifice is offered twice every month at 
the full and change of the moon, and it consists of vari¬ 
ous parts—principal, subordinate, and those subsidiary 
to the subordinate. Hot only does the whole sacrifice 
exercise a mysterious and unseen influence, but each of 
the subordinate and subsidiary parts has its peculiar 


THE PUKVA MIMAHSA. 


287 


efficacy ; and they all combined prepare the soul for a 
prolonged season of enjoyment in paradise. The 
“ Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha” thus speaks of the efficacy 
of each of the parts, principal or subordinate : ‘ ‘ These, 
however, the new-moon and full-moon sacrifices, only 
produce their unseen effect, which is the principal 
apurva, by means of the various minor effects or sub¬ 
ordinate apurvas, produced by the various subordinate 
parts of the whole ceremony.” . . . 

It ought here to be mentioned that a mysterious 
efficacy is attributed to the mere reading of the Yedas, 
the chanting of the hymns, the repetition of certain mys¬ 
tic words and syllables, as om, etc., and the utterance 
of certain prayers and imprecations. It is not necessary 
to carry with us an intelligent appreciation of the 
varied parts of this most complex ceremony, or to un¬ 
derstand the hymns, chants, prayers, and exorcisms 
connected with it. The bare repetition of them, even 
when accompanied with an utter failure to comprehend 
their meaning or keep in view the varied ends they are 
intended to subserve, is enough to secure some degree, 
if not the fulness, of the merit promised. A great deal 
of care is taken to insure correct pronunciation and in¬ 
tonation, but merit is not withheld even where the 
words are mispronounced and the tones misapplied. A 
more complete system of ritualism in its worst form it 
is perhaps impossible to find apart from these records ! 

But was self-immolation practised in the early times 
of which the Sutras present so vivid a picture ? The 
various kinds of religious suicide with which the student 
of Indian history is most familiar—such as widows burn¬ 
ing themselves on the funeral pyres of their deceased 
husbands, or men drowning themselves in sacred rivers 
and seas, or burying themselves alive, or throwing 


288 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


themselves headlong from precipices, or having them¬ 
selves crushed underneath the wheels of a huge car— 
were unknown. The only species of self-immolation 
practised was that exemplified by the Indian devotee 
Calanus, who accompanied Alexander’s army to Baby¬ 
lon, and who, when ripe for immediate translation into 
heaven, had a funeral pyre made and set on flame, 
cheerfully mounted it, and had himself burned on it. 
As has already been said, the Brahmin anxious to 
secure extraordinary merit divided his life into four 
parts, devoting the first to studentship, the second to 
the duties of a householder, the third to those of a 
hermit, and the fourth and last to those of a mendi¬ 
cant. But before the last act of the drama was played 
out, he burned himself alive, and passed into glory 
through a path less tedious than that of disease and 
death. Suicide was considered in India, as in other 
lands demoralized by philosophy falsely so called, not 
merely not censurable, but positively praiseworthy, at 
least under particular circumstances ! 

The Purva Mimansa has nothing directly to do with 
the great subject of the schools, the emancipation of 
the soul from the bonds of ignorance. It is not, how¬ 
ever, wholly unconnected with that blessed state, as 
the initiatory or preparatory work, without which com¬ 
plete deliverance is unattainable, is the grand theme of 
its dissertations. A devotee must pass through two 
distinct stages before the liberation of his ignorance- 
bound spirit can be an accomplished fact, or the sum- 
mum bonum is realized. These are the Karma-Kand 
and the Gyan - Kand , the stage of Duty and the stage 
of Knowledge, the Department of Works and the De¬ 
partment of Contemplation. The exercises connected 
with the initiatory stage are set forth in the Mimansa, 


THE PURVA MIMANSA. 


289 


while those connected with the higher stage are set 
forth in the Vedanta, which, therefore, is as decidedly 
the counterpart of this school as the Yoga is the coun¬ 
terpart of the Sankhya. The reward promised in the 
Mimansa to a faithful discharge of the duties enjoined 
therein is only a temporary season of bliss in paradise 
followed by a renewed life ; but ultimate emancipation 
from the thraldom of transmigration must be attained 
through exercises of a loftier order. 

It is desirable, before taking leave of this school, to 
raise one important question : Has the Mimansa noth¬ 
ing to do with worship ? It certainly has, the Karma- 
Kand being divided into two subsidiary departments— 
the Karma-Kand exclusively so called, and the Upa- 
sana-Kand, Duty and Worship. It is not, however, 
necessary, according to its teaching, to have a god or 
a pantheon of gods and goddesses to enforce the one 
and render the other practicable. Elaborate forms are 
prescribed, along with prayers, hymns, chants, impre¬ 
cations, deprecations, incantations, and exorcisms ; and 
if these are carefully attended to and rightly observed, 
the preparatory work is completed and the reward 
promised is insured. The champions of the Mimansa 
do not rise up to the level of the progressive scientists 
of the day, who maintain that no worship is needed be¬ 
sides the performance of one’s own duty to society and 
a calm contemplation of the order of nature. They 
maintain the paramount necessity of devotional and 
ritualistic observances ; and they act very wisely in 
throwing such abstractions as the impersonal God of 
Hindu Philosophy, and such phantasms as Cosmos and 
Primal Force, into the background, together with deities 
who are monsters either of cruelty or vice. How many 
who believe in a personal God and in His brightest 


290 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


revelation in Christ Jesus look upon their mill-horse 
method of going round a cycle of lifeless ceremonies, 
with no thought beyond their stated return and mo¬ 
notonous observance, as enough to make us happy here, 
and pave our way to heavenly bliss ! 


CHAPTER X. 


THE YED ANT A SYSTEM, OR HINDU PANTHEISM. 

Now we come to the last of the systems called ortho¬ 
dox, the Uttara Mimansa, or the Yedanta. The order 
in which the systems were elaborated, one after an¬ 
other, cannot possibly be set forth ; but the first and 
last links of the chain may, as has already been said, 
be fixed with tolerable certainty. The systems began 
with materialism of the rankest type, and terminated in 
absolute pantheism. The Sankhya, with its apparent 
dualism but real materialistic monism, was decidedly 
the first of the varied forms in which orthodox specula¬ 
tion appeared in ancient India, and its claim to ortho¬ 
doxy was substantiated by the fact that its champions 
appealed to the Yedas in support even of its most ob¬ 
noxious theories. The Yoga system, its counterpart, 
silenced popular clamor by adding to its admitted enti¬ 
ties a god as passive, quiescent, and useless as the soul 
posited by it. The atomic theory was then propounded 
by the schools called Analytic, the Naiyayika, and 
Yaiseshika schools ; and creation was traced, not to 
the quiescent and useless God, whose existence was 
admitted by their champions ; not to the human soul, 
equally quiescent and useless in their estimation, but to 
an unseen, mysterious force called Adrishta, the accu¬ 
mulated merit and demerit, or the work of all the past 
stages of existence. The consequence of these schemes 
of thought was, and could not but be, the prevalence 


292 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


of a species of scepticism unfavorable, if not avowedly 
hostile, to the popular faith ; and against this really, if 
not avowedly, antagonistic force or influence a reaction 
was brought about by the speculations of Jaimini, the 
father of resuscitated ritualism. 

Indian Philosophy was in its inception and early prog¬ 
ress a reaction against ritualism. The simple worship 
of the forces and agencies of nature in the compara¬ 
tively pure Yedic age had been supplanted by a cum¬ 
brous system of ritualism ; and sacrifices, great and 
small, each consisting of a regular paraphernalia of 
ceremonial observances, accompanied with varieties of 
hymns and chants, imprecations and deprecations, in¬ 
cantations and exorcisms, washings and purifications, 
and presided over by accredited representatives of a 
hierarchy almost deified, had taken the place of prayers 
and songs, rhapsodical indeed, but on the whole natural 
and impassioned. But mummeries and tomfooleries, 
however thoroughly systematized and sanctified by 
religion, could only cast a veil over the important prob¬ 
lems of life, but not burke them ; might bury the spirit 
of inquiry for a time, but could not extinguish it. 
And, therefore, when this system of externalism ap¬ 
peared in its most obnoxious forms, a reaction was 
realized, and rationalism made its appearance in forms 
more or less attractive. 

But rationalism is as wild and unmanageable as ritual¬ 
ism, and it developed in India into a series of forms as 
obnoxious as the tj r pes of ritualism from which it had 
derived its existence. It is very common to laugh at a 
person who attaches a great deal of importance not 
only to certain prayers and hymns, but to the manner 
in which the prayers are said and the hymns are 
chanted ; who looks upon certain turnings of the face 


THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 


293 


and postures of the body as peculiarly meritorious, and 
others as fraught with mischievous consequences ; who 
regards the proper intonation of certain mystical words 
and syllables as fitted to send away impure spirits, and 
bring in those whose presence is a source of strength 
and consolation ; and who, in a word, converts religion 
into a scheme of ceremonialism and casuistry, mimicry 
and masquerade, hollow professions and wrong prac¬ 
tices. But it should not be forgotten that our risibility 
is equally stimulated by the absurdities into which 
those thinkers are betrayed who find it hard to ascribe 
creation to an intelligent voluntary Being, but exceed¬ 
ingly easy to trace it to blind chance or an inscrutable 
force ; who throw the Creator into the background, if 
not into the limbo of non-existence, and at the same time 
prescribe devotion to a phantom like the genius of hu¬ 
manity, or the spirit of progress, or the shade of liberty, 
or the beauty of womanhood ; who wipe away the 
essential distinction between virtue and vice, and then 
exhort us to be self-sacrificing in obedience to a code of 
morality framed by selfishness ; and who, like Hindu 
philosophers, recommend austerity, penance, and ascetic 
contemplation, while refusing to recognize any being 
higher than self, and reducing that self to the level of 
inanimate matter by depriving it of its intelligence and 
instinctive or volitional activity. If ritualism has its 
absurdities, rationalism has its also ! 

Rationalism in India developed into varied grotesque 
and absurd forms, and its extravagance brought on a 
reaction against it. This reaction was headed by 
Jaimini, the founder of the Burva Mimansa school, 
who strove successfully to draw away public attention 
from the unsolvable problems of existence, and concen¬ 
trate it on the practical portions of revelation—the por- 


294 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


tions in which human duty is pointed out in the clearest 
terms possible. He revived the age of the Brahmanas, 
and applied to those hoary documents a system of ex¬ 
egesis which he had elaborated with great care. The 
question of the origin of the Yedas and their authorita¬ 
tiveness did not engage his attention so thoroughly as 
the principles involved in their correct interpretation. 
With unflinching logic he applied his own canons of in¬ 
terpretation to their miscellaneous contents, and suc¬ 
ceeded in evolving from them a system of ritualism 
even more complicated than that from which the 
rationalism of the Upanishads had been a relief. 

But ritualism revived and carried to excess bore its 
fruit, and rationalism once more made its appearance. 
It appeared at first in its less repellent forms, and in¬ 
stead of ostensibly or even really striving to overturn 
the sacred Scriptures, it freely admitted their authori¬ 
tativeness, and professed unreserved veneration for 
them. It modestly represented its great work as 
simple interpretation of its contents, not their modifica¬ 
tion or revision. Jaimini had applied certain canons of 
interpretation to the earlier portions of the Yedas, the 
Mantras, and the Brahmanas ; and these had now to 
be applied with logical force to the later portion, the 
Upanishads. The whole of revelation must be accepted 
and correctly interpreted, not merely a part, or the part 
suited to our inclinations and tastes. The hymnology 
and the ritual had been made the subjects of elaborate 
exegetical dissertations, and thus far a great work had 
been accomplished. But something remained to be 
done. The concluding portions of these venerable 
records had not been analyzed and explained ; and as 
they, constituting part and parcel of revelation, could 
not be dispensed with or neglected without a serious 


THE VEDAHTA SYSTEM. 


295 


and irreparable loss, somebody must undertake the task 
of elucidating their contents, as Jaimini had done in 
the case of the earlier portions. 

The great man who undertook this important task, 
and who is honored and revered as the head of the 
Yedantic school, was Badarayuna, or Yyas. He is 
called Yeda-Yyas ; and a legend is preserved fitted to 
show the propriety of his assumption of this title, or 
ascription of it to him by general consent. He had in 
a former fife made himself ripe for beatitude by aus¬ 
terity and meditation ; but he was sent back to the 
world to do a work which no other person could do— 
viz., that of compiling the Yedas, with which his name 
is inseparably associated. A great many other legends 
are related in the sacred books of the Hindus illustra¬ 
tive of his greatness and manifold labors. In the 
Purans he is said to have been an incarnation of 
Yishnu, a fact which no amount of ingenuity can 
reconcile to the notion of his having in a former life 
worked up his way to complete emancipation, and 
being sent back to perform a work of love when almost 
in the arms of beatitude ; though Colebrooke sees no 
difficulty in effecting the reconciliation. If all that is 
said about him is reliable, he seems to have been the 
most voluminous writer the country ever saw. He is 
said to have composed the Mahabharat, written several 
of the Purans, compiled the Yedas, and indited the 
Sutras in which the principles of the Yedantic school 
are set forth. But it is to be observed that the state¬ 
ments which make him the author of such a hetero¬ 
geneous mass of literature ascribe to him a great deal 
of versatility indeed, but very little of consistency and 
of sound sense. It is by no means possible to reconcile 
to one another the books he is said to have penned, or 


29G 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


to evolve out of them a consistent scheme of thought 
or principle ; and therefore the supposition that there 
were several persons of this name, who lived and wrote 
at different times and under diverse circumstances, is 
the only one that appears tenable. 

The great work of Vyas, with which we have to do 
in this paper, is the Saririka or Brahma Sutras. This 
work consists of four books, each subdivided into four 
chapters. The entire number of aphorisms thus classi¬ 
fied is 555, and the number of topics treated of or sec¬ 
tions is 191. In bulk, therefore, it is left behind by 
the work of Jaimini ; but in the loftiness of its themes 
and depth of its philosophy it surpasses its rival; while 
in logical precision and force both the documents are 
on a par and equally deserving of the praise bestowed 
upon the Mimansa Sutras by Max Muller. 

The Brahma Sutras, however, are exceptionally ob¬ 
scure in their phraseology and statements, and scholias 
upon scholias have been written to elucidate their con¬ 
tents. The greatest name among its ancient scholiasts 
or commentators is Baudhayana, a title signifying that 
the bearer of it was a religious devotee entitled to pe¬ 
culiar reverence. But in modern times his exegetical 
dissertations are rarely consulted, they having been 
superseded by the works of the celebrated scholiast 
Sankar Acharya, who lived about seven hundred years 
after the birth of Christ, and whose comments on the 
most important of the Upanishads and on the Saririka 
Sutras are masterpieces of acute thought and philo¬ 
sophical reasoning. 

The first chapter of the first book of the Sutras, and 
four aphorisms of the second were translated by the 
Rev. K. M. Banerjea, LL.D., some years ago, along with 
Sankar’s comments. It is to be regretted that Dr. 


THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 


297 


Banerjea, the greatest native scholar in and out of the 
native church, has not been able to continue this great 
work of his. A fragment also was translated by Dr. 
Ballantyne ; but we have failed in our efforts to pro¬ 
cure a copy of his translation. Mr. Kunte, of Ahmed- 
abad, has, in his serial, Saddarsana-Chintanika , trans¬ 
lated all the four chapters of the first book ; but he has, 
instead of proceeding further, begun the work of trans¬ 
lating the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali. His comments or 
notes are very valuable so far as they go, inasmuch as 
they embody the sentiments, not merely of the school 
of Sankar Acharya, but of the rival school set up in 
opposition to it by Ramanuja, who discarded absolute 
pantheism and maintained the existence of three enti¬ 
ties—the ego, the non-ego, and the infinite. These 
translations we shall lay under contribution in our 
treatment of the subject, and the copious extracts 
presented from all the chapters of all the books of this 
standard work in Colebrooke’s celebrated essay on the 
Yedanta. 

In treating of the Yedantic system, as perhaps of 
every other system of philosophy, a broad line of dis¬ 
tinction ought to drawn between its earlier forms and 
later developments. A system of philosophy appears 
at first in a crude, undigested form, very likely in a 
series of unconnected aphorisms or statements. As it 
makes progress its different parts appear loosely joined 
or inconsistent with one another, and varieties of ques¬ 
tions with reference to its essential truths and outer 
garment of diction and phraseology are raised by the 
inquisitive mind. To reconcile apparent and real in¬ 
consistencies, to explain obscure statements and lop off 
excrescences, new theories are formed and new specula¬ 
tions are allowed to run high. And in process of time 


298 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


new elements of truth are superadded and fresh expla¬ 
nations given ; and the original system appears in a 
new form, with its inner life matured and even modi¬ 
fied, and its outer garment renovated. And therefore 
the historian of the system in question cannot do justice 
to it without discriminating between its original prin¬ 
ciples and later accretions. 

It is to be feared that such discretion is not shown 
by our learned and pious brother, Pandit Nehemiah 
Goreh, in his excellent work entitled “ A Rational Refu¬ 
tation of the Hindu Philosophical Systems.” He pre¬ 
sents his views of the systems with perspicuity and 
force, but he scarcely quotes from the original Sutras 
or aphorisms in support of his statements. His foot¬ 
notes are rich in citations, though the body of his work 
is singularly free from them ; but the books he lays 
under contribution are as a rule not the original works 
of the founders of the systems—the Sutras of Kapila or 
Patanjali or Gautama or Kanada or Jaimini or Bada- 
rayana—but later documents, of great authority indeed, 
but not such as are entitled to the honor ascribed or 
the importance attached to the original sources of in¬ 
formation. This is specially the case in the large por¬ 
tion of his great work devoted to a treatment of the 
Yedanta system. - 

The learned Pandit devotes about half of his work to 
a very able exposition of the principles and errors asso¬ 
ciated with the Yedanta system. But he does not sus¬ 
tain his views of the system by quotations from the 
Brahma Sutras, which are entirely thrown into the 
shade in his very able disquisitions. He lays under 
contribution such books as the Yedanta Paribhasa and 
the Yedanta Sar, and such manuscripts as the Sank- 
shepa Saririka and Sastra Dipika. His object does 


THE VEDANTA. SYSTEM. 


209 


not perhaps require a reference to or analysis of the 
original Sutras ; but as he advocates a view different 
from that ordinarily held and presented of Vedantism, 
it is a pity that his sentiments are not corroborated by 
quotations from the acknowledged writings of its 
founder. 

The Pandit in the first of the two scholarly pam¬ 
phlets he has very recently published on “ Theism and 
Christianity” goes so far as to affirm : “ First, I must 
remove a great mistake which is generally made, that 
of considering Vedantism as identical with pantheism. 
They are not quite the same. ’ 5 Why ? Because Vedant- 
ism attributes a species of existence, called Vyavarika 
or practical, to the external world. In the first chap¬ 
ter of the third section of this great work, “A .Rational 
Refutation,” etc., the section devoted to an analysis of 
Vedantism and an exposure of the errors associated 
with it, he treats of the three sorts of existence main¬ 
tained by the Vedantins, and he quotes in one of his 
foot-notes the following verse from the Vedanta- 
Paribhasa to set forth what they are “ Existence is 
of three sorts—true ( 'paramarthika ), practical (vyava¬ 
rika), and apparent ( pratibhashika ). True existence is 
that of Brahma ; practical, that of ether, etc. ; appar¬ 
ent, that of nacrine silver and the like.” But the 
Pandit must admit that these three sorts of existence 
are nowhere found in the Upanishads and the Brahma 
Sutras, the original documents of the Vedantic system, 
and that there is no ground for denying that the form 
of faith unfolded in them is pantheism. 

Hay, the Pandit himself admits as much when in the 
pamphlet alluded to he says : “ If any one would say 
that this phase of Vedantism, which sets forth the 
theories of Maya, of the falseness of the world, and 


300 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


different kinds of existence, is not found clearly enunci¬ 
ated in the Upanishads, but is rather a later develop¬ 
ment, then I would answer, that if you would appeal to 
that only which seems expressly stated in the Upan¬ 
ishads, you will not mend the matter. For if, accord¬ 
ing to the literal rendering of their words, Brahma 
itself has become everything in reality—man, beast, 
wood, stone, yea, good men as well as most vicious 
men—then Brahma’s omnipotence, omniscience, purity, 
etc. are changed into feebleness, ignorance, impurity, 
and even into inanimate substance. And it is, as I said 
before, to save the Yedanta from this absurdity that 
the Yedanta doctors explain its teaching by the theo¬ 
ries of Maya and different kinds of existence.” 

In this passage the Pandit virtually yields the point, 
and admits that Yedantism, as taught in the Upan¬ 
ishads, is pantheism, and implies a real change of the 
divine into material substance, and the forms or modes 
in which both appear. Now the Brahma Sutras revive 
the religion of the Upanishads as thoroughly as the 
Sutras of Jaimini revive the religion of the other parts 
of the Yedas, the Mantras, and the Brahmanas. And 
whatever is predicated of the scheme of thought de¬ 
veloped in the Upanishads must of needs be predicated 
of that unfolded in the Sutras of Badarayuna. 

We shall develop the system in this paper as it orig¬ 
inally stood by quotations from the Saririka Sutras, 
and reserve our remarks on its later developments for a 
separate paper, of which we shall make the Yedanta 
Sar, recently translated by Major Jacob, our text-book. 

What ground have we for stating that this is the last 
of the systems of philosophy called orthodox ? In the 
first place, let it be observed that all the other systems 
are referred to in the Brahma Sutras and combated. 


THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 


301 


The Sankhya cosmogony is adopted in its salient feat¬ 
ures, but varieties of reasons are brought forward to 
show that its Prakriti or Pradhan could not possibly 
have been the creator of the universe. In the very 
first chapter of the first book an attempt is made to 
prove that the source of existence in its multifarious 
forms could not possibly have been an unintelligent, 
unsentient material form, and that the Sankhyas have 
got their notions simply by perverting the Scriptures. 
The atomic theory of Kanada is made the subject of 
many a denunciatory argument, while Jaimini is ex¬ 
pressly named in the following aphorism : “ The opin¬ 
ion of Jaimini is, The statement that the Supreme 
Spirit is directly to be worshipped does not conflict 
(with any text).” 

But Badarayuna is also named in Jaimini’s Sutras as 
well as in this. That he is named in his own Sutras 
the following aphorism will show : “In the opinion of 
Badarayuna, there are beings above man who have a 
title to the contemplation of Brahma, because this is 
possible.” On this apparent anomaly Colebrooke 
makes the following remarks : 

“ The name of Badarayuna frequently recurs in the 
Sutras ascribed to him, as does that of Jaimini, the 
reputed author of the Purna Mimansa, in his. I have 
already remarked in the preceding essay on the men¬ 
tion of an author by his name, and in the third person, 
in his own work. It is nothing unusual in the litera¬ 
ture or science of the other nations ; but a Hindu com¬ 
mentator will account for it by presuming the actual 
composition to be that of a disciple recording the words 
of his teacher.” 

Badarayuna accepts the six proofs or sources of 
knowledge admitted in the Purva-Mimansa school— 


302 


IIIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


viz., Perception, Inference, Comparison, Presumption, 
Revelation, or Testimony and Privation. Revelation, 
however, is the only proof most thoroughly utilized in 
his Sutras, and the others are brought forward only to 
prop up its declarations, his avowed object being to 
revive the philosophy embodied in it, not to initiate a 
new scheme of thought. Badarayuna also adopts 
Jaimini’s method of treating of a subject or “ topic,” 
which is represented as consisting of five parts—(1) the 
subject or matter to be explained, (2) the doubt or ques¬ 
tion concerning it, (3) the plausible solution or jprimd- 
facie argument, (4) the answer or demonstrated conclu¬ 
sion and true solution, (5) the pertinence or relevancy 
and connection.” 

It is superfluous to say that Badarayuna admits the 
canonicity and authoritativeness of the Yedas, as 
Jaimini does. lie also adopts Jaimini’s doctrine of the 
eternity of sound and the eternity of the Yeda. This 
is distinctly stated by Colebrooke in the following pas¬ 
sage : “In the course of this disquisition the noted 
question of the eternity of sound, of articulate sound in 
particular, is mooted and examined. It is a favorite 
topic in both Mimansas, being intimately connected 
with that of the eternity of the Yeda or revelation ac¬ 
knowledged by them.” 

But there are aphorisms in which the Yeda is ex¬ 
pressly traced to the authorship of God or Brahma. 
The very third aphorism of the first book is a proof of 
this statement : “ Because it is the cause of the Sastra, 
(or) because the Sastra is its manifesting cause.” San¬ 
kara in commenting on these words says : “ Brahma is 
the cause of the great Sastra, the Rig Yeda, etc., sup¬ 
ported by numerous (subsidiary) systems of science ; 
bringing to light, like a lamp, all objects, and being, as 


THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 


303 


it were, all-knowing. Indeed, of such a Sastra, defined 
as the Rig Yeda, etc., endowed with the quality of all¬ 
knowledge, the production cannot be from any other 
than the omniscient.” Again : “ What shall I say, 
then, of the supreme omniscience and omnipotence of 
that Great Being, from which Great Being, as the 
cause, proceeded without effort and as a mere sport, 
after the manner of the human breath, that mine of all 
knowledge called Rig Yeda, etc., diversified by many 
varieties of Sakhas, and the source of the classification 
into varna and asram , of gods, animals, and men V 5 
How are these two truths—the eternity of the Yeda 
and its procession from Brahma—to be reconciled ? 
Hot, certainly, without very great difficulty. One of 
the theories regarding the Yeda is that it has from all 
eternity issued from Brahma as a breath, just as light 
has issued from the sun since the very first moment of 
his existence as a luminous body. In other words, as 
breath is inseparable from a living person in this world, 
as light is inseparable from a luminous body, as fluidity 
is inseparable from water, so is the Yeda inseparable 
from the Supreme Spirit, as well when in a state of 
quiescence as when in its creative moods. It is, how¬ 
ever, said to issue as an efilation from Brahma when, 
after a long period of quiescence, it begins to develop 
into a renewed creation “as a sport.” The Sankhya 
doctrine, that at every renovation of creation the Yeda 
issues like an efilation from Prakriti, is transferred 
mutatis mutandis to the Yedanta school, with perhaps 
this addition, that during the long periods of divine 
quiescence, which alternate with periods of creative 
activity, the sacred volume continues its manifestation 
as a breath, although unperceived and unappreciated 
by any rational being. And in this way the doctrine 


304 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


of its eternity is made to harmonize with that of its 
procession from the Supreme Spirit. Does not this 
doctrine tend to remind the Church of its dogma of the 
eternal procession of the Holy Spirit ? 

The sacredness of the smritis is also admitted, though 
many of the statements embodied in them are attacked 
with unflinching severity. The twenty-third aphorism 
of the third chapter of the First Book refers to these 
writings as authorities : “ Again, in works called the 
smritis (the same) is found.” The Sutras of the fore¬ 
going champions of philosophy, or founders of philo¬ 
sophical schools of an orthodox type, are ranked with 
the smritis properly so called. But they are at the 
same time criticised with the greatest freedom, and 
condemned as if they were mere human compositions 
when they appear as a whole or in part worthy of con¬ 
demnation. Kapila and his followers are referred to 
with the veneration due to Maharishis or apostolic 
teachers ; and yet an exterminating crusade is fought 
by Badarayuna in his Sutras against their opinions and 
principles. The Yoga Sastra or Patanjali is called 
“ Yoga-smriti,” and yet the philosophy with which 
its practical directions are inseparably associated is 
made the subject of many a vehement denunciation. 
The same may be said of the treatment with which 
Kanada, whose writings are also classed with smritis, 
is favored. 

Such treatment of the writings to which the sacred 
appellation of the Smritis is attached by universal con¬ 
sent, proves what we said in our last paper—viz., that 
tradition is to be accepted only when it agrees with the 
Scriptures. But when it obviously runs counter to 
them, or has for its basis a misinterpretation of its 
express declarations, it ought to be unceremoniously 


THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 


305 


rejected as a tiling of no authority or consequence 
whatever. This is. we believe, the firm conviction of 
all sensible men in the Church with reference to the 
body of tradition it inherits. The traditions of the 
Church are authoritative only when they agree with 
the Scriptures; but when they are, in spirit or in letter, 
not in harmony with or in direct contradiction to the 
word and the testimony, they should be thrown aside 
as mere rubbish. But as in the Christian Church there 
are those who raise the traditions above the Scriptures, 
there are multitudes in India who throw the Vedas into 
the background and transfer the homage due to them 
to the writings called Smritis. 

But why are the writings of Kapila, Patanjali, and 
Kanada regarded as Smritis or sacred traditions, while 
those of Buddha and others are regarded as heretical ? 
Because the systematists uphold the canon icity or 
authoritativeness of the Vedas, while Buddha and his 
followers looked upon them as human compositions— 
venerable indeed, but of no authority—just as large 
bodies of professors in the Christian Church look upon 
the writings of the fathers. Orthodoxy and heterodoxy 
seem to have consisted in acceptance and rejection of 
these records as authoritative, rather than of any for¬ 
mulated schemes of doctrine and precept. And the 
result was that doctrinal errors of the most obnoxious 
type were promulgated, and irregularities of practice of 
the most disastrous stamp were legalized by men who 
ostensibly paid reverence to the Vedas, but secretly 
undermined their authority. It may perhaps be proved 
that Buddha and liis followers were not entirely free 
from the meanness and dishonesty associated with such 
procedure, though as a rule they referred to the Vedas 
as writings which should be accepted when they agreed 


306 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


with reason, but rejected when they were out of the 
boundary line of such agreement. 

The object of this philosophy is set forth in the open¬ 
ing aphorism of this book : ‘ c Then, therefore, Brahma- 
inquisitiveness or Brahma-investigation.” The Sutras 
of Jaimini direct our attention to Duty, and throw the 
Being from whom Duty receives its power to challenge 
obedience or its obligatory character, into the back¬ 
ground. The Sutras of Badarayuna advance a step 
further and make this being the object of inquiry and 
investigation. How is this great inquiry or investiga¬ 
tion to be conducted ? But before we settle this ques¬ 
tion we have to set at rest another of a preliminary 
nature—viz., Who are entitled to the honor of being 
engaged in so important and glorious an investigation ? 

In reply to this question, the first remark to be made 
is that the Sudras (members of the lowest caste, or 
rather outcasts) are excluded from the privilege, and 
that peremptorily and unconditionally. Colebrooke 
plainly states this : “ Hot to interrupt the connection 
of the subjects, I have purposely passed by a digres¬ 
sion, or rather several, comprised in two sections of this 
chapter (third of Book I.), wherein it is inquired 
whether any besides a regenerate man (a Hindu of the 
first three tribes) is qualified for theological studies or 
theognostic attainments ; and the solution of the doubt 
is that a Sudra, or a man of an inferior tribe, is incom¬ 
petent, and beings superior to man (the gods of mythol¬ 
ogy) are qualified.” 

Nor are all the members of the three higher castes 
indiscriminately entitled to the privilege of being per¬ 
mitted to carry on this sublime inquiry. The women 
are looked upon as Sudras, and are excluded as a body ; 
though solitary examples of learned females being 


THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 


307 


engaged in such investigation, but not exactly in the 
prescribed manner, are not wanting. In the Brihad 
Aranyaka Upanishad a legend is preserved fitted to 
show that some degree of encouragement was accorded 
to such women ; but the privilege of being engaged 
in the inquiry in the approved fashion or prescribed 
manner is withheld. Yajnavalkya had two wives, 
Maitreyi and Katyayani, the former “ fond of discuss¬ 
ing the nature of Brahma,” and the latter “ wise in 
the duties of a housewife.” Yajnavalkya made up his 
mind to give up the duties of a householder, and to 
retire to a forest for the purpose of seeking the right 
knowledge of Brahma, and calling in his wife Maitreyi 
expressed his determination to divide his property be¬ 
tween his two wives and depart. She inquired if she 
could “ obtain immortality” by wealth. On being 
assured that she could not, she signified her wish to 
have that explained to her which might prove to her a 
stepping-stone to immortality. Her husband was ex¬ 
ceedingly pleased with the good sense she evinced, and 
strove to satisfy her liberal curiosity in a long dis¬ 
course. But when the discourse was over, Yajnavalkya 
“ went to the forest” alone, she not being considered 
entitled to the privilege of accompanying him. 
Women, then, are excluded from this path of inquiry. 

Of the male members of the higher castes, those only 
are encouraged who have proper qualifications, or who 
have passed through a preliminary course of training 
and discipline. The candidates for Brahma knowledge 
must have studied the Yedas under an accredited 
teacher either in this or in a previous fife. They must 
have performed the ordinary and extraordinary rites, 
gone through the prescribed devotions and penances, 
and cleansed their minds from all impurity by avoiding 


308 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


vice and practising virtue, without any regard to re¬ 
ward, present or prospective. The qualified person is 
thus described in the Yedanta Sar : 

“ The qualified person is one who possesses due in¬ 
telligence—that is, one who, by reading the Vedas and 
Vedangas according to rule, either in this life or in a 
former one, has obtained a general idea of the meaning 
of the whole ; who, by performing the constant and 
occasional rites, the penances and devotional exercises, 
and abstaining from things done with desire of reward 
and from those forbidden, has got rid of all sin and so 
thoroughly cleansed his mind, and who is possessed of 
the four means.” 

The four means are thus set forth : 

“ The four means (Sadhana) are : (a) discrimination 
between eternal and non-eternal substances, ( b ) indiffer¬ 
ence to the enjoyment of rewards here and hereafter, 
(c) the possession of quiescence, self-restraint, and ( d) 
desire for release. ? 9 

We cannot read what is said in the Sutras and in the 
Vedanta Sar of these preparatory exercises without 
being reminded of parallel pasages or corresponding in¬ 
junctions in the Upanishads. Brahma-inquisitiveness 
is a stage to which man must pass, through Duty-in¬ 
quisitiveness ; the Uttara Mimansa through the Purva 
Mimansa; the teaching of Badarayuna through the 
teaching of Jaimini. But an attempt is made by the 
most redoubtable of the champions of the Vedantic 
school to undo this connection, or to make its philoso¬ 
phy stand on its own legs. Sankara, in his comments 
on the opening verse of the work, thus speaks of the 
qualifications needed by the inquirer : “ The study of 
the Vedas is a general antecedent (qualification). But, 
then, is the comprehension of prescribed acts here the 


THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 


309 


special antecedent (qualification) ? By no means ; be¬ 
cause even before Duty-inquisitiveness, Brahma-inquisi¬ 
tiveness is possible in one that has studied the Yedanta.” 
This, however, is a later development of the system 
utterly at war with its earlier indications. 

The great inquiry is conducted in these Sutras, and 
ought therefore to be conducted by every sensible 
Hindu by a rigid application of the rules of exegesis, 
framed by Jaimini to the latter portion of the Yedas, 
the Upanishads. These documents are sifted and 
analyzed, and the conclusions they are fitted to uphold 
are stated and supported by appropriate quotations and 
conclusive arguments. They are, in a word, correctly 
interpreted, and the untenable nature of the false con¬ 
struction put upon many of their passages and state¬ 
ments by the champions of Sankhya and Yaisheshika 
Philosophy is set forth ; while apparent contradictions 
are reconciled and obscurities cleared up. A great 
portion of the Sarihika Sutras is therefore argumenta¬ 
tive. Colebrooke, in his able analysis of its contents, 
thus sets forth its controversial character : “ The 
.second chapter of the second lecture (book) is contro¬ 
versial. The doctrine of the Sankhyas is confuted in 
the first section, that of the Yaiseshikas in two more, 
of the Baudhas in as many, of the Jainas in one, of the 
Pasupatas and Pancharatras likewise in one eaoh. . . . 
It is remarkable that the Hyaya of Gautama is entirely 
unnoticed in the text and commentaries of the Yedant 
Sutras.” 

It is to be observed that a correct interpretation of 
the Upanishads cannot be attempted without resorting 
to the approved weapons of logic. These documents 
were roughly handled, twisted, and tortured by all 
classes of thinkers, both orthodox and heterodox, by 


310 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


friend and foe. They were appealed to, not only by 
the Sankhyas in support of their apparently dualistic 
but really materialistic creed, not only by the Vaishe- 
shikas in support of their theory of various kinds of 
atoms led into varieties of combinations by an unseen 
force, but even by the champions of heterodoxy in 
favor of their anti-Vedic sentiments and theories. We 
are tempted to quote from the Vedanta Sar a long pas¬ 
sage to show how these venerable documents were 
handled by the sects called heretical, as well as by the 
orthodox : 

“ For example, the very illiterate man says that his 
son is his self, on account of the text of the Veda. 
(Satpatha Brahmana, 14. 3. 4. 26) : 4 Self is born as a 
son ; ’ and because he sees that he has the same love 
for his son as for himself, and because he finds that if it 
is well or ill with his son, it is well or ill with himself. 

“ A Charvaka says that the gross body is his self ; 
on account of the text of the Veda (Taithiriya TJpan- 
ishad, 2. 1) : ‘ This is man as made up of the extract of 
food ; ’ and because he sees that a man leaving his own 
son (to burn) departs himself from a burning house, and 
because of the experience, ‘ I am fat, ’ ‘ I am lean. 5 

“ Another Charvaka says that the organs of sense 
are his self, on account of the text of the Yeda (Chhan- 
dogya Upanishad, V. I. 7) : 6 They, the organs of 
sense, went to Prajapati and said, (“ Lord, which of us 
is the chief V 9 He said unto them, “ He is chief 
among you whose departure makes the body seem 
worthless”) ; 5 and because in the absence of the 
organs of sense the functions of the body cease, and 
because of the experience, 4 1 am blind of one eye , 9 ‘ I 
am deaf . 9 

“ Another Charvaka says that the vital airs are his 


THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 


311 


self, on account of the text of the Yeda (Taittiriya 
IJpanishad, 2. 2) : 4 There is another, an inner self, 
made of the vital airs,’ and because in the absence of 
the vital airs the organs of sense are inactive, and 
because of the experience, 4 1 am hungry,’ 4 1 am 
thirsty. ’ 

44 Another Charvaka says that the mind is his self, 
on account of the text of the Yeda (Taittiriya Upan- 
ishad, 2. 3) : 4 There is another, inner self, made of the 
mind,’ and because when the mind sleeps the vital airs 
cease to be, and because of the experience, 4 1 resolve,’ 
4 1 doubt. ’ 

4 4 A Baudha says that intellect is his self, on account 
of the text of the Yeda (Taittiriya, 2. 4) : 4 There is 
another, an inner self, made of cognition,’ and because 
in the absence of an agent an instrument is powerless, 
and because of the experience, 4 1 am an agent, ’ 4 1 am 
a patient. ’ 

44 The Prabhakara and the Tarkika say that igno¬ 
rance is their self, on account of the text of the Yeda 
(Taittiriya, 2. 5) : 4 There is another, an inner self, 
made up of bliss,’ and because, during sleep, intellect 
and the rest are merged in ignorance, and because of 
the experience, 4 1 am ignorant. ’ 

44 The Bhatta says that intelligence associated with 
ignorance is his self, on account of the text of the Yeda 
(Mandukya Upanishad, 5) : 4 Self is a mass of knowl¬ 
edge and comprised of bliss, ’ and because during sleep 
there are both the light (of intelligence) and the dark¬ 
ness (of ignorance), and because of the experience, 
4 Myself I know not. ’ 

44 Another Baudha says that nihility is his self, on 
account of the text of the Yeda : 4 In the beginning 
this was a mere nonentity, ’ and because during sleep 


312 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


everything disappears, and because of the experience of 
the man who has just awoke from sleep—an experience 
in the shape of a reflection on his own non-existence— 
when he says, ‘ I slept ; during sleep I was not.’ ” 

This long extract corroborates what we have so often 
affirmed, that the Upanishads are the sources not only 
of Hindu pantheism, but of Hindu Philosophy in all its 
phases of development. But the Brahma Sutras make 
it evident that if they were interpreted on fair princi¬ 
ples, and if allowance were made for the contradictions 
in which they abound, they could be legitimately mar¬ 
shalled only in favor of that species of pantheism 
which presupposes a real change of divine into material 
substance. The great doctrine the Sutras prove is that 
Brahma is both the efficient and material cause of the 
universe. Dr. Mullens objects to the use of the term 
“ material ” in this connection, on the ground that the 
substance of the world is after all spiritual and divine ; 
but he forgets that, according to the teaching of the 
Upanishads, the divine substance actually becomes 
matter, and constitutes the world thus changed. Mat¬ 
ter in these days is said to be a double-faced entity, 
because it in particular conditions becomes mind, not 
merely appears in spiritual forms. According to the 
writers of the Upanishads, and to Badarayuna, who 
merely revives in the Brahma Sutras the teaching of 
these records, the divine substance is a double-faced 
entity, and becomes matter, not merely appears in 
material forms, in particular conditions. Such being 
the case, Brahma may properly be called the material 
cause of the world ; but his efficiency is problematical, 
as we shall show in the proper place. 

How is the great doctrine that Brahma is the mate¬ 
rial as well as the efficient cause of the world proved in 


THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 


313 


the Brahma Sutras ? In the first place, by citations 
from and direct references to many passages in the 
Upanishads. In the second place, by proving the iden¬ 
tity of the elements or other substances here and there 
represented as creative principles in the Upanishads 
with the Supreme Spirit. In the third place, by a re¬ 
production of the imagery by which the identity of the 
universe with the Supreme Spirit is set forth. In the 
fourth place, by proving the untenableness of the San- 
khya and Yaiseshika and other theories of creation. 
And lastly, by refuting the objections advanced against 
the pantheistic notion of creation set forth in the Upan¬ 
ishads and revived and defended in the Brahma Sutras. 

1. We shall observe this order in our treatment of 
the subject. In the first place, let us remark that 
Brahma is set forth as the Creator, Preserver, and 
Destroyer of the world, in the second aphorism of the 
work : “From whom the production, etc., of this.” 
Sankar, in his comments upon this verse, cites some of 
the passages herein referred to. lie expressly says 
that the relation of Brahma as Creator, to the world as 
the created, is proved neither by the direct testimony of 
the senses nor by inference, but by the Scripture texts 
alluded to. Hear what he says : “ Had Brahma been 
an object of sense, it might have been held that this 
work (the universe) was done by Brahma. But where 
the work alone (and not its author) is receivable by the 
senses, it is not possible to determine whether the work 
was done by Brahma or some other agent. Therefore 
the Sutra : ‘ From whom the Production,” etc., is not 
for setting up Inference. What then ? It is for the 
illustration of Yedanta texts. But what are the 
Yedanta texts which are here designed to be illustrated 
by the Sutra ? ‘ Bhrigu Yaruni resorted to his father 


314 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


Yaruna. Teach me, sir, Brahma’—thus introducing 
the question, the Yeda concludes : ‘ From whom these 
entities are produced, by whom the productions subsist, 
in whom departing they are resolved, inquire of Him. 
He is Brahma” (Taittiriya). And the specifications of 
that text, ‘ From Joy indeed these entities are pro¬ 
duced, by Joy the productions subsist,’in Joy departing 
they are resolved ” (Taittiriya). And other texts are 
also to be illustrated of the same kind relating to the 
cause, which is verily eternal, pure, intelligent, free, 
and all-knowing. ” 

According to Sankar, almost every text in this work 
refers either directly or obliquely to several verses in 
the Upanishads, and the quotations he presents are so 
numerous that if they were abstracted from his work 
its bulk would not be half so repelling as it is. It is 
enough to give here one more of the almost innumer¬ 
able verses referred to and cited in the Sutras and their 
commentaries : “ All this universe indeed is Brahma ; 
from him does it proceed ; into him it is dissolved ; in 
him it breathes. So let every one adore him calmly.” 
Dr. Monier Williams very appropriately calls this the 
Yedantist’s simple confession of faith. 

2. But sometimes the elements, ether, fire, etc., or 
such substances as life or the individual soul, are sepa¬ 
rately and individually represented as the creator in 
the Upanishads. How is the discrepancy to be ac¬ 
counted for ? By a simple recognition of the fact that 
they are, when set forth as omnific powers, identical 
with Brahma. The following string of quotations from 
the Upanishads make this clear : “ The omnipotent, 
omniscient, sentient cause of the universe is essentially 
happy (Taittiriya). He is the brilliant, golden person 
seen within the solar orb and the human eye (Chhan- 


THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 


315 


(logya). He is the ethereal element (aJcasa) from which 
all things proceed, and to which all return (Chlian- 
dogya). He is the breath (Prana), in which all beings 
merge, into which they all rise (Udgitha). He is the 
light (jyotish) which shines in heaven, and in all places, 
high and low, everywhere throughout the world, and 
within the human person. He is the breath (Prana) 
and intelligent self, immortal, undecaying, and happy, 
with which Indra, in a dialogue with Pratardana, iden¬ 
tifies himself (Kaushitaki).” 

One of the substances represented as omnific is Vais- 
wanara , which is fire, or, as Mr. Kunte says, the gas¬ 
tric fire. Let us see what is said about this substance 
in the second chapter of the first book : 

“ 24. Because there is a special sense of ordinary 
words, the term Yaiswanara (signifies the Supreme 
Spirit). 

“ 25. That, which should be so remembered, would 
be inference. 

“ 26. If anybody objects that because such descrip¬ 
tions—-as he abides inside, and others—lead to the con¬ 
clusion that he (Yaiswanara) is not the Supreme Spirit, 
then the conclusion is wrong, because the Acharyas 
state that there is a direct precept that there would be 
absurdity, and that therefore Yaiswanara is the Person 
(the Supreme Spirit). 

“ 27. Therefore, indeed, any element or god is not 
the Supreme Spirit (Yaiswanara). 

“ 28. The opinion of Jaimini is, The statement, that 
the Supreme Spirit is directly to be worshipped, does 
not conflict (with any text). 

“ 29. The opinion of Aswarathya Acharya is, (that a 
description of a visible form is given) for manifesting 
(the Supreme Spirit). 


31G 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


“ 30. The opinion of Badiri is, (that the statement 
that the Supreme Spirit is as big as a span, is made) 
that his form may be conceived. 

“ 31. Jaimini shows that such descriptions are given 
for showing the perfection of God.” 

These verses set forth the obscure manner in which 
discussions are conducted in this work. The proposi¬ 
tion to be proved is that Yaiswanara, which is fire, is 
no other than the Supreme Spirit. What line of dem¬ 
onstration is adopted ? Objections to the correct inter¬ 
pretation are stated and refuted in the first place. The 
first objection is : Yaiswanara or fire has a visible 
form, and cannot therefore be the invisible Supreme 
Spirit. In reply, the proof, which rises from the known 
to the unknown, the visible to the invisible—viz., in¬ 
ference is utilized. Yaiswanara is the form in which 
the Supreme Spirit appears. But Yaiswanara, as gas¬ 
tric fire, abides within us ; how can it be the Supreme 
Spirit ? The objectors, however, forget that there is 
direct affirmation in the Yeda in favor of the correct 
interpretation. Mr. Kunte, whose translation of these 
Sutras is given above, quotes the Upanishad texts con¬ 
nected with them, and one of these runs thus : “ That 
Yaiswanara, who by his light extends the earth and 
the heavens.” This verse may be represented as u a 
direct precept” in favor of the interpretation contended 
for. Besides, any other interpretation involves a reduc- 
tio ad absurdum. 

Add to all this the testimony of Maharshis or demi¬ 
gods like Jaimini, Aswarathya,. and Badiri, and the 
conclusion becomes irresistible. They all maintain that 
sensible images are utilized in Yedic descriptions of 
Brahma, because human minds fail to comprehend him 
without their aid. Jaimini in particular maintains that 


THE VEDAHTA SYSTEM. 


317 


such descriptions tend to set forth the perfection of 
the Supreme Spirit, which is both great and small, 
amorphous and with form, all-knowing and unknowing. 

3. The imagery by which the essential identity of 
the universe with Brahma is set forth in the Upan- 
ishads is revived in the Brahma Sutras. Here is a 
string of images revived : “ Him, invariable, the wise 
contemplate as the source (or cause) of beings. As the 
spider puts forth and draws in his thread, as plants 
spring from the earth (and return to it), as hair of the 
head and body grows from the living man, so does the 
universe come of the unalterable.” . . . Here is an¬ 
other : “ As milk changes to curd, and water to ice, so 
is Brahma variously transformed and diversified with¬ 
out aid of tools or exterior means of any sort. In 
like manner the spider spins his web out of his sub¬ 
stance ; spirits assume various shapes ; cranes propa¬ 
gate without male ; and the lotus proceeds from pond to 
pond without organs of motion.” In many passages 
Brahma is said to be related to the universe as yarn to 
cloth, clay to the jar, gold to the bracelet. Some of 
the images employed indicate a real change of sub¬ 
stance, while others merely a change of form. 

Though a real change of substance is shown in many 
passages in which Brahma is described in the Sutras, 
he is emphatically declared unchangeable in some. 
Here is one of Oolebrooke’s extracts from the Sutras, 
and the comments : “ He is described in many pas¬ 
sages of the Veda as diversified, and endued with every 
quality and particular character ; but in other and very 
numerous texts as without form or quality. The latter 
only is truly applicable, not the former, nor yet both. 
He is impassible, unaffected by worldly modifications, 
as the clear crystal, seemingly colored by the red bios- 


318 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


som of a hibiscus, is not less really pellucid. He does 
not vary with every disguising form or designation, for 
all diversity is expressly denied by explicit texts ; and 
the notion of variableness relative to him is distinctly 
condemned in some shaJchas of the Yeda. ’ 5 

Here is a contradiction which is even more apparent, 
in the following extracts presented by Colebrooke : 
“ He is amorphous, for so he is expressly declared to 
be, but seemingly assuming form, as sunshine or moon¬ 
light impinging on any object appears straight or 
crooked.” “ The luminous sun, though single, yet 
reflected in water becomes various, and so does the un¬ 
born divine soul by disguise in diverse modes.” “ The 
Yeda so describes him as entering into and pervading 
the corporeal shapes by him wrought. He framed 
bodies, biped and quadruped ; and becoming a bird he 
passed into those bodies, filling them as their informing 
spirit.” 

The last of these extracts embodies a principle by 
which the passages in which a real change of substance 
is indicated may be reconciled to those in which the 
immutability of the divine spirit is set forth with equal 
distinctness and emphasis. Brahma is the informing 
spirit or inspiriting soul of all corporeal frames—bodies 
of bipeds, quadrupeds, and centipeds, and of all material 
substances. The idea of lifeless matter was scouted in 
the Yedantic school as thoroughly as it is in the writ¬ 
ings of Professor Tyndall, who may be represented as 
a champion of materialistic pantheism. Every particle 
of matter is instinct with divine life, and its inspiriting 
soul never changes, though it appears in endless varie¬ 
ties of combinations. Brahma appears in various 
bodies and frames, which are evolved out of his sub¬ 
stance as the spider’s web is evolved out of its sub- 


THE VEDAHTA SYSTEM. 


319 


stance; but underneath these infinitely diversified as¬ 
sumed forms he remains unchanged and unchangeable. 
This explanation, it must be confessed, does not entirely 
free the descriptions of Brahma given in the Upan- 
ishads and the Brahma Sutras from the charge of inco¬ 
herence and contradictoriness. 

4. One of the great objects of these Sutras seems to 
be the explosion of the Sankhya notion that the word 
Brahma is simply a synonym of the word Pradhan or 
Prdkriti. The Sankhya philosopher maintains, in other 
words, that the source of creation in the Upanishads is 
in reality his Pradhan or Prakriti, though called by a 
different name, Brahma. The Sutras explode this 
notion by pointing out the essential difference or dis¬ 
tinction between the Brahma of the Yeda and the 
Pradhan of Sankhya Philosophy. The axiom on which 
they build their argument is that no unsentient and 
unintelligent substance could possibly be the creator of 
the world. The Yeda attributes creation to a percep¬ 
tion of solitariness. The creator perceived his lone¬ 
someness, and said : “I am one ; let me be many.” 
Sankar, in his comments on the fifth aphorism of the 
book, “ Not so, because of observation, it is unheard,” 
says : “ Unsentient Pradhan of Sankhya fabrication as 
the cause of the universe has no place in Yedanta 
texts.” He makes the following observations to show 
* that there was perception or “observation” on the 
part of the Creator before the commencement of Ilis 
omnific work : 

“ Thus commencing with the texts, ‘ O gentle pupil, 
this was in the beginning an entity,’ c One without a 
second,’ it is added : £ It observed, “ Let me be multi¬ 
plied, let me be produced,” and it “ created the 
right.”’ In these texts the universe manifested by 


320 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


names and forms and expressed here by the word idam 
(this) being determined before production to be an 
existing spirit, its creativeness, in its antecedent state 
indicated by the word entity, of light and other things 
after observation , is declared. Also in other texts, 
‘ This was in the beginning one (only) spirit. There 
was nothing else. He observed (saying), Let us create 
the worlds. He created these worlds. ’ These declare 
also a creation after observation.” 

The Pradhan of the Sankhyas is confessedly un- 
sentient and unintelligent, and it could not therefore 
have observed and created. The Sankhyas, however, 
maintain that knowledge and sentience existed poten¬ 
tially in Pradhan, or in one of the three gunas or quali¬ 
ties of which it consists, and that therefore the possi¬ 
bility of its being the source of creation must even on 
Yedantic principles be admitted. The V edantist retorts 
that ignorance and stolidity also existed potentially in 
Pradhan, and whatever of science existed in it was 
neutralized by its nescience. “ If,” says Sankar, “ in 
the equipoise of the (three) qualities, Pradhan can be 
called all-knowing, by pleading the capacity for knowl¬ 
edge, inherent in the sattwa (attribute), then it may 
also be called little-knowing, on the plea of the capacity 
of precluding knowledge inherent in (the other two 
attributes) rajas and tamas. Further, the state of 
sattwa without an observant (spirit) is not called 
knowledge. Hor has unintelligent Pradhan any inhe¬ 
rent observantness.” 

The Yedantist adopts the cosmogony of the Sankhyas 
in its main features, as will be shown in the next paper ; 
but he attacks their assumption of a material form as 
its starting-point with the greatest vehemence. Hor 
does he spare the atomic theory of Gautama and 


THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 


321 


Ivanada. Many of the arguments arrayed against the 
former are marshalled against the latter theory, and 
the conclusion upheld is that of a divine rather than a 
material substance evolving creation out of itself, con¬ 
sequent on its perception of its own solitariness, and of 
its determination to multiply itself. 

5. The objections to this conclusion raised by the 
Sankhyas and others are stated and confuted. The 
first of these is based on the similarity which should, 
according to Hindu logic, subsist between cause and 
effect. The argument may be stated thus : An effect 
must be of a piece with or similar to its material 
cause ; but there is dissimilarity between the world 
and Brahma ; therefore Brahma cannot be looked up 
to as the cause of the world. In reply it is maintained 
that apparent dissimilarity between a cause and its 
effect is noticeable in many cases. “ Hair and nails, 
which are insensible, grow from a sensible animal 
body, and sentient vermin (scorpions, etc.) spring from 
inanimate sources (cow-dung, etc.).” But the argu¬ 
ment, it is added, may be advanced against the Sankhya 
theory, which brings sentient beings out of an unsen- 
tient material form. The atomic theory, or that which 
brings creation out of a universal void, may be shown 
as untenable precisely in this way. 

Another of the objections advanced hinges on “ frui¬ 
tion,” which discriminates between the party who 
enjoys or suffers, and that which is enjoyed or suffered, 
and which mars thereby the unity of Brahma. The 
imagery brought forward in reply is that of the sea and 
the numerous changes on its surface, the earth and its 
contents and products, and the food eaten and the visi¬ 
ble objects into which it is converted. “ The sea is 
one, and not other than its waters ; yet waves, foam, 


322 


HIKDU PHILOSOPHY. 


spray, drops, froth, and other modifications of it differ 
from each other.” Brahma is the sea, and the innu¬ 
merable souls enjoying or suffering are, together with 
the sources of their enjoyment and suffering, the 
changeable currents, waves, froth, and foam. Again : 
“ An effect is not other than its cause. Brahma is 
single, without a second. He is not separate from the 
embodied self. He is soul, and the soul is he. Yet he 
does not do that only which is agreeable and beneficial 
to self. The same earth exhibits diamonds, rock crys¬ 
tals, red orpiment, etc. ; the same soil produces a 
diversity of plants, the same food is converted into 
various excrescences, hairs, nails, etc.” Brahma’s ob¬ 
ject in creation is, not self-enjoyment, not self-inflic¬ 
tion, but mere “ sport” in diversity,- self-manifestation 
in matter and mind, in virtue and vice, joy and sorrow, 
bondage and liberation ! 

Again the objectors ask, How could Brahma act 
without organs of action—hands, feet, etc. ? Creation 
presupposes action, action presupposes organs ; but as 
Brahma, a pure spirit, is without these, he cannot prop¬ 
erly be represented as a creator and therefore actor. 
This, in the estimation of some Hindu philosophers, is 
a great objection, and it was urged against the theory 
of the Indian atomists. Their reply, alluded to in 
a foregoing paper, is that Brahma, though bodiless, 
can assume bodies, and act through the organs at¬ 
tached to them. The Brahma r Sutras, however, ad¬ 
vance a step further and maintain that Brahma can 
act without organs. “ Brahma is omnipotent, able 
for every act without organ or instrument.” But the 
old difficulty is here encountered : What motive could 
Brahma possibly have for creating ? The Vedant- 
ist’s reply is : “ Ho motive or special purpose need 


THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 


323 


be assigned for his creation of the universe besides 
his will.” 

The most formidable objection and its reply we shall 
state in Sankar’s words, as translated by Monier Will¬ 
iams in his “ Indian Wisdom” : 

“ It may be objected that God is proved not to be 
the cause of the universe. Why ? From the visible 
instances of injustice and cruelty. Some he makes 
happy, as the gods, etc. ; some very miserable, as the 
brutes, etc. ; and some in a middling condition, as 
men, etc. Being the author of such an unjust creation, 
he is proved to be subject to passions like other persons 
—that is to say, to partiality and prejudice—and there¬ 
fore his nature is found wanting in spotlessness. And 
by dispensing pain and ruin He is chargeable with 
malice and cruelty, deemed culpable even among the 
wicked. Hence, because of the instances of injustice 
and cruelty, God cannot be the cause of the universe. 
To this we reply : Injustice and cruelty cannot be 
charged upon God. Why ? Because He did not act 
independently. God, being dependent, creates this 
world of inequalities. If you ask on what He is de¬ 
pendent, we reply, on merit and demerit. That there 
should be an unequal creation, dependent on the merit 
or demerit of the souls created, is no fault of God. As 
the rain is the common cause of the production of rice 
and wheat, but the causes of their specific distinctions 
as rice and wheat are the varying powers of the irrespec¬ 
tive seeds, so is God the common cause in the creation 
of gods, men, and others ; but of the distinctions be¬ 
tween gods, men, and others, the causes are the vary¬ 
ing works inherent in their respective souls.” 

The original Sutras commented upon in the words 
quoted above are thus translated by Dr. Mullens, whose 


32 4 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


translation, by the way, is simpler than that of Cole- 
brooke : “ Injustice cannot be attributed to Brahma 
because some are happy, some miserable, and some 
both. Every one has his lot in the world, according to 
his merit in a former stage of the universe. So the 
rain-cloud distributes his rain equally, but the plants 
vary according to the seed whence they spring” 
(Brahma Sutras, II. 34-37). 

These aphorisms and these comments make it evident 
that the ultimate source of creation is not the divine 
will, but some power by which that will is determined, 
the power of merit or demerit or of work. Why is, 
then, creation expressly attributed to the will of God, 
to His perception of His solitariness, and His determi¬ 
nation to create ? Ho explanation can possibly be given 
of this bit of inconsistency and contradiction, excepting 
the acknowledged fact that Hindu logicians, like some 
modern heroes, never scrupled to silence a body of 
objectors by a recourse to principles inconsistent with 
others for which they at other times were compelled 
by their theories to stand up. The Sankhya notion of 
creation evolved out of a dead substance had to be ex¬ 
ploded, and sentience and knowledge and desire and 
determination were attributed unscrupulously to a 
Being who was held up as incapable of being influenced 
by these attributes and predicates. 

But after all the universe cannot properly be said to 
have been created at all ! And this brings us to an¬ 
other objection and reply, which we shall present in 
Sankar’s words, as translated by Monier Williams : 

“ The Supreme Being existed at the beginning, one 
without a second. Hence, before the creation there 
could be no works in dependence on which inequalities 
might be created. God may be dependent on works 


THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 


325 


after distinctions are made. But before the creation 
there could be no works caused by varying instruments, 
and therefore we ought to find a uniform. We reply : 
This does not vitiate our doctrine, because the world is 
without beginning. The world being without begin¬ 
ning, nothing can prevent works and unequal creations 
from continuing in the state of cause and effect, like 
the seed and its plant.’ 5 

Here is another flagrant inconsistency. But there is 
one way of accounting for it. Brahma is uncaused, 
and has therefore lived from eternity. How ? Either 
in a state of quiescence, or in a state of activity, or in 
states of activity alternating with states of quiescence. 
The first two suppositions are untenable because of the 
long, long seasons called haljoas, each preceded by the 
consummation of one stage of mundane existence and 
succeeded by another. Periods of activity alternating 
with periods of quiescence are, properly speaking, the 
salient features of the divine existence ; and they have 
followed one another in succession throughout eternity. 
Just as the Veda has been breathed out and breathed 
in by Brahma throughout eternity, the world has been 
evolved out of his substance and swallowed up in it 
throughout eternity ; and if he can properly be called 
the author of the one, he may legitimately be called 
the creator of the other. But the question arises, By 
what law is this beginningless and endless series of 
evolutions and involutions regulated—an inherent law 
of necessity, or an extraneous force ? If by an inher¬ 
ent law of necessity, all talk of freedom on the part of 
Brahma is bosh. If by an extraneous force, such as 
Karma (work), he cannot be the ultimate source of 
creation ! 

We reserve our remarks on the theory of bondage 


326 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


and. liberation propounded in these Sutras, as well as 
on their physiological teaching, for our next paper. 
Meanwhile we conclude with the remark that the con¬ 
tradictions with which they abound are the inevitable 
results of the attempt made in them to reconcile varied 
and conflicting lines of thought. Some scholars incline 
to the- opinions expressed by Mr. Kunte that in the 
Yedanta Sutras we find the germ of the eclecticism, 
which was brought to perfection in the Swetaswara 
Upanishad and the Bhagvada-Gita. It is a matter of 
fact that the Sankhya cosmogony is adopted, and the 
Yaisheshika view of work. But all attempts to recon¬ 
cile these systems to it are repelled with firmness and 
even contumely. But the author does not seem to have 
freed himself from the prevailing lines of philosophic 
thought sufficiently to be able to elaborate a consistent 
system of pantheism ; and to the homage he paid to 
established schools is to be attributed the glaring con¬ 
tradictions into which he seems to have been betrayed. 


CHAPTER XI. 


THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 

The great teachers in ancient India of the orthodox 
stamp may be divided into six classes—viz., the Rishis, 
the Vedavadins, the Parinamavadins, the Sankhyas or 
Dualists, the Vaiseshikas or Trialists, and the Maya- 
vadins or Illusionists. 

The Rishis were shepherd-warriors, who came into 
the country with their hosts of brave followers, drove 
the aborigines from some of its fertile provinces, and 
organized colonial settlements within the precincts of 
the territory thus vacated. They did not belong to the 
most advanced branch of the great Aryan family, but 
they had great natural abilities, which had crowned 
their schemes of conquest and colonization with brill¬ 
iant success, and which were called into vigorous play, 
and sharpened and improved by the dangers by which 
they found themselves surrounded, and the varied 
exigencies of nascent communities which they had to 
meet. Hor did the scenery around their new homes, in 
vast plains overshadowed by ranges of magnificent 
mountains, intersected by broad rivers, and surrounded 
by dense forests, fail to stimulate their natural love of 
the sublime and the beautiful, and stir up the poetic 
fervor of their brave, generous natures. And conse¬ 
quently, in the midst of their warlike pursuits, the 
varied aspirations of their hearts evoked by present 
necessities, rather than by a calm foresight of future 


328 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


contingencies, were vented in strains of impassioned 
poetry and metrical prayer. The hymnology thus 
elaborated is characterized by archaic simplicity, natu¬ 
ralness, and devotional enthusiasm, but it is lamentably 
deficient in keenness of insight, depth of knowledge, 
and breadth of view ; while the puerility characteristic 
of it as a whole, and the obscenity by which not a 
small portion of it is vitiated, are blemishes from which 
it were to be wished it had been free. The Rishis 
were worshippers of nature, had rites and ceremonies 
of the simplest kind, and could justly claim some virtues 
of a rugged but sterling nature ; and their teachings, 
though below par judged by a modern standard, were 
fitted to curb the ferocity of growing communities of 
successful marauders, and raise them to a low stage 
of civilization—the stage attained by their Iranian 
brethren. 

But simple naturalism gave place in course of time to 
a complicated system of polytheism, the practical 
requirements of which could not be met except by an 
elaborate ritual. Nor could a cumbrous system of 
ceremonial observances be reduced to practice without 
a stated and recognized ministry, or rather priesthood. 
And thus the Yedavadins sprung into existence. The 
Rishis were poets and priests, as well as warriors and 
statesmen ; and they supervised and controlled both the 
secular and spiritual concerns of the new settlements, 
of which they were recognized chieftains. But when 
the objects of worship were multiplied, and a complex 
ceremonial system was elaborated, a division of labor 
was realized, and a broad line of demarcation was 
drawn between the functions of the State and the 
functions of the Church. While kings and statesmen 
managed the concerns of the State, those of the Church 


THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 329 

were left in the hands of a hierarchy, the members of 
which enjoyed peculiar privileges, and gradually arro¬ 
gated to themselves all power, temporal as well as 
spiritual, regal as well as sacerdotal. The result was a 
mock theocracy, under the blight of which the spirit of 
inquiry was crushed, poetry vanished into thin air, and 
nothing remained but an endless round of mummeries 
and tomfooleries. The age of the Brahmanas was em¬ 
phatically an age of degrading superstition, priestcraft, 
and formality ; of spirit crushed, mind enslaved, and the 
noblest instincts and emotions of the heart paralyzed. 

The Yedavadins or the royal-priests began to lose 
their influence and ascendency as soon as the spirit of 
inquiry was aroused by a rationalistic reaction against 
lifeless externalism ; and the Parinamavadins appeared 
on the stage to dispute their once unrestricted but now 
limited sway. The Parinamavadins assumed a modest 
tone, and professed to do nothing more than simply 
disclose the esoteric meaning of the hymns, which had 
been composed and sung by the Kishis, and the ritual, 
which had been elaborated and reduced to practice by 
the Yedavadins. They did not ostensibly raise the 
standard of revolt against current beliefs and supersti¬ 
tions—perhaps they did not mean to do so. Neverthe¬ 
less they undermined the influence of such beliefs and 
superstitions by leading public attention, or the atten¬ 
tion of the intelligent portion of the public, away 
from them toward an all-embracing spiritual essence, 
changed, by a necessitated process of evolution or self¬ 
development, into the objects of nature and the phe¬ 
nomena of life. The Parinamavadins are also called 
Yikarvadins, or the teachers who insisted on a real 
change of spiritual into material substance in the process 
of development to which creation is to be traced. 


330 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY, 


But their scheme of thought, unfolded somewhat 
incoherently in the Upanishads, had to pass through a 
prolonged period of warfare waged against it by two, 
if not several, antagonistic systems of philosophy. The 
Sankhyas, with their dualism, which denied the 
existence of God or divine substance altogether, and 
affirmed that of an ever-active, self-evolving material 
form and innumerable quiescent souls, maintained a 
dire struggle with the Parinamavadins, and succeeded 
in crippling their power and circumscribing their influ¬ 
ence for a time. But they themselves had to retreat 
before the triumphant flag of the Yaiseshikas, who 
propounded the atomic theory, and courted popular 
favor by admitting the existence of a quiescent God 
as well as quiescent souls. The Yaiseshikas succeeded 
in further undermining the influence of the Parinama 
theory. 

But the Parinamavadins had their triumph restored 
to them by the ritualism revived and further developed 
by Jaimini and the Purva-Mimansa school. But their 
theory had to be remodelled, and the work of recon¬ 
struction and renovation was effected by the Mayava- 
dins or the illusionists. It is but fair to add that but 
for this timely change the system of the Parinamavadins 
could not have risen to that ascendency which it has 
enjoyed for so many cycles of ages in India. 

The defects which rendered its reconstruction a 
necessity ought to be categorically stated and carefully 
examined before the Maya or illusion theory is treated 
of and explained. 

1. The theory of the Parinamavadins is in antago¬ 
nism to that monism which both the Upanishads and the 
Brahma Sutras are so obviously intended to uphold. 
The watchword of these documents is Ekamevaditiyam , 


THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 331 

One without a Second ; and the reasonings embodied 
in them, together with the legendary matter introduced 
and the illustrative imagery pressed into service, are all 
fitted to bolster up non-dualism. But the Parinama 
theory involves dualism, derivative, if not original ; 
and it therefore runs counter to this, the central or 
vital principle of Yedantic speculations. It will not 
avail to say that the dualism we notice in creation is, 
after all, monism ; that the diverse objects around us, 
as well as the phenomena of our inner consciousness 
and life, are evolutes of one primal substance, having 
originally sprung from it, and being in process of reso¬ 
lution into it. The fact is, that two classes of phe¬ 
nomena, each obviously implying a substrate different 
from that of the other, exist ; and the conclusion is 
irresistible that there is at present a dualism, a dualism 
emanating from monism and sure to terminate in 
monism, but yet a dualism. The Parinama theory is, 
therefore, incompatible with or hostile to the root-prin¬ 
ciple of Yedantism, and it had in consequence to be 
remodelled. 

2. Again, the Parinama theory is inconsistent with 
the Hindu notion of causality. According to this 
notion, the effect must be of the same nature with the 
cause. If the effect is spiritual, the cause must be 
spiritual ; and if the effect is material, the cause must 
be material. From spiritual substance material sub¬ 
stance cannot be derived. Matter is the very antipodes 
of Brahma, or the divine essence. Brahma is pure, 
while matter is impure ; Brahma is intelligent and 
sentient, while matter is unintelligent and insensible ; 
Brahma is unchangeable, while matter is mutable. 
How could matter have possibly sprung from Brahma ? 
Besides, it ought not to be forgotten that the idea of 


332 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


impure matter emanating from pure spiritual substance 
is abhorrent or most offensive to Hindu susceptibilities, 
and cannot be entertained for a moment. Hence the 
inconsistency in the reasonings of the Parinamavadins 
in the Upanishads and the Saririka Sutras ; inconsis¬ 
tency so glaring that some have gone so far as to deny 
the existence of the theory in these documents. 

3. The theory, moreover, is inconsistent with an ac¬ 
knowledged attribute of Brahma. In the Upanishads 
Brahma is described as impartite ( akhanda ), or without 
parts. What is meant by this technical term when 
applied to the Deity ? Major Jacob, in his annotations 
appended to his excellent translation of the Yedanta 
Sar, thus discloses its meaning : “ According to the 
commentator Yrisemhasarasavati, this term {akhanda) 
means ‘ devoid of anything of a like kind or of a differ¬ 
ent kind, and without internal variety.’ A tree, for 
example, has the ‘ internal variety ’ of leaves, flowers, 
and fruit ; it has things £ of a like kind ’ in other trees, 
and things ‘ of a different kind ’ in stones, etc. But 
Brahma is not so, he being absolute and unchangeable 
unity.” According, however, to the theory con¬ 
demned, the variety, resemblance, and dissimilarity 
from which Brahma is declared free, may justly be 
predicated of him. The theory had, therefore, to be 
either abandoned or reconstructed. 

4. But the most formidable objection to the theory is 
its incompatibility with a proper scheme of theodicy. 
Sin and misery exist in the world, and human life is 
only a tissue of sighs and groans. What is the cause 
of this anomalous state of things ? Why did God 
knowingly allow the ingress of sin, with its interminable 
train of distress and wretchedness ? Is God omnipo¬ 
tent ? If so, why did He not interpose His all sufA- 


THE MAYA, OH THE ILLUSION THEORY. 


333 


cient and limitless power between sin and the world 
converted by it into a favored abode of disease and 
death ? Is God omniscient and all-wise ? If so, why 
did He not, while foreseeing the impending danger, 
adopt judicious measures to avert it ? Maintain that 
sin and misery are realities, and the justice and mercy 
of God cannot but be impugned. But regard sin and 
misery as illusions and dreams, and these attributes of 
God are left intact. A proper system of theodicy is 
possible only when the Parinama theory is abandoned. 

These are some of the reasons assigned for the reno¬ 
vation of the theory of real transformation propounded 
in the Upanishads and the Brahma Sutras. The work 
of reconstruction was accomplished when their cogency 
was clearly seen, and the Parinama theory was super¬ 
seded by the Yivarta or Illusion theory. The small 
treatise in which this latter theory is unfolded is 
Yedanta Sar, translated by Dr. Ballantyne years ago, 
but very recently presented in an excellent translation, 
with copious notes, by Major Jacob. Of his version we 
shall avail ourselves in our attempt to set forth the 
broad features of a doctrine which is one of the queerest 
this world has seen, but which, though obviously lu¬ 
dicrous, some modem philosophers have not been 
ashamed to revive. 

Yedantism appears in its incipient stage of develop¬ 
ment in the Upanishads and the Sutras, in which the 
doctrine of the Upanishads is simply revived, with its 
approved arguments and stock illustrations. It appears 
in a state of maturity in the Yedanta Sar, a compendi¬ 
um of Yedanta principles of a much later date. But its 
latest phasis of development is noticeable in another 
standard treatise of a still later date, called Yedanta 
Paribhasa, the contents of which are analyzed in 


334 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


Pandit Nehemiak Goreh’s able and acute dissertations 
on Yedantism, in his book already referred to. He 
presents in his footnotes numerous extracts from this 
work, and of these we shall avail ourselves. And first 
of all let us dwell, as the learned Pandit does, on the 
three sorts of existence posited by the Yedantins of the 
most modern school. 

These three sorts of existence are Paramarthika or 
True, Vyavaharika or Practical, and Pratibhasika or 
Apparent. They are thus set forth in the Yedanta- 
Paribhasa, p. 18 : “ Existence is of three sorts—true 
(paramarthika), practical (Yyavaharika), and apparent 
(pratibhasika). True existence is that of Brahma ; 
practical, that of ether, etc.; apparent, that of nacrine 
silver and the like . 9 9 Brahma truly exists, and therefore 
he is really real ; the world exists practically, but not 
truly, and therefore it is unreally real ; and nacre, mis¬ 
taken for silver, or serpent imagined in a rope, has only 
apparent, deceptive existence, and it is also unreally 
real. Practical and apparent existence agree in one 
respect, and differ on three points. They agree in 
their being both false, though ignorantly imagined 
real. They differ, inasmuch as apparent existence is 
now and then mistaken for veritable existence, not con¬ 
stantly as practical existence. Apparent existence, 
moreover, cannot be the source or centre of practical 
business, as nacre, mistaken for silver, can never be sold 
as silver. In the third place, our belief in apparent ex¬ 
istence is the result, not of ignorance only, as our belief 
in practical existence, but of some defects superadded 
to ignorance, such as distance, etc. 

What is practical or, as Professor Banerjea calls it, 
conventional existence ? Is it simply our assumption 
of the existence of the world for purposes of business 



THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 


335 


and pleasure ? Some of our modern philosophers do 
not believe in an essential distinction between virtue 
and vice ; but they kindly allow or overlook its recog¬ 
nition by mankind in general for the benefit of society. 
The moral beliefs of humanity are all myths in their 
opinion ; but their utility is recognized, and their prac¬ 
tical ascendency is left uninterrupted, that the business 
of society in its present state of ignorance may go on 
undisturbed. Do the Yedantins allow the existence of 
the world only on this principle, or do they maintain 
that after all it has a sort of existence to which the 
name practical, in contradistinction to the real, ought 
to be given ? Pandit Nehemiah Goreh maintains that 
their practical existence is a sort of existence, an inter¬ 
mediate fink, so to speak, between true existence and 
non-existence. They divide objects into three classes 
—those which are really real, those which are unreally 
real, and those which are positive unrealities. Brahma 
is truly existent, really real ; the world, its creator, 
souls, etc., are practically existent, but not non-exist¬ 
ent, and therefore unreally unreal ; and such figments 
of the head as “ a hare’s horn,” “ the son of a barren 
woman,” etc., are non-existent or positive nonentities. 

Mr. Goreh represents practical existence, as unfolded 
by the Yedantin, “as a combination of two contradic¬ 
tory ideas.” The Pandit’s authorities are, however, 
enemies, not friends, of the Yedanta system, Parthasa- 
rathi Misia and Yijnana Bhikshu, “ writers on the 
Mimansa and on the Sankhya, respectively.” The 
former, Parthasarathi, in his Sastra Dipika, introduces 
a Yedantic opponent, who speaks thus : “ We do not 
say that the universe is unreal, since it is established, 
by perception and other proofs, to exist. Nor do we 
say that it has true existence, it being falsified by right 


33G 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


apprehension of spirit. The universe cannot, therefore, 
be described either as true or as unreal.” The same 
controversialist is also represented as saying : “ That 
which never presents itself—as the horn of a hare—is 
held for unreal ; and that which presents itself, and is 
never falsified—as the true nature of spirit—is held for 
true ; and, as for the universe, since it presents itself, 
and yet is falsified by right apprehension, it is not to 
be described as true, or yet as unreal.” 

The other writer, Vijnana Bhikshu, the author of the 
Sankhya-Pravachana-Bhashya, says, p. 25 : “ If it be 
held that nescience is essentially of two contradictories? 
But ‘ should ’ it be alleged that nescience ought to be 
pronounced c essentially of two contradictories,’ entity 
and nonentity, or else to be different from both ; and 
thus there would be no invalidation thereby—that is, by 
nescience—of non-duality, the only true ( jparamarthika ) 
state. Such is the case. . . . c Not so; ’ for such a 
thing is unknown.” These quotations certainly tend 
to prove that practical existence is not tantamount to 
non-existence. And therefore Ignorance or Nescience, 
which according to the system has practical, not true, 
existence, is said to be “ not describable as existent or 
non-existent” in the Yedanta Sar. 

But from one point of view practical existence ap¬ 
pears sheer non-existence. From the point of view of 
true existence, the objects practically existent appear 
non-existent; as from the point of view of practical ex¬ 
istence, even Brahma, the really and truly existent, 
appears non-existent. The correct view is obtained by 
the Yedantin, who occupies an intermediate station 
between practical and true existence, and who sees on 
one side objects practically but not really existent, and 
on the other Brahma, really but not practically existent. 


THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 337 

A word about apparent existence, and we shall have 
done with this portion of our knotty subject. Appar¬ 
ent existence has also, according to Vedantic teach¬ 
ing, a reality in it. When a rope is mistaken for 
a snake, an apparent snake is really formed. Let us 
reproduce Mr. Goreh’s own words and the proofs he 
adduces in their support: “ Eespecting apparent 

things, the partisans of the Vedanta hold this language : 
that when a man on seeing nacre takes it for silver, 
apparent silver is really produced. If silver, I ask, is 
then really produced, how is this proved to be a mis¬ 
conception ? In reply I am told that, if the silver were 
true or practical, there would be no room to speak of 
misconception ; but since it is neither, but apparent, 
misconception has place.” 

Mr. Goreh’s proofs are all borrowed from Vedanta- 
Paribhasa. His first extract is from page 10 : 
“ Though by the efforts, however belying, of a misap- 
prehensive person, to obtain possession of an illusory 
object, such an object is established as existent ; yet 
there is no proof that it, the misapprehension, has 
reference to an apparent object, as silver, etc., pro¬ 
duced at that time. For silver, which is extant else¬ 
where, may be taken as its object. If this be said, I 
demur, since that silver elsewhere, not being in contact 
with an organ of sense, cannot be an object of percep¬ 
tion.” 

This extract is somewhat obscure, but it will become 
luminous when we look upon the objector as pressing 
into his service the Naiyayika theory, that when nacre 
is mistaken for silver the memory is a factor in the pro¬ 
duction of the mistake. The Vedantin in reply affirms 
the principle that perception is possible only when 
there is a contact between the thing perceived and a 



338 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


percipient organ, and that, therefore, silver not present 
where the nacre is seen cannot possibly occasion the 
mistake alluded to. 

It is not necessary for us to take notice of Mr. 
Goreh’s other extracts, besides the one in which the 
process of the formation of apparent silver is set forth. 
The apparent silver is evolved out of ignorance through 
the media, so to speak, the “ nacreness” of nacre, its 
“ glitter,” the impression of silver before seen, and some 
defect, such as bile, or distance, etc. The Yedantic 
theory of perception is not less strange than complicat¬ 
ed, and it will have to be referred to before the sequel. 

Meanwhile let us remark that the recondite disquisi¬ 
tion on existence, embodied in books like Yedanta- 
Paribhasa, is an after-growth, arising from the difficul¬ 
ties with which the illusion theory appeared beset some 
time after it had been propounded. The Yedanta Sar, 
the compendium in which that theory is presented in 
detail, says nothing about the three sorts of existence 
by which it was rendered consistent with human con¬ 
sciousness. Men cannot be easily led to believe that 
the universe, which in varieties of ways manifests its 
existence, is false; and if a conclusion so obviously in¬ 
compatible with all our instinctive beliefs has to be 
naturalized, it must be backed by a mass of sophistic 
reasoning. The Yedantic philosophers recognized such 
necessity ; and they met it by manufacturing a theory 
of existence which, while it loudly proclaimed the 
falseness of the world, attributed what may be called a 
subtle species of existence to it. And besides, this 
queer theory of existence proved the salvation of the 
world, inasmuch as it successfully counteracted that 
tendency to indolence and dereliction which the illusion 
theory is so eminently fitted to foster and mature. 


THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 339 

It must also be admitted that the great champions of 
the Yedantic system could not emancipate themselves 
thoroughly from the materialistic speculations of the 
Sankhya school ; and, therefore, while denying most 
emphatically the existence of gross matter, they seemed 
inclined to admit that of tenuous matter or material 
principles, such as the unperceived principles immedi¬ 
ately emanating from Prakriti, according to Sankhya 
notions. This fact we hope to be able to prove after 
we have set forth the nature of that ignorance to which 
creation is traced by the Yedantin. 

How we raise the important question, What is the 
Illusion theory, by which the Parinama or Yikara the¬ 
ory of the Upanishads and the Brahma Sutras was so 
thoroughly superseded ? This question cannot be 
rightly answered till another question is raised and set 
at rest. What is Illusion or Ignorance ? There are 
three well-known Sanscrit words which are met with 
in almost every page of every standard work on 
Yedantic philosophy. These are Ajnana, Ignorance ; 
Avidya, Nescience ; and Maya, Illusion. These words 
are interchangeable, or of the same import ; and it is 
because they are somewhat indiscriminately used—the 
first for the second, and the second for the third—that 
uniformity of phraseology is endangered, and mystifi¬ 
cation is realized. We shall, therefore, make use of 
the word Ignorance, and avoid the use of the other two 
synonyms as far as possible. 

What is Ignorance ? The third section of the 
Yedanta Sar thus furnishes the reply :— 

“ Illusory attribution is the attributing to the real of 
that which is unreal, as a snake is imagined in a rope 
which is not a snake. 

“ The ‘ real ’ is Brahma, existence, intelligence, and 


340 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


joy, without a second. The ‘ unreal 5 is the whole mass 
of unintelligent things, beginning with Ignorance. 

“ Ignorance, they say, is not describable as existent 
or non-existent —an entity composed of the three quali¬ 
ties antagonistic to knowledge. 

“ (Its existence is established) by one’s own con¬ 
sciousness of being ignorant, and also by the Veda, 
(which speaks as) the own power of God, concealed by 
its emanations” (Swetaswatara Upanishad). 

Ignorance is in this passage called the “ unreal ” and 
placed in sharp antithesis to Brahma, who is called the 
“real.” It is, moreover, said to be “unreal,” along 
with the whole mass of unintelligent things which has 
emanated from it, as a source of existence. But the 
moment the conjunction is indicated, or the causal rela¬ 
tionship between Ignorance as the cause and the uni¬ 
verse as the effect, a difficulty arises. How ean that 
which is unreal be a productive cause at all ? The 
causal efficacy of Ignorance being admitted, its un¬ 
reality must be qualified. It is, therefore, said to be 
“ something not describable as existent and non¬ 
existent,” having a subtle species of existence, a species 
of existence which may be described as an intermediate 
link between existence and non-existence. In these 
words we may see the doctrine of varieties of existence 
developed in Vedanta-Paribhasa foreshadowed. 

It is also said to be an entity, not a positive unreality, 
like the horn of a hare or the son of a barren woman. 
And, moreover, it consists, like Prakriti of the San- 
khyas, of three qualities— sattwa , the attribute which 
generates and promotes goodness ; rajas, that which 
generates and promotes activity, and tamas, or that 
which leads to indolence and stolidity. 

If Ignorance is an entity, eternal, all-diffusive, like 


THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 


341 


ether, or rather like Prakriti, its dissolution or destruc¬ 
tion is impossible. The Hindus maintain, like some 
modern scientists, that what is eternal is indestructible. 
Ignorance is eternal, and it is the source of our bond¬ 
age, which will last as long as its cause lasts. Igno¬ 
rance being eternal is everlasting, and consequently our 
bondage, which is co-eternal with it, will last forever. 
There can, therefore, be no hope of emancipation held 
forth to alleviate the misery of suffering humanity. 
But happily Ignorance, though eternal, is annihilable. 
It is “ antagonistic to knowledge,’’ and flees before 
knowledge as darkness flees before light. What the 
Sankhyas say about their non-discrimination, as regards 
its eternity and annihilability, the Yedantists predicate 
of their Ignorance. 

IIow is the existence of Ignorance proved ? By uni¬ 
versal consciousness in the first place. We are all con¬ 
scious of being Ignorance-bound, and all the varied 
systems of Indian Philosophy concur in representing 
man in his unregenerate state as fettered by Ignorance. 
Its existence, therefore, is universally admitted. Its 
existence is further proved by revelation. 

How does Ignorance manifest itself ? Both as “ a 
collective aggregate” and as “a distributive aggre¬ 
gate.” Every soul is, according to the Yedantic sys¬ 
tem, a synthesis of a particle of Ignorance and a parti¬ 
cle of Brahma invariably called Intelligence. Every 
soul, therefore, represents Ignorance in its distributive 
form or as a distributive aggregate. The Ignorances 
attached to the innumerable souls in the world ema¬ 
nated from and are to be reabsorbed in one mass of 
Ignorance, called “ Collective Ignorance. ” This Col¬ 
lective Ignorance, or totality of Ignorance, is called 
Iswar or God, the Creator and Preserver and Destroyer 


342 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


of the world. It is, however, not appropriately called 
Iswar, for it forms only “ the causal body” of this 
Being. Iswar, like the individual soul, is a synthesis, 
and consists of the compound of all Ignorances, called 
Collective Ignorance, and a very large portion of 
Brahma, the sum total of all the particles of Brahma 
attached to the innumerable souls in the world. Col¬ 
lective Ignorance is, therefore, his causal body rather 
than his entire self. Distributive Ignorance is in the 
same way the “ causal body” of the individuated soul, 
and not its entire self. The relationship between Col¬ 
lective Ignorance and Distributive Ignorance is illus¬ 
trated in the Yedanta Sar by that subsisting between a 
“ forest” and “ the trees” of which it consists, or that 
between a “ lake” and “ the waters” of which it con¬ 
sists. 

The relationship between Collective and Distributive 
Ignorances is thus set forth in section four of Yedanta 
Sar : “ As, when regarding a forest as a distributive 
aggregate composed of trees, there is a perception of 
its manifoldness, which is also perceived in the case of 
a lake regarded as a distributive aggregate of waters; 
so, when viewing Ignorance distributively, we perceive 
it to be multiplex. As the Yeda says, ‘ Indra, by his 
supernatural powers, appears multiform ’ ” (Rig Yeda, 
6, 47, 18). 

“ Thus, then, a thing is regarded as a collective or 
distributive aggregate according as it is viewed as a 
whole or as a collection of parts.” 

The portion of Brahma associated with Collective 
Ignorance, or forming the soul of Iswar, is called “ the 
most excellent,” and has the qualities of “ omniscience, 
omnipotence, and universal control 5 ’ attributed to it. 
It is said to (< abound in pure goodness,” to be “real 


THE MATA, OR THE ILLUSION" THEORY. 343 

and unreal,” “ imperceptible, the internal ruler and the 
cause of the world.” It will be shown in the proper 
place that all these attributes belong, properly speak¬ 
ing, to Collective Ignorance rather than to the portion 
of Brahma associated with it ; to the causal body rather 
than the indwelling soul of Iswar. 

The very small portion or particle of Brahma associ¬ 
ated with Distributive Ignorance, or forming the indi¬ 
vidual soul, is called “ humble,” and it “ abounds in im¬ 
pure goodness.” It has “ the qualities of parvipotence 
and parviscience” attributed to it. Distributive Igno¬ 
rance is its causal body, “ because it is the cause of the 
making of, etc.” The portion of Brahma attached to 
Collective Ignorance is called its Illuminator. “ Om¬ 
niscience is attributed to him (this portion of Brahma) 
as the illuminator of the whole of Ignorance. As the 
Yeda says, who knows all (generally), who knows 
everything (particularly)” (Mundaka i. 1, 3). The por¬ 
tion of Brahma attached to the individual soul, called 
Prajna in contradistinction to Iswara, is parviscient 
because it illuminates only one Ignorance. “ The 
smallness of its intelligence is owing to its being the 
illuminator of one Ignorance only.” It will be shown 
that both the collective portion of Brahma and the dis¬ 
tributive portion are called Illuminators more by court¬ 
esy than owing to any inherent fitness in them to do 
the work for which they get credit. 

There is, moreover, a disengaged portion of Brahma, 
appropriated neither to Collective Ignorance nor to 
Distributive Ignorance ; and this is called the Fourth, 
the absolute, unrelated, unconditioned Brahma. Why 
this term is applied to him will be shown when the 
work of creation, or rather self-distribution, performed 
by Collective Ignorance, is set forth. Meanwhile let us 


344 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


present a couple of extracts from the fourth section of 
the book under review in corroboration of our state¬ 
ments : 

“ Nor is there any difference between Iswara and 
Prajna, who are associated respectively with these (col¬ 
lective and distributive aggregates of Ignorance), just 
as there is none between the ether appropriated {i.e. the 
space occupied) by the forest and that appropriated by 
the trees composing it, or between the sky reflected in 
the lake and that reflected in its waters. As it is 
written in the Yeda, ‘ This is the Lord of all, omnis¬ 
cient, the internal ruler, the source of all, for it is the 
source and reabsorbent of all creatures ’ ’ ’ (Mandukya 
Upanishad 6). 

“ As there is an unappropriated ether, the source of 
that appropriated by a forest or by its trees, and of 
that reflected in a lake or its waters, so too there is In¬ 
telligence (Brahma) which is not associated with Igno¬ 
rance, the source of these two Ignorance-associated 
Intelligences (Iswara and Prajna). It is called the 
Fourth. As it is written in the Yeda, ‘ They consider 
that calm, blissful, secondless one to be the Fourth. 
That is Soul—that is to be known ’ 5 ’ (Mandukya 7). 

Why the unassociated portion of Brahma, the abso¬ 
lute, unrelated entity, is called the Fourth, will become 
apparent when we have set forth the order of creation 
according to this system. The creative power resides, 
in reality, in Ignorance, not in the Brahma portion 
associated with it. Ignorance has two powers—the 
power of Concealment and that of Projection. 

By its power of envelopment or concealment, Igno¬ 
rance, though limited, throws a veil over the infinite 
soul, and completely cuts it off from our view, just as a 
small bit of cloud sometimes covers the entire disk of 


THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 


345 


the sun and makes the luminary invisible. On account 
of this covering or overshadowing Ignorance, the 
quiescent soul u appears to be an agent and a patient, 
and to experience pleasure, pain, and other mundane 
conditions, just as a rope, covered by ignorance as to 
its real nature, appears to be a snake.” 

The power of concealment is the enveloping, not the 
creative power. This last is the power of Projection, 
and u is such that just as Ignorance, regarding a rope 
by its own power, raises up the form of a snake, etc., 
on the rope, which is covered by it ; so Ignorance too, 
by its own power, raises up, on soul which is covered 
by it, ether and the whole universe. As it has been 
said, “ The projective power (of Ignorance) can create 
the world, beginning with subtle bodies, and ending 
with the terrene orb.” 

It is to be observed here that Intelligence or Brahma 
is associated with Ignorance in the work of creation, 
and represented as the efficient cause. The fourth sec¬ 
tion of the book concludes with this statement : “ In¬ 
telligence, associated with Ignorance possessed of these 
two powers, is, when itself is chiefly considered, the 
efficient cause ; and when its associate is chiefly con¬ 
sidered, is the material cause. Just as a spider, when 
itself is chiefly considered, is the efficient cause of its 
web, the effect ; and when its body is chiefly consid¬ 
ered, h the material cause of it.” 

T >v: ver, is one of those statements in the book 

which are obviously inconsistent with the spirit and 
le ; iT Yedantic teaching—nay, of all Hindu Phi- 
p Brahma is described in the latest of the 

is, the Swetaswatara Upanishad, as “ with- 
ut i, devoid of action, tranquil, irreproachable, 
.ess.” In this very book Brahma is called 


34G 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


“ the substrate of all”—that is, of all the creations of 
Ignorance, but not certainly its associate in creation. 
Brahma could not possibly have a desire to create, 
could not possibly have displayed any activity in crea¬ 
tion, without neutralizing that perfect quiescence in 
which all that is characteristic of him is concentrated. 

The creative power resides in Ignorance, not in the 
portion of Brahma associated with it. But it may be 
said that its juxtaposition or association is needed to 
lead Ignorance to energize. Why ? Is it because it 
stirs up the creative power latent in Ignorance by a 
voluntary action ? or is it because it makes Ignorance 
fruitful by emitting unconsciously an automatic influ¬ 
ence ? The Brahma portion attached to Ignorance 
could not have led to its energization by a voluntary 
exertion, because the absolute spirit is, under all circum¬ 
stances, associated or unassociated, incapable of volition 
and action. And its proximity is not needed to drive 
Ignorance to action, because Ignorance is moved by an 
inherent power to energize or evolve. Ignorance, 
therefore, is both the efficient and the material cause 
of the universe. 

From Ignorance, “ attended by its projective power, 
in which the quality of insensibility (tamos) abounds, 
proceeds ether ; from ether, air ; from air, heat ; from 
heat, water ; and from water, earth.” These are the 
subtle, rudimentary, or non-quintuplicated elements ; 
and in them “ arise the qualities pleasure, pain, and 
insensibility in the proportion in which they exist in 
their cause.” From them, when these qualities 
manifest themselves, spring the subtle or rudimentary 
bodies, each of which consists of seventeen mem¬ 
bers—the five organs of sense, the five organs of action, 
the five vital airs, mind, and intellect. The subtle 


THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 347 

body consists of three sheaths—the intellectual or 
cognitional (yiynanamayakosa) sheath, consisting of the 
organs of sense, the ear, skin, eye, tongue, and nose, 
and intellect ; the mental or sensorial ( manomayakosa ) 
sheath, consisting of mind and the organs of action, 
the mouth, hand, foot, excretory and generative 
organs ; and respiratory (prana-mayakosa) sheath, 
consisting of the five vital airs, respiration, inspiration, 
flatuousness, expiration, and digestion. The subtle 
body, consisting of these sheaths, migrates with the soul 
from one body to another, and is not dissolved till its 
final liberation and absorption into the universal soul. 

These subtle organisms or bodies, brought into exist¬ 
ence by the subtle elements, appear both as a collective 
aggregate and as a distributive aggregate. “ Here, 
too, the totality of subtle bodies, as the seat of one 
intellect (i.e. Sutratma’s), is a collective aggregate, like 
the forest or the lake ; or as the seat of many intellects 
(viz., those of individual souls) is a distributive aggre¬ 
gate, like the forest trees and the lake waters.” 

The portion of Brahma 4 4 associated with the collec¬ 
tive aggregate (of subtle bodies) is called Sutratma 
(thread-soul), Hiranyagarbha, or Prana, because it 
passes as a thread through all (the subtle frames), and 
on account of the conceit that it is the five uncom¬ 
pounded elements possessing the faculties of knowing, 
desire, and activity (i.e. that it is the subtle body 
itself).’ ’ And the portion of Brahma 44 associated with 
the distributive aggregate of subtle organisms is called 
Taijasa (the brilliant), because it has the luminous in¬ 
ternal organ as its associate.” 

The subtle bodies, in their collective and distributive 
forms, have an 44 experience” which the gross frames 
can never have. 44 These two, the Thread-soul (Su- 


348 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


tratma) and Taijasa, by means of the subtle modifica¬ 
tions of the mind, have experience of subtle objects. 
As it is said in the Yeda, ‘ Taijasa has fruition of the 
supersensible.’ ” It ought to be mentioned here that 
of the three sheaths of the subtle organism, “ the intel¬ 
lectual, being endowed with the faculty of knowing, is 
an agent ; the mental, having the faculty of desire, is 
an instrument, and the respiratory, having the faculty 
of activity, is an effect.” 

The unity of the Thread-soul and Taijasa is thus set 
forth : “ There is no difference between the collective 
and distributive aggregates of the subtle frames, or be¬ 
tween Sutratma and Taijasa, who are associated with 
them, just as there is none between the forest and its 
trees, or between the space occupied by each, or be¬ 
tween the lake and its waters, and the sky reflected in 
each.” 

From subtle elements and subtle bodies let us proceed 
to those of a grosser kind. The gross elements are 
evolved out of the subtle ones by a process called quin- 
tuplication. It is thus explained : “ After dividing 
each of the five subtle elements, ether and the rest, 
into two equal parts, and then subdividing each of the 
first five of the ten moieties into four equal parts, mix 
those four* parts with the others, leaving the undivided 
second moiety of each. As it has been said, ‘ After 
dividing each into two parts, and the first halves again 
into four parts, by uniting the latter to the second half 
of each, each contains the five ’ ’ ’ (Panchadasi, i. 27). 

These quintuplicated elements are earth, water, fire, 
air, and ether. From them “ spring, one above the 
other, the worlds Bhur, Bhuvar, Swar, Mahar, Janas, 
Tapas, and Satya ; and, one below the other, the nether 
worlds, called Atala, Yitala, Sutala, Basatala, Talatala, 


THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 


349 


Mahatala, and Patala.” They also give birth to 
“ Brahma’s egg, the four kinds of gross bodies in¬ 
cluded in it, and food and drink.” These four kinds 
“are the viviparous, the oviparous, the moisture- 
engendered, and the germinating. 

“ The viviparous are those produced from the womb, 
as man and animals ; the oviparous are those born 
from eggs, as birds and snakes ; the moisture-engen¬ 
dered are those which spring from moisture, as lice and 
gnats ; the germinating are those which shoot up from 
the ground, as creepers and trees.” 

The gross bodies, like the subtle ones, appear as a 
collective aggregate and as a distributive aggregate. 
“ In this case, too, the fourfold gross body, viewed as 
the seat of one (collective) intellect or of many (indi¬ 
vidual intellects), is a collective aggregate, like a forest 
or a lake, or a distributive aggregate, like the forest 
trees or the lake waters.” The portion of Brahma 
associated to the collective gross body is called vais- 
wanara (the spirit of humanity) or meat ; “ (the 
former) because of the conceit that it is in the whole of 
humanity, and (the latter) because it appears in various 
forms. The portion of Brahma associated to each dis¬ 
tributed body is called viswa, because, without aban¬ 
doning the conceit of the subtle body, it enters into all 
gross bodies. ” The gross body in its collective and 
distributive form is called the nutrimentitious (anna- 
mayakosa) sheath, “ on account of the changes of food 
(which go on within it and build it up). ” 

It is time to refer in detail to the divisions and sub¬ 
divisions of Brahma in creation. The Deity is, in the 
first place, divided into two main portions, one left in 
its original state of absolute, unconditioned existence, 
and the other appropriated to Ignorance, which has 


350 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


three qualities. This portion of Brahma has various 
titles, being called Brahma with qualities, Brahma 
adulterate, illusion-associated Brahma, illusive Brahma. 
This portion of Brahma is divided into innumerable 
particles appropriated to the innumerable objects of 
creation. A portion of it is attached to the collective 
or universal subtle body, and through it appropriated 
to all varieties of subtle bodies and the subtle elements 
called Tanmatras. Another portion is attached to the 
collective or universal gross body, and appropriated 
through it to all varieties of gross bodies, and the gross 
elements and their products, the seven upper and the 
seven nether worlds. Brahma therefore is found in 
four different states, which are thus indicated by Major 
Jacob : 

“ Firstly, with a causal body, composed of Ignorance 
or Illusion, which in the aggregate is Iswar or God, 
and distributively, individual souls or Prajna. It is 
likened to a state of dreamless sleep. 

“ Secondly, with a subtle body, composed of the five 
organs of sense and of action, mind, intellect, and the 
five vital airs, seventeen in all. This, in the aggregate, 
is called Hiranyagarbha, or the Thread-soul, and in the 
distributive state, Taijasa. It is likened to a state of 
dream. 

“ Thirdly, with a gross body, composed of the com¬ 
pounded elements. Viewed in the aggregate, it is 
called Vaiswanara, and distributively, Viswa. It is 
likened to the waking state. 

“ A fourth state is that of the unassociated pure 
Brahma, who is technically styled the Fourth. ” 

But these divisions and subdivisions of Brahma into 
innumerable parts, associated to various spheres of ex¬ 
istence and various classes of objects, subtle and gross, 


THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 


351 


cannot but suggest the idea of dualism. IIow is the 
integrity of monism to be maintained in the teeth of 
descriptions so obviously at war with it ? To under¬ 
stand this it is necessary to comprehend the Yedantic 
notion of “ illusory attribution” and its “ withdrawal.” 
Of the former we have the following definition in Sec¬ 
tion 3 : “ Illusory attribution is the attributing to the 
real of that which is unreal, as a snake is imagined in 
a rope which is not a snake. ” The meaning is obvious. 
Brahma is real , absolute, unconditioned, unrelated 
existence, without consciousness, without feeling, with¬ 
out qualities. But in all ordinary descriptions of 
Brahma certain attributes and operations are attributed 
to him. He is represented as omnipotent and omni¬ 
scient, as creator and preserver, as associated to various 
spheres of existence and various classes of objects, as 
enslaved by and emancipated from ignorance. But the 
representations by which he is set forth as conditioned 
and related, determined by qualities, states, and acts, 
are all “ false,” knowingly resorted to by the learned 
for the purpose of making the absolute intelligible to 
the unlearned. 

The pupil who has qualified himself for Brahma lore 
and. found the accredited teacher, is not expected to 
grasp the idea of the absolute all at once. He must 
advance, step by step, from the related to the non- 
J related, from the conditioned to the unconditioned, 
from the phenomenal to the real. And therefore, in 
accommodation to his inferior capacities, descriptions 
are resorted to such as lead him to look upon the abso¬ 
lute Brahma as a being conditioned and related. But 
when his understanding power is expanded, the illusory 
attribution is gradually withdrawn, and the uncondi¬ 
tioned is finally set forth in his original, immutable 


352 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


state of absolute existence. It is therefore said in 
Section 2 : “ That teacher, with great kindness, in¬ 
structs him by the method of illusory attribution ( adhy - 
aropa), followed by its withdrawal {apavada).” 

On this process of instruction Pandit Goreh makes 
the following remarks : “ Then, an objector may urge, 
the efficient causativity and material causativity of the 
spider both appertain to its body ; for the internal 
organ is called the subtle body, and it must therefore 
be regarded as body ; and, this being the case, why is 
a distinction taken between the spider and its body, 
and the former called efficient cause, and the latter 
material cause (of its web) ? My reply is that, in the 
passage of the Yedanta Sar under discussion, the ex¬ 
oteric notion is adopted. For when the Yedantins 
speak of the origin of the world, for instance, they do 
not believe its origin to be true. This mode of expres¬ 
sion they call false imputation. It consists in holding 
for true that which is false, in accommodation to the 
intelligence of the uninitiated. At a further stage of 
instruction, when the time has arrived for propounding 
the esoteric view, the false imputation is gainsaid, and 
this gainsaying is termed rescission.” 

The divisions and subdivisions of Brahma set forth in 
the Yedanta Sar, together with what is said about his 
association with ignorance and the ignorance-imagined 
creation, are examples of false attribution ; and all that 
is needed to make Brahma intelligible in its original 
essence is its “ withdrawal.” Section 7 shows how this 
gradual withdrawal takes place, and the Absolute set 
forth in his original state : 

u The 6 withdrawal’ {apavada) is the assertion that 
the whole of the unreal, beginning with Ignorance, 
which is an illusory effect of the Real, is nothing but 


THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 


353 


the Real ; just as a snake, which is the illusory effect 
of a rope, is nothing whatsoever but the rope. 

“ It has been said, ‘ An actual change of form is 
called Vikara , while a merely apparent change of form 
is called Vivartta . ’ This shall now be illustrated. 

“ The whole of the four classes of gross bodies con¬ 
stituting the seat of enjoyment, food and drink neces¬ 
sary for their use; the fourteen worlds, Bhur and the 
rest, the repository of these, and Brahma’s egg, which 
is the receptacle of all these worlds—all these are noth¬ 
ing more than the quintuplicated elements of which 
they are made. 

“ The quintuplicated elements, with sound and the 
objects of sense, and the subtle bodies—all these are 
nothing more than the non-quintuplicated elements of 
which they are made. 

“ The non-quintuplicated elements, with the qualities 
of goodness and the rest, in the inverse order of their 
production, are nothing more than Ignorance-associated 
Intelligence, which is their material cause. 

“ Ignorance, and Intelligence associated with it, con¬ 
stituting Iswara, etc., are nothing more than Brahma, 
the Fourth, the unassociated Intelligence, which forms 
their substrate.” 

By this process of false imputation or illusory attri- 
' bution and its withdrawal, the meaning of the great 
Yedantic watchword, Tat Twam Asi , That art Thou, 
is made manifest. The word “ that” in this mystic 
sentence embraces the first Yedantic triad—viz., Col¬ 
lective aggregate of Ignorance, Intelligence associated 
with it, called Iswar or God, and represented as pos¬ 
sessed of such divine attributes as omnipotence, omni¬ 
science, etc., and unassociated, unrelated Intelligence 
destitute of qualities. Of this triad the first two 


354 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


members, Collective Ignorance and Intelligence associ¬ 
ated with it, owe their existence to illusory attribution, 
and have therefore no real existence. The word 
4 4 that” therefore means absolute, unrelated Brahma, 
which really exists, and is the substrate of all that ex¬ 
ists—viz., of Ignorance and the Brahma-portion associ¬ 
ated with it. The word “ thou” in this great sentence 
embraces the second Yedantic triad—viz., Ignorance in 
its distributive aggregate, the Brahma-portion or Intel¬ 
ligence associated with it, called Prajna, and repre¬ 
sented as possessed of parviscience, parvipotence, etc., 
and the portion not thus associated, or associated at 
all. The first two members of this triad owe their 
existence to false imputation, and are therefore really 
non-existent. These being thrown out of calculation, 
what is left is pure, unassociated Brahma. The sen¬ 
tence, then, resolves itself into this : Brahma is 
Brahma. Therefore the words inscribed on the banner 
of Yedantism are : Brahma satyam Jag an mithya jiva 
Brahmaiva naapara (Brahma is true, the world is 

FALSE, THE SOUL IS BrAHMA AND NOTHING ELSE). 

Mr. Goreh proves clearly and indisputably that ac¬ 
cording to Yedantic principles the very existence of 
Brahma cannot be proved. The cosmological or teleo¬ 
logical argument is the great argument by which the 
Hindu philosopher proves the existence of God ; and 
this argument cannot be arrayed in favor of divine 
existence, according to Yedantic principles. The ex¬ 
istence of the world must be presupposed before that of 
God can be deduced as a corollary from it. But 
Yedantism represents the world as non-existent, a mere 
illusion, an unreality, a nonentity. The very founda¬ 
tion, therefore, of the teleological argument is under¬ 
mined. But Brahma, it may be said, is the illumina- 


THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 355 

tor, and enables the internal organ or the inner sensory 
to perceive and cognize ; and the teleological argument 
may be based upon its operations, if not upon the phe¬ 
nomena of nature. But Brahma is called the illumina¬ 
tor or creator by courtesy only ; by false imputation 
rather than with a due regard to truth. Besides, the 
internal organ itself is an illusion, and all its operations 
are illusions ! 

But Ignorance exists both in a collective and in a 
distributive capacity. May not the teleological argu¬ 
ment be made to rest on it ? But Ignorance itself is 
ignorantly imagined, and therefore false. Ignorance 
certainly cannot be regarded as a material substance of 
extreme tenuity, all-diffusive and all-embracing ; for 
it is emphatically said to be different from the Prakriti 
of the Sankhya school. Nor can Ignorance be regarded 
as a spiritual substance, for by hypothesis spiritual sub¬ 
stance, apart from Brahma, called Intelligence, does not 
and cannot exist. It has what Dr. Banerjea calls 
“ conventional existence,” which is, as he says, tanta¬ 
mount to non-existence. 

The conclusion, then, to which we are brought is 
that, as nothing exists but Brahma, the great teleolog¬ 
ical argument has not a peg to hang on in the Yedantic 
system. The other arguments in favor of the existence 
of God—those based on our intuitive convictions, our 
sense of responsibility, and our moral nature in general- 
share its fate. The only argument the Yedantin can 
utilize is based on what he calls c<: testimony” or revela¬ 
tion. But, after all, revelation is an illusion, and there¬ 
fore nothing in the shape of a reason can possibly be 
assigned for his unequivocal statements regarding the 
existence of Brahma. 

Let it also be noted that Brahma, as described in the 


356 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


standard documents of the Maya school, if not of all 
Yedantic schools, is a nonentity. Brahma is without 
attributes, both material and moral. When he is de¬ 
scribed as having extension and other material proper¬ 
ties, the description is merely conventional, provision¬ 
ally resorted to for the purpose of explaining his 
unrelated and unqualified being. Again, when spiritual 
powers and dispositions are attributed to him, the 
attribution is illusory, and must be withdrawn before a 
proper idea of his existence can be formed. He is 
therefore destitute of both material and moral attri¬ 
butes. He is neither matter nor mind—an inconceivable 
phantom, an illusion, a nonentity. Yedantism is equiv¬ 
alent to the absolute nihilism of Buddha and his fol¬ 
lowers ! 

A brief reference to the Yedantic theory of bondage 
and emancipation is enough to bring us to the conclu¬ 
sion of our discourse. The cause of the bondage of the 
soul is, as in all the schools, Ignorance, which leads to 
desire, work, and the long chain of transmigration. 
Ignorance, by its encompassing and projecting power, 
conceals “ the Secondless, Indivisible Brahma” from the 
view of the soul, breeds an idea of its difference from 
the Being with which it is identical, generates a desire 
to secure pleasure and avoid pain, and leads to works 
which must bear their fruits in an almost interminable 
series of births and deaths. And therefore to ensure 
liberation, all that is necessary is to destroy ignorance or 
supersede it by right knowledge. The devotee must 
not only comprehend the meaning of the sentence 

That art Thou,” but understand its counterpart, “ I 
am Brahma.” He must notice the illusory character 
of all that appears to exist, or all that is besides the 
absolute spirit, and thereby be in a position to say, “ I 



THE MAYA, OR TIIE ILLUSION THEORY. 


357 


am Bralima, the unchanging, pure, intelligent, free, 
undecaying, supreme joy, eternal, secondless.” 

IIow is such self-knowledge to be attained ? To 
acquire that right knowledge which is a stepping-stone 
to liberation it is necessary to practise (a) hearing 
( sravana ), (l>) consideration ( manana ), (c) profound 
contemplation (nididhyasana) , and (d) meditation 
( samadhi ).” “Hearing is the ascertaining of the drift 

of all the Yedantic writings regarding the secondless 
Reality.” u Consideration is unceasing reflection on 
the secondless Reality, which has been heard of in con¬ 
junction with arguments in support of the Vedanta.” 

Profound contemplation is the continuance of ideas 
consistent with the secondless Reality, to the exclusion 
of the notion of body and such-like things, which are 
inconsistent (with Him).” “ Meditation is of two 
kinds—viz., (1) with recognition of subject and ob¬ 
ject ( savihalpaha ), and (2) without such recognition 
( virvikalpaka ). 5 5 

Here we have the ri seeded ” and the “ seedless” 
meditation of Yoga Philosophy, the meditation in which 
the triad of subject, object, and thought are recognized 
as different entities, and that in which they are merged 
into a unity. The means to the attainment of the 
latter, enumerated in Chapter XIII. of the Vedanta Sar, 
are the eight accessories of Yoga—viz., “ (1) For¬ 
bearance {yama) ; (2) Religious observances ( niyama ); 
(3) Religious postures (asana ); (4) Regulation of breath 
(.pranayama) ; (5) Restraint of the organs of sense 
(pratyahara) ; (6) Fixed attention (< dharand ) ; (7) 

Contemplation ( dliyama ); (8) Meditation {samad¬ 

hi)” ' 

The hindrances to such meditation, or “ the medita¬ 
tion without recognition of subject and object,” are not 


358 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


exactly those enumerated in the Yoga Sastra. They 
are : 

“ 1. Mental Inactivity (lay a ). 

“ 2. Distraction (vilcshepa). 

“ 3. Passion (kashayd), and 

“ 4. The tasting of enjoyment (rasaswada). ” 

The first of these obstacles may strike us as strange 
in a system which makes mental inactivity its goal. 
But the explanation removes the difficulty : “ ‘ Mental 
inactivity ’ is the drowsiness of the modification of the 
internal organ while not resting on the seconclless 
Reality.” When the obstacles are removed, and dis¬ 
criminative knowledge followed by perfect quiescence 
m, not apart from, the secondless Brahma is attained, 
the state of the soul is called jivanmuJcti , which is, 
being interpreted, “ liberated, but still living.” The 
devotee in this state is in a manner petrified, though 
alive. He moves not, being “ as (the flame of) a lamp 
standing in a sheltered spot”; he sees not, hears not, 
thinks not, breathes not as ordinary mortals do. 
“ Though he has eyes, he is as though he had them 
not ; though he has ears, he is as though he had them 
not ; though he has a mind, he is as one without a 
mind ; though he has vital airs, he is as though he had 
them not.” Being alive, he cannot but see, but he 
" sees not duality, or, if seeing it, regards it as non¬ 
duality ;” and when he acts he “ is free from (the 
results of) actions. ” He is above responsibility, and all 
distinctions, even those between virtue and vice, purity 
and impurity, neatness and shabbiness, etc., vanish 
before him into thin air. “If he who knows the sec¬ 
ondless Reality may act as he likes, what difference is 
there between the knowers of truth and dogs in respect 
of eating impure food ? Except the fact of knowing 


THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY. 359 

Brahma, there is no difference ; the one knows the Self, 
the other (the dog) does not.” 

Such is the goal of the system ! The Paramhansa, 
or the Knower of Brahma, feeding as swine upon filth 
and living as swine without self-consciousness, thought, 
perception of physical and moral beauty, recognition of 
distinction between good and bad ; without taste, 
refinement, sublimity of thought, elevation of feeling, 
holiness of purpose, and grandeur of aspiration, left not 
even to the guidance of instinct, and reserved for a state 
of annihilation in a Being destitute of intelligence and 
volition, as well as of material properties, and therefore 
a nonentity ! 

This system has proved a refuge of lies to many a 
hardened sinner. The perplexed minds which have 
found shelter in its solution of the problems of exist¬ 
ence are few indeed ; but the number of the wicked 
hearts which have been composed to sleep by the opiate 
of its false hopes is incalculable. The astute politician, 
whose past life is a record only of malversation and 
successful intrigue ; the tyrant, whose progress in life 
has been marked by violence and wanton cruelty ; the 
rake, whom a course of unblushing licentiousness has 
brought to the verge of a premature grave ; the man 
steeped in the vice of intoxication and determined not 
to abandon ; the villain, the ruffian, the criminal, the 
cunning cheat and the daring rogue, and the false 
friend and the sneaking hypocrite—what a balm to the 
seared but not deadened consciences of these, and others 
as bad as they, in a system which assures them that all 
their fears arising from their recognition of moral dis¬ 
tinctions are groundless, and that perfect beatitude will 
be their reward if they can only bring themselves to the 
conclusion that there is no difference between God and 


360 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


man, virtue and vice, cleanliness and filth, heaven and 
hell ! Nowhere has the system been so universally 
tried as in India, and its results here are fitted to lead 
any candid observer to re-echo the statement —Pan¬ 
theism is Pandiabolism. 


CHAPTER XII. 


THE HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 

A good deal of morbid sentimentalism is arrayed in 
behalf of what is called the ancient civilization of 
India. An attempt is made to give prominence to and 
speak in terms of praise of the commendable features 
of national life and the excellences of individual char¬ 
acter it has fostered ; and thus far a work, not merely 
unobjectionable but positively useful, is accomplished. 
Bug when an argument is based on these admirable ele¬ 
ments of an effete civilization in favor of its perpetua¬ 
tion, or against its supersession by a higher and a 
healthier civilization, a move in a direction on the 
whole right is transformed into a drag on genuine 
progress. The civilization of the country, though em¬ 
balmed amid sacred recollections, is dead; and it is as 
impossible to make it live as a plastic, formative power 
as it is to convert the dead language with which it is 
intimately associated into a living tongue ! 

It is very easy to say that Western and Eastern 
civilizations ought to help each other by an unrestricted 
interchange of beauty and glory, the one being ready 
to adopt and incorporate with its substance the peculiar 
excellences of the other, and both being ready to co¬ 
operate in the great work of raising fallen nationalities 
and degraded peoples. But the two forces refuse to 
march alongside of each other, raised above petty jeal¬ 
ousies and unseemly antagonisms. The stronger over- 


3G2 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


comes the feebler, and evinces an irresistible tendency 
to reign alone and unrivalled. The law of the survival 
of the fittest reigns here as elsewhere ! Those who 
have carefully watched the progress Western civiliza¬ 
tion has made in the country will never hesitate to ad¬ 
mit that no compromise is possible between it and the 
decrepit civilization it has had to encounter ; and that, 
if its superstructure is to be raised at all, it is to be 
reared on the ruins of its rival ! 

But Western civilization is by no means faultless, 
and therefore the fatality in favor of its triumphant 
march and ultimate ascendency cannot be contemplated 
with unmixed satisfaction. And it were to be wished 
that its progress had not been ensured till it had been 
completely shorn of its objectionable features. But 
this is not the case with the heaven-bestowed religion 
with which the very best elements of that civilization 
are intimately and indissolubly associated. Christianity 
cannot amalgamate with the religions of the country, 
and if it is at all to rear its superstructure on Hindu 
soil, it will be on the ruins of the Hindu religion and 
the others by which its sway has been for ages and is 
now being curtailed. 

Christianity represents a philosophy—a philosophy 
not methodically developed, not intrenched behind a 
network of definitions, propositions, and syllogisms, 
but sublime and deep nevertheless, suited to man’s con¬ 
dition in life, and in accord with his common-sense and 
highest reason. Between this philosophy and that 
enshrined in Sanscrit literature there is very little in¬ 
deed that is common, while in all essential features the 
one is the antipodes of the other. How is a compro¬ 
mise possible ? A lasting peace or even a temporary 
truce ? A compromise may be effected, a peace nego- 


HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 303 

tiated, between the dead civilization of Asia and the 
living civilization of Europe, between languages dead 
and gone and those which are full of life and vigor. 

But a compromise between a God-given and a man- 
invented religion, a philosophy true and a philosophy 
falsely so called, is monstrous, and should be deprecated. 

But is there not an indissoluble connection between 
ancient and modern philosophy ? Yes ; there is that 
sort of connection between the one and the other which 
exists between the parent and his offspring, between 
the cause and its effect, between the producing power 
and the thing produced. Modern philosophy, falsely 
so called, is the child of ancient philosophy, and differs 
from it in external drapery rather than in any feature 
of an essential character. Christianity does not ally 
itself to the self-sufficient philosophy which in these 
days is reviving some, if not all, of the aberrations of 
ancient thought. And therefore a compromise between 
the varied types of ancient and modern speculation does 
not indicate any approach on the part of Christian phi¬ 
losophy toward a reconciliation at once unnatural and 
irrational. 

It is our intention in this paper to set forth the 
difference or rather the contrast between the vital doc¬ 
trines of Christian philosophy and those of Hindu Phi¬ 
losophy. But before we do so it is desirable to offer a 
remark or two on the ingenious way in which the 
sombre character of Hindu Philosophy is explained. 
Hindu Philosophy is Pessimism. It begins with a recog¬ 
nition of human sorrow, goes out in vain in quest ofa l/ 
proper remedy, and ultimately arrives at annihilation 
as the goal where human misery terminates only in the 
extinction of life. Even Schopenhauer does not speak 
of the phenomena of life in terms more lugubrious than 


364 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


those which form the prominent features of the phrase¬ 
ology and nomenclature of philosophy in our country. 
How is its gloomy character explained ? 

According to Max Muller the Greek intellect was the 
very antipodes of the Hindu intellect. The Greek was 
sensuous, of a volatile temperament, alive to the varied 
charms of the world of the eye, and the ear, and ab¬ 
sorbed in its occupations and pleasures. His intellect 
was vivacious, but not profound ; ready to catch the 
significance that lies on the surface of things, but un¬ 
able to apprehend the deep meaning that underlies it ; 
while his earth-born impulses drove him toward the 
present business of life and its ephemeral enjoyments. 
He therefore distinguished himself as a man of busi¬ 
ness, a statesman, an orator, a dramatist, an artist, a 
son of Mars, or a devotee of pleasure ; and he failed to 
unfold and expound the deep meaning of the universe 
or the recondite truths of philosophy. The Hindu, on 
the contrary, was highly intellectual, insensible to ex¬ 
ternal charms, and averse to the grovelling realities of 
sense and the commonplace incidents of life. His in¬ 
tellect was deep, and led him to penetrate instinctively 
beneath the surface of external nature, and to bring 
out the jewels of profound truth hidden in its inmost 
recesses ; while his feelings, chastened by domineering 
intellectualism, tended to draw him away from the busy 
scenes of life, with its monotonous round of occupations 
and pleasures. And therefore he failed to distinguish 
himself on the busy theatre of worldly success and 
worldly renown, and succeeded only as an ascetic 
thinker and recluse philosopher. This contrast can be 
very beautifully drawn out from universals to particu¬ 
lars, from the region of magnificent generalizations to 
that of petty details. There are, however, some facts 



HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 3G5 

incompatible with the assumption of such a sharp an¬ 
tithesis between the intellect of ancient Greece and an¬ 
cient India. It is a matter of fact that the generality 
of people in India were, as they are now, as thoroughly 
immersed in the avocations and pleasures of life as the 
generality of people in Greece ; while in that favored 
cradle of taste and artistic beauty schools of philosophy 
were not wanting wherein the deep problems of life 
were as earnestly and as fruitlessly pondered and 
analyzed as in India. The peculiarly gloomy type of 
Indian Philosophy cannot be satisfactorily explained by 
a reference solely to the intellectual differences pointed 
out by scholars like Max Muller. 

Nor will the specious theory propounded in Buckle’s 
u History of Civilization in England ” of itself account 
for the peculiar type of intellectual development no¬ 
ticeable in Hindu Philosophy. Buckle traces all the 
ethnological peculiarities by which one race is distin¬ 
guished from the others to the omnipotent influence of 
physical causes ; and, according to him, food, soil, cli¬ 
mate, and general aspects of nature are enough to ex¬ 
plain the idiosyncrasy of Hindu Philosophy, especially 
as it was elaborated in a country and at a time where 
and when man had not learned to modify nature, and 
was therefore irresistibly propelled by its laws and 
forces. Our Aryan ancestor had in the country a rich 
soil, and much labor was not needed on his part to 
make it yield enough for his sustenance. He was, 
moreover, temperate and abstemious ; and his diet, 
being simple and spare, combined with the enervating 
influences of a tropical climate in making him indolent 
and sluggish, prone to fruitless meditation, and averse 
to the stirring incidents of an active and busy life. 
Nor were the general aspects of nature in the plains 


366 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


fitted to magnetize his intellect, during especially the 
time justly called the season of universal lassitude and 
languor. This beautiful theory might be adopted but 
for one serious objection, besides the one which nullifies 
Max Muller’s representation of the opposite tendencies 
of the Greek and Hindu intellect. It is a matter of 
fact that these identical physical causes did not prevent 
the Rishis of the Rig Yeda times and their followers 
from leading a life very much like that of the ancient 
Greeks, and in marked contrast to that of the philoso¬ 
phers whose excogitations assumed so gloomy a form. 
It may be said that the physical causes enumerated by 
Buckle had not produced their legitimate fruits among 
the Aryans of Rig Yeda times, who, having come from 
a colder climate, retained that mental activity and 
bodily vigor which were impaired gradually under the 
tropical heat of our country. But it must not be for¬ 
gotten that this era of vaunted purity was long enough 
to give the climate a fine opportunity of displaying its 
disastrous power in deteriorated physique and enfeebled 
intellect, the interval between the composition of the 
earlier hymns and later ones being admittedly no less 
than a period of three hundred years. It should, more¬ 
over, be borne in mind that the Brahmana period,- almost 
equally long, and separated from it by an interval of at 
least two hundred years, presents the same picture of 
devotion to sensuous enjoyment which we find depicted 
in the Rig Yeda. 

The truth is, no single theory cut and dried can of 
itself satisfactorily explain tne peculiar bent of the 
Hindu intellect, and the sombre type of the philosophy 
to which it gave birth. A variety of conditions tended 
to give the one its introspective character and the other 
its dark color. Food and climate had their appreci- 


HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 367 


able influence, but they did not constitute the sole 
cause of the unique effect. The theocracy established 
by our Aryan ancestors, so obviously fitted to lead to 
political inaction by burking independence of thought 
and freedom of speech in matters affecting the interests 
even of this life, combined, with the absence of that 
spirit of scientific inquiry which the ancient world 
rarely if ever saw evoked in its vigor and enthusiasm, 
to breed in the Indian philosopher his habit of morbid 
introspection, and give his speculations a gloomy char¬ 
acter. His intellect was too lofty to allow him to rest 
content, as common minds do, with the petty concerns 
of life ; and as he was driven away from its nobler 
objects and ambitions by the very constitution of the 
society of which he was an integral part, he had to fall 
back upon himself for the exercise of those powers of 
which the world around him refused to make a proper 
use. He made himself the subject of his study and 
meditation, and the gloominess he saw within himself 
was by an easy transition transferred to the picture he 
drew of human life and the conclusions he based 
thereon. The Greek philosopher, who had a grand 
theatre of activity opened for him in a healthier politi¬ 
cal atmosphere, looked out of himself \ and made happi¬ 
ness the object of his search ; while the Hindu philoso¬ 
pher, cut off from such stirring scenes, looked within 
himself \ and made extinction of pain the object of his 
life and thought. His philosophy was emphatically 
esoteric , or subjective, while that of his Greek brother 
was on the whole exoteric , or objective. 

To return to the great object of this paper—to show 
that in all important features the philosophy we have 
been trying patiently to unfold is the very antipodes, 
not of ancient Greek philosophy, which was its repro- 


368 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


duction in some respects and its counterpart in others ; 
not of the boasted modern philosophy, in which almost 
all its important doctrines are revived and presented in 
fresh garments, but of the philosophy of the New Tes¬ 
tament. This antithesis or antagonism will be manifest 
if we take into consideration its descriptions of (1) God, 
(2) Creation, (3) Providence, (4) Man, (5) his Duty in 
Life, (6) the Source of his Present Degradation, (7) his 
Salvation, and (8) the Prospect before him. 

1. To begin with God. According to Hindu Phi¬ 
losophy, God is a nonentity. One, the very first of its 
six orthodox schools, declares Him non-existent, and 
opposes a series of arguments, ingenious though incon¬ 
clusive, to those brought forward by common-sense to 
prove His existence. The other schools, however, 
thought fit to abandon its attitude of rank atheism, and 
substitute for its appalling negation a Being wrapped 
up in grandiloquent phraseology, but destitute of any 
quality fitted to determine it or discriminate it from 
nothing. God, when kindly allowed to exist, is with¬ 
out power, without intelligence, without feeling, with¬ 
out material properties and spiritual attributes, or, to 
speak philosophically, without power, without quali¬ 
ties, and without relations. He is the Pure Being of 
some schools of Greek philosophy ; but as, according 
to no less a philosopher than Ilegel, Pure Being equals 
nothing , He is a nonentity. Ancient philosophy 
labored, not only in India, but in all famous centres of 
speculative thought, to reduce God to nothing ; and 
such phrases as “ the Eternal Yoid,” “ the Everlasting 
Night,” etc., were most ingeniously invented to set 
forth His real nothingness under a cloud of high-sound¬ 
ing words. And modern philosophers are simply fol 
lowing their example in their attempts to maintain th< 


HINDU AKD CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 369 


nothingness of God behind an array of imposing tech¬ 
nicalities. According to them, God is the Absolute and 
the Unconditioned. If these technical expressions 
mean anything, they represent God as Pure Being and 
nothing more—that subtle, impalpable nonentity which 
defies every attempt to determine it or give it some¬ 
thing like a definite shape. God again is the Infinite, 
and as such He fills all states and pervades all condi¬ 
tions. He cannot be existent, for were He so He 
would be out of the condition of non-existence. He 
cannot be omnipotent, for if He were so He would not 
fill the state of parvipotence. He cannot be perfect, 
for imperfection is a condition He must pervade as 
well as perfection. This miserable Being, hanging 
between life and death, power and weakness, moral 
excellency and moral turpitude, indeterminate, undefin- 
able, out of relation to all things, yet the fountain of 
creation, is the God of modern philosophy. Better by 
far the idol of the semi-civilized man, which represents 
some hero of a bygone age, who to a host of vices added 
at least a few virtues ! Better by far the fetich of the 
savage, which is in his opinion instinct with life and 
armed with power, and which when propitiated is be¬ 
lieved able to protect the worshipper from some tangi¬ 
ble danger or calamity ! 

The God of the Bible is not such a Being. He is not 
an inscrutable force, a nondescript power of natural 
selection, a mass of potentialities, a blind, self-evolv¬ 
ing principle acting under an iron necessity immanent 
in or foreign to it. He is a Person, intelligent, volun¬ 
tary, infinite in power, wisdom, and holiness. He 
pervades creation, and is at the same time above it, 
immanent and transcendent, intramundane and extra- 
mundane. He is not merely the Creator and Upholder, 


370 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


but the Euler and Governor of the universe, lie loves 
and hates—loves order, harmony, righteousness ; hates 
disorder, disharmony, and unrighteousness. He has 
not, therefore, that sentimental weakness which unfits 
a ruler for the sterner elements of his vocation. The 
consistency of the Bible picture of God, drawn by 
different hands in different places and at different 
times, under endless varieties of circumstances, and 
presented in diversified modes—now in a series of provi¬ 
dential dealings, then in denunciations of an appalling 
nature, and anon in exhortations and appeals which are 
fitted to melt the hardest heart or bedew the driest 
eye—is a standing miracle ; while prophetic announce¬ 
ments of what God is to do combine with narratives of 
what God has done in upholding that perfect character 
of severity and tenderness which nature, through its 
beneficent and destructive agencies, gives to its Author. 

We do not wish here to insist on that crowning rev¬ 
elation of God which is the characteristic glory of our 
holy religion, His revelation in Christ Jesus, in whom 
He is brought down to the level of our comprehension 
more than in natural phenomena and providential deal¬ 
ings, and in whom therefore He is presented in the 
only form in which it is possible for us to know, love, 
and serve Him. Hor do we wish to dwell upon His 
great work, in which both the sterner and milder feat¬ 
ures of the divine character are brought into bold relief, 
and which therefore is pre-eminently fitted to discour- 
age sin, and at the same time encourage the sinner to 
come where pardon, peace, and joy are held in reserve 
for him. 

2. Let us next contrast the notion of creation em¬ 
bodied in Hindu Philosophy with that presented in the 
Bible. There is no such thing as the ex-nihilo theory 


HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 371 


of creation within the compass of Hindu literature in 
general, or philosophy in particular. The maxim 
navastunovastusiddhi , which is the Sanscrit version of 
ex nihilo nihil fit, underlies, runs through, or permeates 
all the grotesque cosmogonies associated with it. The 
Sankhya school assumes a self-evolving material princi¬ 
ple called Prakriti, and evolves creation out of its trini¬ 
tarian substance. The Yoga school adds God to its 
categories, but the being whose existence is postulated 
is a nonentity, and has consequently nothing to do 
with the creation, preservation, and destruction of the 
world, all which operations are left exactly where the 
Sankhya school leaves them, hanging on the potential¬ 
ities of its primordial principle. The Logical schools 
have a God equally passive and quiescent, equally 
devoid of power, quality, and relation ; while the orig¬ 
ination and preservation of the universe are left in the 
hands of a mysterious and irresistible force called 
Adrishta, which has atoms of various kinds as its work¬ 
ing material. And these four schools concur with one 
another in maintaining the pre-existence of souls and 
rendering them useless appendages by forcing them out 
of all power, quality, and relation. The Mimansa 
throws all questions of a recondite character into the 
background, and seems to maintain the eternity of the 
w r orld along with the Yedas ; while to its champions it 
is a matter of perfect indifference whether God exists 
or not. And finally, the Yedantic system in its earlier 
forms evolves creation out of the substance of God, 
modified according to its exigencies, and in its later 
forms represents the whole universe as a gigantic 
dream. 

In marked contrast to all this, the Bible represents . 
God as the Creator of the world, of its substance as 


372 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


well as of its form, as the Personal, Intelligent, and 
Voluntary Agent who brought entity out of nonentity, 
things that appear out of nothing, not as the Architect 
who builded up the universe out of pre-existing mate¬ 
rials. The Bible does not compel us to oppose the 
modern theory of evolution; but according to it the 
process begins with an act of creation thoroughly 
ex nihilo , and progresses in a line, not uninterrupted 
by fresh acts of direct intervention, under the guidance 
of infinite wisdom, backed by unlimited power and 
infinite goodness. The idea of creation, or something 
brought out of nothing, is as distasteful to modern 
scientists as it was to our ancient philosophers ; and 
that because it is inconceivable. But it is forgotten 
that the theory of spontaneous generation, or of life 
coming out of dead matter, or that of thought spring¬ 
ing out of slime, is equally inconceivable. And if we 
have to swallow the one theory, we may as well swal¬ 
low the other ! 

3. God, according to Hindu Philosophy, is a non¬ 
entity, and therefore cannot rule or provide for the 
exigencies of life. He is in the same predicament with 
an idol of stone—nay, decidedly worse off. The idol of 
stone has eyes, but it sees not ; ears, but it hears not ; 
a nose, but it smells not ; but it consists of some mate¬ 
rial of which a proper use may be made. But the God 
of philosophy is a phantom, and has no existence be¬ 
yond the compass of an imagination prone to frivolity, 
though not destitute of creative power. How is it 
possible for Him to govern, to control the laws of the 
material world, guide human volitions, and regulate the 
complicated machinery of life ? He is therefore very 
properly thrust into the background ; and a material 
form such as Prakriti, or metaphysical phantasms such 


HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 373 

as Karma or work, Ma}^a or illusion, are posited to 
regulate the evolutions of providence. Modern philos¬ 
ophers have not been slow to follow the example, and 
such fantastic creations of a prurient imagination as 
Natural Selection, Kosmos, Moral Order, Thought, 
Idea, etc., have been pressed into service, clothed with 
gubernatorial powers, and placed at the head of the 
economy of providence. The scientist substitutes his 
immutable laws for these intangible chimeras ; but he 
does not see that, apart from a moving or a regulating 
power, they are as chimerical as the subtlest phantasy 
conceived or invented by the spirit of metaphysical 
refinement or generalization. 

God, according to the Bible, is the Author of Crea¬ 
tion and the God of Providence. Nor is His govern¬ 
ment general, confined to operations and events which 
are invested with peculiar importance and glory by 
human beings. His government is minute, particular, 
or individual, and it comprehends all material move¬ 
ments, from those of the largest heavenly bodies the 
advancing light of which has not yet reached our globe, 
down to those of a mote scarcely visible in a bright ray 
of fight, and all events, from the political convulsions 
by which great empires are shaken to their centres, or 
sanguinary wars by which their boundary fines are ex¬ 
tended, down to the pettiest occurrences of the most 
prosaic of fives—the fife say of a shoeblack or a chim¬ 
ney-sweep. “ Are there not two sparrows sold for a 
farthing ? and one of them shall not fall on the ground 
without your Father. But the very hairs of your head 
are all numbered.” Some theistic philosophers are 
willing to allow a sort of general government of the 
world and its concerns by God, but they revolt from 
ea of representing Him as condescending enough 


374 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


to take an interest in the dry details of every-day life, 
or in local idiosyncrasies and individual peculiarities. 
These persons, however, forget that, as great things 
are often evolved out of little things, there can be no 
government at all unless the minutiae of life are in¬ 
cluded, and that our petty distinctions between great 
and small are not recognized in heaven. Alexander 
Yinet refers, in one of his very suggestive discourses, to 
an event in the life of our Lord eminently fitted to 
show that Heaven takes special notice of many things 
passed over by us as uninteresting and useless. While 
His disciples were wrapped in admiration of the great 
buildings of Jerusalem and its magnificent temple, 
together with multitudes of rich and well-to-do people 
passing to and fro in processions more or less pompous, 
His eyes were fixed on the poor widow who cast into 
the treasury of the Lord all her living ! 

4. Let us now advert to the picture of man as pre¬ 
sented in Hindu Philosophy and that presented in the 
Bible. Man, according to Hindu Philosophy, is either 
a lump of matter, or a particle of the divinity, or a mere 
dream. His dualistic nature is admitted apparently in 
the Naturalistic and Logical schools ; but the soul to 
which his body is attached is devoid, like the God gen¬ 
erally admitted as existent by their champions, of power 
and quality, and really, if not apparently, thrown out 
of all relation to things heavenly as well as earthly. 
The soul is doubtless said to be related to the body or 
to nature in general through its material organ, the 
mind, and is represented as witness of its sufferings and 
ruler of its movements. But such representation is 
meaningless, as its ability to see and rule is emphati¬ 
cally denied ; and it is moreover neutralized by counter¬ 
representations, which make it the passive and unfeel- 


HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 375 

ing recipient of impressions made upon the mind by 
mischievous Prakriti, both pleasurable and painful^ 
But may not its proximity to nature, such as makes it 
seem active and impressionable when it in reality is 
thoroughly passive and impassible, suggest the idea of 
relation ? But its proximity to nature, after having 
been posited and made the basis of many a weighty 
conclusion, is emphatically denied. Both its entangle¬ 
ment and emancipation are declared fictitious, not 
real ! The soul, therefore, being set aside, all that 
remains of man is the body, a lump of matter moved 
by a law over which he has no control whatever. The 
Yedantic school converts this lump into a particle of 
the essence of the divinity, or one of its modes. The 
question, How the infinite becomes the finite ? is not 
categorically stated and perspicuously treated of ; but 
the theory of self-diremption is in a somewhat clumsy 
manner elaborated in the later documents of the sys¬ 
tem. That the infinite is modified in all its infinitude, 
now into a material form and then into a spirit, may be 
the import of some passages at least in the Upani shads 
and. the Brahma Sutras ; but later expositions of 
Yedantism ascribe to the deity an almost endless divis¬ 
ibility, by virtue of which one portion remains absolute 
and unrelated, and others are endlessly divided and 
subdivided into the innumerable realities of life, both 
material and spiritual. But the dualism or rather mul¬ 
teity involved in such endless emissions and modifica¬ 
tions of the divine substance is obviated by the Maya 
or Illusion Theory, which represents everything, spirit¬ 
ual or material, as unreal besides God—the real unity 
mistaken for variety. According to this last refinement 
of speculative thought, man is an illusion, or an unreal 
mode of divine existence ! 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


But whatever man is—a modification of the infinite 
in its entirety, a particle of the divine essence, or an 
illusion—he is not essentially different from the brute 
that perisheth, or even from inanimate matter. Ac* 
cording to Hindu Philosophy in its later manifestations, 
the inferior animals have souls as well as man, and the 
precedence the lord of creation might legitimately 
claim is the superiority of degree rather than of kind. 
He is, moreover, not generically different from particles 
of matter, as each of these either is or has a particle of 
the universal soul latent in it. Nowhere is the modern 
theory of continuity carried to such perfection as in 
India ! 

Man, according to the Scriptures, is the crowning 
apex of the pyramid of creation in this nether sphere. 
He is dualistic , consisting of body and soul, indissolu¬ 
bly or all but indissolubly united. Some Christian 
philosophers maintain that the body and the soul 
united in man form a third substance, a tertium quid; 
but though this theory may justly be represented as 
suggesting a chemical fusion inconceivable, the sharp 
lines of distinction by which the one is separated from 
the other are by no means sanctioned by the Scripture 
representations of man. According to these, man is a 
dualism, the relation between his body and soul being 
permanent, and involving interpenetration and constant 
interaction ; and the current belief in a Hades peopled 
with disembodied spirits needs, in the opinion of some 
eminent Christian philosophers, correction. Man is 
intelligent, and his intelligence is not either a particle 
or a mode of the Divine Intelligence. There are even 
among Christians habits of thought and expression to 
which, when not properly explained, serious exceptions 
may be taken. The relation, for instance, between a 


HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 377 


cause and effect has been, it is to be feared, pressed 
too far by some Christian writers in its parallelism to 
that subsisting between God and the universe. It is 
affirmed that, as the effect must be potentially in the 
cause, intelligence and free agency in man must poten¬ 
tially exist in God. But it is not perceived that such 
language tends to make human intelligence and wili, in 
all their weakness and perversity, simply modes of the 
unerring intelligence and the absolutely uncontrolled 
and uncontrollable will of God ; and that, as divine 
attributes are inseparable from the divine essence, an 
identity is established between the nature of God and 
the nature of man. We Christians believe in a sort of 
anthropomorphism, not in pantheistic unity between 
God and man ; and the Christian position is that man 
was created in the image of God—that is, clothed with 
intelligence, power, and free agency similar to but not 
identical with these elements of the divine nature. 
We have by anticipation already stated that man is a 
free agent, and as such a first cause, capable of setting 
in motion lines of second causes within certain limits 
and under certain conditions. But is his free agency 
absolute and uncontrolled ? Some Christian theolo¬ 
gians maintain that his will is absolutely free, while 
others admit some degree of control, not only in the 
region of action, but in that of volition also. But 
happily they all concur in maintaining that man is 
responsible for his thoughts, words, and deeds, even 
when they are placed under the control of God and 
are made subservient to the grand purposes of His gov¬ 
ernment. Christianity upholds divine sovereignty and 
human responsibility without pointing out the line in 
which these two apparent contradictions or, to adopt a 
well-known Kantian phrase, antinomies, meet. 


378 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


5. We now come to man’s duty in life. Representa¬ 
tions of this embodied in Hindu Philosophy are low, 
and fitted to demoralize him. His aim, according to 
them, is personal and selfish—his own deliverance from 
pain. The Hindu philosopher is' pre-eminently sub¬ 
jective, but his views of pain are characterized by an 
objectivity inconsistent with the general tenor of his 
philosophy. Among the varieties of power from which 
deliverance is described as desirable and necessary, those 
of an external character—viz., pains of the body resulting 
from impurity, disease, and death, or from the inclem¬ 
encies of the weather, or from the malignant influences 
of evil stars, or from the cruelty of demons and hob¬ 
goblins—occupy the most prominent place ; while the 
excruciating mental sufferings attendant on sinful dis¬ 
positions and vile passions are rarely, if at all, referred 
to. The great Buddha attributed the awful amount of 
suffering noticeable on the surface of the globe to birth, 
old age, disease, and death ; and the grossness of con¬ 
ception he displayed on this head is characteristic of 
Hindu Philosophy in general. It was, in short, derived 
from one of its systems, and gave its color and com¬ 
plexion to those elaborated after that reformer’s death. 
Be this as it may, the aim of the Hindu philosopher 
is essentially selfish : his own deliverance from pain in 
its varieties of ghastly forms. That of the Greek phi¬ 
losopher was by no means higher, his summum bonum 
being happiness. An aim so selfish cannot but lead a 
man to concentrate his attention upon his own self, to 
be self-centred and self-absorbed. Under its influence 
he makes self the centre of his thoughts, feelings, and 
desires, and all his schemes and projects revolve around 
it as their pivot or pole. Is it possible for a per¬ 
son to be thus absorbed in self without being de- 


HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 379 

graded and debased, enfeebled in mind and vitiated in 
soul ? 

Man’s duty in life is, according to the Bible, to glo¬ 
rify God, his Maker, Preserver, Euler, and Eedeemer. 
Christianity requires him to renounce and mortify self, 
and make God the centre of his thoughts and feelings, 
the goal of his plans and projects, the end, in a word, 
of his existence. Self-deliverance, self-improvement, 
or self-glorification is not to be made the aim of life, 
though these blessings are sure to crown his efforts to 
serve God with a singleness of eye to His glory. He 
is delivered from sorrow, exalted and glorified, not be¬ 
cause he seeks with all his heart his own beatification, 
but because his life is unreservedly devoted to the 
adoration and service of Him by whom he has been 
redeemed. Hay, in proportion as his mind is with¬ 
drawn from selfish aims and purposes and set “ on 
things above,” his sorrow of heart disappears, his 
thought becomes exalted, his feelings purified, and his 
soul made instinct with an abiding sense of peace, tri¬ 
umph, and gladness. The true philosophy of happiness 
is with him, and him alone. Happiness flies the more 
it is sought, and the Greek philosopher who eagerly 
pursued it as the sole business of fife found it receding 
from his grasp in proportion as it was run after, and 
was ultimately covered with disappointment and shame, 
as the alchemist in the Middle Ages in his search after 
the philosopher’s stone or the elixir of life ! This was 
also true of the Hindu philosopher, whose pains multi¬ 
plied in proportion as he sought deliverance from them, 
and who therefore was forced to make self-annihilation, 
in the literal sense of the term, his summum lonum. 
The Christian, however, by following the principle 
“ not enjoyment and not sorrow,” does succeed, in a 


380 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


pre-eminent degree, in securing the one and fleeing 
from the other. 

But how is man to glorify God ? By properly and 
conscientiously doing his work, not certainly by fleeing 
from the world. His work will become manifest if we 
take into consideration the position he occupies in this 
nether creation. He is, in the first place, a king, and 
as such he is to subdue the world, to people it, to de¬ 
velop its resources, and to make all within his power 
subservient to the varied purposes of life, the higher as 
well as the lower. He is, in the second place, a Proph¬ 
et, and as such he is to observe, reason, inquire, and 
investigate, and in this way to rise from the varied ob¬ 
jects of nature around him and the events of providence 
to their correct ideas in the mind of God—the eternal 
repertory of truth in all its entireness and glory. As 
a Prophet man is to acquire and spread knowledge, 
and thereby to benefit the world and his own self. 
And in the third place, man is a Priest, and as such he 
is to bring all the precious things in his possession, and 
his own self as an offering to God, to be under His 
direction utilized in promoting the highest welfare of 
the world at large. This threefold duty presupposes a 
standing revelation and perpetual guidance on the part 
of God, and the full development of every side of his 
nature on the part of man ; and it enables him to dis¬ 
play, in what may be called the outgoings of his life, a 
beautiful union of piety with activity, devotion with 
philanthropy, the sublimity of contemplative retire¬ 
ment with the enthusiasm of practical humanitarianism. 
Man, therefore, glorifies God by making every force 
within and without him do its appointed work, and so 
prove conducive to the adornment of the inanimate and 
the enjoyment of the sentient creation. 


HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 381 


G. But in the case of man the quid est is by no means 
the quid ojporte. In his present condition he neither 
occupies the lofty position intended for him, nor per¬ 
forms the duty intrusted to him. He is obviously de¬ 
graded very far below his natural station and voca¬ 
tion, despised by the meanest of those over whom he is 
appointed to rule, debased by error, enslaved by preju¬ 
dice, brutalized by passion, and dragged into the lowest 
depths of shame and misery by a downward tendency, 
which has, in consequence of an anomalous state of 
things introduced by his own folly, grown with his 
growth, strengthened with his strength, and become 
almost omnipotent and irresistible. One cannot look 
at his present condition even cursorily without raising 
the question, What is the cause of his not merely obvi¬ 
ous but most obtrusive degradation ? Ignorance, says 
the Hindu philosopher ; and his reply would not be far 
from truth if by ignorance he meant ignorance of God. 
Sin debases and ruins us by darkening our views of 
God, and thereby leading us to commit the twofold 
error of withholding confidence from Him and placing 
it in our own selves. The history of the fall illustrates 
the way in which moral apostasy in man is initiated 
and consummated. Adam was induced to believe that 
the only restriction by which his freedom of action was 
curtailed was a hardship, not a blessing ; and he most 
foolishly threw off all allegiance to a Being who had 
resorted to a mean artifice to check his rise to a proper 
level, became his own master and guide, and grievously 
misdirected all the energies of his complex nature. 
Ignorance may be represented as the cause of man’s 
present degradation and misery ; and if the Hindu 
philosopher had, in his theory of ignorance, any refer¬ 
ee to the repulsive views of God entertained by man- 


382 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


kind in general, much might be said in favor of his 
position. But by ignorance he meant not ignorance of 
God, hut ignorance either of the difference between the 
soul and non-soul, or of the essential identity of the ego, 
non-ego, and the infinite—that is, ignorance in either 
case of what is a palpable untruth, an ignorance which 
is bliss indeed ! The Greek philosopher, especially 
of the Socratic school, also traced human depravity to 
the same cause—to ignorance of Duty, Moral Beauty, 
and subtle moral distinctions ; to ignorance of the path 
of justice to be trodden, and the path of injustice to be 
avoided. But he failed to perceive, amid the cobwebs 
of his subtleties and refinements, that knowledge of 
duty is not in this life always associated with the power 
to perform it ; and that, when not supplemented by 
grace from on high, it is neither a restraint to vice nor 
an incentive to virtue. The moral life of the philoso¬ 
phers of antiquity in general was, alas ! a proof that 
the knowledge of virtue is but too often accompanied 
in this world with the practice of vice ! 

The Christian traces human degradation and misery 
to a deliberate and wilful transgression of a known law 
of God. Adam, the progenitor of the human race, be¬ 
came the author of sin by an act of disobedience delib¬ 
erately committed ; and his sin has, by what may be 
called incessant self-propagation, plunged into misery 
all his descendants, one alone excepted, because pre- 
ternaturally introduced into the all but endless chain of 
life. The Christian believes in original sin; and 
science, after having laughed at it for centuries, finds 
it convenient now to uphold his belief to maintain the 
credit of its all-embracing.theory of evolution and con¬ 
tinuity. The Christian, moreover, believes that in¬ 
herited sin is in every man of mature understanding 


HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 383 


aggravated by wilful transgression, and that, there 
being no one that sinneth not, all flesh is guilty before 
God. “ There is none righteous, no, not one. There 
is none that understandeth, there is none that seeketh 
after God. They are all gone out of the way, they are 
together become unprofitable ; there is none that doeth 
good, no, not one.” This sad picture is justified by 
every-day experience, and it sets forth the essence of 
sin as well as its dire consequences. The essence of sin 
is godlessness, of which even the man who fulfils the 
duty of social life faithfully and passes for a man of 
probity and benevolence is as guilty as the licentious 
wretch who has not what a brilliant writer calls “ a rag 
of reputation. ” Ignorance of God, recoil from Him, 
distrust in His all-embracing goodness, aversion to 
what is good, proneness to what is evil, unrighteous¬ 
ness and unprofitableness, are all consequences of sin, 
which therefore is the parent of all the degradation and 
misery which we see heaped up in the world. 

Sin makes us miserable in two different ways. It in 
the first place separates us from God, the source of life, 
light, and joy ; from that dependence without which 
liberty is but license ; from that cheerful submission 
without which our will becomes stubborn and intrac¬ 
table ; that communion without which the soul is bereft 
of its genuine enjoyment, and that grace without which 
true progress is an impossibility. It then darkens our un¬ 
derstandings, vitiates our affections and passions, and 
proves thereby a source of ineffable restlessness and tor¬ 
ment to our own selves, and to all around us. For, though 
its seat is the heart, it is perpetually issuing out in pu¬ 
trid streams of corruption in our life and conversation. 
The springs and fountains of life within are vitiated by 
'' ind its outgoings cannot but partake of the corrup- 


384 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


tion. The history of the world is the history of sin 
incarnated in words and deeds ; and if the history of 
the human heart could be written, it would be the his¬ 
tory of sin in its original form, in its naked ghastliness. 
Wilberforce’s argument, that the existence and univer¬ 
sality of sin may be proved by the same sort of argu¬ 
ment which led Newton to his discovery of the law of 
gravitation, has not so much stress laid upon it in these 
days as it deserves. All nature combines with all his¬ 
tory to prove the universality of sin, its early develop¬ 
ment, and its controlling power ; and it is the height 
of unphilosophical temerity to deny its existence in the 
teeth of the universal ruin around us, or to speak of it 
in sentimental terms as “ virtue in the making.” 

7. Now we come to the plan of salvation embodied 
in Hindu Philosophy. That salvation is, in the first 
place, not universal. It does not embrace in its broad 
sweep all races, nations, languages, and tongues, or 
overleap all geographical, ethnological, social, and 
chronological landmarks. Nor is this salvation the 
common property of the Hindu nation at large. It is, 
even within the narrow bounds of our own country, the 
monopoly of the few, not the heritage of the many. 
From it, as has already been indicated, all orders of 
society below the sacerdotal are mercilessly excluded. 
It is true that Kapila, the father of Hindu Philosophy, 
did strive to include in his scheme distinguished appli¬ 
cants from the lower orders, and even select members 
of the weaker sex ; but his example, though backed by 
the mighty reform of Buddha, was not followed ; and 
the exclusiveness by which philosophical salvation had 
been characterized became stereotyped. Again, the 
female sex in almost all its entireness is excluded from 
this salvation. Half the population of the country, 


HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 385 

therefore, and the greater portion by far of the remain¬ 
ing half, must pine away under the sweeping ban of 
exclusion. A sort of inferior salvation, with some tem¬ 
poral and temporary advantages, is reserved for them ; 
and the hope of their rise in a future birth to the dig¬ 
nity of the priesthood, and therefore a share in the 
privilege of final emancipation, is held out. But their 
immediate exclusion is protected by a series of iron 
rules which nothing can break or even relax. But 
even of the Brahmin caste the majority are debarred 
from this grand boon. Only those Brahmins who have 
fitted themselves by a long and painful process of prep¬ 
aration, have successively performed the duties of the 
student and the householder, may aspire to the blessed 
exercises which result in emancipation. The narrow¬ 
ing process almost brings the privilege down to a 
point ! Need we say that the Christian salvation is 
for all mankind, who are invited to accept of it just as 
they are f 

The way in which philosophic salvation is attained is 
a way of thorns and briers, the rugged path of asceti¬ 
cism. Separation from family life or family entangle¬ 
ments, as the expression is; retirement tp a forest, fast¬ 
ing, mortification, and penance practised for many a 
long year ; and, above all, self-oblivious meditation— 
these are the weapons of war, and the victory is literal 
annihilation of self. There is no harm in making one’s 
own self the subject of one’s meditation, provided the 
object is the ascertainment of truth. From the partic¬ 
ular ego within we are led by subjective or introspec¬ 
tive meditation to the Universal Ego without, from 
created intelligence to the primal intelligence, from the 
will of limited potency to the will of unlimited power. 
But such progress from the finite to the infinite is not 


386 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


the object of the Hindu philosopher. His object is to 
kill the varied states of the mind, thought, feeling, and 
volition ; to paralyze the nerves and muscles of the 
body, and deaden consciousness by sheer inaction. But 
before this state of the positive death of the body and 
the mind is attained, the devotee is raised above the 
polarities of nature, and he cannot in consequence be 
affected by heat and cold, light and darkness, storm 
and calm. The instincts of his sesthetic nature are ex¬ 
tinguished, and he sees no difference between beauty 
and ugliness, proportion and disproportion of form, 
harmonious and heterogeneous mixture of colors. His 
moral nature is extinguished, and he is raised above 
moral distinctions, virtue and wisdom being to him in 
no way different from vice and folly. It is a relief 
that he does not continue long in this state, and that 
absolute death comes apace to swallow up and remove 
from the possibility of doing mischief a mind so com¬ 
pletely separated from its legitimate functions ! 

The salvation offered by Christianity is not depend¬ 
ent on our righteousness. Our vows and jirayers, our 
devotions and meditations, our penances and mortifica¬ 
tions cannot buy it. In its germinal state it is a gift 
bestowed upon us freely the moment we accept Christ 
as our Saviour by faith, and in its advanced stages it is 
matured and perfected by the spiritual nourishment we 
obtain by simply “ looking unto Jesus.” The theory 
of gratuitous salvation is a peculiarity of our religion, 
and appears to be the soundest philosophy, when we 
consider man’s utter helplessness in spiritual matters, 
his inability to make an atonement for his past sins and 
transgressions, and effect within himself that radical 
change without which religion is a sham and an illu¬ 
sion ; his inability, in a word, to make amends for past 


HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 387 


follies, to shun the had and cleave to the good. The 
history of the world, of philosophy and religion, proves 
to a demonstration that man can neither find God by 
wisdom nor save himself by work. Supernatural rev¬ 
elation and supernatural help are needed from Alpha to 
Omega to enable man to know, love, and serve God ; 
and our heaven-bestowed religion embodies the one and 
shows the way in which the other is obtained and 
availed of. 

The present result of this salvation, so gratuitously 
bestowed and so mercifully matured and perfected, is 
the complete development of man, or his development 
as far as possible under present circumstances. The 
result of Hindu salvation is not the subordination of his 
lower nature to the higher, not the evolution under 
proper culture of an exalted character, with varied ex¬ 
cellences harmoniously blended, but the absolute extinc¬ 
tion of his inner and outer nature. Greek philosophy 
oscillated between sensationalism and intellectualism ; 
and its aim was, under the guidance of the Sophists, 
the extinction of intellectual life and the exclusive sway 
of sensibility ; and under the guidance of the philoso¬ 
phers of the Socratic school a reversal of this process— 
the death of feeling and the exclusive sway of 
thought. Greek philosophy was, with reference to this 
and other matters, onesided, while Hindu Philosophy 
' may be described as ^-sided. Christianity recognizes 
the undesirability and the absolute impracticability of 
the Hindu ideal, and holds an even balance between 
sensationalism and intellectualism. Asceticism has 
prevailed in the Church, and has by no means been an 
unmixed evil, its aim being not the extinction of human 
nature, but the due subordination of its lower to its 
higher element. But it must not be forgotten that 


388 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


asceticism was brought into the Church by heathen 
philosophy, and it has never appeared but in apparent 
disharmony with the genius of Christianity. The 
Christian principle is the development of all the ele¬ 
ments of the complex nature of man, and we fully 
accept Buckle’s dictum , that if the religious nature of 
man were exclusively developed and the other elements 
thrown out of culture, the result would be a monk or a 
saint, but not a complete man. Man has varieties of 
instincts which may be repressed, but which cannot 
possibly be extinguished. These are love of property, 
love of comfort, love of society, love of esteem, love of 
beauty, love of knowledge. Human nature being dis¬ 
eased to the very core, it may be desirable under pecul¬ 
iar circumstances to suppress a few of these instincts, 
just as it is desirable in cases of bodily malady to ab¬ 
stain from proper food. And God may call upon us to 
hold a few of them in abeyance for the public weal ; but 
it ought never to be forgotten that they are all God-given 
and heaven-implanted, and therefore sacred and inviola¬ 
ble. Properly cultivated and developed, they are sources 
of pleasure and improvement, as when ill-cultured and 
misdirected they occasion unutterable agony. Chris¬ 
tianity does not stand up for their annihilation, but 
for their proper culture and development. Christianity 
therefore is not ascetic, nor anti-social, nor anti- 
economical, nor communistic, nor subversive of order 
either in human nature or in human society. It is the 
only religion that has encouraged and fostered culture 
of the broadest stamp—culture spiritual, intellectual, and 
aesthetic, culture of piety and humanity in their highest 
forms. The philosophy of the world extinguishes 
either the religious nature of man, or his longing after 
the infinite, or his social nature, or that principle of 


HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 389 

benevolence to which the amenities and charities of life 
are to be traced. But Christianity unfolds both these 
apparently antagonistic elements of his nature ; and in 
the character matured under its influence we have the 
enthusiasm of humanity now so much talked of, plus 
the enthusiasm of piety now thrown into the back¬ 
ground ! 

8. And lastly we come to the prospect before man, 
first, according to Hindu Philosophy, and afterward 
according to Christianity. The prospect according to 
Hindu Philosophy is annihilation ! The soul, when 
freed from bondage by mortifications and penances, 
isolation and meditation, loses its being as a drop in 
the ocean, either in the one physical or in the one 
spiritual substance of the universe. The Greek philos¬ 
opher did not always point to a better goal. Socrates, 
not to speak of the schools that preceded him, did at 
times speak of beatific abode with the gods in a better 
world as the crowning reward of virtuous life ; but his 
disciple, Plato, oscillated between materialism and 
pantheism ; and his followers, the Heo-Platonists, held 
up the theory of an eternal substance of a spiritual 
nature engaged in the agreeable work of disgorging 
and gorging world after world in endless succession ! 

The Gospel has brought life and immortality to 
light. Christian salvation has results which are proxi¬ 
mate and results which are ultimate—a present and a 
prospective efficacy. Under its auspices, if we are 
allowed the expression, a new life is begun here, and 
matured under varieties of conditions, each eminently 
fitted to retard its development ; but it is not, it can¬ 
not be perfected on this side the grave. But its perfec¬ 
tion will be realized, under circumstances more propi¬ 
tious, in a better and more durable world. Heavenly 


390 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


bliss is described in the Bible by images and symbols, 
which, though not gross and debasing as those in the 
Koran, are more or less material ; and these have 
given birth to some grave misapprehensions in the 
Church and some foolish objections out of it. Chris¬ 
tianity is represented as an incentive to the dominant 
selfishness of our nature, and the Christian is held up 
as one who serves God and practises virtue solely with 
a view to the glittering prize or crown placed before 
him. His own aggrandizement, if not in this world, 
at least in the world to come, is his paramount motive 
—his own deliverance from the troubles of this life, his 
own happiness, his own glorification. This objection 
is perhaps not groundless when advanced against the 
gross views of heaven entertained by ill-informed 
Christians, but it is ludicrously groundless when 
brought against the sublime views presented, though in 
a material garb, in the Hew Testament. The crown 
held up as the great reward of piety and virtue in the 
other world is a crown of righteousness, the crown 
which sets forth the immutable righteousness of God 
and the completed righteousness of the beatified man : 
the perfection of his nature and the happiness proceed¬ 
ing necessarily from it , not material comfort and pleas¬ 
ure. He looks away from himself in this life, and is 
happy in proportion as he serves God with a singleness 
of eye to His glory ; his happiness in heaven will pro¬ 
ceed from the same source—service rendered to God 
with all the powers of a perfected nature, and without 
the hindrances of this life. Unselfish love to God 
begun here and perfected in heaven—such is the source 
of the happiness Christians experience here, and of 
that they look forward to as their reward. 

Men are consciously and unconsciously assimilated in 


niNDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 391 

character to the gods they worship. Augustine in his 
Confessions sets forth the principle in these well-known 
words : “ Terence introduces a profligate young man, 
justifying his lewdness by the example of Jove, while 
he beholds on the wall a picture of Jupiter and Danse, 
aid excites himself to lust as by divine intuition : 
‘Shall he, who shakes heaven with his thunder, do 
fhese things, and may not I, a poor mortal, do the 
same ? 5 ” The vices current in the country are in 
nine instances out of ten fac similes of the vices of the 
gods and goddesses adored by our countrymen. The wor¬ 
shippers of Krishna become as a rule licentious; of Ma- 
hadeva, smokers of intoxicating drugs ; of Kali, blood¬ 
thirsty Thugs. From this law of assimilation the phi¬ 
losopher is not excluded. The object of his worship, or 
rather contemplation, is a Being without power, qual¬ 
ity, and relation, a magnificent Nothing ; and it is no 
wonder that he should by a painful process of mortifi¬ 
cation endeavor to reduce himself to nothing by extin¬ 
guishing his consciousness, thought, feeling, and mus¬ 
cular energy. That he does not succeed is no fault of 
his. He wishes and strives to be like his god, and his 
present aim as well as his future prospect is annihila¬ 
tion. The Christian also tries to be like the object of 
his worship—the Lord Jesus Christ—and he daily 
grows in piety, humility, meekness, and benevolence ; 
and the prospect before him is perfection in these and 
other kindred virtues. Is it necessary to say that 
while Hindu Philosophy is Pessimism Christian philoso¬ 
phy is Optimism in the highest sense of the term ? 

A word ought to be said under this head about what 
Christian salvation has in reserve for the body. No 
mercy was shown, no quarter given the human body in 
the schools, generally speaking, of ancient philosophy, 


392 


IIItfDU PHILOSOPHY. 


in our own or in foreign countries. It was described 
as the seat of corruption and impurity, and its purifica¬ 
tion was placed beyond the confines of possibility. 
Matter and sin could not, according to approved phil¬ 
osophical maxims, be dissociated from each other any 
more than breath and physical life ; and the only way- 
in which the soul can be saved from sin is by its com¬ 
plete deliverance from material claims. So irreclaim- 
ably impure is matter, that God was thrown out of 
direct relation to it that He might not be contaminated 
by its inherent and inalienable corruption. The Hindus 
made an emergent Deity the Tiexus between God and 
creation, and the Heo-Platonists held the doctrine of 
the transcendence of God at the expense of His imma¬ 
nence, making a primal potency, the idea of ideas, the 
intermediate link of connection. The mystics of the 
Middle Ages adopted the notion, and in our time Swe¬ 
denborg recognized in Christ the nexus between God 
and the universe. Christianity, however, sets forth 
the original purity if not the absolute impeccability of 
the body, and offers it a share in its salvation. The 
body is involved in the consequences of sin, and has 
become the abode of deformity, disease, and death ; 
but its deliverance from these fatal results and its ulti¬ 
mate glorification are insured. The whole man sins, 
the whole man is involved in the dire consequences of 
sin, the whole man is delivered from these, and the 
whole man is glorified—such is the glorious fruit of the 
scheme of salvation revealed in the Gospel. 

In conclusion let us ask, Is an amalgamation between 
Hindu and Christian philosophy possible ? The ques¬ 
tion is almost as absurd as the other, Is an amalgama¬ 
tion between darkness and light possible ? A God 
without power, quality, and relation amalgamated with 


HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 393 


a God with power, quality, and relation ! A man with 
a perfectly quiescent soul, thoughtless, passionless, in¬ 
voluntary, with a man with a soul endowed with 
thought, emotion, and volition ! The idea of enthral¬ 
ment occasioned by sin, with the idea of enthralment 
occasioned by failure to recognize the essential distinc¬ 
tion between soul and non-soul ! The idea of gratui¬ 
tous salvation, with the idea of salvation wrought by a 
painful process of penance and meditation ! Life in 
an utterably more glorious stage of existence, with the 
frightful void of absolute annihilation ! The reconcili¬ 
ation is impossible, and the less people talk of it the 
better ! 

The history of the Church is full of warnings against 
any attempt on our part to allow our doctrine to be in 
the slightest degree influenced and modified by human 
philosophy. The experiment was unhappily tried in 
the Church not long after the days of the apostles, and 
the result is known. Justin Martyr in the Sub-Apos¬ 
tolic, and Tertullian and Origen in the Post-Apostolic 
times incorporated a little of their philosophy with the 
pure theology of the New Testament, and ages elapsed 
before the Church was emancipated from the influence 
of the heterogeneous mixture. Asceticism crept into 
the Church and tinctured its theology and practical 
morality ; and it was not till science had discovered 
the correct principles of hygiene, sanitation, political 
economy, and social science that its fetters began to be 
broken and shaken off. Perhaps they have not been 
entirely cast off yet ; but the day is not far off when 
the influence of an asceticism imported from schools of 
false philosophy and self-righteous Pharisaism will not 
be felt, at least to an appreciable degree. Science has 
in various ways benefited the Church. It has dis- 


394 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


enthralled it from many wrong notions and erroneous 
interpretations of revealed truth, and it is destined to 
be a potent antidote to those gloomy ideas of morality 
which have placed Christianity in antagonism to the 
spirit of broad and comprehensive progress it has fos¬ 
tered. False science and false Christianity are antag¬ 
onistic to each other, the object of the one being the 
adornment of our temporal life to the exclusion of that 
to which it is a stepping-stone, and that of the other 
being the maintenance of the interests of the soul at 
the expense of those of the body. 

Christianity successfully points out the path of true 
felicity in this life, as well as in that which is to come. 
In its work of renovating man it begins with humility, 
perfect self-distrust, and perfect self-abnegation. It 
sets forth the feebleness, the utter inadequacy of our 
own resources, so far as our spiritual emancipation and 
elevation are concerned, and it leads us to look aloft 
for that help which we cannot possibly derive from our 
own selves. It begets faith in us, and leads us eagerly 
to avail ourselves of the revelation which God has 
made of Himself and our duty to Him, and of the 
plenitude of help He has promised on condition of 
simple reliance on His goodness and might. It invites 
the soul to God, and the soul has freely communicated 
to it that life of love and beneficence of which He is the 
fountain. Nor are faith and love the only source of 
felicity opened up in the tempest-tossed heart. Hope 
is also generated, which raises him above temporal 
mists and clouds, and exultingly grasps the inheritance 
which is incorruptible and undefiled, and which fadeth 
not away. Without this lively hope our joy cannot 
be complete. Trials and temptations will cross our 
path, and imperfections cling to us till the last moment 


HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED. 395 


of our earthly life. One of the great Fathers of the 
Church said very justly : “ This is the only perfection 
of men—to know themselves imperfect. 5 ’ And holy 
men have in every age been conscious of imperfection 
and impurity in proportion to the nearness attained by 
them to God and heavenly things. Such conscious¬ 
ness, growing as years roll on, will, in addition to the 
inevitable trials of life, be a source of sorrow and de¬ 
pression to the godly soul in the midst of its earnest 
endeavors to serve God. Something is needed to sus¬ 
tain it amid the fluctuations of the inner and the vicis¬ 
situdes of the outer man ; something to prove a coun¬ 
terpart to that intense longing for perfection which 
the very best men are the most conscious of. Chris¬ 
tianity, with the most complete knowledge of the deep¬ 
est yearnings of the heart, supplies this something— 
a hope which will survive the crash of our earthly feel¬ 
ings, and end only in fruition. The path of humility, 
faith, love, hope is the path of pleasantness and peace 
pointed out by our holy religion ; while the path of 
self-sufficiency, self-dependence, self-deception, and 
self-destruction is that which philosophy points its 
finger to ! 


SUPPLEMENT. 


HINDU ECLECTICISM. 

One of the trials incident to missionary life in a 
semi-civilized country like India has scarcely had due 
prominence given it. The Indian missionary lives, like 
his brother worker in less civilized heathen lands, in what 
the late good Bishop Thompson very appropriately 
called “ a moral pest-house and he has difficulties of 
a general character, arising out of human nature, cur¬ 
rent systems of belief, defective intellectual culture, a 
low type of morality, and various other sources, to 
grapple with. But he has some peculiar trials, and 
these begin as soon as he begins his conscientious 
preparation for his work. lie has to study languages 
which, whatever might be said by the champions of 
philology of their affinity to his, are to him a jargon to 
be mastered with immense trouble. He has, more¬ 
over, to master a literature which is barren and unin- 
structive, a philosophy which bewilders rather than 
strengthens the mind, a mythology which is a tissue of 
puerility and obscenity, and systems of religious belief 
so corrupt that their ascendency is the best proof that 
can be given of the Scripture doctrine of human de¬ 
pravity. Is it a wonder that, in the teeth of such a 
formidable mass of useless reading, a few missionaries 
have proved recreant and taken to work less trouble¬ 
some and apparently more productive ? 


HINDU ECLECTICISM. 


397 


The idea deserves expansion. Quiet and system¬ 
atic study is a pleasure of the most refined if not the 
sublimest stamp, to a minister of the Gospel in a 
Christian land. His mind literally feasts and fattens 
on the graces of genuine poetry, the facts of reliable 
history, the verities of true science, and the truths of 
sound philosophy ; and even when he has, in the due 
discharge of his duty, to master current systems of er¬ 
ror, he finds them embodied, as a rule, in readable 
books, or propounded with some regard to approved 
rules of taste in composition and logic in reasoning. 
His reading is not only pleasant but profitable, and the 
more thoroughly he gives himself to it the more thor¬ 
oughly he expands his mind and broadens his sym¬ 
pathies. His brother worker in the vineyard of the 
Lord in Hindustan is very differently circumstanced in 
this as in many other respects. Study is to him a 
painful rather than a pleasurable duty, and the result 
is often a burdened rather than an invigorated mind, a 
bewildered rather than an expanded intellect. The 
trouble he has to take in mastering foreign languages 
and making them his own is not without profit, is 
amply, repaid by accessions of intellectual vigor, such as 
linguistic study is invariably accompanied with and 
followed by. But whatever study he applies himself to 
after having done this preliminary work is a weari¬ 
some task. If he wishes to study poetry, and through 
it to obtain an insight into the manners and customs of 
the people he has to deal with, he has to fight his way 
not only through extravagances of an exceedingly 
vicious style of composition, but through a heap of epi¬ 
grams, anagrams, chronograms, and stuff such as his 
soul abhorreth. If history attracts him, he has, in 
order to glean a few sporadic facts of at best doubtful 


398 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


historical value, to wade neck-deep through the rub¬ 
bish of mythology and fable. If philosophy is his 
forte, a tremendous mass of verbosity and logomachy, 
of sophisms and quibbles, before which those embodied 
in the wildest speculations of the Middle Ages are as 
specimens of correct reasoning, is before him ; while 
he can scarcely get a correct idea of the many-sided 
and hoary religion he has to understand, face, and 
overcome, except after being literally lost in the 
dreary wastes of an unnaturally developed and corrupt 
literature. 

But what, it may be asked, has the missionary to do 
with such literature and such philosophy ? He has to 
preach Jesus Christ and Him crucified, and his busi¬ 
ness is to fit himself by rapidly picking up. a foreign 
tongue for this work of paramount importance. Such 
assertions have been more than once ventured by men 
who, while earnestly engaged in doing good among a 
nominally Christian people, find time to elaborate beau¬ 
tiful theories on the best method of carrying on evan¬ 
gelistic work among the heathen. That the simple 
story of Jesus Christ and Him crucified is, after all, the 
truth on which the regeneration of Christian and non- 
Christian lands, as well as that of individual' souls, 
must ultimately hang, no sane Christian will venture 
to deny. This story, ever fresh, is inherently fitted to 
touch the dead heart into life and infuse vigor and 
vitality into effete nationalities and paralyzed civili¬ 
zations. But a great deal of rubbish has to be re¬ 
moved, especially in heathen lands like our own, ere 
its legitimate consequences can be realized ; and a 
patient and persistent study of false religions, and the 
complicated systems of false philosophy indissolubly 
associated with them, enables the missionary to throw 


HINDU ECLECTICISM. 


399 


out of the way those heaps of prejudices and errors 
which make it impossible for the simple story of the 
cross to reach and influence the heart. The theorists 
who think that modes of operation which have been 
successful among nominal Christians must needs be suc¬ 
cessful among the heathen, brought up amid time-hal¬ 
lowed systems of theology and. philosophy, falsely so 
called, have only to migrate from the one department 
of work to the other to be convinced of their error, and 
forced to exclaim, with redoubled vehemence, “ Old 
Adam is too strong for young Melanchthon !” 

One of the many ancient books fitted to illustrate the 
peculiar trial to which attention has been called is the 
“ Bhagavad Gita , 5 ’ the precious book which may 
justly be represented as the fountain-head of Hindu 
eclecticism besides the Suaredasware Upanishad. The 
missionary can scarcely maintain any intercourse with 
the reading classes in India without hearing the work 
eulogized and extofled in the most extravagant terms 
possible. It embodies the loftiest flights of the 
sublime philosophy of Asia, and presents the cream, 
so to speak, of Hindu morality and Hindu religion. 
It is replete with doctrines which stand unrivalled in 
sublimity and grandeur, truths of a transcendental 
order set off by sentiments of an elevated type, 
and precepts which, if generally reduced to practice, 
would convert this sin-stricken world into a veritable 
paradise. As regards its style, human tongue can 
scarcely describe its beauty and loftiness, while the 
man must be a consummate dullard who fails to see 
that it is a masterpiece of correct reasoning as well as 
a model of composition. The missionary, moreover, 
finds these testimonials indorsed by learned oriental¬ 
ists, who, as a class, have the knack of perceiving 


400 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


beauty where ordinary mortals see nothing but deform¬ 
ity, excellency of arrangement and cogency of reason¬ 
ing where others see nothing but confusion worse con¬ 
founded. With bright anticipations—anticipations 
generated by recommendations both indigenous and 
foreign—he opens the book and enthusiastically begins 
its perusal, and lo ! his disappointment commences. 
Instead of an elegant style, he finds extravagances of 
diction from which even the worshippers of Dr. John¬ 
son in his own country would recoil in horror. He 
sees incoherence rather than logical consistency, con¬ 
fusion rather than lucidness of thought, naked sophisms 
instead of convincing arguments, and crude notions and 
jarring sentiments agglomerated into a philosophy of 
the most heterogeneous and the wildest character, 
while the harsh transitions, incongruous metaphors, and 
tiresome repetitions he has to wade through would 
justify even a prostrating fit of homesickness on his 
part. 

One must one’s own self read this book in the original, 
or a literal, verbatim translation of it, such as Thomp¬ 
son’s, which will be our itinerary or guide-book in our 
research into its contents, to be convinced of the sound¬ 
ness of these remarks. We do not expect the general 
reader—we mean the reader who has not made Orien¬ 
tal literature his specialty—to indorse our criticism or 
to extend to the toil-worn foreign missionary the sym¬ 
pathy we have always felt for him ; and we are afraid 
that our self-imposed task of setting forth the contents 
of this time-hallowed book may, after all, be thankless. 
But we must correct an error carefully tended and 
nourished by a class of philosophers in America who 
are striving to naturalize the belief that the fundamen¬ 
tal ideas of all religions are alike, and that an attempt 


HINDU ECLECTICISM. 


401 


to set lip one religion on the ruins of others is unjust 
as well as uncalled for. And we therefore raise the 
question, What is Hindu eclecticism ? The proper 
answer to this question is furnished by the Theol¬ 
ogy, Anthropology, Soteriology, and Eschatology 
of the “ Bhagavad Gita.” Let us call attention to 
these departments of the book, or rather to the con¬ 
tents of the book, which, though presented in promis¬ 
cuous heaps, without much regard to the advantages of 
a luminous, concatenated arrangement, may, by a not 
unnatural application of the laws of analysis, be 
classed under these heads. 

To a correct appreciation of its teaching under these 
heads some account of the work itself, its origin, its 
relative position in Hindu literature, and its influence 
in the development of religious life in our country is a 
sine qua non. 

Some preliminary remarks of a somewhat historical 
character will therefore be first made. The “ Bha¬ 
gavad Gita,” or the Song of Bhagavad or Krishna, one 
of the nine incarnations of Yishnu, appears in the “ Ma- 
habharat” as one of its multitudinous and grotesque 
episodes, one of those almost innumerable legend¬ 
ary tales to which, along with those enshrined in the 
“ Ramayana,” the peculiar excellences and defects or 
our national character are to be traced. It presents, in 
poetical language, a philosophical dialogue between 
Arjun, the most estimable of the characters depicted 
in that epic, and the above-named god, Krishna, who, 
in the form of man, acts in the humble capacity of his 
charioteer. The origin of this dialogue, or rather 
monologue, as Arjun appears more as a hearer than as 
a speaker, is set forth with poetic coloring and exaggera¬ 
tion. Arjun sees before him the two hostile branches 


402 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


of the tribe to which he himself belongs—that is, his 
own relatives and kinsmen—in battle array facing each 
other, and ready to plunge in dire conflict, and the 
sight sends a chill of horror into a heart distinguished 
alike by courage and tenderness. He is unnerved, his 
limbs become palsied, the hairs on his body stand on 
end, the blood of his heart is curdled, his head becomes 
dizzy, and the great consecrated bow in his right hand 
drops down as if from an arm suddenly struck with 
paralysis. He is unwilling to fight, to further schemes 
of self-aggrandizement by slaughtering his own kins¬ 
men in cruel, fratricidal war, or to wade through the 
blood of his own relations to the unsubstantial and 
ephemeral glory of an earthly throne. He recognizes 
divine nature beneath the humble exterior of his char¬ 
ioteer, and anxiously inquires if, under the circum¬ 
stances, he is not justified in retiring from the field 
before the clang of trumpets and the clash of arms 
make retreat on his part dishonorable and cowardly. 
This question and others, which as his mind grasps one 
new truth after another he puts one by one, draw out 
of the divine interlocutor a series of discourses which, 
besides nerving him for the approaching conflict, open 
the eyes of his mind to a variety of mystic truths re¬ 
garding his own personality, that of the being he is 
privileged to question, and the real, occult nature of 
the inanimate world around him. The immediate re¬ 
sult of the conversation is a great change in his con¬ 
victions. He sees truth both absolute and relative, 
shakes off his temporary weakness, rushes into close 
encounters, sweeps everything before him, and main¬ 
tains, amid scenes of carnage and desolation, the char¬ 
acter of a brave, all-conquering, but at the same time 
noble-minded and generous warrior. 


HIUDU ECLECTICISM. 


403 


But though mixed up in popular belief with the 
“ Maliabharat,’’ and presented ordinarily as an inci¬ 
dent of its great plot, it bears unmistakable marks of 
a much later origin. It is, in the first place, replete 
with references, both direct and incidental, to the 
varied schools of philosophy which flourished in India 
long after the stirring scenes of its Heroic Age had 
been enacted. The Sankhya philosophy is frequently 
referred to by name, and the author’s predilection for 
or adherence to its fanciful cosmogony is discovered in 
unmistakable terms. The Yoga philosophy is the 
subject of a number of direct as well as oblique allu¬ 
sions, and its doctrine of emancipation consequent on 
hermit solitude, meditation and penance stands out in 
bold relief from its pages. And, lastly, che uncompro¬ 
mising pantheism of the Yedant, which is also named, is 
the underlying basis of all its characteristic thoughts 
and ideas. Again, the “ Bhagavad Grita” sets forth 
the caste system, not in the crude, embryonic state in 
which it appears in the “ Mahabbarat,” but in the 
matured, fully developed state in which it appears in 
the Institutes of Menu, our national legislator, whose 
caste regulations have ruled India for ages untold. 
The essential difference between the four primal castes 
is herein dwelt upon with mark 3d emphasis, and the 
duties devolved upon each, and carried down by the 
law of heredity from father to son, are particularized in 
such a manner that its composition posterior to the age 
of the compilation of the Institu tes, and consequently to 
that of the “ Mahabharat,” appears to be a certainty. 
And, lastly, the Krishna cultrs, with its mystic notions 
of Bhakti or faith, is the most characteristic feat¬ 
ure of this philosophico-religious treatise ; and no one 
with even a superficial knowledge of the history of Hin- 


404 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


duism will venture to call in question the compara¬ 
tively recent origin of this worship. When these 
chronological data are put together, the conclusion at 
which orientalists like Monier Williams have arrived— 
namely, that the book was written about the second 
century of the Christian era, or about the time when 
Greek eclecticism flourished at Alexandria—will appear 
irresistible. 

The state of things which led to its composition by 
an unknown author, its ascription to the learned, ver¬ 
satile author of the “ Mahabharat,” and its incorpora¬ 
tion with that long epic, t may be guessed rather than 
ascertained by proper investigation. The philosophi¬ 
cal systems which had been elaborated and matured in 
the schools had popularized an ideal of piety which, 
though incompatible apparently with the business of life, 
has always proved peculiarly attractive to the Hindu 
mind, if not to the human mind in general. Intense 
contemplation in solitude, resulting in complete mastery 
over self, stoic indifference to the occurrences of life, 
painful or pleasurable, extinction of desire, holy calm, 
and imperturbable quiescence—such' had'been the stand¬ 
ard of piety set up by the philosophical speculations of 
thejgried schools of thought, of which the eclecticism of 
thlAfGita” may justly be represented as an offshoot. 
And the more its excellence had been appreciated the 
more had a distaste for the avocations of life been 
created and a rush toward hermit solitude realized. 
Nor had the morbid hankering after the enjoyment of 
undisturbed meditation in sequestered places been con¬ 
fined to the higher orders of society, to the sacerdotal 
and military castes ; it had come down from the apex 
to the Aery base of the social pyramid, and the indus¬ 
trious trader and even the vile serf had separated them- 



HINDU ECLECTICISM. 


405 


selves from useful and indispensable toil, and swelled 
the ranks of devotees drawn away from the turmoil 
of busy life to the repose of serene contemplation. 
The social machinery, worked by the forces emanating 
from the caste system, had been unhinged, and a reac¬ 
tion against the results of philosophical speculation was 
needed to secure its or their harmonious operation. 
That reaction was initiated by the eclecticism of the 
“ Gita,” which not merely restated with emphasis the 
divine origin of the caste system, but made the duties 
enjoined by it essential to salvation. But the author 
of this ancient treatise, whoever he was, could not 
emancipate himself from the influences either of the 
philosophical speculations which he tried to work up 
into a composite system, or of the ideal of piety popular¬ 
ized thereby. And so he vibrates between conflicting 
sentiments, and ultimately upholds what at first he 
seems determined to oppose and counteract. The 
eclecticism of the “ Gita,” like every other syncretistic 
movement, either in the history of philosophy or that 
of religion, proved a failure ; but some of the ideas it 
popularized have continued to influence Hindu society 
ever since the period of its composition. Its attempt 
to work heterogeneous systems of philosophic thought 
into a homogeneous whole is scarcely appreciated.^ /en 
among people who would exhaust the vocabulary of 
praise in speaking of its literary merit and ethical pu¬ 
rity and excellence. But its attempt to uphold the 
caste system and make the duties enjoined by it step¬ 
ping-stones to the higher degrees of perfection attained 
only by quiet meditation in sequestered places, has 
proved a grand success, as we shall have an opportuni¬ 
ty of showing. But the real excellence of some of the 
principles to which it has given currency cannot screen 


406 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


it from the charge of a lack of earnestness or laxity of 
principle which makes its speculations incoherent and 
its conclusions unsatisfactory. The lax accommodating 
spirit of compromise, the evil star, so to speak, of all 
systems of eclecticism, from the oldest of those which 
flourished in times of yore down to that which was 
recently transferred wholesale from Boston to Cal¬ 
cutta, is at once the most characteristic and culpable 
feature of this philosophico-religious treatise. 

Having brought our notice of the state of things to 
which the composition of the “ Bhagavad Gita” is to 
be traced to a close, we are at liberty to call attention 
to 

I. Its Theology. The theology of the “ Gita” is 
not merely tinctured with, but is nothing more or less 
than the absolute pantheism of the Yedant. The 
difference is not to be traced in the creed of the sys¬ 
tems, which, in its important features, is one and the 
same, but in the manner in which this creed seems to 
have been arrived at. The Yedant arrived at its un¬ 
mitigated pantheism through the pathway of judicious 
rejection, while the “ Gita” arrived at the same goal 
through the pathway of a somewhat unnatural though 
dexterously effected amalgamation. The Yedant came 
to its grand idea of unity of substance by rejecting two 
of the three entities held by three of the foregoing 
schools of philosophic thought, while the “ Gita” came 
to its grand idea of unity by merging these three en¬ 
tities into one substance. To explain this, a little refer¬ 
ence to the foregoing schools of philosophy, or rather 
to the principles inculcated in these schools, is neces¬ 
sary. Let us begin with the Sankhya system of 
Kapila, which is chronologically, perhaps, the first of 
the six systems into which philosophical speculation 


HINDU ECLECTICISM. 


407 


developed in India about five or six centuries before the 
birth of Christ. This system, apparently if not really, 
is dualistic, and it admits the eternal co-existence of 
two entities, the primordial, self-evolving form, called 
Prakriti, and the human soul, Purush. The primordial 
form, or nature in its original essence, passes through 
varied processes of evolution, gives birth to intelli¬ 
gence, egoism, the elements, both subtle and gross, 
the senses, and the powers of action, and finally 
the mind, called the eleventh organ, through which it 
entraps the soul, eternal and pure, and makes it miser¬ 
able by begetting in it desire and aversion, such as neces¬ 
sarily lead to action. This system explains the phenom¬ 
ena of creation on thoroughly atheistic principles ; 
and its rampant atheism led to its condemnation among 
a people more thoroughly religious than even the 
Athenians, whose fervor in religious matters was eulo¬ 
gized by the Apostle of the Gentiles. It was therefore 
supplanted by the theistic Sankhya of Patanjali, who 
to the two admitted entities of his atheistic prede¬ 
cessor added another entity, namely, God. This 
triadism was upheld by the two Logical schools which 
eventually followed the Sankhya schools in the path¬ 
way of philosophical investigation ; but, though fitted 
to satisfy the religious longings and aspirations of the 
Hindu heart, it was too complex to satisfy the 
generalizing tendency of the Hindu mind. And so it 
was made to shrink into monism under the auspices of 
the Vedantic school, which retained God and cast over¬ 
board the other two entities associated with Him. 
But the pantheism of the “ Gita” is not elaborated in 
this way. The “ Gita” admits the existence of the 
three entities of the Sankhya philosophy of the the¬ 
istic type, and of the Logical schools. The divine 


408 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


interlocutor, Krishna, dilates in the fifteenth chapter, 
as in many other places, on his identity with the 
world at large, but at the same time calls attention to 
the existence of two entities beside or rather in himself. 
Here are the words : 

“ And I alone am known to be by all the Yedas, and 
I am the composer of the Yedant, and also the inter¬ 
preter of the Yedas. These two spirits exist in the 
world, the divisible and also the indivisible. The di¬ 
visible is every living being. The indivisible is said to 
be that which pervades all. But there is another, the 
highest spirit, designated by the name of the Supreme 
Soul, which, as the imperishable master, penetrates 
and sustains the triple world. Since I surpass the di¬ 
visible and am higher than the indivisible, I am, there¬ 
fore, celebrated in the world and in the Yedas as the 
highest Person.” 

This extract shows how the triadism of the theistic 
Sankhya is made to consist with the monism of the Ye¬ 
dant. The divisible spirit is the essence of the soul, 
dwelling in the Supreme Spirit as his better or superior 
portion, and individualized in man—the individuated soul 
being but a portion of this element of divinity. The in¬ 
divisible spirit is the Prakriti of former schools, or es¬ 
sence of matter, which forms the inferior part of the 
divine nature, and which appears in varied forms in the 
objects of nature around us. These two entities which 
Yedantism casts overboard are merged in the all-em¬ 
bracing divine nature by the author of the “ Gita,” ac¬ 
cording to whom the Supreme Soul is a compound of 
the essence of all individuated souls and the essence of 
all material phenomena. The Supreme Spirit is repre¬ 
sented as evolving the world out of his inferior element, 
and the souls of men out of his superior element. The 


HIUDU ECLECTICISM. 


409 


union, therefore, effected in the “ Gita” is exactly 
similar to the union between the tiger and the lamb 
when the latter was in the former ! 

Pantheism thus elaborated is the theology of this 
philosophico-religious dialogue or monologue ; and in¬ 
numerable are the passages in which the divine inter¬ 
locutor, Krishna, represents himself as the original, es¬ 
sential, all-embracing, all-pervading Deity. The sub- 
limest type of egoism with which even pantheism 
familiarizes us are tame in comparison with that which 
characterizes his discourses concerning his own mystic 
personality. All the figures and images by which the 
essential identity of the Creator with the creation is set 
forth in the sacred books of the Hindus, and which, 
moreover, give a peculiarly imposing aspect to their 
voluminous literature, are heaped upon him in these 
discourses. He represents himself as the luminous ele¬ 
ment of the sun and moon, the heat of the fire, the 
brilliance of the flame, the light of lights, and the radi¬ 
ance of all radiant objects. He represents himself as 
the sound of ether, the fragrance of the earth, the 
everlasting seed of existing things, the life of all living 
things, the father, mother, husband, forefather, sus- 
tainer, friend, and lord of the world. According to 
Monier Williams’s somewhat free version, he concludes 
his description of his own all-pervading personality, or 
rather essence, with these words : 

. . . “I am its (world’s) way and refuge, 

Its habitation and receptacle. 

I am its witness. I am victory 

And energy ; I watch the universe 

With eyes and face in all directions turned. 

I dwell as wisdom in the heart of all ; 

1 am the goodness of the good ; I am 
Beginning, middle, end, eternal time, 


410 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


The birth and death of all. I am the symbol A 
Among the characters. I have created all 
Out of one portion of myself.” 

This passage, so decidedly instinct with lofty egoism, 
gives prominence to the second of the fundamental ideas 
of the system of theology propounded in this book. It 
ought to be borne in mind that the “ Bhagavad Gita” 
embodies an attempt not merely to reconcile jarring 
schools of philosophic thought, but to effect a union 
between philosophy and popular mythology. And so, 
on the system of absolute pantheism evolved out of the 
dissertations of the schools, we see grafted the theory 
of incarnation, propounded and illustrated in popular 
mythology. The speaker is not an ordinary emanation 
from the Deity, but the Deity himself in the form of 
man, and he calls himself not only Adhyatma, the 
Supreme Soul ; Adhibhuta, the Supreme Exist¬ 
ence ; Adhidaivata, the Supreme God ; but Adhi- 
yajna, the Supreme Sacrifice. The Hindu doctrine 
of the cyclic incarnation of Yishnu, the second per¬ 
son of the Hindu triad, is clearly set forth, and the 
object of these periodic manifestations of the Deity is 
mentioned, namely, “to establish righteousness.” 
The divine interlocutor not merely represents himself 
as an incarnation of God, not merely refers to his past 
incarnation, not merely dwells on the great object to 
accomplish which he comes down periodically in va¬ 
rious forms from on high, but, at Arjun’s special re¬ 
quest, appears in his “ celestial form” (Monier Will¬ 
iams’s translation) : 

“ Endowed with countless mouths and countless eyes, 

With countless faces turned to every quarter, 

With ornaments and wreaths and robes divine. 

With heavenly fragrance and celestial weapons, 


HINDU ECLECTICISM. 


411 


It was as if the firmament were filled, 

All in an instant, with a thousand snns 
Blazing with dazzling lustre ; so beheld he 
The glories of the universe collected 
In the one person of the God of gods.” 

The last two lines are eminently fitted to correct the 
mistakes into which Mr. Thompson has fallen, of as¬ 
suming that the personality of the Godhead is clearly 
set forth in the “ Gita.” God is certainly spoken of 
in many places as a person endowed with attributes 
generally ascribed to the Deity, and even moved by 
infinite compassion to come down, in various forms, to 
establish righteousness ; but the personality ascribed to 
God is merely a collection of the “ glories of the uni¬ 
verse.” A consistent, coherent system of theology 
cannot possibly be evolved out of the jarring sentiments 
brought into one focus in the “ Gita,” any more than a 
homogeneous body of speculative divinity or practical 
religion can be evolved out of the vaunted eclecticism 
of the nineteenth century—the eclecticism, we mean, 
which has been distilled from the writings of Theodore 
Parker at Calcutta, if not transferred wholesale. But 
the theology embodied therein settles down, after ap¬ 
pearing in varied forms, into that pantheism which as¬ 
sumes the existence of an all-pervading substance rather 
than of an intelligent voluntary agent, as the founda¬ 
tion of existence in all its diversified aspects or modes. 

II. The Anthropology of the “ Gita” is in keeping 
with its theology, and, like it, vibrates between the tran¬ 
scendental notions of the schools and the coarse ideas 
embedded in popular mythology and religion. Man is 
represented as a union of body and soul, the former a 
portion of the indivisible material essence in the Deity, 
and the latter a portion of his higher nature, the spirit- 


412 


HIHDU PHILOSOPHY. 


ual essence. The dualistic nature of man is set forth 
in the following extract (Chapter XIII.): 

“ This body, O Son of Kunti, is called Kshetra. 
Those who know the truth of things call that which 
knows this (Kshetra) Kshetrajna (knower of the 
body). And know, also, that I am the Kshetrajna in 
all Kshetras, Bharat. That which is the knowledge of 
the Kshetra and Kshetrajna is considered by me spirit¬ 
ual knowledge. The great elements, the egoism, the 
intellect, and also the principle of life and the eleven 
organs and the five objects of sense—desire, aversion, 
happiness and unhappiness, multiplicity of condition, 
reflection, resolution—(all) this is briefly denominated 
Kshetra with its passions.” 

Place this in juxtaposition with the following quota¬ 
tion from Chapter XY.: 

“ An eternal portion of me only, having assumed life 
in this world of life, attracts the mind and the five 
senses, which belong to nature. Whatever body the 
Sovereign Spirit enters or quits, it is connected with it by 
snatching those senses from nature, even as the breeze 
snatches perfumes from their very bed. This spirit ap¬ 
proaches the objects of sense by presiding over the ear, 
the eye, the touch, the taste, and the smell, and also 
over the mind. The foolish do not perceive it when it 
quits the body, nor when it remains (in it), nor when 
actuated by the qualities it enjoys (the world). But 
those who have the eyes of knowledge do perceive it.” 

These two extracts set forth the author’s predilection 
for and belief in the cosmogony of the Sankhya school, 
and his anxiety to infuse thereinto the pantheism of 
the Yedant, as Yedantic philosophers themselves did 
less conspicuously. Indeed, the author does nothing 
more or less than transfer wholesale the cosmogony of 


imq-DU ECLECTICISM. 


413 


the former school and substitute for its self-evolving 
material principle, Prakriti, the self-evolving spiritual 
substance of the latter school. The process of evolu¬ 
tion remains the same, intelligence giving birth to 
egoism or consciousness, and through it to the subtle ele¬ 
ments, namely, sound, feel, color, sapidity, and odor ; 
and the five organs of action, namely, the larynx, hands, 
feet, and the excretory and generative organs. And, 
lastly, the mind or the eleventh organ is created, and all 
the evils of life are realized through its ceaseless and 
malignant activity. : The ultimate power of this series 
is, however, not the primordial form of materialism, but 
the spiritual substance of pantheism, with its conscious¬ 
ness and varied mental powers potentially, if not actu¬ 
ally, present in it. This spiritual substance, it must be 
borne in mind, appears in the “ Gita” embodied as a 
rule in an all-embracing infinite personality with a two¬ 
fold nature, the inferior element manifested in the va¬ 
rious modes of material existence, and the superior in 
those of spiritual fife. 

But how does the theory of cyclic incarnation, or of 
a series of incarnations culminating in Krishna, the 
divine interlocutor, consist with this view of pantheistic 
thought ? Are we to suppose that the modern theory 
of incarnation, that we mean which makes the Lord 
Jesus Christ the crowning point of a graduated scale of 
incarnations, was anticipated in India about two millen¬ 
niums ago ? We have no doubt but that it was, though 
the theory does not appear stated with logical precision 
either in this book or any other work on Hindu Phi- 
losopby and Hindu religion. How little has modern 
rationalism added to the results philosophical specula¬ 
tion displayed in ancient times ! The theology of the 
“ Gita” renders the essential unity of the human race 


414 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


a logical necessity or an inevitable logical sequence. 
If all men are portions of the Deity, both as regards 
their bodies and as regards their souls, whatever 
difference we may notice among them must be a differ¬ 
ence of degree, not a difference of kind—quantitative, 
not qualitative. This irresistible conclusion is, how¬ 
ever, evaded by the author. He is a Brahman as well 
as a philosopher, and one of his main objects in the com¬ 
position and circulation of this philosophico-religious 
treatise is to uphold the caste system in its fully devel¬ 
oped form at all hazards. And so he cheerfully sacri¬ 
fices logical consistency at the altar of the social god, 
whose ascendency must be re-established after the tem¬ 
porary confusion created by philosophical speculation. 
And he unhesitatingly maintains the essential difference 
between the recognized castes. The following passage 
shows that the division of labor introduced by that 
system is dependent, according to our author, on original 
propensities rather than on the mere accident of educa¬ 
tion : 

“ The offices of Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Yaishyas, 
and Sudras, O harasser of thy foes ! are distributed 
according to the qualities which predominate in the 
dispositions of each. Tranquillity, continence, mortifi¬ 
cation, purity, patience, and also rectitude, spiritual 
knowledge, and spiritual discernment, belief in the ex¬ 
istence of another world, comprise the office of a Brah¬ 
man, sprung from his disposition. Valor, glory, 
strength, firmness, ability in warfare, and also keeping 
one’s ground, liberality, and a lordly character, are the 
office of a Kshatriya, sprung from his disposition. 
Agriculture, herding of kine, and commerce are the 
office of a Vaishya, sprung from his disposition. Ser¬ 
vitude is the peculiar office of a Sudra, sprung from his 


HIOTU ECLECTICISM. 


415 


disposition. Each man who is satisfied with his office 
attains perfection . 5 ’—Chapter XVII. 

III. The last line brings us to the Soteriology of 
the “ Gita,” a subject of paramount importance, inas¬ 
much as we see reflected in it the notions of salvation 
now current among our countrymen. The soteriology 
of the “ Gita” appears at first sight to have been a re¬ 
action against that of the schools, the jarring theories 
of which, it endeavored to weld into a homogeneous 
whole, Ihe watchword of the schools was quiescence , 
but that of the “ Gita” seems to have been action. 
The schools systematically opposed action, and repre¬ 
sented it as the source of all our trouble. According 
to their teaching attachment to the world breeds desire, 
and desire breeds action, and action breeds merit or 
demerit, and merit or demerit brings in its train 
reward or punishment and a fresh transmigration, and 
all the evils associated with it. Action, therefore, with 
its antecedents and consequents, should be annihilated 
or superseded by meditative stillness and quiescence, 
ere the vexed spirit can be liberated from the thral¬ 
dom of transmigration and merged into the material 
or divine essence as a drop in the ocean. The schools 
were certainly at loggerheads with one another on many 
of the fundamental questions of theology and science, 
but they were unanimous in denouncing action and up¬ 
holding passive contemplation as essential to salvation, 
in the Hindu sense of the term—that is, absorption into 
the Deity. Moreover, this doctrine of the schools was 
by no means received by the people at large as a beau¬ 
tiful theory to be revolved in the mind for a few min¬ 
utes and then quietly shelved. On the contrary, ear¬ 
nest souls from all ranks of society succumbed to its fas¬ 
cinating influence, separated themselves from needed 

V 



41G 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


work, betook themselves to hermit solitude, and wasted 
their energies in indolent meditation. To remedy this 
growing evil the “ Gita ; ’ appeared, with its watch¬ 
word action , opposed to the passiveness and quiescence 
of the schools ; and the arguments by which it sustains 
its position are eminently fitted to influence for good 
even the contemplative Hindu, who looks forward to 
annihilation in the Deity as the summum bonum. 
Action, the “ Gita” maintains, is inevitable. The dev¬ 
otee must breathe, his blood must circulate, the varied 
portions of his body must discharge their functions to 
enable him to give himself to that quiet and contem- 
plative life which has such an irresistible charm for 
him. Moreover, he must eat and drink a little in 
order to sustain life, and this means action. Action, 
then, being inevitable, to denounce it as the cause of 
all our sorrows and discomforts, and attempt its ex¬ 
tinction, is not true philosophy. 

But action, the schools maintain, is fructescent, and 
must bear its fruit either in reward or in punishment, 
and thereby prolong the chain ot transmigrations. 
The author of the “ Gita” admits that action is fruc¬ 
tescent, but he maintains that it is not invariably so. 
When action is performed with a view to rewards or 
punishments—that is, when action is performed with 
interested motives, it bears fruit, prolongs the chain of 
transmigrations, and perpetuates the misery of exist¬ 
ence. But when action is performed without any 
regard to consequences its effect is salvation, not pro¬ 
longed enthralment. Hot action in general, but ac¬ 
tion with interested motives, action from selfish desires 
and selfish aims, ought to be denounced. The neces¬ 
sity of action being admitted, the question arises, What 
course is action to take ? Or, in other words, What 


HINDU ECLECTICISM. 


417 


are men to do to be saved from the misery of pro¬ 
longed existence ? The “ Gita,” in reply to this im¬ 
portant question, does not give an uncertain sound. 
Men are to perform the duties of their castes, nothing 
more and nothing less. The track chalked out for a 
man by the rules and regulations of his caste is to him 
the path of righteousness and salvation ; and on it he 
is safe, it being absolutely impossible for him to go 
wrong while treading it patiently and perseveringly. 
“ It is better to perform one’s own duty, even though 
it be devoid of excellence, than another’s duty well. 
He who fulfils the office obligated by his own nature 
does not incur sin. One should not reject the duty to 
which one is born, even if it be associated with error, 
for all (human) undertakings are involved in error, as 
fire is by smoke. ” 

But the soteriology of the book, like its theology and 
its anthropology, is involved inextricably in confusion, 
because the author, while determined to give prominence 
to some principles of a practical stamp, seems to have 
been unable to free himself from the fascinating influ¬ 
ence of the ideal of piety held up by the schools—the dev¬ 
otee seated cross-legged or standing still and immova¬ 
ble beneath the outstretched branches of a shady tree, 
with his eyes fixed on the tip of his nose, his breath reg¬ 
ulated according to fixed rules, his mind concentrated 
on one theme or object of contemplation, his passions 
and appetites not merely controlled but extinguished, 
his desires and aspirations subsiding into a holy calm, 
the serenity of his soul making him impassible or in¬ 
different to hunger and thirst, heat and cold, pleasure 
and pain, and his entire self, separated from its acciden¬ 
tal surroundings, merged into the Deity. Ho Hindu 
thinker, in the days of our author, however broad 


418 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 


might be his thoughts, could contemplate this picture 
of tranquil meditation without being instinctively led 
to recognize its immense superiority to the bustle and 
turmoil of an active life. And so the author of the 
“ Gita,” like the great Buddha himself, after flying 
from it for a moment, swung back to it with redoubled 
momentum. And its theory of salvation is the theory 
to which universal homage is paid in Hindustan to¬ 
day—the theory, we mean, which makes an inferior 
degree of salvation hang on karmayoga, or the devo¬ 
tion of works, while salvation in the fullest sense of the 
term is only attainable through the pathway of gyan- 
yoga, or the devotion of knowledge or hermit solitude 
and concentrated meditation. 

IY. The Eschatology of the book need not de¬ 
tain us long. The Hindu doctrine of transmigration, 
with its ascending and descending series of animated 
bodies, innumerable births and deaths, terminating, 
after the slow cycle of ages innumerable, in absorption 
in the Deity, is the basis in all its speculations on this 
subject. It, however, recognizes one principle which 
should not be passed over unnoticed—namely, that a 
man’s condition in the world to come is determined by 
his meditations rather than action in this life. 

“ £Le who, remembering me at the moment of death, 
quits the body and comes forth, enters my nature, 
there is no doubt about that. Or again, whatever na¬ 
ture he thinks on when he abandons the body at the 
last, to that only does he go, O son of Kunti ! having 
been always conformed to that nature. Therefore 
think of me at all times and fight. ” 

It is impossible to enumerate the superstitions to 
which this and other passages of the sort have given 
birth, or the various expedients adopted to direct the 


HINDU ECLECTICISM. 


419 


thoughts of the dying Hindu to the incarnation of 
Yishnu, who is the principal interlocutor in this dia¬ 
logue. The Hindu father of the Vaishnab sect, or 
the sect which upholds the worship of Yishnu in pref¬ 
erence to that of any other god, to that either of 
Brahma, the first, or Maheshwar, the third person in 
the Hindu triad, gives names to his male children, 
such as may in the hour of death recall the Deity to 
his mind ; or he writes some of his hundred and eight 
names on his sacred garments and on his arms and on 
the palms of his hands, that his eyes may fall on them 
and bring up associations fitted to pave his way to 
heaven before they are closed forever. The immoral 
principle that man, however bad his life has been, will 
enter heaven if at the moment of his death he repeats 
the name of Yishnu, is a legitimate deduction from 
such a passage, though perhaps the author and his com¬ 
peers did not foresee the wrong use which has been 
made in subsequent ages of their unguarded state¬ 
ments ! 

We confess we do not rise from the perusal of this 
time-hallowed and extravagantly venerated book with 
a very high opinion of its contents. The devotee 
who, amid the enlightenment of the nineteenth century, 
represents God as the life of every living thing, from 
man down to the meanest worm, and the aggregate of 
all forces, mechanical, chemical, electric, and magnetic, 
as the sum total, in short, of all forms of life and all 
material agencies, may be in raptures' when speaking 
of its teachings. The self-styled anthropologist, who 
throws overboard the supernatural element in Chris¬ 
tianity, and represents it as a development of or an 
outgrowth from pre-existing religious ideas, may see 
in it a grand stepping-stone to the rapid progress made 



I 




420 


HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 





in subsequent ages in religion and morals. But we are 
ordinary mortals, with no pompous titles, and we can¬ 
not help representing its general teaching, theological 
and moral, as on the whole pernicious, even while we 
are not backward in recognizing the excellence of a few 
truths and principles scattered up and down among its 
miscellaneous contents. We have no hesitation what¬ 
ever in affirming that this and other books of the sort 
have, on the whole, been so many drags on rather than 
incentives to the progress of the world in religion and 
morals, and we fearlessly oppose this bold assertion to 
the sentimental talk which is unhappily gaining ground 
even in the churches of Christendom. 


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